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ST. PETERSBURG AND LONDON

1852–1864

VOL. II.

ST. PETERSBURG AND LONDON

IN THE

YEARS 1852–1864

REMINISCENCES

OF

COUNT CHARLES FREDERICK VITZTHUM VON ECKSTÆDT

LATE SAXON MINISTER AT THE COURT OF ST. JAMES'

EDITED WITH A PREFACE BY

HENRY REEVE, C.B., D.C.L.

TRANSLATED BY EDWARD FAIRFAX TAYLOR

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IN TWO VOLUMES—VOL. II.

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I HAD scarcely returned to London, when two ministerial changes, the one in France, and the other in Sardinia, changed the whole aspect of the burning Italian question. Walewski, displeased at one of those pamphlets, by which Napoleon was fond of working on public opinion, had sent in his resignation and retired with a good grace. To Thouvenel, a far abler man, fell the legacy of difficulties caused by Napoleon's policy of contradictions. He hoped to find a way out of them and to reconcile, in some measure, without a fresh war, the idiosyncrasies of his master with the demands of practical politics. The task

was no easy one, since the Italian problem, wantonly raised and still unsettled, had evidently overtaxed the irresolute Emperor. This was plainly seen when Victor Emmanuel thought the moment come for once more calling Count Cavour to the head of the Government.

So long as the idea of a European Congress was afloat, the reinstatement of Cavour would have been questionable. He himself felt that he was no *persona grata* to European diplomatists, and that another would gain more for Piedmont at a Congress than he could. But now, owing to the growing distrust of England in Napoleon's policy, a Congress was no longer to be thought of. The British Ministers, notwithstanding the protest of France, were secretly encouraging the Sardinian Government to give effect to the national aspirations after unity. For the achievement of this aim the energy and undeniable popularity of Cavour were indispensable. He began by tempting the French Cabinet with the bribe he had proffered at Plombières, but which Napoleon appeared to have renounced after Villafranca. Walewski, after having informed the British Ambassador on July 8, 1859, that Napoleon had no idea of annexing Savoy and Nice, hinted afterwards to Lord Cowley, in the autumn of the same year, that, in case Sardinia should seek aggrandisement by annexing Parma and Modena, France would deem herself obliged to insist upon the cession of Savoy and Nice. Strange to say, however, the British Government had disregarded this hint, and was taken completely by surprise by the agreement made between Cavour and Benedetti at Turin. This agreement was placed in its true light by the remark of Cavour, 'Maintenant vous êtes nos complices.'

The indignation of Palmerston and Lord John Russell was further increased by Napoleon's designating this annexation in

his Speech on opening the Chambers (March 1) as a restoration of the natural frontiers of France, and disregarding altogether the rights of Switzerland acquired by treaty. The indignation of all parties at this reckless conduct of the French Emperor became all the deeper as the sympathies of the public were more openly expressed in favour of a united Italy. Lord John Russell gave vent to his personal indignation in the House of Commons. Palmerston instructed Lord Cowley formally to renounce his friendship with Napoleon. It was in vain that Persigny endeavoured to combat this feeling of resentment. Even the old Count Flahault received an intimation from the angry Premier that England was not afraid of a rupture with France.

This attitude of the English Cabinet took Napoleon all the more by surprise, as he had hoped to win over completely the public opinion of England by a commercial treaty personally negotiated with Cobden. This treaty, praised by many as a masterpiece of Napoleonic policy, met at first with most determined opposition on both sides of the Channel. The French manufacturers complained of being sacrificed to free trade principles. In England people asked themselves whether that was the proper time to lower the import duty on French wines, and cheapen English iron and English coal for their probable antagonists. Gladstone's eloquence succeeded in making Parliament ratify the treaty. But no political capital could then be made out of this innovation forced upon both countries. The waves of national antipathy rose higher and higher. 'Old Pam' never left it in doubt that his vigorous measures of defence were directed solely against France.

In the streets of London is often to be seen a vehicle containing a number of animals trained to consort together peaceably, though mutually hostile by nature, and this

spectacle is called a 'happy family.' Such a 'happy family' at this crisis was her Majesty's Government. It needed all the energy, experience, and tact of Lord Palmerston to keep this pretended strong Government together. Its three chief members, the Premier, Lord John Russell and Gladstone, had nothing in common but their blind predilection for the Italian Revolution. On the subject of the extension of the franchise so strong was the difference of opinion between Palmerston and Russell that the latter repeatedly threatened to resign. On the other side, Gladstone was in no way inclined to modify his Budget. He was anxious to abolish the paper duty and willing to renounce the revenue it brought in, and yet he would not hear of the loan necessary for the coast defences and iron-clads. He too, like Lord John Russell, was constantly threatening to resign. His hopes were based on the support of the powerful peace party, who regarded the treaty of commerce as a panacea.

Under these circumstances Palmerston would hardly have remained master of the situation had not his political opponents come to his aid. At this critical moment Lord Derby proved himself a statesman who was a patriot before a party man. He, with Malmesbury, was thoroughly persuaded that a fresh attempt to govern with a minority in the House of Commons could tend only to weaken the position of England and discredit her parliamentary system. Accordingly, he privately informed Lord Palmerston that he would assist him, not only against Russell, but also against Gladstone and the Manchester men. For the latter object he promised to secure the rejection by the House of Lords of the Bill for repealing the paper duty, which had already passed the House of Commons by a small majority, and to do his best to enable the necessary money to be procured for the defence of the

country. Lord Derby, in making this offer, added only the stipulation that in the event of Lord Palmerston's Government permitting an attack upon Venetia, his support would be withdrawn. With this sole reservation, so honourable to the leader of the Conservative party, he left Lord Palmerston a certain freedom of action in respect of both his home and foreign policy.

I was indebted for this peep behind the scenes of the parliamentary comedy to some hints given me by Disraeli.[1] The secret of this agreement was kept quite as strictly from the two most immediately interested in it — Russell and Gladstone—as from the press and the public. Those who were initiated into it could not refrain, however, from smiling, like the Roman augurs of old, when they passed each other in the street, as move by move the preconcerted game was played and won. Palmerston had done a favour to Russell by allowing his Bill to pass the second reading. But as both inside and outside the House the greatest apathy was shown, the Reform Bill, like the three other abortive measures of the same kind, was withdrawn. Lord John was bitterly mortified, but he had already discovered such a relish for inditing unnecessary despatches, that he swallowed his grief and remained in office. Gladstone proved far more unruly. He fulminated a speech against his chief, and protested against the vote for the national defences which Palmerston urgently pressed upon the House. Ultimately, however, he gave way, being hopeless of forming a ministry with Bright and Cobden. He rather comically reserved to himself merely the right of protesting the next year against further measures of defence. When, therefore, on May 21, the House of Lords, after a patriotic speech by

[1] See Lord Malmesbury's account in his *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 227.

Lord Lyndhurst, who completed his eighty-eighth year on the day of the debate, rejected the Bill repealing the paper duty by a majority of no less than 193 to 104 votes, Gladstone's rage knew no bounds. It needed all the cleverness of the Prime Minister to prevent a conflict between the two Houses, and preserve to the Peers their constitutional right of veto in this matter of taxation. Lord Derby compared the skill with which Palmerston victoriously steered himself and his Ministry through the rocks of this difficult question to the perilous feats of a rope dancer. Gladstone, however, remained Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Russell at the Foreign Office.

That under such abnormal relations Palmerston found courage to break with France is a fact that deserves full recognition. The surprise of Villafranca and the annexation of Savoy and Nice had completely cured him of his French sympathies. The mistrust awakened by the shuffling policy of Napoleon led to an understanding with Berlin and Vienna. Austria, Prussia, and England mutually engaged to notify to each other without delay any proposals that Napoleon should make to either of the three Courts with regard to territorial changes. Thus a bar was placed against the 'remaniement de la carte de l'Europe,' and a further extension of the 'natural frontiers' of France.

Mindful of this agreement, the Prince Regent of Prussia had induced the leading German princes to be present at his interview with Napoleon at Baden-Baden on June 16, so as to avoid even the smallest appearance of a secret conference. Napoleon put a good face on a bad matter. He loaded the Prince Regent, as well as the Kings of Saxony, Hanover, and Würtemberg, with assurances of peace.

What little value was attached in London to these fine words was shown by the vigorous prosecution of the naval

and military preparations. The volunteer rifle corps, established a year before under the auspices of Prince Albert, had made rapid strides. On June 23 the Queen held a grand review of them in Hyde Park. 21,000 volunteers, well armed and uniformed at their own expense, were assembled on that day. London alone supplied 15,000, and the provinces 6,000 men. The latter, for the most part, paid their own travelling expenses, a portion only were sent to the metropolis by express trains specially hired for the occasion by some large landed proprietors. Disraeli, who had a fine house in Upper Grosvenor Street, opposite one of the park entrances, had invited a numerous company to see the spectacle from his windows. I accepted his invitation, and was much interested to hear the impartial opinion of several generals of distinction as to the military value of the volunteers. The bearing and discipline of these improvised troops met with general and sincere approbation. The Queen appeared in an open carriage by the side of the King of the Belgians, and Prince Albert on horseback. The Duke of Cambridge, as Commander-in-Chief of the British army, did the volunteers the honour of commanding the review in person. An enormous crowd of people thronged the Park. The enthusiasm was genuine.

Viewed as an anti-French demonstration, this armed gathering had a meaning which was not to be undervalued. Napoleon could now for the first time measure the ground he had lost in England. 'So far and no farther' was the common challenge of all classes of the population. He became decidedly anxious—not that he feared a rupture with England from a military point of view, but because he saw that his position in his own country and in Europe essentially depended on the good opinion of Great Britain. Accordingly

he again took a step behind the backs of his ministers, which, as Thouvenel rightly foresaw, made his embarrassment an open secret. He wrote an autograph letter to Persigny (July 25), abounding in assurances of peace, which only intensified Palmerston's distrust. This would have signified but little had the letter been confined to Government circles; but the Emperor committed the mistake of having it published in the 'Moniteur,' a step which incensed his own Ministers, and aroused the conjecture in England that the letter was addressed not so much to the Government as to the British Peace party, and was inspired by Cobden. Persigny knew not what to do; nobody trusted him any longer; his part as Ambassador was played out. But that he, the inventor and chief promoter of the English alliance, had to live to be sent away by the very Palmerston for whose reinstatement in office he had laboured so hard, was a Nemesis he had not expected. And yet so it happened. After a violent scene Palmerston demanded the recall of Persigny, who was superseded provisionally by the old Count Flahault.

This former aide-de-camp of Napoleon I., and Ambassador of Louis Philippe, had been living since 1848 as a private man in England. His wife was Baroness Nairne and Keith, a Scotch peeress in her own right; his eldest daughter was married to Lord Shelburne, afterwards fourth Marquess of Lansdowne. He was supposed to be the father of Count Morny, the half-brother of Napoleon. Morny was the author of the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, and the Emperor's right hand. Flahault was too old to undertake definitively the post of Ambassador. However, as it was a question of quickly finding a successor to Persigny, whom it was impossible any longer to retain, and as it was important above all to select a person agreeable to the English Court, and able to in-

spire the Ministry with confidence, a more fortunate choice could hardly have been made. Nobody was more impressed with the necessity of peace and of a friendly understanding with England than Flahault, whose refined manners contrasted most agreeably with the eccentricities of Persigny and Malakoff. Like Morny, he had advised the Emperor from the very first against his Italian policy of adventure.

Meanwhile affairs in Italy had taken a most serious turn. Garibaldi, who had made himself a name by his defence of Rome against the French in 1849, had collected around him in the harbour of Genoa several thousand desperadoes. With these he took ship (May 5), with the intention of hastening to the assistance of the rebels in Sicily. As Garibaldi was angry with Count Cavour for the cession of Nice, his birthplace, it was for a long time doubtful whether, or how far, this Minister had not supported, if not actually instigated, the rash enterprise. I heard the following on this subject from a trustworthy Italian source.

Shortly after his return to office, Cavour received one morning a visit from an Englishman unknown to him. This stranger described to him the situation in Italy and the task of the Cabinet at Turin with such an intimate knowledge of affairs that Cavour interrupted the conversation by exclaiming, 'How is it that you, a stranger, are acquainted with secrets which I thought were known to *one* man only besides the King and myself, namely the republican exile Mazzini?'

'Where I get my knowledge from must be a matter of no importance to you,' replied the stranger. 'I only wished to show you that I am well informed. I consider you a good Italian. I love Italy as you do yourself. Listen to me, then, in the name of Italy. I will tell you what I would do were I the Prime Minister of Victor Emmanuel.'

'The hour has not yet come for the Italian republic. Italy must first be united, and unity is only possible through Victor Emmanuel. Of that Mazzini as well as Garibaldi is convinced. The latter must, therefore, be allowed to have his way and be secretly supported. When he has wrested Sicily and Naples from the Bourbons, then will be the time for stepping in to subdue Umbria and the Marches by force of arms, and organise the territory thus acquired. The conquest of Rome and Venetia must be delayed in order to avoid the intervention of foreign Powers.'

Cavour could but approve of this plan. On taking leave the mysterious stranger removed his red wig, and said, smilingly, in Italian, 'You guessed right; I am Mazzini. Now hand me over, if you like, to your police.'

'*Se non è vero*,' I said to myself at the time I heard the story. But when the predictions of my Italian informant were one by one fulfilled, I was forced in justice to believe him.

The history of Italy in 1860 is like a fairy tale. England, with true Carlylian hero-worship, celebrated the heroic deeds of Garibaldi. Miracles he did not perform. But his jugglery, thanks to the inaction of Europe and the melancholy condition of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, met with unexpected success. One example of this jugglery will suffice. A few weeks after Garibaldi's entry into Naples, a former Neapolitan general was arrested in Paris. He had, without knowing it, paid out some forged banknotes. The examination showed that he had received them from Garibaldi as a bribe. People knew after this how the latter bought his victories.

At Paris the notion of creating, out of this Italian chaos, a Kingdom of Etruria and giving it to Prince Napoleon, had

been no sooner conceived than abandoned. Cavour, however, said that the moment was come for throwing off altogether the mask of legality. After having secured at Chambéry the neutrality of France, he profited by the encouragement afforded him by the English Ministers to venture on an open violation of international law. He sent an ultimatum to Rome. The Pope, long since cured of his Italian sympathies, had, at Cardinal Antonelli's advice, formed a small army, composed of Swiss and French Legitimists, for the defence of the States of the Church. General Lamoricière took the command of the Papal troops. The Marquis of Pimodan, formerly in the Austrian service, was one of the bravest officers of this force. Neither of these men would serve under Napoleon. The French Government, who themselves were still occupying Rome for the protection of the Pope, put no obstacle in the way. The whole contingent did not muster more than 8,000 men, consisting, with the exception of a few Swiss regiments, of volunteers. The Pope had undoubtedly the right to levy troops, and employ them in defence of the States of the Church. Contrary to international law, Cavour demanded in his ultimatum that these troops should be disbanded. Without any declaration of war, about 40,000 Piedmontese invaded the Papal States, overran them, occupied some strongholds, and defeated the Papal troops at Castelfidardo. Lamoricière, with a few thousand men, broke through the Piedmontese ranks, and escaped to Ancona, which, after a short siege, surrendered. Pimodan, more fortunate than his general, met with a hero's death upon the battle-field. This fight at Castelfidardo, unimportant in itself, since the Papal troops were crushed by a superiority of three times their number, decided the fate of Italy. Victor Emmanuel could now, like a *deus ex machinâ*, make an end of the Garibaldian

farce in Naples, take possession of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and lay siege to the fortress of Gaëta, where Francis II., with a few faithful troops, had taken refuge. In vain had this prince, deserted by all, appealed to the sanctity of treaties and invoked the aid of the European Powers. The latter yielded to the logic of events, and preferred Victor Emmanuel's usurpation to Garibaldian anarchy.

One thing seemed inconceivable in this drama, the inactivity of Austria. Cardinal Antonelli asked me, five years afterwards, what the reason could have been that prevented the Emperor of Austria from coming to the assistance of the Pope and the King of Naples in 1860. In his opinion, an Austrian army of fifty or sixty thousand men would have been sufficient to conquer the Piedmontese and restore order. The only answer I could then make to the Cardinal was that probably the fear of a second war with France had kept the Austrian army within the limits of the Empire. This fear, as I have since learnt, was totally unfounded. Napoleon not only expected, but wished that the Austrians should march in. My authority for this statement is Prince Latour d'Auvergne, Napoleon's last Foreign Minister. He told me shortly before 1870 that Thouvenel and Napoleon had informed him in 1860 that they were hourly expecting a telegram from Vienna with the news that the Austrians had made use of the opportunity to cure the Piedmontese for ever of the notion of attacking Venetia. The French Cabinet would stand quietly by so long as the Peace of Zurich was respected.

The neglect of Austria to seize this chance of putting a stop to the Italian Revolution is due, therefore, not so much to her foreign as her domestic difficulties. Had France remained neutral, the platonic sympathies of England would not have saved Italy, had she had to face a well-led Austrian army.

Lord John Russell had not failed to express his sympathy in a despatch addressed to Sir James Hudson, and actually to encourage the Piedmontese Government in their outrage on international law. Upon my expressing to an English friend my astonishment at this despatch, unique in the annals of diplomacy, he said to me, with great composure: 'You have surely now been long enough in England to know that all our despatches are written only for the House of Commons, "for home consumption."' If this principle is generally recognised, the desire for personal popularity on the part of an ambitious Minister can at any moment compromise the Government. On the other hand, foreign statesmen will by this time have learnt not to attribute any undue importance to the written effusions of the Foreign Office.

Towards the end of the season the International Statistical Congress met in London. Prince Albert opened the sittings with a masterly speech. Nobody at that time suspected that this was the last address of the kind that the Prince would deliver. He possessed the rare faculty of never saying too much nor too little on these occasions, and of surprising his hearers with original ideas.

To the no small dismay of sportsmen, the Session, chiefly in consequence of the barren debates on Lord John Russell's Reform Bill, which was eventually withdrawn, lasted much longer than usual. The prorogation did not take place till August 28.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.—1860.

London, Jan. 14: Audience at Windsor Castle—Prince Albert on the German Question—Napoleon and the Position of England.—London, Jan. 18: Interview with Disraeli—The Opposition's Plan of Campaign. London, Jan. 28: Prospects of the Ministry—French Treaty of Commerce. London, Feb. 4: English Demands from Austria respecting the Complications in Italy Rechberg's Answer—Contradictions in French Policy—Favourable Signs for Gladstone and the Treaty of Commerce.—London, Feb. 12: Victor Emmanuel's Programme—Secret Treaty between France and Sardinia—Rumours respecting the Treaty—Napoleon's Dilemma—Fear of an Eastern Crisis England paralysed by the Treaty of Commerce—Palmerston's Policy—Gibraltar, Antwerp, and Constantinople.—London, Feb. 14: Audience of Prince Albert—The German Question—Correction of Rumours as to the secret Franco-Sardinian Treaty—Napoleon's Assurances respecting Savoy The Eastern Crisis and the Treaty of Commerce—England crippled.—London, Feb. 17: Interview with Disraeli—The Reform Question—A bold Policy recommended as against France—Central Italy and Savoy—Lord John Russell's good Advice to Germany—His Carelessness respecting the threatened Crisis in the East.—London, Feb. 23: Acceptance of the French Treaty of Commerce assured.—London, Feb. 25: Idea of a European Congress for the Settlement of Italian Difficulties—Attitude of the Powers to Italy.

London: Jan. 14, 1860.

I was anxious not to omit giving Prince Albert some information in private about the Conferences of the German minor States at Würzburg and Munich. As a rule, the Prince gives no audience at Windsor; he made, however, an exception, and wrote himself, appointing which we to go there yesterday afternoon at five o'clock. Germany. versation lasted nearly two hours, and was of a des, and character. Twice

we were interrupted by urgent despatches, requiring the Prince's immediate attention.

What his Royal Highness said may be comprised under two heads—first, the German question, and then his remarks on France, England, and the European situation.

The view taken by the Prince in the German question is well known.[1] He is still living in the Liberal circle of ideas which prevailed in our learned world between 1830 and 1840. He had quitted Germany before the events of 1848 and 1849, and misses the experiences of those years. Thus, for instance, he believes that the only reason why the Frankfort Parliament had no practical result was because the German people have not yet learned to yield to majorities. The Diet he still regards as a calamity, a tool in the hands of the Austrian Jesuits, who only make use of it to keep down all progress in Germany and check every healthy development in the bud. He thinks it is due to Europe alone, and not to the Diet, that, in spite of the irreconcilable dissension between Austria and Prussia, Germany has hitherto been saved from civil war.

The Prince began by observing that we might think ourselves fortunate that the Prince of Prussia was not a Victor Emmanuel, and that there was no Cavour among his Ministers. He enlarged on this idea in the course of the conversation and warmly recommended the Italian transactions as a wholesome subject of study. Just as the princes there lost country and people from their trusting to Austria, so it would happen with us if we failed to take warning in time. As there the populations were driven to join Sardinia, whom

[1] The clearest detailed explanation of his view is given by the Prince in his letter to Bunsen of March 18, 1860. See Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, iii. 39.

they hated, simply to escape from the Austrian oppression, which was crushing out all life from the country, so also it would fare with Germany.

No practical results could be expected from either Würzburg or Eisenach. These movements or aspirations would end in smoke, for different reasons. Apart altogether from his Prussian sympathies, Prince Albert appeared to suspect Ultramontane tendencies behind the Würzburg Conference, and not to see that Bavaria had been only outwardly chief actor. His Royal Highness has evidently the same dislike to Bavaria as to Austria—a dislike which he gave vent to in the sarcastic remark that the Bavarian contingent of the Bund had been deficient last year in everything: uniforms, shoes, men, and horses. If we flattered ourselves on having united eighteen millions of people, practically, it would alter very little the general situation. These eighteen millions of Germans had more votes to dispose of at the Diet than Austria and Prussia put together. Austria and Prussia, therefore, in the event of their being united upon any question, could be outvoted by the others. But since it was almost inconceivable that these two Great Powers should agree, the Würzburg Governments would always vote with Austria against Prussia, who, as before, would never submit to the decision of the majority.

I naturally refrained from any recrimination against this reasoning, and confined myself simply to facts. Reminding the Prince of the revival of national feeling manifested last year in all parts of Germany, I dwelt on the painful reflections left behind by the lame issue of the Italian campaign, and added that the Berlin Cabinet had neglected an opportunity for achieving moral victories, which would virtually have placed Prussia at the head.

From this the Prince d[illegible] laid the blame on

Austria, who had delayed making any advance towards an understanding until the last moment. It had been arrogantly insisted at Vienna that Prussia should simply place her army at the disposal of the Emperor. The same arrogance still prevailed in the Austrian Cabinet; they had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. They had made no use of the respite gained by the Peace of Villafranca, and the war in Italy would probably break out again the following spring under far less favourable circumstances than before.

'However that may be,' I interrupted him, 'the fact remains that the German people have been disappointed of their just expectations. Prussia throws the blame of this on the military organisation of the Bund. Can we be blamed if we desire that that organisation should be changed?' The minor States, I added, wished, indeed, nothing more than to strengthen the Bund and secure a neutral ground on which the petty jealousies of the two Great Powers could be arranged and decided. For if the democratic movement, now concealed behind the so-called Gotha Party, were not stemmed in time, Prussia might be driven against her will into measures which the Prince Regent regards with abhorrence. We were in a condition of peril that justified us in resorting to self-protection. We had openly said in Vienna and Berlin that there were eighteen millions of people in Germany who had an interest in seeing a settlement at length effected of some of the long pending questions concerning the safety of their Fatherland. Among these questions were the fortifications on the coasts of the North and Baltic Seas.

The Prince acknowledged the soundness of these remarks, but reminded me that the Governments represented at Würzburg had frustrated in 1849 the formation of a German fleet.

On my observing, however, in reply, that a fleet without

fortified harbours and coasts would be almost useless, he agreed.

The Prince, who had purposely, as he told me, read nothing as yet about the Würzburg Conference, listened at first to my statement on that subject with coolness and scepticism. But when he perceived the real nature of those proceedings, his attention increased.

'I confess,' said his Royal Highness, 'that hitherto I have based my opinions on the belief that it was nothing but hatred to Prussia, stirred up by Ultramontane tendencies, that took the minor States to Würzburg. I can anticipate no good to Germany from alliances formed by hate. I am much obliged to you for the documents you have entrusted to me ; if they succeed in convincing me that love, real love, for a common Fatherland lies at the root of these efforts, be assured you will have my warm sympathy.'

After this by no means altogether refreshing discussion, I followed the Prince with real pleasure upon the field of European politics. His habit of taking a high view of things has sharpened his sight and raised his judgment far above the mists of prejudice derived from party passion. Nobody in England is so at home on these serener heights as the consort of the Queen. I can only regret that my pen cannot reproduce the portrait of the French Emperor, sketched by the Prince in short, pithy sentences, and worthy of a great historian. My latest impressions from Paris, agreeing with those brought by Lord Cowley to Windsor, gave occasion to this sketch of character.

'I should not like,' began the Prince, 'to call the Emperor Napoleon inscrutable (*unberechenbar*). I see in him no enigma. The events we have yet to expect will, upon the whole, not surprise me. He is, as he himself may sometimes

think, the creature of a fatal destiny. His actions are the logical consequences of given premises. He *wills* far less often than he *must*. He is more to be pitied than blamed. His whole power is based upon falsehood. His system rests upon unsolved and insoluble contradictions, which assert themselves in mutual antagonism, and which must bring his system, if not himself, to a tragic end. To reconcile these contradictions is impossible. Napoleon would like to be Emperor by the grace of God, and at the same time *par la volonté nationale*. He can be either one or the other, but never both together. In France his power, if not derived from, at least rests upon, the Catholic priesthood. In Italy he is compelled, in order to escape the daggers of Orsini's confederates and to redeem the promises made to the Carbonari, to threaten and attack the Romish Church. In like manner the "l'Empire c'est la paix" stands in direct contradiction to the need of giving employment to his army. Eventually he will not be able to live without the halo of a campaign on the Rhine. Even in apparently minor matters, the Nemesis of these insoluble contradictions pursues him. Take merely the architectural embellishment of Paris. Enormous sums were lavished to stop the mouths of hungry workmen; whole quarters of the town were pulled down and built up again. But when the work is finished, there will be no one in the most beautiful metropolis of Europe rich enough to enjoy its beauty. The most extraordinary thing is that the Emperor is really sincere in both directions. He honestly believes in what he says to-day, and just as honestly in what he will say to the contrary to-morrow. That things have gone tolerably hitherto is owing to his undeniable cleverness and to a certain exercise of prudence. But with all his gifts he is unable to appreciate that irreconcilable conflict of ideas, of which he is sure in

time to be the victim. He is no philosopher. You will not be surprised to hear that I have vainly endeavoured to make this clear to honest Persigny.

'The only policy which, in my opinion, England has to follow with Napoleon can be expressed in two words: Dignified Silence. I trust we shall succeed in keeping our hands clean. No doubt this is more easily said than done in a country where the Press is free and the Parliament a power. If they took my advice, the Government would keep silence. That would be quite enough. What is now going on is very simply explained. Our national movement, the Volunteer Rifle Corps, even more than our naval preparations, have made Napoleon anxious to lull John Bull to sleep again. Up to a certain point he may succeed. At present we are not, unfortunately, in a normal condition. Since 1846 we have been wanting a great man to guide us, and hence the machine of State is not working as it should. What we want is a leader of the Conservatives in the House of Commons like Sir Robert Peel. We have lost in him the rock against which the waves of democracy broke, the man who in the House of Commons struck with true instinct the keynote of resistance.'

It was characteristic that the Prince should represent, as he did, the ill success of Austria as a Nemesis for the infatuation of the democratic Minister Bach, in having sought in French Cæsarism the model for reconstructing the Empire.

The Prince incidentally mentioned that the Queen had resumed the private correspondence with Napoleon, which had been interrupted since the war. He added that her Majesty had most carefully weighed every word.

In conclusion, the Prince spoke of Professor Gneist's recently published work on the English Constitution and

Government. He praised the first part, and acknowledged the learning shown in compiling and digesting the rich material at the author's command. 'Even English statesmen,' said the Prince, 'can learn from this book. For just as healthy people trouble themselves but little about the anatomy of their body and the texture of their veins, so the English, as a rule, know but little of their institutions.' The author's conclusions in the second part of the work he dismissed as absurd, and laughed at the Berlin Professor's notion of blessing England with an army of Prussian bureaucrats.

London: Jan. 18, 1860.

Yesterday I had an hour and a half's confidential conversation with Mr. Disraeli, who has enabled me to give some information as to the views of the Opposition and their plan of campaign for the Session which is to open on the 24th.

The leader of the Opposition does not in the least share the disinclination of his countrymen for German politics. I found in him an attentive listener, while I attempted to explain to him as clearly as I could the efforts made by the federal Governments at Munich and Würzburg. I represented to him that if, by means of timely and popular reforms, they succeeded in strengthening the German Bund, and thereby Austria's position, England's task would only be lightened. The necessity might arise for the Continental Powers to unite in common defence against Bonapartist aggression. I turned to account my impressions recently acquired in Paris, to point out to Disraeli that we have to deal with a well-laid plan for a general unsettlement of Europe. The incorporation of Savoy and Nice would make Napoleon master of the passes of the Alps, and thereby master of Italy. He would next turn his thoughts to the 'natural frontiers' on the Rhine; and if

England, blinded by selfishness, allowed all the elements of resistance to crumble away, he would proceed to the long-talked-of revenge for Waterloo.

Mr. Disraeli thanked me for what he described as the very valuable and interesting information I had given him on the state of things in Germany, and agreed with me entirely in my view of the European situation.

'People in Paris are deceived,' he said, 'if they think the Tories would take no active interest in preserving the temporal Sovereignty of the Pope. Although, in consequence of the Pope's being threatened, the Roman Catholics have strengthened the Opposition, we shall take good care not to afford Lord Palmerston an excuse for dissolving Parliament. Hoping, as we do, to be able to form a strong Government next year, we shall not be in a hurry to get the fruit, till it is ripe and falls into our hands. Lord Palmerston, to tell the truth, is in his dotage. He is entirely ruled by women, and through women by the Sardinian Minister. In the Cabinet he has won over Lord John Russell, whom he leads by the nose by humouring his Italian sympathies. Gladstone, too, has been "bought over" by the Premier. He, too, raves for Italy, though the prospect of concluding a Commercial Treaty with France allures him most. The other Ministers, however, although they have no leader or any great statesman among them, form the majority of the Cabinet, and are led by the Court behind the scenes with tact and circumspection. Lord Clarendon inspires his brother Charles Villiers and his brother-in-law Cornewall Lewis, both of whom belong to the anti-French party. We learnt, during last summer and on the 10th of this month, to know and respect the power of this party. At the Cabinet Council on the 10th, Palmerston and Russell, who were ready to conclude an offensive and

defensive alliance with France, were put in the minority. This state of things can only strengthen us in our policy of waiting. We shall continue to inspire the Court and the moderate majority of the Cabinet with courage, by showing that it is not our intention to bring about a Ministerial crisis at present. Our course is to keep a sharp watch over Palmerston and Russell, and force them to pursue our foreign policy. For the present we are more useful and powerful in Opposition than on the Ministerial bench. If we oppose every territorial aggrandisement on the part of France, we shall in the end paralyse Palmerston and show Napoleon that his alliance with the noble Viscount does not bring him the tangible advantages he had expected. Then, at last, the eyes of Count Persigny and his master will be opened. The rest follows as a matter of course. The most important thing for us is to know exactly how far we can depend upon Austria. In spite of all her defeats, we regard her as the centre and nucleus of all Conservative efforts in the field of European politics. If Austria is nowhere, what can we do? What you tell me about Austria's position in Germany, and the statesmanlike efforts to strengthen it, pleases but does not satisfy me. I should like to be informed, as accurately as possible, on the following points: "How do matters stand in Hungary? How are the finances of the Empire? and what power of resistance can, if necessary, be developed in Venetia?"'

'According to all I hear from Vienna,' I replied, 'Rechberg, who does not belong to the optimists, by no means regards the internal situation as desperate. The newspapers exaggerate. There is no doubt that Austria requires peace to enable her to effect the meditated reforms and regulate her finances. She will therefore do everything she can, within the bounds of honour, to prevent the outbreak of the

war next spring. Should the Italians venture to attack the Quadrilateral, it would only serve Conservative interests. 'Thrown back on the defensive, Austria would show a tenacity which, as history teaches us, has already often astonished the world.'

Disraeli again begged that I would inform him precisely upon the three points above mentioned. He assured me that he would faithfully use the weapon put into his hand to refute the misstatements and calumnies which the Ministers were accustomed to fling against Austria. He promised at the same time to keep me *au courant* of everything going on here.

London: Jan. 28, 1860.

Seldom has a Session begun under more favourable auspices for the Ministers of the day than the present one. Rightly convinced that the Opposition will leave them to settle the Reform question with all its difficulties, they are now doing all they can to postpone the decision of this important home question. The Reform Bill is not to be introduced till February 20, and it is hopeless to think of passing it before Easter. However, it is not impossible that all these calculations may prove wrong. The political barometer has fallen during the last week and points to storm. The French Commercial Treaty has not made the impression here that was expected in Paris, where it was hurried to a conclusion. Some people even speak of it as stillborn, and call to mind the Conspiracy Bill which led to Palmerston's downfall and unhinged the French Alliance. This Treaty of Commerce is to be laid before the House of Commons on February 6, together with the Budget. A serious fight is expected. Many think that the leaders of the Opposition may be forced by their own party, against their will, to oppose the Treaty,

without waiting for the Reform Bill. A change of Ministers in an anti-French direction would just now involve serious consequences. Nobody is more persuaded of this than Lord Derby and Disraeli, who have not abandoned their well-considered plan of action. The only question is, whether they will be strong enough to carry out their clever policy of waiting. A peer of the realm thinks not. He offered yesterday to make me a bet that the Commercial Treaty will not pass the House of Commons.

'Lord Derby,' he said, 'is not master of his own party, and Disraeli still less. The country will force them both to show fight. Disraeli is in too delicate a position to venture on bearding the large phalanx of the Tories, who only follow his leadership *faute de mieux*. Just look for a moment at the House of Commons, and especially at the Irish Brigade. You know that Bowyer brought the most explicit orders from Rome to compass Palmerston's overthrow at any cost. On the very first Cabinet question, no matter what the subject, the Irish will vote to a man against the Government. The great mass of the Conservative party will do the same, in order to get rid of the democratic Reform Bill. Both Irish and Conservatives have a common interest in fomenting the daily increasing agitation against the Commercial Treaty. This Treaty has two powerful bodies as sworn enemies, the brewers and the distillers. Both of these protest against the introduction of cheap French wines, as do also the licensed victuallers, who have considerable influence with the lower classes, and especially with the county electors. With the county members, moreover, all those will vote against the Treaty who do not allow dust to be thrown in their eyes. It comes, therefore, to this, whether we are to make use of this opportunity to destroy the newly-formed intimacy between

the Government and the French Emperor, and thus render futile his plans of aggrandisement. To declare war on account of Savoy and Nice is impossible. And yet they will think twice at Paris before announcing that annexation, if the rejection of the Commercial Treaty shows them that the British House of Commons sees through the intrigue and has not fallen into the snare.'

I give these views without saying that I share them. The Ministers display the greatest confidence, although many of their friends consider the Commercial Treaty a political blunder.

London: Feb. 4, 1860.

With reference to the Italian complications Lord Augustus Loftus, as instructed by the British Government, has submitted to the Austrian Cabinet four Points:—

1. Austria and France agree not to interfere for the future by force in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called upon to do so by the unanimous assent of the Five Great Powers.

2. The French troops will evacuate Lombardy and the States of the Church. The time and manner of that evacuation to be so arranged as to afford the Papal Government sufficient opportunity to garrison Rome and to take every precaution against disorder and outrage.

3. The internal government of Venetia not to be in any way matter of negotiation between the European Powers.

4. Great Britain and France to invite the King of Sardinia to agree not to send troops into Central Italy until its several states and provinces shall, by a new vote of their Assemblies, after a new election, have solemnly declared their wishes as to their future destiny. Should that decision be in favour of annexation to Sardinia, Great Britain and France

will no longer require that Sardinian troops should not enter those states and provinces.

Lord John Russell is fair enough not to demand from Austria the acceptance of this fourth Point, which is in direct contradiction to the stipulations of Villafranca and Zurich, or to require her to recognise Italy. The secret motives of the English Cabinet are easily guessed. The idea of an Italian Confederation is buried, and Austria prevented from turning to diplomatic account the concessions she might make to Venetia.

Count Rechberg's reply to the foregoing was brought hither yesterday by a special messenger :—

Ad 1. Austria has no intention of intervening by force of arms, but she cannot renounce the right of doing so, if requested by one of the parties concerned (Tuscany and Modena). Moreover, a 'Concert Européen' must first be established before any single Power can acknowledge the decisions of a European Areopagus.

Ad 2. Austria has no troops outside her own frontiers; this point, therefore, can only concern France.

Ad 3. Austria will certainly repudiate any attack upon her sovereign rights.

Ad 4. Lord John Russell appears himself to have felt that this solution was too contrary to the principles professed by Austria, and too much an aggression upon the rights of succession and reversion guaranteed to her by treaties to which Great Britain was a consenting party, to ask Austria's adhesion to his plan of pacification.

The tone of the despatch is very friendly as regards the French Cabinet. That the latter will decline to accept the fourth Point is assumed as certain, and any expression is avoided which might show a suspicion that Napoleon desired

to repudiate the international engagements entered into by him at Villafranca. This confidence is justified by the language used by Napoleon to Prince Metternich. The latter is convinced that the French reply to the English despatch will agree to the first three Points, but disagree to the fourth.

It would be premature to hazard a guess as to who is to be deceived at Paris, whether Austria or England, or both. One thing is certain, that Napoleon yesterday had not yet thrown off the mask, but had rather been doing everything to convince Prince Metternich that the Imperial word pledged at Villafranca would in all respects be honourably observed. Facts stand in strange contradiction to these assertions. While the newspapers announce the reduction of armaments and the grant of furloughs to officers, one hears, on the other hand, that the French army in Lombardy is to be doubled to a total of 100,000 men, and that a camp of forty or fifty thousand troops is to be formed at Chalons under Marshal Canrobert. That a pause will intervene in regard to the annexation of Savoy is considered very probable. This news, which has been spread by Rothschild, has had a favourable influence on the Stock Exchange. Napoleon will, in any case, desire to await the issue of the debates in Parliament on the Treaty of Commerce before he shows his hand.

Notwithstanding the unimportant defeat of the day before yesterday, when the Government were left in a minority of twenty-nine, there is every prospect that the Parliamentary storm now threatening will disperse. Several circumstances are extremely favourable to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Above all, the liability which had accrued to the State by the conversion of the four per cent. Consols into three per cents. will have been cleared off at the end of the current financial year. The saving of six millions thereby effected does not, of

course, suffice to cover the cost of armaments, the expense of the coast defences alone being estimated at ten millions. The modification of the Land Tax will please the Conservatives very little, but the Radicals all the more. Lastly, the tariff reductions offered by the Commercial Treaty are so cleverly interwoven with the whole financial scheme of the Government, that the House of Commons will hardly be able to displace a single stone without bringing down the whole edifice. So at least Gladstone's friends declare. What chiefly favours the Ministers is the fact that the Tories cannot make use of the Irish Brigade for a purely party move. For such every Ministerial crisis would appear to be, so long as the Opposition are unable to form a stronger Government than the present one. Until the Reform question is settled, this is impossible. In any case it is in the interest of the Conservative party to postpone as long as possible such a settlement and put an end to the questionable kind of auction, in which Whigs and Tories go on outbidding each other to the delight of the Radicals.

London: Feb. 12, 1860.

At Turin not a moment has been lost in confidentially informing the English Government that Sardinia will not trouble herself at all about the Four proposals. Victor Emmanuel already looks on Venetia, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna as Sardinian provinces. But that alone is not enough for him; Rome and Naples must be secretly stirred up and annexed, and the Holy City made the capital of Italy. Such is the programme that meets here with the loudest approval. France will of course endeavour to prevent such ideas from being realised. Some newspapers already hint at a second Villafranca, in the event of Count Arese's mission proving fruitless.

To estimate the difficulties in which the French Emperor has involved himself, it is necessary to go back to the Secret Treaty, in the existence of which Lord Grey recently in the House of Lords refused to believe, on the ground that he could not imagine any Government capable of perpetrating such a 'crime against the civilised world.' Nevertheless, well-informed authorities declare that this Treaty, consisting of only three articles, was signed between January 15 and 22 of last year, by Marshal Niel and M. Pietri, as plenipotentiaries of France, with Count Cavour. This transaction, therefore, would have taken place about a fortnight or more after Napoleon's New Year's reception of Baron Hübner, and just when the Cabinet at Paris was making believe that it honestly desired the Congress proposed by Russia. Count Walewski is said not to have been in the secret, and even now seems to know nothing about it. Cavour, who feared lest the French plenipotentiaries might be disavowed, is stated to have induced Napoleon in a weak moment to ratify it with his own hand. This would only prove, if true, how little confidence there was on either side, and how well justified was the famous 'Je le tiens' of the cunning Piedmontese.

As regards the contents of this Secret Treaty, the first article is said to stipulate the cession of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom to the King of Sardinia, who promises, in return, to surrender Savoy to France. In the second article Sardinia is stated to have promised to cede the arrondissement of Nice, in case Napoleon should succeed in seizing the Duchies and the Romagna for Victor Emmanuel. As to the contents of the third article nothing is divulged, and it may possibly relate to the ratification of the treaty.

Count Cavour's line of argument is in thorough keeping with these stipulations. He says: Savoy cannot be sur-

rendered, because Venetia has not been freed; Nice cannot, because the Duchies and the Romagna have not been conquered by French troops, while their inhabitants, moreover, have declared their voluntary submission to King Victor Emmanuel.[1] The logic of facts does not belie this reasoning.

In a flight of real or assumed sincerity Napoleon said briefly to Prince Metternich, 'Si j'obtiens la Savoie, Nice et la frontière du Rhin, la France sera satisfaite.' Should he now seek to accomplish forcibly the annexation of Savoy against the will of Sardinia, he would expose himself to the publication of the Secret Treaty, and thereby run the most serious risk. That he cannot reckon on the moral support of England in such transactions will have been made clear to him from the proceedings on the 7th in the House of Lords. Napoleon is, therefore, face to face with a dangerous dilemma. Either he must postpone the annexation of Savoy till the future conquest of Venetia, in order to purchase Victor Emmanuel's silence; in which case he must consequently assist the Sardinian Government, as far as possible, in the development of their plans, which are plainly opposed to French interests. Or he must confess to the Austrian Cabinet his Secret Treaty with Sardinia, and make up his mind for a humiliating *Pater peccavi*, in which case he will have to sacrifice Sardinia and Italy altogether, to be enabled to crush, with Austrian help, the Italian revolution and gain Savoy.

In view of this dilemma, it has been conjectured that Napoleon will push the Italian question for a while entirely into the background and, as he did in 1853, bring about an unexpected complication in the East, in order to conceal his game. Thouvenel's long studies at Constantinople, the

[1] These rumours are corrected and explained more fully in the letter of the 14th of February, which follows.

sinister reports, industriously circulated by the Press, of agitations, intrigues, and revolutions, and, above all, the fact that a serious crisis is preparing in the provinces of the Lower Danube, all these symptoms are quoted to confirm this conjecture. People are already talking of a revival of the policy of 1829, which was hindered by the July Revolution—namely, an understanding between Russia and France. The latter would by that means be enabled to seize her so-called 'natural' frontiers in the Alps and on the Rhine, while Russia would free herself from the onerous fetters of the Paris Treaty of 1856.

These rumours throw a new light on the real object of the Commercial Treaty concluded with England. The position of its author, Cobden—whom the Radical papers call the real Prime Minister—is compared to that of Fiesco's Moor, after he had done his work. Whether the Commercial Treaty is accepted or rejected, England in either case is paralysed. The worst thing that could happen to France, namely, Palmerston's overthrow, would result either in a dissolution of Parliament, or the accession of a weak Derby Ministry to power.

When I asked Brunnow whether a coalition was preparing against France, as in 1813–14, he said he knew nothing about it. He answered, in his wonted manner, with a few dark oracular phrases.

Lord Palmerston has recently spoken out in unequivocal terms in a long conversation with one of my friends. The Prime Minister declared that in all Continental questions he would adhere firmly to the principle of non-intervention. Should Russia, nevertheless, claim for the Eastern populations the right of autonomy, or employ it as a pretext for aggression, English interests would imperatively demand the

immediate occupation of Constantinople, with a view not of conquering it, but of holding it as a guarantee.

In exactly the same sense, a member of the House of Commons, who is well versed in foreign questions, remarked to me yesterday: 'We shall not go to war for Savoy and Italy, but there are three points, the threatening of which would compel us to draw the sword: Gibraltar, Antwerp, and Constantinople.

London: February 14, 1860.

To complete the documents which I lately left in Prince Albert's hands, I hastened to send his Royal Highness the Saxon Memorandum of January 19. I thought it indiscreet to request another audience, and was, therefore, the more agreeably surprised when the Prince sent for me of his own accord, and was pleased to receive me yesterday evening.

The Prince had given the Memorandum an attentive examination, as is shown by his own marginal comments on the annexed copy. With the view of explaining this commentary the Prince went through the document with me in a thoroughly business-like fashion.

'I cannot disguise from you,' said his Royal Highness, 'that I am unable to take the same view as the Saxon Government. As to the end—namely, the maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of the minor States of Germany—we are at one, but not as to the means. I regard German 'Particularism' as a blessing, as a genuine German element, to be preserved and protected. The formation of a centralised united State seems to me impossible, and not even desirable. But with sword and pen the minor States of Germany must not meddle. Such matters are beyond their proper province. Were I King of Saxony, I would not scruple to entrust my army and diplomacy, under certain fixed and

clearly defined conditions, to the leadership of Prussia, for the interests, be it well understood, not of Prussia herself, but of Germany. I should regard this, to speak plainly, as the only means of maintaining a healthy independence. The great thing is, to let the nation see that the existence of the minor States does not weaken the defensive power of Germany, or impair her *prestige* on the Continent. The military organisation of the Bund dates from a time when Russia, Austria, and partly also Prussia, aimed at nothing short of the political annihilation of Germany. The stress laid in the Memorandum on the defensive position of the German Bund in the European State system is rather dangerous. It is exactly this purely defensive position which is so contrary to the wishes of the German nation. Foreigners of Prince Gortschakoff's type are thus misled into speaking of Germany as "une combinaison." A country which must always wait, and only wait, until it is attacked, is already lost. To be able to take the offensive at the right time is the only means of defending oneself victoriously. Had the King of Sardinia hesitated to subordinate his own army to that of the French, the Allies would never have conquered at Solferino. Success is everything. The question turns on winning the day. To make a division within the Austrian army and the Prussian army is a sheer impossibility. In each army there are good, bad, and indifferent troops. We are all but men. Do you suppose the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia will place their best troops at the disposal of the Bund? Is it consistent with the *esprit de corps*, the traditions, and the discipline of a great army to engage only a part of it, and not the whole? Certainly not. Any arrangements of that sort, as events in Italy show, are worth only the paper they are written on. Where was the Austrian federal con-

tingent during the late war? We are assured that it was ready. I don't believe it. If it was, would not the Emperor of Austria have made use of it, or at least have pushed it forward into Tyrol? And yet it must have been perfectly well known at the Austrian head-quarters that the Franco-Sardinians would have been lost, if Austria had only had another 120,000 men to throw into the scale. The fact that these 120,000 men were not brought up shows that they did not exist or, at all events, were not ready. There is only *one* means of safety for Germany, to hand over the conduct of military and diplomatic affairs to Prussia. That this must and can be done with all consideration for the very praiseworthy *amour-propre* of the individual armies, is self-evident. Austria is always Austrian, not German, and this will always remain a sore spot in the Bund, until it is clearly seen that Germany, under the leadership of Prussia, is strong enough to play a part in Europe. The relations with Austria could be regulated by a military convention, which, under a guarantee of reciprocity, should place the entire Austrian army, and not merely her contingent, at the disposal of federal Germany.'

The Prince was fair enough to admit that the overbearing temper and provincial narrowness prevailing in Berlin were fatal to that confidence which would be the *sine quâ non* condition of the military organisation he recommended. Pure Prussianism is as distasteful to Prince Albert as to the majority of Germans. In his opinion, however, the feeling of humiliation and of weakness in foreign relations will overcome the popular hatred of Prussia. He does not consider it politic, at a moment so full of danger as the present, to put forward proposals of Reform which would have no prospect of success. If it came to war, events would break in upon us so suddenly,

so irresistibly, and in such a sweeping manner, as to threaten most seriously the very existence of the German Bund and of the minor States.

The 'Trias' idea is altogether repugnant to the Prince, as his commentary shows.

'Remember,' he said, 'the saying of Frederick the Great: "Battles are won not with arms, but legs;" and do not forget that the North Sea States of Germany will always be forced to go with Prussia. For how should those contingents, if the question were one of concentrating the "Trias" army, say, at Mayence, be able to put themselves in motion, with munitions, provisions, train, &c., at the very moment when railways and military roads would have to be kept free for a Prussian army on the march? What would the "Trias" be, however, without the North Sea States, which are geographically isolated? Nothing but a second edition of the Confederation of the Rhine. The egotism of the two Great Powers would inevitably compel the united minor States to seek support either with France or Russia. When the hour of danger came, the question of bare existence would outweigh the interests of the common Fatherland.'

The Hanoverian idea of dividing by turns the supreme command of the army of the Bund between Austria and Prussia was rejected as impracticable. Austria, said the Prince, never can and never will agree to this proposal; nor can Prussia either be expected to do so. The Prussian proposition also he regarded as defunct. He repeated that he looked on the future of Germany as very, very black.

'If only a means could be found,' said the Prince, 'of procuring for Germany the respect to which she is entitled, and of preventing her from being always trampled under-foot, I would not, as a German, exchange Germany for any

country in the world. With the exception of a European position, we are better off in every respect than the rest.'

An hour and a half had passed by so quickly that I had scarcely time to turn the conversation to the subject of Europe, and yet I was extremely anxious to request the Prince to correct the rumours, mentioned in my despatch of the 12th, about the Secret Treaty between France and Sardinia.

His Royal Highness remarked that the Secret Treaty coincided in point of time with Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna. As to its contents he assured me I was misinformed. There was nothing said about the Duchies and the Romagna, though mention had then been made at Paris of a Kingdom of Etruria for Prince Napoleon. The cession of Savoy had been stipulated in return for the conquest of Lombardy, and that of Nice for Venetia. The most able speech on this shameless transaction had been made by Lord Grey, whose very doubts of its existence enabled him to speak out fearlessly in the House of Lords the most wholesome truths.

Cavour's reasoning was, that the cession of Savoy was out of the question, since the Preliminaries of Villafranca had not placed Sardinia in full possession of Lombardy. So long as Mantua and Verona remained in Austrian hands, the acquisition by Sardinia of the flat country, which in a military sense was untenable, was rather an embarrassment for her than a source of strength. 'And in that,' said the Prince, 'he is quite right.' He added, that the cession of Nice, according to Cavour's view, was still less in question, as Venetia had not been conquered at all.

'Under these circumstances,' the Prince concluded, 'we have demanded an assurance from the French Emperor, to leave the question of Savoy at present undisturbed. At the

same time he has been required to promise us that, in case the project should be again entertained, he would make the actual cession depend on the approval of the other Great Powers. In my opinion we must come to a previous understanding with the other Powers not to give that approval in any case. I hope it will be possible to arrive at an agreement to this effect.'

The Prince fully confirmed my remarks in reference to the threatening crisis in the East, and added characteristically: 'And now, to make matters worse, this stupid Treaty of Commerce steps in.'

Encouraged by the frankness of the Prince at this private interview, I developed to him the view stated in my despatch of the 12th, and insisted that the only object of this Treaty had evidently been to paralyse England for some months.

'You are quite right,' replied the Prince. 'Whether the House of Commons accept or reject the Treaty, in either case we are crippled for a time. Besides that, Napoleon has the advantage of getting cheap iron and cheap coal, and through the differential duties on coal, which will be introduced into France on French ships, of benefiting and gratifying his commercial marine. But the worst of all is that the thing has such a bad appearance. The Treaty is really Persigny's work, and the Emperor personally is not at all fond of Free Trade. Whenever I explained to him its advantages, he invariably replied, "Que voulez-vous, on n'en veut pas en France."'

London: Feb. 17, 1860.

In accordance with a request from Mr. Disraeli, I went yesterday to his private house to talk over the situation, unmolested, as he said, by Whig spies.

We discussed first of all the *data* which had come to the

notice of diplomacy respecting the Secret Treaty between France and Sardinia. The knowledge of this suspicious agreement appears to have opened the eyes of English statesmen to the full gravity of the situation. With regard to the real object of the Commercial Treaty, Disraeli entirely shares my view.

He expressed himself with unusual reserve and moderation on the subject of the coming Parliamentary contest. He attached great importance to the fact that the Reform question had been flung overboard. Lord Derby's statement, at the meeting of the Conservative party on the 14th, that he had redeemed his pledge and would not introduce a new Reform Bill, had been received with approbation. I remarked that if the House of Commons were to reject Cobden's Treaty, the men of the Manchester school would give vent to their ill-humour by an increased agitation in favour of Reform, and that there was only one means of preventing that danger.

'What is that?' asked Disraeli.

'A bold and determined policy towards France, even at the risk of war,' was my reply. 'Moreover, such a policy alone could preserve England from the dangers now imminent in the East. The firmer you show yourselves, the more will those in Paris knuckle under.'

'We are convinced of that,' said the leader of the Opposition. 'The Emperor Napoleon will remember my having warned him some years ago against throwing himself into the arms of Palmerston. He declared then that we Tories were his hereditary enemies, and that he had, therefore, no choice in the matter. I denied it, and assured him we would go with any Government in France which respected treaties, but not with any that did not. Palmerston would make many promises, but keep none of them, because he had

not the power to do so. He had a few followers, but no party.'

My parting advice fell on thankful ears. I stated that the Conservatives must at once, whether in opposition or in office, insist on a unanimous decision of the four Great Powers against any territorial aggrandisement on the part of France. In that case, the present turn taken by the question of Savoy could be utilised to pave the way for a future coalition of Europe against the Second Empire.

Since the recent Conservative meeting the Ministers seem to be treating the threatened crisis in a more serious spirit than before. Accordingly, they are anxious now not to submit the Commercial Treaty as a whole, but to secure the acceptance of its fundamental principles in separate resolutions, in the hope of avoiding the Cabinet question. It is expected that the Opposition, in that case, will submit counter-resolutions. In the event of the Ministry being defeated, a result hardly to be expected, a dissolution, which many, both Whigs and Tories, think impossible, would be unavoidable, unless the majority against the Treaty were to assume unexpected proportions.

With regard also to foreign policy, the anti-Ministerial feeling of Parliament points to the importance of exercising caution. Thus we were under the impression that England and France had already come to an agreement with respect to Central Italy, until yesterday Lord John Russell made the surprising confession to two of my colleagues, that nothing whatever had been agreed upon. This corroborates the answers given by him yesterday to the questions put in the House of Commons by Sir Robert Peel and Seymour Fitzgerald. It is clear from those answers that the opposition of Parliament to the annexation of Savoy has compelled the

Ministers to keep the Central Italy question an open one. The consequence of this is, that the reservations which Thouvenel, in his despatch of January 30, thought it necessary to make touching the fourth English Point are now more sharply insisted on in Paris than they were a fortnight ago. Nay, they would like, it seems, to make France's consent to Sardinian aggrandisement in Central Italy directly dependent on the cession of Savoy. On the other hand, Lord John Russell, with regard to Savoy, is following the counsels of the Opposition. He has hastened to profit by Lord Malmesbury's argument against the annexation of Savoy, and instructed Sir James Hudson to recommend it to the consideration of the Cabinet of Turin. In point of fact, Sardinia, who complains that the preliminaries of Villafranca have left her an open and indefensible frontier, would acquire by the cession of the passes of the Alps a second open frontier and thus fall into entire dependence on her two powerful neighbours. Lord John's despatch was sent off, to my knowledge, the day before yesterday to Turin. Yesterday Lord John in the House of Commons, like Lord Granville in the House of Lords, mentioned the declaration of the Sardinian Government, that Sardinia had no intention of ceding Savoy. And he added that England would in any case seek to secure the rights of Switzerland.

When I asked the Sardinian Minister whether he believed in the military occupation of Savoy by French troops, he replied, 'Cela serait peut-être le meilleur moyen de trancher la question.'

Amidst the embarrassments which their sympathies for the Revolution on the one side, and the growing distrust of France on the part of Parliament on the other, are preparing for the Liberal Ministers and paralysing their action in Central Italy, the Foreign Secretary thinks it his duty to give good

advice to Germany. Why had we not at length become united? he asked yesterday one of my German colleagues. Why did we not choose an Emperor and give him a Parliament? He came to the right man, who was probably at no loss for an answer, and who may have cooled to some extent the glowing fancies of the Reformer *par excellence* by referring him to stern facts.

With regard to the gathering storm in the East, Lord John remains careless and indifferent as ever. However, the confidential Austrian despatch of the 10th inst. has been so far at least successful, that Lord Augustus Loftus has been instructed to follow attentively what is passing in Bulgaria, Servia, &c., and not suffer to cool down the willingness now existing in Vienna to co-operate with England in the East. Lord John justifies his unconcern on the ground of the quieting assurances given him by the Turkish Ambassador in London, which coincide with the reports of the English diplomatic agents.

For the rest, it seems that France and Russia are employing these complications to denounce each other mutually to England. Gortschakoff writes to Brunnow that Russia has no intention whatever of interfering, but adds, 'Si nous avions de mauvaises intentions, les provocations et les excitations ne nous manqueraient pas, et les alliés ne nous feraient pas défaut.' In exactly the same sense Thouvenel says in one of his last despatches, 'Si l'Empereur voulait profiter de ces troubles, les alliés ne lui manqueraient pas.'

The first Blue-book, entitled 'Correspondence respecting the affairs of Italy from the signature of the Preliminaries of Villafranca to the postponement of the Congress,' has been published to-day, and contains 252 documents. I propose to revert to its contents hereafter.

London: Feb. 23, 1860.

Nobody has a doubt now that the Ministry will come out victorious from the debate on the Budget. It becomes more and more evident that the French calculation was completely right. The more one sees through it, the more one learns to distrust Napoleon. So preponderating, however, are the material advantages offered by Persigny's Treaty to the interests of commerce, that the exultation of the Manchester school is unbounded. Not only will the Radicals vote for the Treaty to a man, but Palmerston and Cobden reckon also on a number of deserters from the Conservative ranks. Some Tory members are the owners of considerable coal mines, and the opening of the French market for their products will weigh heavily in the balance at the division.

London: Feb. 25, 1860.

Russia and Prussia have agreed on the mode of urging jointly on the British Government the idea inspired by France to leave the settlement of the Italian difficulties to a European Conference. This attempt has failed. Lord John Russell told Baron Brunnow and Count Bernstorff that they came too soon, the moment had not yet arrived. When reminded that Lord Palmerston, on the contrary, had expressed his opinion that the moment was gone by, the Foreign Secretary took refuge in an Irish anecdote, to show that 'too late' and 'too soon' meant the same thing.

The Ministry, fortified by the acceptance of the Treaty of Commerce and the results of the last two divisions—called the Magenta and Solferino of the Conservatives—is now more than ever resolved to give free play in Italy to the 'inexorable logic of events.' In this frame of mind, the suggestion of the Prussian Minister to warn France and Sardinia against

making any attack on the line of the Mincio, will not have made any deep impression on Lord John Russell. However, the suggestion itself is a very gratifying sign of the correct attitude maintained by the Cabinet of Berlin.

Theoretically it is always of importance that Russia and Prussia should not countenance the French excuses, but on the contrary step in to support the principle of legitimate right in Central Italy, even if not actually by force. In conformity with the Breslau Conferences, the two Powers have guarded themselves against a Conference *à quatre* (that is to say, without Austria), as well as against the laying down of a programme, which might bind their hands from the beginning. These safeguards, however, have no practical value, since the Conference will not take place at all, either *à quatre* or *à cinq*. In either case, Austria's attitude of reserve can only further her understanding with Prussia and Russia.

If a bad cause could be bettered by a good pen, Thouvenel's despatch of January 31 would have had the desired success in Vienna. Count Rechberg, however, has not failed, in his despatch to Prince Metternich of the 17th inst., to refute the glaring sophisms of the French Minister. Every unprejudiced person will now admit that Austria could not possibly accept the Four Points without entirely abandoning her ground.

The Austrian Ambassador in London, to whom Rechberg's despatch has been communicated in strict confidence, has been instructed to direct Lord John Russell's attention to the intrigues of Sardinia, and reassure him as to the defensive measures taken in Venetia.

I may assume it is known that the Curia has rejected the latest proposals of the French Cabinet. The Duc de Gra-

mont had offered, in exchange for the cession of the Legations, the island of Sardinia or certain territories of the King of Naples, which were to be indemnified by that island. As the Court of Rome, however, has declined to enter into this transaction, these proposals have only an historical interest.

CHAPTER XIX.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.—1860 (*continued*).

London, March 5: French Speech from the Throne and the Savoy Question—Napoleon drops the Mask—Indignation in Parliament against Napoleon—Bernstorff's Inquiry—Protest recommended—Confidential Interview with Disraeli—Persigny's Wrath—Austria's Attitude of Reserve—The British Parliament the only Power to check Napoleon.—London, March 19: Cabinet Council of the 17th—Rumoured Quarrels in the Ministry—Palmerston and Russell—Protest of Switzerland—Anxieties of the Court—Persigny's Excitement.—London, March 25: Anglo-French Discussions on the Savoy Question—Attitude of Russia—Unpleasant Rumours of German Sympathies for France—Palmerston's Outburst against the Neapolitan Ambassador.—London, April 16: Impressions at Paris—Latest Austrian Despatches—Austria's waiting Attitude—France promises soon to evacuate Lombardy, and gives Cavour good Advice—Cavour mastered by the Revolution—A secret Article—Cardinal Antonelli's Anxieties—Lamoricière at Rome—Austria declines the Defensive Alliance with Prussia.—London April 18: Collapse of Project of a Conference—Switzerland's Claims of Indemnity.—London, April 22: Negotiations between Lord John Russell, Persigny, and the Swiss Envoy—Persigny conveys the Result to Paris—French Coquetries with Austria—Palmerston's View of Austria's Position—The Storm in the East blows over—Lavalette's Instructions communicated to Lord Cowley.—London, April 30: Threatened Position of the Ministry—Lord John's 'Little Bill' and expected Statement on Foreign Affairs—Side Lights on the secret History of the Campaign.—London, May 1: Conversation with Prince Albert—Gloomy Forebodings—Criticism of the Austrian System—Bernstorff recommends Caution to Denmark—A Memorandum of Palmerston's respecting Savoy.—London, May 6: Cavour's threatened Position in the Turin Parliament—Garibaldi in Genoa—Lavalette demands Instructions—Probable Mystification of Lord Cowley.—London, May 10: Embarkation of Garibaldi—Attitude of Sardinia and England—Persigny's Return from Paris.—London, May 11: Rechberg combats English Illusions respecting a *rapprochement* with Prussia—He considers a Conference impracticable and recommends Switzerland to negotiate direct—Anti-Prussian Feeling in Paris—Rumour of a coming Interview between the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon at Nice—Gladstone's Repeal of the Paper

Duty—Palmerston dissatisfied—Lord Derby prepares a Remedy.—London, May 13: Signs of a Storm—Lavalette is to *achever l'Homme malade*—Russian Movements of Troops—England hopes for German Assistance—Persigny's Difficulties.—London, May 19: Gortschakoff's Proposal of an *Enquête internationale* into the Condition of the Christians in Turkey—View of this Proposal—The Garibaldian Campaign—Russia's Protest—Mutual Suspicions of England and France—Brunnow's Criticism.—London, May 26: Malmesbury's Recapitulation of Events—Italy freed by a Woman's Intrigue—A *Diplomate en jupons* on French Ambition and Palmerston's Readiness for War.

London: March 5, 1860.

GERMAN diplomacy here has not been idle, though unable to display its activity officially. Whether its efforts have been successful, will be seen by to-night's proceedings in the House of Commons.

Since the Savoy question first loomed above the political horizon, no efforts have been spared to open the eyes of statesmen in this country, who, as a rule, are indifferent to foreign politics.

The French Emperor's Speech from the Throne and Thouvenel's despatch of February 24, which has been published in the 'Moniteur,' complete the Blue-book just laid before Parliament, and confirm the apprehensions I expressed some weeks ago. The Government would gladly follow the policy of the ostrich; but facts are facts, and all possibility of affecting any further confidence has disappeared. The mask has fallen off. 'Geographical necessity' is an argument that admits of too serious extension to be disregarded.

The Prussian Minister alone was in a position to act officially. By the orders of his Government, he has energetically questioned both Palmerston and Russell as to England's future course of action. He has insisted that Prussia is entitled to press for a distinct answer. She must know whether and how far she can rely on England, in case the geographical necessity of natural frontiers shall be applied

to Germany. As was to be expected, both Ministers have given not so much an evasive as a negative reply: England was not in the habit of binding her hands for future eventualities, and would not enter into any kind of engagement. Bernstorff answered that his Government required no engagement for the future, but only an unequivocal answer to the burning question of the day, whether England, as a guaranteeing party to the Treaties of 1815, would allow Savoy to be annexed without a protest? Hitherto all efforts have failed to convince the English Government of the necessity of such a vindication of public law. Nothing, therefore, is left but to force the Ministers, if possible, by means of Parliament to do what they will not do of their own accord. A week ago there seemed little chance of succeeding in this attempt. The Conservatives, discouraged by their defeats, had lost confidence in their leaders. But since the publication of the French Speech from the Throne a reaction has taken place, which augurs ill for the Ministers. The speeches of Sir Robert Peel and Lord John Manners have inflamed, and Bright's tactless ebullition of 'Perish Savoy!' which was disavowed by Lord John Russell and approved only by Gladstone, has embittered this feeling of hostility to the Government.[1] The only thing now is to take advantage of this reaction in time.

The Duchess of Wellington had arranged the day before yesterday a grand evening party in honour of the Prince of Orange, which gave me an opportunity of sounding the leading members of both Houses. Count Bernstorff undertook to enlighten Lord Malmesbury on the situation, and requested him in plain terms to move a protest in the House of Lords against the annexation of Savoy. I endeavoured to gain over

[1] For an account of this sitting see Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, vol. ii. p. 218.

Lord Lyndhurst and Lord Grey to this idea. The latter was afraid it was too late, a fear which I endeavoured, not altogether unsuccessfully, to dispel by observing that it is never too late to mend. Sir Robert Peel also, still elated at his recent success, was armed with the necessary weapons for a new attack. One of my colleagues hinted to me privately whether it would not be possible to carry an Address praying the Queen to command the Government to protest.

Having slept over the matter, I resolved to discuss this idea with Disraeli in another form. When I called upon him yesterday, he had given his servants orders to say he was engaged, but that he would be glad to see me if I called. I was admitted at once.

'I bring you a suggestion,' I said, 'although you will hardly need one. The House of Commons has been talking quite enough about Savoy. It is time to act. As far as I know, the Ministers intend to-morrow (that is, to-day) to move an Address, praying the Queen to agree to the Treaty of Commerce. Would it be impossible to carry an amendment and pray her Majesty at the same time to protest formally against the annexation of Savoy? The reasons for this step I need not enlarge upon. It is a question of honour for the nation, the House, and, above all, for the Conservative party. Rightly or wrongly, the French Treaty is regarded as merely a bribe to purchase the assent of the House of Commons to this flagrant breach of international faith. Is it not clearly the duty of the English Parliament to give practical proof that it considers it beneath its dignity to be a party to such a transaction? A protest is no declaration of war, but a vindication of law. Did not Lord Malmesbury protest last year against the French troops marching through the neutral territory of Savoy? There we have a precedent. If Eng-

land boldly takes the lead, Prussia, Austria, and Russia will follow. Now or never is the moment for a leader of genius to come forward. Would it not be a grand triumph to achieve at length a victory after two lost battles? And what do you risk? Absolutely nothing. In all probability the Ministers will not even venture to oppose you. Lord John has tied his hands by his recent declarations. If the forms of the House do not permit such an amendment, what would prevent you from laying this prayer on behalf of public rights at the steps of the Throne in a separate but simultaneous Address?'

Disraeli had followed my remarks with the utmost attention. He thanked me most warmly, and called the suggestion a 'capital and most excellent idea.'

'You come,' he said, 'at the nick of time. I have just received a request from Lord Derby to speak with him about to-night's debate on the question of Savoy.[1] In my opinion, there is no objection to an amendment such as you propose. Should the Ministers be compelled to accept it, we should gain a real triumph.'

Seymour Fitzgerald also has been won over to this idea. He knows that Lord John Russell, when giving the reins to his optimism on the occasion of Kinglake's motion on February 28, had been for two days in possession of Thouvenel's despatch of the 24th. The French Ambassador is foaming with rage, and does not hide his anger either from the Ministers or any one else. He declares that Lord John has exposed his Imperial master in the most unjustifiable manner. At an interview yesterday with Lord Palmerston, Persigny was so violent, and declaimed so loudly, that we who were standing by could distinctly hear the words, 'La

[1] Concerning Lord Derby's view of the situation, compare his letter to Lord Malmesbury of the same day, *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, vol. ii. p. 218.

Savoie? Mon Dieu! Tout cela a été arrangé préalablement avec la Sardaigne. Vous n'avez rien à y voir. Les anciens traités n'existent plus. Un nouvel ordre de choses a été créé en Italie et nous oblige à réclamer de nouvelles garanties.'

Austria does not quit her attitude of reserve. The Vienna Cabinet is, perhaps, not sorry to see Sardinia weakened by obtaining a second open frontier. Others think it is only making use of the Savoy question as a means of negotiation, in order to obtain material concessions from France. However that may be, a real agreement between Austria and France is conceivable only at the expense of England.

As matters stand at present, there is only *one* power capable of crying halt to Bonapartist aggression—the British Parliament.

London: March 19, 1860.

The reply to M. de Thouvenel's despatch, communicated to Lord John Russell by Count Persigny on the 15th inst., was discussed at a Cabinet Council the day before yesterday. Lord John Russell and Sir G. Cornewall Lewis were prevented by indisposition from taking part in this important discussion; as was also Lord Granville, who has not yet returned to town since the death of his wife a few days ago. The absence of the Foreign and Home Secretaries has given rise to the report that each had tendered his resignation; the former in consequence of a serious difference of opinion with the Prime Minister, and the latter from his declining to undertake any longer the responsibility for Gladstone's financial scheme, which he has disapproved from the beginning. The resignation of Sir G. Cornewall Lewis is expressly denied in the 'Observer.' That Lord John Russell, who has been unwell for some days, should have been anxious to spare himself for the

second reading of his Reform Bill, is in itself not improbable. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that his conduct at Friday's sitting may have led to a serious difference with Lord Palmerston. 'Unexpected revelations' are scarcely in harmony with the customary traditions of this country. When Lord John imparted to the House of Commons last Friday (March 16) his criticism on Thouvenel's despatch, that despatch had been for twenty-four hours in his hands. It is asked what induced the Foreign Secretary to keep back so momentous a document from his colleagues, and communicate it to the House without the knowledge of the Cabinet. In support of the conjecture just referred to, people call to mind his violent attack on Count Cavour, so strangely contrasting with Lord Palmerston's eulogies of that statesman. Some declare that the reason of the disagreement between the two leading Ministers lies still deeper. Lord Palmerston, when the last Derby Ministry was in office, had already, after his visit to Compiègne, engaged in a private correspondence with the Emperor Napoleon. Lord John is said to have now discovered that the noble Viscount continued this correspondence after his becoming Prime Minister, and that behind the backs of his colleagues. Shortly before or after Napoleon's New Year's speech to Baron Hübner, Lord Palmerston is said to have declared that if the Emperor demanded Savoy and Nice, their annexation was too unimportant to entitle England to object. Since then Palmerston's view may have been materially modified, as indeed his speech on Tuesday proves. His intimate friends will have noticed the day before yesterday a very plain display of ill-temper on the part of the Premier against his Imperial friend.

A serious embarrassment for the Cabinet arises out of the protest of Switzerland. Lord John had distinctly promised

in the House of Commons, in reference to the neutral districts of Chablais and Faucigny, to guard the rights of the Confederation. He now excuses himself on the ground that Switzerland has opened direct negotiations with France, and only invoked the assistance of the other Great Powers, after those negotiations were broken off, when it was too late. That Swiss diplomacy had been duped in Paris is very likely; it is not the only victim. The assertion, however, that the Federal Government in Berne has sounded the alarm too late is refuted by the documents published by the English Government itself.

In any case we have now reached a crisis, and everything points to that of 1853. Just as the Crimean War was in great manner brought about by the influence the Emperor Nicholas wrongly ascribed to Bright and Cobden, the peace apostles of the Manchester school, so the Emperor Napoleon to-day, deluded by the financial scheme of Gladstone, the acceptance of the Commercial Treaty, and the attitude of Lord Palmerston, may easily deceive himself as to the real temper of England.

The situation, as viewed in a quarter raised above the gusts of party passion, is considered very grave. The Government, says Prince Albert, have committed blunder upon blunder, and allowed themselves to be completely gulled. All their present efforts to maintain peace may only tend to hasten the outbreak of war, and, unhappily, the first cannon shot will find England unprepared.

Persigny is again in the utmost state of excitement. His poor Emperor, he says, is far too kind. He has been anxious to please all, French, English, Italians, and Swiss, and has pleased nobody. Hence all these difficulties.

A weatherwise prophet declared yesterday that in six

weeks the Ambassadors in Paris and London would each demand their passports.

London: March 25, 1860.

Lord John Russell's reply to Thouvenel's despatch of the 13th is probably, though Persigny doubted it, on its way. It repeats all the objections already urged to the annexation of Savoy. The question of Chablais and Faucigny, raised by the protest of the Swiss Federal Council, has been reserved for a separate despatch, which does not appear to have yet been sent. Lord John Russell the day before yesterday threatened the French Ambassador with a formal protest against the acquisition of these neutralised districts. The Ambassador is said to have replied that such a protest would be regarded as a declaration of war; France could not retreat from her position; the English Ministers came too late, and had only themselves to blame for it. That public opinion and the British House of Commons would attach such great importance to the question of Savoy could never have been foreseen in Paris. The matter was now concluded; Napoleon had received the deputation from Savoy, and could not possibly abandon the project, simply to keep Lord Palmerston at the helm. As Lord John Russell finally promised to submit these statements of the Ambassador to the Cabinet, Persigny flatters himself he has obtained a milder treatment of the matter. The Foreign Secretary personally is resolved to adopt a very decided attitude towards France. He complains all the more of the passive conduct of Russia, the vacillation of Austria and Prussia, and the disunion of Germany.

Russia has declared that she had generally no objection to make to the cession of Savoy and Nice. Every Sovereign had the right to cede his country to another. Switzerland had no

ground for complaining, provided that France undertook the same obligations ('les mêmes servitudes') which now bound Sardinia in respect of the Confederation. This provision is said to have been fulfilled. The replies of Austria and Prussia are not yet forthcoming.

With regard to the supposed French sympathies of the minor States of Germany, particularly Würtemberg, some unpleasant rumours are again afloat. A scapegoat is evidently wanted. The English Government would like to lay the blame elsewhere, since it is their own policy, or rather the want of any rational policy, which really did the mischief, and apparently made Napoleon the dictator of Europe. That Austria should not have been in a hurry to pull the chestnuts out of the fire is natural. It will be impossible to terminate the now daily growing confusion until the Anglo-French alliance is recognised as a fiction.

During to-day's Drawing-room, Lord Palmerston made an incredible scene with the harmless Neapolitan Envoy. He told him in Italian that Naples had only the choice between reforming her Government or changing the dynasty, and that the latter step would be hailed with loud approval in England. The poor old Chevalier had shortly before received by telegraph his recall. He was, therefore, the less in a mood to meet this unexpected attack with a plucky reply. Taken in connection with the unaccounted-for despatch of the English fleet to Naples, this scene is regarded as a prelude to an occupation of Sicily.

'The example set by France,' said Baron Rothschild to me this evening, 'is suspiciously contagious. It cannot be wondered at, if England makes use of the first opportunity to take possession of Sicily and Egypt. Just as little could the United States be now prevented from annexing Cuba.'

London: April 16, 1860.

I have taken advantage of a short trip to Paris during the recess of Parliament to ascertain to some extent the situation there.

Prince Metternich was unwell and confined to his room, and so I was able to speak with him undisturbed. Altogether the Austrian Ambassador described the relations between the two Imperial Courts as, outwardly and apparently at least, satisfactory. He was awaiting a messenger of whom he had been advised by telegraph. The last one, who arrived on March 29, brought Rechberg's answer to Thouvenel's despatch of the 13th—an answer which has given satisfaction to France. In a confidential despatch of March 21, Thouvenel had taken note with pleasure of the verbal assurances given to the Marquis de Moustier by the Emperor Francis Joseph. His Majesty had repeated to the French Ambassador that he would persevere in his policy of reserve in regard to Italy, and avoid anything which might provoke a rupture with France. Thouvenel, in commending the wisdom of these words, insisted that France demanded no surrender of principles, but only regarded the Austrian policy of waiting as one required by the well-understood interests of the two Imperial Courts. The Emperor Napoleon wished for nothing so much as 'de pouvoir dégager sa responsabilité en retirant ses troupes de la Lombardie.' Rechberg accepts this assurance as satisfactory. He states plainly that Austria considers everything done by Piedmont in contravention of old and new treaties, as existing only *de facto*, not *de jure*. At the same time, he expresses his expectation that the Emperor Napoleon will be taught by events that the course adopted by Piedmont 'avec un cynisme révoltant' can never lead to the restoration of peace in Italy.

Since then Prince Metternich has been instructed to request a further explanation respecting the non-withdrawal of the French troops and the support given to Sardinia in arms and ammunition. The Austrian Ambassador has received the most conclusive assurances. He is convinced that by the end of May the French troops will have completely evacuated the territory of Milan. Reasonable as appear the demands of the French Government which have been communicated to Turin, still Cavour, long since mastered by the Revolution, is no longer in a position to comply with them. The French Cabinet demands the speedy settlement of the Savoy question, and recommends the adjournment of the Turin Parliament, since Victor Emmanuel, as in the late war, must be dictator, if a settlement is to be arrived at with regard to the newly acquired possessions.

Prince Metternich thinks it very likely that Lombardy and Parma have been guaranteed to Sardinia in a secret article of the Franco-Sardinian Treaty of the 24th inst.; but he considers it impossible that this guarantee should have been extended to Modena and Tuscany. He places entire confidence in Thouvenel's asseveration that the Emperor Napoleon desired nothing more ardently than to leave Victor Emmanuel to his fate, and would do everything to prevent an attack on Venetia and a fresh outbreak of war in Italy.

From a despatch of the Austrian Ambassador in Rome, communicated to Prince Metternich only for his information, I gathered that Cardinal Antonelli entertains the most serious anxiety, and regards the removal of the Pope as a not unlikely eventuality. A Papal steamer is lying in readiness, and the British *chargé d'affaires*, Odo Russell, has placed an English man-of-war at the disposal of his Holiness. The question where the Pope shall go to has been searchingly

discussed. Antonelli has stated in plain terms that France is out of the question; Pius IX. would never place himself under the protection of that Power. He had no desire to embarrass Austria, and would, therefore, choose Spain as a refuge, in case of need.

General Lamoricière has gone to Rome and taken over the command of the Papal troops. Trustworthy private letters confirm the announcement in the newspapers that the General has expressed a very favourable opinion of the abundant material for war which he has found there, as well as of the troops themselves. Neither Lamoricière nor his aide-de-camp, the Marquis de Pimodan, has asked the French Emperor's leave, but this has been obtained since their appointment, through the Pope. Napoleon 'fait bonne mine à mauvais jeu,' and leaves all French officers at liberty to follow the Orleanist general, whether for the sake of preparing difficulties for the party of Revolution in Italy, or of enabling the withdrawal of the French garrison from Rome.

London: April 18, 1860.

An Austrian messenger who arrived here yesterday brings no new proposals respecting the Swiss affair. Lord John Russell's suggestion that the Conference should meet at Brussels must be regarded as having failed. Napoleon refuses to appear as defendant before a European Areopagus, and states that he will take no part in a Conference unless it is held in Paris, and after full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty of March 24. Switzerland rejects the offer of sham concessions, and prefers to bow to *force majeure* under protest. She demands as a *sine quâ non* the shore of the Lake of Geneva and the Simplon Pass. The rumour of an agreement having been effected was denied yesterday in a telegram from Berne.

The idea of a programme for the Conference has been shipwrecked at St. Petersburg.

London: April 22, 1860.

On the 8th inst., the day before Persigny's departure, a Conference was held at the French Embassy, to attend which Lord John Russell came to town from Pembroke Lodge. Besides the Secretary of State and the Ambassador, the only other person who was there was the Swiss plenipotentiary, M. de la Rive.

After the latter had, in pursuance of his instructions, declined all illusory concessions and demanded a strong strategic frontier for Switzerland, he declared that the Confederation would yield to superior force, abandon their former neutrality, and by joining Germany avoid the inconveniences accruing to her from the cession of the neutralised portion of Savoy. Persigny, thereupon, is said to have seized his pen and asked, 'Voyons, qu'est-ce qu'il vous faut?' The Swiss plenipotentiary remarked that he was not instructed to define the strategic frontier. The French Ambassador, however, did not forbear to point out the Savoy shore of the Lake of Geneva and the Simplon Pass as points the possession of which must be assured to Switzerland. He promised at the same time to represent this demand personally to the Emperor Napoleon in Paris. Lord John, sanguine as ever, expressed his expectation that Persigny would succeed in arranging a peaceful agreement on this basis. The result has not corresponded with this expectation. Thouvenel threatened to resign if the Emperor listened to Persigny. Lord John throws the blame on Persigny, who, he says, by his over-zealous advocacy of the English view, has rather marred than mended the matter. Persigny's prophecy, that the rejection of the Swiss demands would result in a war with England

within six months, may have only strengthened Napoleon in his opposition. The fact is, that Persigny, notwithstanding the threats which he scattered about here some time ago, is convinced that his Emperor is quite unable to carry on a war with England, and would pay for a rupture within a twelvemonth with his crown. Such, at least, was the language he used to one of his intimate friends shortly before his departure.

Meanwhile, the French Court is doing everything to affect an intimacy, which in reality does not exist, with the Austrian Court. Metternich may insist as pointedly as he will on the radical difference between the Austrian and French views of the situation, still Napoleon and his Ministers vie with each other in eulogising the loyalty and consistency of Austria's policy.

The rumour, originating in Paris, that the Austrian Cabinet has entirely adopted Russia's view of the question of Savoy, is denied to-day in the 'Times,' on the authority of Count Rechberg.

Although as yet there are no traces of a *rapprochement* of England towards Austria, in the sense of Lord John Russell's speech of March 26, the reasons for desiring it are hardly to be looked for in any fear lest the intimacy with Austria, now affected in Paris, might injure English interests. People here know what to think of that, and have long ago seen through French feints. The difficulty lies partly in the Italian sympathies of the English Ministers, partly in their doubts as to the present fitness of Austria for an alliance. Palmerston has had a very searching discussion of the question a few days ago with a statesman who is thoroughly versed in Continental affairs.[1] He designated at once the news of comprehensive

[1] Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, formerly British Ambassador in Constantinople.

concessions being about to be granted to the Hungarians as a turning-point full of momentous consequences to Europe. All he wished was that Austria should become strong. At present French influence was weighing on the Cabinet of Vienna. Menaced on all sides, that Cabinet found itself in the lamentable position of allowing the Emperor Napoleon to play the welcome part of mediator between the Emperor Francis Joseph and his subjects. 'How can you wish,' exclaimed the Premier, 'that we should conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with a Power so threatened, from within and without, as Austria is to-day?' With regard to Lord John Russell's statement on March 26, Lord Palmerston observed at the same interview, 'I should have said the same thing myself, only in other words.' The noble Viscount showed a confidence in the stability of his Ministry, which his friend did not share, although during the last few days the relations of the majority of the Cabinet with the Prime Minister have become more harmonious. The so-called Court Party is indignant at Lord John's statement on the 26th, which it appears he was not authorised by the Cabinet to make. New intrigues are suspected, and it is feared that the Foreign Secretary will employ the present feeling against France to bring about a crisis in the Cabinet and turn it to his own advantage. With regard to this anti-French feeling of the country, Palmerston does not indulge in any illusion. In his opinion, war could be made inevitable in a few weeks, if it were useful to do so. He thinks, however, that the hour has not yet come, and considers it his duty to moderate warlike passions, since an isolated and ill-timed striking out would not be in the interest of England.

In the light of these utterances, confidentially imparted and to be taken *cum grano salis*, it cannot be wondered that

Lord John Russell's interviews with Apponyi have hitherto remained without result. It is not to be denied that Austria would make a more or less distinctly formulated guarantee of her present possessions in Italy the vital condition of a *rapprochement* with England. A desire of that kind has been put forward indirectly, but indirectly declined. Lord John fully understands that Austria, under present circumstances, must do everything to prevent a new French campaign in Italy.

The main reason which made the British Cabinet desire closer relations with Austria has ceased to operate during the last few days. The lately threatening storm in the East has blown over. The Emperor Napoleon may have foreseen the danger, and done all in his power to pacify the distrust in England. Lavalette is said to be returning at once to Constantinople. His instructions enjoin him most peremptorily to maintain the *status quo*. Lord Cowley, to whom they have been communicated, expresses his extreme satisfaction at them, and is convinced that France will now go hand in hand in the East with Austria and England.

London: April 30, 1860.

Unless some unforeseen piece of luck occurs, the Palmerston-Russell Ministry, as now constituted, can hardly live to see the end of the Session. The 'little Bill,' as Lord John recently, in a flight of well-calculated modesty, named his Reform Bill, is a stone of Sisyphus, and at the same time an apple of discord, which threatens to produce a split in the Ministry. The Cabinet Councils repeatedly held during the last ten days or fortnight have only established the irreconcilable antagonism between Lord John and his colleagues. The clever, if not exactly brilliant, tactics of the Opposition

are quietly enjoying a decisive victory. The House of Commons, now scarcely two years old, is still too young and full of life to perform the act of suicide which is desired of it. The second reading, which has been postponed from day to day, could only be carried under the tacit understanding that the Bill is not to pass through Committee. Lord Palmerston condemns in Parliament the dilatory tactics of Disraeli, but in secret he is rubbing his hands. Backed by the majority of his Cabinet, he has attempted to convince Lord John of the necessity of comprehensive concessions. His attempts as yet have been in vain. Lord John considers himself personally pledged, and if the Cabinet persists in refusing to accept the pledge in its entirety, he will probably resign, and in so doing cause the Ministry to be divided, if not actually to fall to pieces. In addition to this discomfiture of the Reformer, a further defeat awaits him on the field of foreign policy. Nobody any longer believes that he will succeed in obtaining adequate guarantees for Switzerland. Thus, under the calm, not to say apathy, now prevailing in Parliament, undeniable dangers lie hid. To-day's 'Times' already sounds plainly enough the death-knell of the 'little Bill,' and implores both Ministers and Opposition to bring the troublesome question of Reform to something like a decent conclusion, in order not to let the present Session be wholly wasted.

The suicide of Baron Bruck gives the newspapers here another opportunity of venting their spleen against Austria and the Austrian system.

An article in the 'Observer' reproduces the view of the Prime Minister which I stated in my letter of the 22nd. The theory that Austria can never become strong till she surrenders Venetia and her position in Germany, is nothing new. When

this theory is preached by men who see in Herr von Vincke the statesman of the future—the only man who could achieve the union of Germany—it is simply a proof of their ignorance of our affairs.

A letter in the 'Nazione' of Trieste, though written by a hostile hand, throws a side light on the secret history of the late campaign. Is it true that Napoleon at Villafranca had been the first to draw attention to the frauds which explain the defective equipment and commissariat of the Austrian troops? Was it the urgent representations of Baron Bruck with reference to the financial condition of the Empire that really determined the precipitate conclusion of the armistice? If so, there is only too good reason to suspect that the Emperor of Austria and his brave army have been the victims of a dark conspiracy.

The manning of the Navy continues to cause serious embarrassment to the Government. The veteran Lord Lyndhurst intends to raise a debate immediately on this important question in the House of Lords.

London: May 1, 1860.

After the Queen had left the dinner table, Prince Albert yesterday had a confidential talk with me.

I found his Royal Highness in very low spirits. Speaking from the impressions I had recently formed in Paris, I threw out the conjecture that peace would not be disturbed till next spring.

The Prince shared this hope, but remarked, not without bitterness, 'By that time the Piedmontese will have been able to gain a sufficiently strong footing in Italy to venture an attack on Venetia. By that time also the Franco-Danish alliance will have ripened, the object of which is to occupy a portion of the German forces in Holstein. Then, as any one can fore-

see, will come the moment for Napoleon to deal his premeditated blow against the Rhine. England will be obliged to look on. We are kept in check in the South by the Italian sympathies of our Ministers, and in the North by the London Treaty of 1852, which guarantees the integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark. Even the French Treaty of Commerce will be perverted into a means of keeping down the warlike spirit of the nation. Our merchants and manufacturers are promising themselves mountains of gold out of it. As to the value of patriotism and loyalty nowadays, Bright gave us lately a pretty edifying illustration on the occasion of the Savoy affair.'

That Napoleon would wait for the death of King Leopold, before proceeding to annex Belgium, the Prince considered probable. The news that the Government of Hesse-Cassel had declared its readiness to comply with the wishes of the Estates, had not yet reached his Royal Highness, and was received with scepticism.

The Prince commented not without severity on the recent proceedings in Vienna. 'These are the fruits,' he said, 'of a system overduly admired. They will surely now acknowledge that nothing can be done by pure repression and an aping of French centralisation. Against the bleeding process performed by Schwarzenberg I have nothing to say. It was the only means of resuscitating the Empire after its serious stroke in 1848. But when this treatment is continued for eleven years, and no better way is found of curing the patient than Russian bayonets and the unhappy Concordat, the State doctors of Austria have given a grievous proof of their poverty of resource.'

In reply to this criticism, I did not omit to point out how it was scarcely possible to estimate the difficulties of the present problem unless one had lived in Vienna during the events

of 1848–1849. If Bach and Bruck had abused the confidence of their Imperial master, it must not be forgotten that both of those 'men of the people' had been designated by public opinion as the ablest men for their posts. Could any one now wonder if the aristocracy, who were decried as reactionary, were confirmed in their distrust of Liberal upstarts?

As regards the danger of a Danish attack on Holstein, it is known already that the rumour of an offensive and defensive alliance has been denied, not without ostentation, by the newspapers in Copenhagen as well as in Paris. When Thouvenel gratuitously assures Count Pourtales, that France has no time to trouble herself about the Danish question, and no intention of mixing herself up in it, his assurance will hardly suffice to reassure. Germany can in this matter reckon neither on the sympathies of Russia nor of England. My Prussian colleague, who is personally not at all inclined in favour of Denmark, has found it expedient to recommend the greatest caution, since a precipitate Federal execution might easily force Denmark into the arms of France. He has represented, moreover, that such a step would be condemned by all parties in England, just as last year they condemned Austria for taking the offensive in Italy.

In spite of Wodehouse's answer yesterday, I think I can assure you that the Government have abandoned all opposition to the choice of Paris for the sittings of the Conference. They will insist on a strategic frontier for Switzerland, in the sense of Lord Palmerston's Memorandum, and, if that is rejected, they will refuse to recognise the cession of Savoy and Nice. What importance would be attached in Paris to such non-recognition, is another question. The British Ministers may change their minds, if the Conference actually takes place between the 15th and 20th.

Prussia, within the last few days, has urgently recommended to the English Government a correct attitude towards Naples.

London: May 6, 1860.

Cavour's urgent protest against the withdrawal of the French troops from Italy, is explained by his threatened position in the Turin Parliament. He is evidently anxious to secure support. The fear expressed by the Sardinian Minister in London, that his chief may be forced to bow to the storm of party passion, now at riot, seems sincere. Under these circumstances, it is intelligible enough that the Government at Turin should seek to shake off Garibaldi. The guerilla leader had threatened an invasion of Umbria. As Victor Emmanuel flatly forbade such a step, Garibaldi declared he would go to Sicily. Under pressure from England, the Sardinian Government seems to be opposing the projected expedition, but not to desire to put any difficulties in the way of Garibaldi's going thither personally. Yesterday, as Sir James Hudson telegraphs, he was still in Genoa.

A rumour comes from Paris that Napoleon may possibly be inclined to give an ear to Garibaldi's urgent entreaties, on the ground that the Italian question must be settled at any cost, owing to the serious state of things at Constantinople.

The latest reports of Lavalette's mission strangely belie the blissful confidence which the British Cabinet has derived from the instructions to that Ambassador, communicated to Lord Cowley. It is said that Lavalette himself attaches no weight to these ostensible instructions, but requires explicit orders. He has been mindful in this respect of his recall in 1853, and, while regarding his reappointment

as a proof that justice is now done to his former conduct, he has emphatically stated that he cannot undertake the responsibility, unless he has clear and precise instructions. Thouvenel is said to have replied that this is impossible, as the Ambassador, in the midst of the crisis now threatening the East, must be left to deal with circumstances at his own discretion. If, therefore, it would seem that Lord Cowley is being mystified at Paris, *raison de plus* for attentively watching all that is passing on the Bosphorus, as the best means of gauging the degree of intimacy in the relations between Russia and France.

Notwithstanding the remonstrances of Austria, England insists on the admission of Sardinia to the Conference, in order to give Cavour an opportunity to define more closely the neutrality of Chablais and Faucigny, for which he is supposed to stipulate.

With regard to Switzerland, M. de la Rive does not abandon his hopes of obtaining material guarantees.

London: May 10, 1860.

The telegram received here yesterday from the British Consul in Genoa confirms the French news of Garibaldi's embarkation. The Sardinian Government had closed the harbour, in order to prevent the expedition from leaving. Garibaldi, however, conveyed his volunteers, furnished with arms and ammunition, in small boats, on board two steamers lying outside the bay, which were nominally intended for Malta. The number embarked is computed not at 3,000, but only at 1,000 men, but it is supposed they will receive additions on the way. Garibaldi is said to have retired from the Sardinian service. The flagrant connivance of the Sardinian Government in his present expedition is excused

by the circumstance that Garibaldi, a native of Nice, has ceased to be a subject of Victor Emmanuel.

That the English Government should oppose this piratical enterprise is not to be expected. Lord John Russell said yesterday to one of my colleagues, that the King of Naples must be left to defend himself against his enemies. Whether this expedition is really intended for Sicily is doubtful. Some think it not impossible that a landing may be first meditated on the undefended coasts of Calabria, as a diversion in favour of the Sicilians. The newly appointed Neapolitan Envoy, Count Ludolf, arrived here two days ago, and was to be received to-day by Lord John Russell. His task is neither easy nor enviable.

Persigny returned yesterday morning, and in the evening appeared at a Court concert. He is praised for his mild and conciliatory language, which, however, is said not to correspond with the contents of a tolerably bitter despatch which he brings with him from Thouvenel.

A private letter of Guizot's contemplates the outbreak of war next autumn. This prophecy is in contradiction to the official news from Paris.

London: May 11, 1860.

The ideas developed in Count Rechberg's private letter to the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin have now been reproduced in a despatch which Count Apponyi is to communicate to-day to Lord John Russell. The British Ambassador in Vienna, like Lord John here, had repeatedly expressed the expectation that a French attack on Belgium or the Rhine provinces would find Austria and England resolved on a common opposition. Count Rechberg answers that the views of Herr von Vincke and his associates, so recklessly paraded in the Prussian Chamber, would be hardly qualified to render

possible a combination of the military forces of Central Europe in a war against France. Just as little, he says, is the Prussian propaganda of British agents in the minor States of Germany calculated to awaken confidence on the part of Austria. If Vincke's ideas were sought to be carried out in Berlin, the minor States would never voluntarily submit to Prussia. In the case, anticipated by England, of an attack on the Rhine, either the minor States, therefore, or Prussia herself, might be forced into an alliance with France. Either of these eventualities would render impossible the defence of the Rhine provinces, so desirable in the interests of European peace.

With regard to the Swiss question, Count Rechberg resumed his pen on May 3, for the purpose of combating English illusions. The Austrian Foreign Minister does not think that any serious guarantees for the neutrality of Switzerland could be obtained by means of a European Conference. Lord John Russell will scarcely perceive in this despatch, which was communicated to him to-day, the irony with which the contradictions are exposed, out of which the British Cabinet is vainly seeking an escape. The possession of Savoy by France, writes Rechberg, was a menace in reality to the neutrality of Switzerland. England herself had enabled France to annex Savoy, by having furthered the aggrandisements of Sardinia, in defiance of the Treaty of Zurich. Geneva, Valais, and Vaud were strategically commanded by the new frontier. It would be a sheer delusion to imagine that the surrender of a little strip of land on the shore of the Lake of Geneva would afford any material security to those three cantons. What was the use of a Conference for such a trifling matter? Had they not tied their hands beforehand, and limited the action of the Four Powers to friendly

representations? And if France declined to listen to these friendly representations, what then? It was only by way of direct negotiation that Switzerland could hope to effect an understanding with her powerful neighbour. Austria would not hold aloof from the Conference, if all the Powers desired one, but she could not entertain any prospect of its success. The despatch concludes with a repeated protest against the admission of Sardinia, and refers to earlier declarations on that subject.

The Conference must, accordingly, be regarded as collapsed. Nobody here seems to have expected any practical result from it. The Government would, nevertheless, have welcomed it as a means of staving off Parliamentary criticism.

In Paris, during the last few days, an extremely warlike feeling has manifested itself against Prussia. There is a talk, among other things, of demanding back the fortress of Landau, and it is stated that anti-Prussian pamphlets and papers are being distributed among the soldiers.

A rumour is current of an intended interview between the Emperors Napoleon and Alexander at Nice, under the pretext of paying a visit to the Dowager Empress of Russia. The object of this interview is stated to be the settlement of the Turkish question. People are asking whether Budberg's journey is connected with it.

The rejection by a majority of only nine[1] of Sir Stafford Northcote's amendment on the third reading of Gladstone's Bill for repealing the Paper Duty, is due to accidental circumstances, to which alone the Ministry are indebted for this miserable victory. Thirty Conservative members, all of

[1] 219 against 210. One member, however, Mr. Herbert Ingram, voted with the minority by mistake. The amendment on the second reading had been rejected by a majority of 53.

whom intended to vote against Gladstone, came up to town too late. The leaders of the Opposition were anxious to force a Ministerial crisis. The rejection of the Bill would have so shaken the ingenious financial scheme of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that his resignation could hardly have been avoided. Lord Palmerston's friends complain loudly of Gladstone's obstinacy. The Premier and the other Ministers, like the Opposition, do not think the present a right time to give up such a lucrative source of revenue. However, the matter is not yet finally decided. Lord Derby declared yesterday that he will move the rejection of the Paper Duty Bill in the Lords; and, as money bills passed by the Commons are not as a rule objected to by the Peers, his opposition is both unexpected and ominous.

London: May 13, 1860.

The storm raised on the other side of the Channel by restless ambition, and on this side of it by short-sighted infatuation, is growing more threatening every day. Optimism is cooling down. Even Lord Palmerston regards the immediate future as very black. The movements of Russian troops, the extraordinary mission for the protection of the Christians with which Constantinople is menaced, Prince Napoleon's trip to the Bosphorus, the departure of Lavalette—the *agent provocateur*, as Clarendon calls him—are all signs of the coming tempest. Has not Lavalette when passing through Turin disclosed the secret of his mission by the blunt remark 'Je vais à Constantinople pour achever l'homme malade'? Has not the Marquis de Moustier at Vienna, with a feigned air of mystery, given hints of Napoleon's intention, openly avowed to Lord Cowley, of demanding back the frontiers of 1792, and annexing, of course without a war, Saarlouis and Landau? All this has opened the eyes of the most timid, and made it

clear to everyone that the present is not the time for Parliamentary reform and peace budgets, but that the hour has come to prepare for a serious conflict. Napoleon is credited with the wildest schemes of adventure. Some talk of a new Byzantine-Frankish Empire for Prince Napoleon, others of a South-Italian one for Prince Murat, and of the removal of the Pope from Rome to Jerusalem. The fact is that France extends to her Latin co-religionists in the East a most remarkable protection at the expense of the Greek Church. Here would be the point where the seemingly parallel lines of Russian and French policy must cross. This consideration, nevertheless, cannot lessen the anxieties of statesmen in this country. Their eyes revert to Vienna, and they are preaching German unity in the hope of being able to make use of the German armies to resist the threatening Slavo-French attack on Europe. The latest Austrian despatches have given rise to very exhaustive interviews, not only with Lord John, but also with Lord Palmerston.

The policy of the Berlin Cabinet is sharply criticised. Lord John has only lately, in a very earnest despatch, urged the importance of not wasting precious time with side-issues like the Danish and Hesse-Cassel questions, which could only disturb the work of union.

In a similar manner Lord Clarendon spoke to me yesterday with regret of the proceedings at Berlin. 'It is folly,' he said, 'to confound Germany with Italy. Those are not Prussia's friends, but the Republic's, who are giving the Prince Regent the bad advice to look to the people for support against the Government. If a revolution, got up in Berlin, were to spread and meet with general success, it would not stop at the Prussian throne.' I took this opportunity of discussing thoroughly with the former Foreign

Secretary the Hesse-Cassel affair. When he heard that the Constitution of 1831, so extolled by the newspapers in England, taken in connection with the additions made in 1848–49, gave every official, nay, every officer, the right of renouncing his allegiance to the Government, he exclaimed, with a smile, 'If we had such a Constitution here, I should at once refuse to pay income tax, as unconstitutional.'

Persigny has returned empty-handed, as regards Switzerland. It is now denied that he brought with him a menacing despatch. The failure of his journey suffices to explain his uncertain and embarrassed behaviour. The ill-humour he displayed the day before yesterday at the children's ball at Buckingham Palace has been ascribed to the presence of the Orleanist Princes and Princesses. This is a mistake; the Ambassador had been previously apprised of their intended presence, and could easily have found an excuse to stay away. Already at the last Court concert he studiously avoided going near the Queen. His pet theme now is, that France has not a single seaworthy ship, and could not dream of quarrelling with England. Malmesbury and Disraeli told me with a smile that they had taken pains to confirm Persigny in this conviction.

How paradoxical is this Ambassador is shown by his attempt yesterday to prove to one of my German colleagues, in a moment of absence, that the German nation was tired of its Princes. Is this then the latest *parole* gone forth from the Tuileries? or is it merely a personal freak of this eccentric diplomatist?

London: May 19, 1860.

Prince Gortschakoff has addressed a circular despatch to the Russian representatives at the four great Courts, with orders to communicate a copy of it in Vienna, Berlin, Paris,

and London. After an exposition of *gravamina* against the Porte, it proposes an inquiry ('enquête internationale') into the present condition of the Christian populations in the Turkish Empire. The stress laid on the co-operation of France can only have excited unpleasant apprehensions in this country. It is conjectured at once that the basis of this secret Franco-Russian understanding is possibly the agreement of 1829. If this conjecture is well founded, Lord Palmerston has some reason for speaking already of 'gros événements,' even before the Session is over, and preaching not the unity but the union of the German Powers. As a palliative, meanwhile, the Russian proposal of an international Commission of Enquiry has not been unfavourably received. Lord John Russell thinks he ought to support everything which might prevent Russia and France from finding a pretext for direct interference. The Turkish Ambassador, himself a member of the Greek Church, protests against any inquiry as an invasion of the Sultan's sovereign rights.

Garibaldi's expedition has been severely blamed by the Russian Cabinet in its despatches to Turin, and a formal protest has been made against the connivance of Sardinia. Russia's attitude in favour of the King of Naples has made some impression in Paris. It is characteristic of the situation that France and England are mutually accusing each other of having secretly abetted Garibaldi. Notwithstanding all the sympathy shown here to this adventurer, even in the ranks of the Conservative party, it seems scarcely credible that the British Ministers should have ventured to find the large supplies in money which Garibaldi has at his disposal. In Paris it is easier to have recourse to secret funds. Nothing there is thought of a few million francs, when the question is one of securing the advantages which the revolution in Italy

might offer. Nothing is said any longer of an evacuation of Rome. Persigny, on hearing of Garibaldi's departure from Genoa, exclaimed in delight, 'Maintenant il ne peut plus être question pour nous de quitter Rome.'

Baron Brunnow is highly concerned about the King of Naples. The Russian Ambassador has advised Count Ludolf not to be in a hurry with his household arrangements. He regards the present state of confusion as transitory, and, like a true philosopher, thinks that everything depends on knowing how long the world will tolerate such an abnormal state of things. He consoles himself for Lord John's speech of yesterday with his accustomed *bonhomie*. 'For us, who live here,' he said to me, 'all this is easy to bear. Our stomachs are used to this spiced English fare. But if only we had not to write to those who have not yet ruined their digestions and who attach an undue importance to the utterances of British Ministers!'

London: May 26, 1860.

Lord Malmesbury lately recapitulated to me in a confidential conversation the events of last year. 'Ours is a wonderful country,' he remarked. 'We, who boast of being practical in our politics, and of pursuing our ends with rigid consistency, have been forced into paths contrary to all the traditions of our forefathers and all our true interests. And how?—the future historian of our time will not believe it—by a woman's intrigue. Despite the Argus-eyes of Parliament, and our free Press with its thousand tongues, not a soul has a notion of the truth. We have all been humbugged by a beautiful lady who raves about Italy. Lady S——, not Napoleon, has emancipated Italy. The latter would never have gained his end had not we supported him so blindly.'

I quote these words of the former Foreign Secretary as my excuse for repeating a conversation with which Lady S——, the *diplomate en jupons* in question, honoured me yesterday. I am not one of the votaries of the beautiful and amiable Countess, and am not in the habit of talking politics with her. I was surprised, therefore, when she addressed me yesterday in a crowded London ball-room, with words to the following effect:—

'Really, it is too bad! My sister (one of the Queen's Ladies in Waiting) has just returned from a week's visit to Paris, and tells me they are talking there quite openly about seizing Belgium and the Rhine provinces. We knew long ago that they had thoughts of doing so, but even Lord Palmerston is astonished that they should make no secret of their intention.'

'What astonishes *me* most,' I answered, 'is the astonishment of the noble Viscount.'

'I know,' replied the British Egeria, 'you are one of those who do not believe that the Premier will let matters come to an open rupture. He looks on war as certain in a month, or two months at the outside. Nobody would like more than he to "go ahead." But he knows the country and the House of Commons, and is aware that Lord John's speech has caused the most fear and terror among those very men who are accusing the Cabinet of lukewarmness and friendship for Napoleon. The country is not yet prepared for a rupture; nobody has a notion how serious matters are. One instance only, to show you how plain-spoken is Lord Palmerston. General Flahault, as he was about to start for Paris, asked the Premier whether he had any message for the Emperor Napoleon. Lord Palmerston answered: "Repeat to your Emperor Lord John Russell's speech, and tell him that it

expresses my own opinions." "Mais, c'est la guerre?" said the peace-loving general. Lord Palmerston shrugged his shoulders and replied, "Eh bien! si c'est la guerre, c'est la guerre. Que voulez-vous? Nous sommes préparés, et nous l'attendons de pied ferme."'

CHAPTER XX.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.—1860 (*continued*).

London, June 1: Russia's conciliatory Attitude in the Turkish Question—Fall of Palermo — Speculations — A revolutionary Emissary from the Palais Royal to Hungary—Warlike Tone at the Tuileries—The Chinese War—Prussia's Anti-Bonapartist Attitude.—London, June 3: The King of Naples requests French Mediation—England declines to take part in it.—London, June 7: Rumours respecting Italy and Belgium—Palmerston's Difficulties. — London, June 14: Prussian Despatch on the approaching Meeting at Baden-Baden.—London, June 16: The Press on the Meeting at Baden-Baden—Dissensions in the Cabinet.—London, Buckingham Palace, June 19: Prince Albert to Count Vitzthum—Congratulations on the first Confinement of the Princess George of Saxony.—London, July 5: Count Trauttmansdorff's Reports on the Baden-Baden Meeting—Rechberg's Despatch on French Schemes in Hungary and Italy—Favourable Impression—Collapse of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance between Sardinia and Naples.—London, July 9: Lord Palmerston's Resolutions accepted—The Threatened Conflict between the Two Houses avoided—Retrospect of the Session—Conservative Reaction—Debates in the Commons—Mr. Horsman's Speech.—London, July 10: The Prussian *Pro Memoriâ* and Danish Promises—Paget's Appointment as British Minister at Copenhagen—His unprejudiced View of the Question in Dispute.—London, July 15: The Congress and Switzerland—Temporising Policy of the German Great Powers.—London, July 17: Paget's verbal Report on the Danish Question—Statistical Congress in London opened by Prince Albert.—London, July 21: The 'Massacre of the Innocents'—Lord Derby's 'Unparty' Speech—Meeting of the Austrian Emperor and the Prince Regent at Teplitz—Favourable Aspect—French Expedition to Syria.—London, July 25: National Defences and Parties in Parliament—Syria—Naples.—London, July 26: Palmerston's War Speech—Lord John Russell and French Intervention in Syria.—London, July 30: Mission of the Marquis de la Greca—Refusal of English Intervention in Naples—Mysterious *communiqué* in the 'Morning Post'—Collapse of Public Business.—London, July 31: Napoleon's private Letter to Persigny—The Syrian Convention—Lord Dufferin.—London, Aug. 1: Impression produced by the Emperor's Letter to Persigny—*Risum teneatis, amici.*—London, Aug. 3:

Napoleon's Aim defeated—Acceptance of the Proposals respecting the National Defences.—London, Aug. 4: Signing of the Protocol respecting the Syrian Question.—London, Aug. 7: Last Parliamentary Contest of the Session—Ministerial Victory.—London, Aug. 11: Volunteer Review at Holyrood—Reorganisation of the British Army in India—Spain—Syria.

London: June 1, 1860.

THE Porte has refused the 'enquête' demanded by the Russian Government, but declared its readiness to undertake itself the desired inquiry. The Russian Cabinet now proposes to add plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers to the Turkish Commission. A milder tone is being taken in St. Petersburg, the Russian Cabinet being surprised by the co-operation of England with the German Powers, and kept in check by the financial embarrassments of the Empire. The Government here have resolved to go hand in hand with Austria in this question, but they still persist in not understanding that this is scarcely practicable, as long as in Italy they continue to support the revolution against Austria. Hitherto the bitter experiences of the last few months have not yet borne any fruit in this respect. The fall of Palermo is hailed with delight. The 'Times' already regards the throne as vacant, and the Government would like to see it bestowed on the Count of Syracuse, who is considered Liberal, to the exclusion of Victor Emmanuel and Murat. In speculations of this sort it is wholly overlooked that the continuance of the French garrison in Rome is a fact that weighs heavily in the scale. In Paris people adhere to the opinion that all that is passing in Italy, including Garibaldi's expedition, is a preconcerted game between Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel, and in proof of this opinion they point, not unreasonably, to the important supplies of arms and ammunition now drawn by the Sardinian Minister of War from France. Prince Napoleon's

influence becomes daily more palpable. A well-known Socialist, Mathieu, is said to have gone to the East, through Hungary, with the knowledge of the French Emperor. It is supposed that he is to convey to the leaders of the Hungarian party of revolution the instructions of the Palais Royal. Recently, after a small *soirée* at the Tuileries, Napoleon dismissed the Commander of Cherbourg with the words, 'Tenez-vous prêt, le branle-bas général commencera avant l'automne.'

The insolent rejection of the British Ultimatum in Pekin (the 'Times' of the 12th gives the text of this document) has created a not unpleasing sensation in Paris. The now inévitable war with China will occupy the British in the far East. The French contingent taking part in the operations is numerically too insignificant to be taken into account.

It is gratifying that all private news from Paris represent the attitude of the Prince Regent of Prussia as thoroughly hostile to Bonapartist plans. Russian whispers to the contrary have been plentiful at Berlin. Latour d'Auvergne reports, however, that the Prussian Government is completely under English influence, and will in no event separate itself from its German Confederates.

London: June 3, 1860.

The French Ambassador yesterday about noon informed the Foreign Secretary that the King of Naples had requested the mediation of Napoleon. In consequence of that, he said, the French Envoy, in concert with General Filangieri, was engaged in drafting a Constitution for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The King had determined to grant a Constitution, if France would mediate an arrangement with the insurgents in Sicily. This request of his Sicilian Majesty had not yet been answered. Napoleon wished to know, in the first instance, whether England thought of undertaking the

mediation jointly with himself. By eight o'clock the same evening Lord John Russell was able to assure one of my colleagues that England had declined to take any part in a mediation between the King of Naples and his rebellious subjects. Persigny has not neglected to recommend urgently the co-operation of France and England in this affair. From another quarter also it has been represented to the British Minister that the French proposal deserves at least a careful consideration. Is it wished to throw the helpless young King entirely into the arms of France? Is it in England's interest to leave to Napoleon the dictatorship also in the south of the Peninsula which has been so readily conceded to him in the north? Blind hatred has made the leading English Ministers unsusceptible to representations of this kind. They will have nothing to do with the present Neapolitan Government, and refuse to place the smallest confidence in the young King's promises.

London: June 7, 1860.

The interruption of the sanguinary prelude in Sicily suggests reflections. It is asked whether Garibaldi will be found after all to be the mere puppet of Napoleon; whether the conquests he is making for Victor Emmanuel will give Genoa or the island of Sardinia to France; or whether Garibaldi is working in league with Mazzini to erect an Italian republic on the ruins of the Sardinian monarchy? While these riddles are occupying the public mind, the rumour crops up that Victor Emmanuel is seriously ill, that he is troubled with scruples of conscience and desires to be reconciled to the Pope. Can this be connected with the mysterious meeting lately held between Napoleon and Cavour?

Meanwhile events are transpiring nearer home which may

shortly direct attention to the country whose sagacious King is just now staying at Windsor. King Leopold's visit to England is to last a fortnight. May it not then be too late to return to Brussels? His friends find him strikingly aged and weary of governing. Many go so far as to believe that he will rather renounce his crown than embark on a serious struggle to maintain it. The annexation of Belgium is unquestionably on the *tapis* in Paris. Numerous agents are 'working' the clergy, the nobility, and above all the working-classes, and boast of exaggerated success. Napoleon is said to have lately thrown out the remark that if the Belgians were bent on becoming Frenchmen, he could not help it. France had far more general sympathies to rely upon in Belgium than in Savoy and Nice.

'We shall live to see great things in the next few weeks, and those in Belgium,' Lord Derby whispered to me to-day, and shrugged his shoulders when I asked him what England would do.

Lord Wodehouse, in answer to the same question, said yesterday to one of my colleagues, that England would look on. If the Belgians were determined to be annexed, who could prevent it? It was no use reckoning on Germany. Austria would leave Prussia in the lurch on the Rhine, just as Prussia left Austria in the lurch in Italy. Prussia, even in alliance with Germany, could not go to war with France. The Bund existed only in name. The best thing, therefore, would be, to let the readjustment of frontier desired by France be effected without war.

The Radical party, to which Lord Wodehouse swears allegiance, imagines that England can fight the whole of Europe, and can therefore look on with utter indifference at what is passing on the Continent. And yet in the event of an

attempted invasion, as was recently shown in Parliament, scarcely 28,000 or 29,000 of the Queen's troops would be available to defend the United Kingdom!

Under these circumstances Lord Palmerston will prefer to take time by the forelock. He will begin the war, so long as England can still find allies on the Continent, and not wait until France, in alliance with Russia, has succeeded in uniting the whole of Europe against England. Italian sympathies will not make him swerve from this resolve; but, before he can act, the Premier must first have a united Ministry behind him. The present one is seriously menaced. If the Reform Bill, as is thought likely, be abandoned, Lord John Russell is expected to resign. If Gladstone does not obtain the desired satisfaction for the defeat sustained in the House of Lords, his retirement and that of Milner Gibson are considered probable. For Lord John, whom Palmerston wishes to retain, Lord Clarendon would supply an efficient substitute. Gladstone's loss the Premier would scarcely regret. Palmerston and the Tories have so plainly the same interest in the Reform as well as in the Paper Duty question, that he can reckon absolutely on their support against the Radicals. The next few days will tell us something for certain about this.

London: June 14, 1860.

The reasons which induced the Prince Regent of Prussia to accept Napoleon's invitation to the meeting at Baden-Baden have been put before the British Cabinet. From the despatch of Baron Schleinitz of the 6th inst., addressed to Count Bernstorff, I gather that the Prince Regent has chosen to travel by way of Dresden. I abstain, therefore, from giving any analysis of this document. After his refusal, for which reasons were given in the despatch to Count Pourtales of the

9th of May, the acceptance has struck people here and there as strange. Every one who knows the Prince of Prussia is aware that any attempt to effect the restoration of the French frontiers of 1814 will miscarry; Napoleon will return from Baden-Baden convinced that regulations of frontier—in other words, surrenders of German territory — would provoke a national war, to which France cannot venture to expose herself, all the less as her alliance with England is on the eve of dissolution.

London: June 16, 1860.

The meeting at Baden-Baden is fiercely denounced by the newspapers in this country, as might have been expected. It is sought to make the German Princes the scapegoat of the sins of English policy, to which Napoleon owes his present power. These articles serve to indicate the amount of interest taken by the English public in our affairs. Owing to the popular ignorance betrayed directly a question of foreign policy crops up, newspapers like the 'Times' exercise, unfortunately, far too great an influence on public opinion.

Lord Palmerston and the leaders of the Opposition concur in the desire to take the edge off the constitutional quarrel now pending between the two Houses. The question whether the Lords have violated the privileges of the House of Commons by rejecting the Paper Duty Bill, they propose to bury quietly in a Select Committee of Inquiry. Should Gladstone and Milner Gibson make their continuance in office depend on the result of this dispute, the Premier would not break his heart. The Tories, however, are not satisfied with the retirement of these two obnoxious Ministers. Their leaders demand, further, at confidential interviews with Lord Palmerston, the removal of Lord John Russell. Of this, however, there appears no prospect. Lord John has evidently only

consented to the sacrifice of his Reform Bill, to keep himself in office. Lord Palmerston cannot desire such a change. By the removal of Lord John he would be obliged to put himself entirely under the protection of the Opposition. Disraeli could then easily repeat to him, what Palmerston said to the Opposition last year: 'I compel you to remain in office and carry out my policy.'

The Prince Consort to Count Vitzthum.

(Autograph.)

Buckingham Palace: June 19, 1860.

MY DEAR COUNT,

We were very pleased to receive your message,[1] although, like the King's family, we should certainly have preferred a son. The Duc de Malakoff consoled himself under similar circumstances by saying 'que les garçons aiment à courir après les jolies filles,' and we must also content ourselves with this thoroughly French consolation. Pray express our cordial congratulations to all at Dresden.

Yours faithfully,

ALBERT.

London: July 5, 1860.

The day before yesterday an Austrian messenger brought several despatches from Count Rechberg of June 29, enclosing the reports from Count Trauttmansdorff, the Austrian Envoy at the Court of the Grand Duke of Baden, of the 17th and 19th ult.

Count Trauttmansdorff represents the Baden incident in the most pleasing light. The unimpeachable honesty of the Prince Regent has been displayed by the most absolute frankness on his part. His Royal Highness informed Count Trauttmansdorff of all that passed between himself and Napoleon, nor even concealed the scepticism with which he

[1] The first confinement of the Princess George of Saxony.

himself and his allies received the French monarch's stereotyped assurances of peace. The King of Hanover explained his appearance at Baden by his Austrian sympathies. He seems to have expressed the wish to crown the work of unity, commenced in Baden, by a meeting of Princes in Vienna. Count Trauttmansdorff reports with satisfaction the negative result of the meeting, Napoleon not having ventured to come forward with proposals, which, if put into words, would have become open questions.

Out of this meeting at Baden germs have since been developed which may lead to positive results, and which are already beginning to exert a wholesome influence on the policy of the British Cabinet. The latter learnt with delight that Napoleon had missed his object, and, instead of sowing suspicion and discontent, had involuntarily promoted the union of the German Princes in view of the common danger. In consequence of this, the Government hastened to strike a note in Vienna, to which we had not hitherto been accustomed from the organs of Palmerston and Russell. Lord A. Loftus has repeatedly and urgently recommended a confidential interchange of views on all pending questions, as the wish of the British Government. Rechberg, in a confidential despatch of June 29, takes note of this desire and instructs Count Apponyi to inform the Foreign Secretary of the schemes pursued by Napoleon in Hungary and Italy. To the French Emperor's assurances of peace Count Rechberg attaches as little credit as did the Prince Regent and the German Princes in Baden. On the contrary, he is convinced that an attack on the line of the Mincio, together with a simultaneous unchaining of the revolution in Hungary, is a thing resolved upon, and is only the means of conquering the frontier of the Rhine, the voluntary surrender of which it is

hopeless to expect. This despatch has fallen here on carefully prepared ground. King Leopold has not wasted his time, and left on the 30th with the conviction that England will not regard such an enterprise with indifference, but support Austria by force of arms, in case it should appear that the Rhine can only be defended on the Mincio. The King flatters himself that he has received verbal but definite assurances to this effect from the British Ministers. Unfortunately, Count Apponyi cannot yet boast of having received any such assurances. Nevertheless, an improvement is to be observed in the language employed towards him. Lord John Russell already admits that he made a mistake in supposing that an enlarged Sardinia would be strong enough to save the peninsula from French influence. Nay, he has even allowed that limits must be imposed on the right of the populations to determine their own destiny, should the unrestricted exercise of that right endanger the equilibrium and the general interests of Europe. Thus England would never have allowed the National Assembly in Brussels to decide on being annexed to France, or offering the Belgian throne to a French Prince.

No practical value will attach to such glimmerings of a correct political view until Austria and Prussia, united by an offensive and defensive alliance, shall be able to lay the weight of a United Germany into the scales. If this is done, we shall venture to count unreservedly, though not till the hour of danger comes, on England's co-operation against the common enemy.

The attempt of the Neapolitan Government to gain over Sardinia to an offensive and defensive alliance, may be regarded as a failure. Cavour demanded that Naples should promise:—

1. To adopt a common policy against Austria ; in other words, to support the meditated attack on Venetia.

2. To abolish the temporal supremacy of the Pope, or, at least, to restrict his sovereignty to the city of Rome.

3. To recognise the right of the Sicilians to choose their own Government, even in the event of their deciding on being annexed to Sardinia.

In the face of these impossible demands England looks to diplomatic negotiations as the only means of effecting an understanding between the North and South of Italy. Certainly the change of system which has taken place in Naples has blunted the edge of the blind hatred against the dynasty. Palmerston and Russell are asking themselves whether the maintenance of that dynasty would not be preferable in English interests to combinations which must expose the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as an appanage of Sardinia, either to Mazzinism or to French influence.

London: July 9, 1860.

Lord Palmerston's three Resolutions, the only object of which was to prevent a barren conflict as to privilege between the two Houses, were agreed to on the 6th by the House of Commons. The two days' debate, which preceded this decision, was one of the most interesting that has taken place for some years. Maintained, as it was, only by first-class speakers, it gives a faithful picture of the leading statesmen of the day. The manner in which Gladstone's financial scheme was treated testifies to the Conservative reaction, which has been prevailing for some months. At the commencement of the Session the Radicals were in hopes of realising the dreams they had long been cherishing in secret. Bright and Cobden boasted that they held the fate of the Ministry in the hollow of

their hands. They had actually smuggled one of their men, Milner Gibson, into it. Lord Palmerston was regarded by the Radicals as a convenient makeshift; a sort of figure-head behind which they hoped to obtain the extension of the franchise and a democratic readjustment of the system of taxation. The miserable collapse of their efforts for Reform gave the first shock to the Manchester school. They had no idea how consistently Lord Palmerston had played into the hands of the Opposition, in order to stifle Lord John's 'little Bill.' Then came the disappointment after their exultation over Cobden's Commercial Treaty. There still remained the hope of covering by direct, instead of indirect taxation, the increased expenditure rendered necessary by events. Gladstone, with undeniable adroitness, had taken advantage of the abolition of the Paper Duty to attain that object. This duty presses particularly upon the daily press. Bright and his friends hoped by means of cheap papers to crush the power monopolised by the existing newspapers, which are too aristocratic for their taste, and to bribe the whole of the daily press in favour of Gladstone's scheme of finance. The Paper Duty Repeal Bill, however, only passed a third reading in the Commons by a majority of nine. The annexation of Savoy and Nice opened the eyes of the country to the political blunder of the French Treaty. Under these circumstances, the House of Lords was emboldened to take advantage of an old right which had been dormant for nearly two hundred years. The Commons claimed the exclusive privilege of deciding questions of finance. Nevertheless, the Lords have the right of rejecting, as a whole, Bills relating to taxation, even after they have passed the House of Commons. Three Liberal peers, among them Lord Overstone, the opulent head of the old and famous banking house of Lloyd, took the

initiative to prevent the State, at such a stormy time, from being deprived of a certain and important source of revenue. Lord Derby, acting in private concert with Lord Palmerston, undertook to repair the mischief caused by the precipitate action of the Commons. It was notorious that he himself had no idea of undertaking the construction of a Government. To show that no party manœuvre was intended, he left Lord Monteagle to move the rejection of the Bill. An unexpected majority of no less than eighty-nine rejected the measure, and thereby shattered the elaborate financial scheme of Gladstone. After the first amazement had subsided, which this *coup d'état*, as the vote was called, excited in the Radical camp, soon came a scarce-concealed feeling of exultation. An opportunity seemed to have been found at last of dealing the Lords a sensible blow. Fulminating articles in the penny press, street placards, mass meetings, and speeches by the tribune of the people, Bright, at Manchester and Birmingham—every effort was made to inflame the people against the dictatorship of the House of Lords and the tyranny of Lord Derby. But all in vain. This mock battle was regarded by the public with indifference. However, the Manchester party still reckoned on the passions of the House of Commons, ever jealous since 1688 of its privileges. Palmerston's position was a difficult one, but he showed himself equal to his task. He quelled the Radical storm by moving the appointment of a Committee to search for precedents. This Committee included the leaders of all parties. Walpole, a Conservative of the purest water, was chosen Chairman, while Bright represented the Radicals, and Sir James Graham the Peelites. The colourless and dryly historical report gave rise to violent debates in the Committee. Bright moved an amendment, with the view of inviting the House of Commons to join open battle

with the Lords. He proposed to introduce and pass the Bill again and send it up to the House of Lords. His proposal was rejected by 19 votes to 3. Strange to say, two of the Ministers, Gladstone and Lord John Russell, voted with Bright in the minority, while Lord Palmerston went with the majority. A somewhat less Radical amendment of Gladstone's was likewise rejected by 9 votes to 7. This time Palmerston voted with his colleagues, while Sir James Graham joined the Conservatives and thus decided their victory. The report of the Committee was presented on the 2nd. On the same day a stormy Cabinet Council was held, at which Gladstone announced his retirement. Rumours were current in town that Milner Gibson, the originator of the Paper Duty Bill, and Lord John Russell, who in the Committee had denounced the House of Lords with the utmost violence, would follow the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It appeared that Gladstone, for three hours, was in reality no longer Minister. At Lord Palmerston's request, a lady of high rank undertook to reunite the separated elements. The result was a compromise, of which Lord Palmerston's three Resolutions are the fruit. They are criticised as being vague, meaningless, and ungrammatical. Lord Derby remarked to me with a smile that they must first be translated into the Queen's English. Nevertheless, their importance consists in the statesmanlike tact which had dictated them.

The Premier, now seventy-six years old, gave the most brilliant proof of this tact when, on the 5th, he recommended his Resolutions, not to say his commonplaces, to the acceptance of the House. Lord Palmerston is no orator, but he possesses, to an extent that nobody else does, the ear of the House, and, as a rule, hits the nail on the head. Never, since he has sat in the House of Commons, has he enjoyed such a

triumph before. Lord Derby and Disraeli both described to me his conduct at this crisis as beyond all praise. The Opposition hailed his speech with vociferous cheers. Some Radical amendments were moved and rejected. The Conservatives did not think it worth while at first to take part in the debate. This was not flattering to Gladstone's *amour propre*. Deeply offended by the brilliant defence of the House of Lords, which he had listened to from the mouth of the Premier, the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave full scope to his eloquence. He derided the Opposition for seeming to accept the Ministerial Resolutions and being silent partisans of a gigantic innovation. He could not refuse his own assent to the Resolutions, but he reserved to himself an entire freedom to vindicate by action the privileges of the Commons, which had been violated by the House of Lords. This tactless Ministerial outburst met at once with well-merited chastisement. Disraeli broke the silence, for which he had been so bitterly reproached, to expose to the Homeric laughter of the House, in an extempore speech, brilliant and spiced with humour and satire, the miserable part played by Gladstone.

The debate, resumed on the 6th, was opened by Lord Palmerston. He declared, in reply to a question at the commencement of the sitting, that he demanded nothing but the acceptance of his Resolutions.

The speech of the talented Mr. Horsman serves to indicate the flood-mark reached by the Conservative spring-tide this year. Mr. Horsman had the courage to declare openly that the overbearing conduct of the Commons would imperil the Constitution, if the wisdom of the House of Lords did not restore, by salutary acts like the present one, the balance between the constitutional powers. 'The truth is,' he concluded, 'on this occasion, we have no materials for a contest

with the Peers, and the attempt to raise one has lamentably broken down. The law is not with us—precedents do not favour us — constitutional principles and polity are both against us; and as to the country, if we appeal to that, the nation is certain to affirm what history will most assuredly record—that this Session of 1860 has been doubly memorable—for the rashness, the recklessness, the ruinous disregard of consequences that have marked the proceedings of the Commons, and the calmer courage, the dignity, and the patriotism that have shed a lustre over the saving wisdom of the Lords.'

Lord Derby, who perfectly agreed with these remarks, said to me he would hardly have ventured to use such language in the House of Lords.

Lord Palmerston is now master of the situation, and holds his Ministry completely in his hand. It is to be hoped that he will turn to account in his foreign policy the Conservative victory he has won at home.

London: July 10, 1860.

The statement ventured by the Danish Government that no assurances had been given to Germany in reference to Schleswig, has met with the refutation it deserved in the Prussian *Pro Memoriâ*. With respect to the earlier negotiations and despatches of the Federal Commissioners, the Danish promises made to the German nationality in Schleswig are put together under three heads. This *Pro Memoriâ* also, like all the papers exchanged with the Copenhagen Cabinet, has been communicated to Lord John Russell. We cannot disguise from ourselves that the Government here have neither the time nor inclination to take these controversial questions into serious consideration, however urgently necessary their settlement may have become.

The personal change effected by the new appointment to the post of British Minister in Copenhagen is favourable to Germany. Mr. Augustus Paget displays in his despatches a more unprejudiced view than his predecessor. The latter, who is now developing a somewhat mischievous activity in Naples, is, as is well known, Lord John's brother-in-law. It is not surprising if some difficulty is experienced in effacing the philo-Danish impressions which the Foreign Secretary has derived from Elliot's despatches. English statesmen, however, must not be denied the merit of endeavouring to look facts in the face and judge unpleasant situations without prejudice. They have not omitted in this instance to give urgent admonitions to the Government at Copenhagen, though they have failed, it is true, to realise the fact, which has been represented to them from a competent quarter, that affairs in Schleswig are at least as desperate as in Sicily. One is beginning to feel gradually the mischiefs of the tyranny of a democratic Cabinet devoid of firmness and principle. Here, where Continental affairs are seen more and more from a bird's-eye perspective, the main danger kept in view is that Denmark may be driven by Federal execution entirely into the arms of France. While deprecating, however, such execution, the Government are fair enough to admit that German forbearance is being most severely tried.

London : July 15, 1860.

Austria has proposed to confine herself to acknowledging the receipt of Thouvenel's despatch respecting Switzerland, and to postpone deciding whether and when she will take part in the Conference. Prussia has adopted the same course, and the two German Powers are consequently following, to the great displeasure of the Swiss Federal Government, a temporising policy, in the hope of postponing the Conference,

and, possibly, burying it altogether. From the Austrian point of view, it is intelligible that the Vienna Cabinet should endeavour to gain time for the internal reconstruction of the Empire, and avoid any serious difference with France. Count Bernstorff, nevertheless, is personally not at all inclined to temporise. He thinks, on the contrary, that the correct attitude taken by the English Government in the Swiss question should be encouraged and taken advantage of, in order to respond practically to the desire expressed in England for a *rapprochement* with Vienna and Berlin. In favour of this view is the fact that the Cabinet of the Tuileries is using every effort to prevent the Conference. With this object Thouvenel is spreading through his agents in Germany the erroneous idea that the English Government care nothing at all about the Conference, and are only promoting it *pro formâ* for Parliamentary reasons. That this is not the case is shown by Lord John Russell's published despatches, and by the language used by him and Lord Palmerston to the representatives of the German Great Powers. The British Ministers, like ourselves, are convinced that France will not agree to any concessions. Nevertheless, they are firmly resolved to take advantage of the Conference, to prevent the tacit recognition of the Savoy transaction. England desires, in conjunction with Germany, to place on record that the annexation is a breach of treaties, as being contrary to Article XCII. of the Final Act of Vienna.

London: July 17, 1860.

Mr. Augustus Paget has arrived here. His leave of absence had been at first flatly refused, but was afterwards granted him on condition of his drawing up, before leaving, a full report on the differences between Germany and Denmark.

Paget preferred to do this by word of mouth. Immediately after his arrival he hastened to Lord John Russell, to explain to him *ab ovo* the Schleswig-Holstein question. This statement, notwithstanding the eloquence of the Ambassador, is said to have produced a narcotic effect on Lord John, and Paget was obliged to give it up. Yet the game of intrigue at Copenhagen seems to have become full of interest. Hall and Monrad are wooing by all means, legitimate and illegitimate, for the favour of Herr von Blixen, the only man who has the King's ear. Questions of foreign policy are entirely subordinated to these intrigues. The programme of the Eider Danes is assuming, nevertheless, more importance than ever. The pliant Ministers would let matters go the length of a war with Germany, if the annexation of Schleswig suited the fancy of the Countess Danner, and could assure the Ministers against their own dismissal. Whether and how far Blixen is in French pay, it is impossible to know for certain. People in England are persuaded that everything done or not done in Copenhagen is inspired from Paris.

Prince Albert came yesterday from Osborne to London, to open the fourth meeting of the International Statistical Congress. His masterly speech made the deepest impression on the learned assembly.

During the late visit of the Duke of Coburg, the Court's plans for the summer have been arranged. After a short stay at Balmoral, the Queen thinks of going with her husband—probably on September 21—direct to Coburg, without touching at Berlin or Vienna. The Crown Princess of Prussia is expected there after her confinement. Lord John Russell is to accompany her Majesty.

London: July 21, 1860.

Parliament, like Saturn, is in the habit of destroying a number of its children, and of abandoning, at the end of the Session, Bills which have already passed a second reading. This is called the 'Massacre of the Innocents.' The House of Commons, exhausted by its frequent late sittings, has been particularly zealous this year in the work of destruction. Lord John Russell's Reform Bill was the first victim. Then followed a vast and voluminous measure, the Bankruptcy Bill, containing no less than 300 paragraphs, of which 152 had already passed through Committee. Gladstone failed to rescue even the Savings Bank Bill. *A propos* of this rebuff to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, one of the leading members of the Opposition remarked to me, 'We are doing what we can to keep Palmerston and his Coalition Ministry in office. Our time has not yet come. Unhappily the weakness of this disunited Cabinet is such, that a crisis, against our own wish and will, is no impossibility.'

Lord Derby has thought it necessary to call the attention of the House of Lords to the serious condition of public business. In moving for the appointment of a Select Committee on the subject, he has exposed in the clearest manner the often-blamed impotence of the Whigs. His speech made all the deeper impression, since it was divested of any party spirit; Lord Brougham, coining, as he said, a new word for a novelty, described it as an 'unparty' statement. It would be unfair to blame the Ministers for the sins of omission and commission during this barren Session. The blame lies entirely with the House of Commons, whose foolish habit it is to drag every petty grievance before its tribunal and waste precious time in useless wrangling.

The meeting between the Austrian Emperor and the

Prince Regent at Teplitz will consummate, it is to be hoped, the work of unity begun in Baden. The silly calumnies of the Press, which represent the meeting as a mere *réchauffage* of the Carlsbad resolutions, are refuted by the Austrian Emperor's note of the 17th. As in to-day's 'Times,' but in briefer and more drastic terms, a Liberal statesman expressed to me his joy at the fortunate turn that has taken place. 'If Austria and Prussia join hands,' he said, 'and the Governments and people of Germany combine with them, France and Russia will be powerless to disturb the peace of the world.'

A *communiqué* in to-day's 'Morning Post' publishes the news that arrived here yesterday of the French proposals for the pacification of Syria—namely, an expedition of 8,000 French troops, the appointment of an International Commission, and the administrative reorganisation of the country with the view of ensuring the necessary protection to the Christian inhabitants. In answer to a question in the House of Commons, Lord John Russell yesterday stated that he had not received any intelligence of an embarkation of French troops for Syria. He admitted, however, that negotiations were pending between the Great Powers with the view of supporting the Sultan by a restoration of order and tranquillity. 'I do not believe,' remarked the Foreign Secretary, with his accustomed optimism, 'that there is any intention on the part of France to act alone in this matter.' It is hoped here that Fuad Pasha will restore order before the French expedition reaches Beyrout. In many quarters the disorders there are ascribed to a deep-laid scheme of the French Cabinet, and as a proof of this it is stated that neither money nor labour had been spared for the construction of military roads in that inhospitable country.

London: July 25, 1860.

The Commission appointed by an Order in Council of August 20, 1859, and composed of officers of eminence in the army and navy, had for its task to examine and inquire into the defences of the coasts, harbours, and dockyards of the United Kingdom, and recommend proposals with regard to their completion. Their Report, consisting of 172 paragraphs, was presented to the Queen on February 7 last, and has been communicated to Parliament the day before yesterday in a voluminous Blue-book.

After an industrious inquiry and examination by the ablest authorities in the country, the Commission have rejected the Quixotic scheme of protecting London by a series of detached forts. They have also recognised the impossibility of rendering every point on the extended coasts of Great Britain secure against any attempt at a landing. The Commissioners accordingly recommend that those harbours, strong places, and dockyards which are used as arsenals should be made impregnable against even the improved artillery of the present day. As vital points they designate Portsmouth, with its dependencies (Spithead, the Isle of Wight, and Gosport), Plymouth, and Dover. The cost of these fortifications, which are indispensable at once, but which will take three or four years to complete, is estimated at 11,850,000*l.*

The circumstance that this Report has been kept secret for four whole months, and was not presented to the House of Commons till the 23rd inst., is only to be accounted for by the regard which Lord Palmerston was compelled to pay to Gladstone's peculiar position in the Cabinet. It is now known for the first time that Gladstone was aware of this Report when he unfolded to the House of Commons, on February 10,

his ingenious financial scheme. Had the Commons had an inkling then that this peace Budget concealed an item of expenditure of twelve millions, scarcely all the eloquence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have succeeded in getting it carried.

Lord Palmerston, at the sitting on the 23rd, urgently recommended the adoption of the Commissioners' proposals, and, to supply the necessary funds, proposed to raise a loan by means of terminable annuities, redeemable in thirty years, and to charge the Consolidated Fund with two millions of that sum for the present year. As General Peel, speaking on behalf of the Opposition, expressed his entire approval of the Resolution, it is expected that the House will agree next Monday to the proposals of the Government, notwithstanding the protests of Bright. The absence of Lord John Russell, Gladstone, and Milner Gibson during the whole course of this debate is very remarkable.

At the commencement of the sitting the Foreign Secretary answered a question put by Sir James Fergusson, and gave the House the latest news about the complications in Syria. In consequence of the atrocities committed by the Druses, the English Government have empowered the commander of the men-of-war now cruising off the Syrian coast to land in case of need. They have declined, however, to take part in the projected French expedition.

In Naples, according to all appearances, the Government have lost their heads and done their best to hasten the long-prepared catastrophe. Messina, and all the places in Sicily, hitherto occupied by the Royal troops, have now been evacuated. King Francis II. has consented to send one of his aides-de-camp to Garibaldi. The Minister of Public Works, the Marquis de la Greca, has arrived in London with the object

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of making a last attempt to interest the English Government on behalf of his young King. He has probably come too late, events having overtaken him.

London: July 26, 1860.

Lord Palmerston's speech of the 23rd, in recommending to the House of Commons his Resolution concerning the coast defences, is considered an event the importance of which has been only enhanced by the absence of Lord John Russell, Gladstone, and Milner Gibson. That the ultra-septuagenarian Premier should have ventured to renounce so unreservedly the French alliance has taken everybody by surprise. Persons are not wanting who blame this openness. They are afraid that it may lead to a formal rupture of the already very strained relations. It is also alleged against Lord Palmerston that he has been far too frank in pointing out the weak points for Napoleon to attack, if he were actually to attempt to carry out the wild scheme of a *coup de main* against London. In any case, this speech of Lord Palmerston's, taken in connection with his warlike utterances at the Lord Mayor's dinner, shows that he has fully made up his mind to let matters proceed to a mortal struggle with France. The Manchester party are proclaiming loudly enough in their penny papers that the springtide of the reaction has thrown England back into the state of feeling which prevailed in 1810. One may regret it, in common with Bright and Cobden, but the fact is that Lord Palmerston has simply expressed in eloquent terms the public opinion of the day.

The negotiations respecting intervention in Syria, which have apparently resulted in an understanding, suffice to show what deep mistrust the French policy has excited in the minds of statesmen in this country. I gather from the lips of a British Minister the following particulars: Persigny

came on the 18th and urgently demanded to speak to Lord John Russell. Just then the Cabinet was sitting. Lord John left the Council, but shortly afterwards returned with a despatch, which had been handed to him by the French Ambassador. The question it contained, whether England would co-operate with land forces in the French expedition to Syria, was immediately discussed, and a negative reply unanimously agreed upon, any co-operation with France being thought most objectionable. The same authority assures me that the Government here are convinced that the troubles in the Lebanon are the result of Russian and French intrigues, and that the French expedition is nothing but a masked attack against Turkey, and indirectly against England. Acting on this conviction, he says, the Government has given orders to the British fleet to cruise off the Syrian coast, with a view not so much to protect the Christians as to watch the movements of the French.

London: July 30, 1860.

The Marquis de la Greca left London on the 27th inst., without accomplishing the object of his mission. The day before his departure, Lord John Russell had informed the House of Commons that the Marquis had proposed, on behalf of the Neapolitan Government, that England and France should mediate for an armistice between the King of the Two Sicilies and Garibaldi, and use force against the latter if he refused to accept such mediation, a proposition to which the British Government had declined to assent. The Neapolitan Envoy Extraordinary has complained of this statement as inaccurate, in a letter addressed to the Foreign Secretary, which the latter, on the 27th, read to the House. In this letter it is stated that there had never been any question of asking England and France to employ direct force against

Sicily; that the Neapolitan Government had simply req that England, in concert with France and Piedmont, sh 'exercise a pressure upon Garibaldi, with the view of obta a real truce for six months, so that the negotiations fo alliance with Piedmont might be brought to an issue, and meeting of the national representatives take place.' L John, in explanation of this misunderstanding, remarked the statements made to him by the Marquis de la Greca entirely verbal, and might thus have occasioned a mi- The main point was that England had been obliged to d any interference in the complications in Sicily, and coul regard the arguments of the Marquis de la Greca as va The latter had declared that a European interest was c cerned. If time were not given for the change of system Naples to consolidate itself, the door would be opened to re lution. In fact there was only one choice, to carry on now inevitable war for the possession of Venetia, either w the regular troops of Sardinia and Naples, or with volunte The first was to be preferred. If the inevitable war w Austria were left to Mazzinism, the ultimate result would either the red Republic, or the strengthening of for supremacy in Italy. This line of argument will not fail produce its effect in Vienna. How should Austria inter herself for the maintenance of a Government which, ever from fear and weakness, displays such hostile tendencies?

While the antagonism shown between the English a French policies in the latest negotiations respecting interv tion in Syria becomes daily more marked, to-day's 'Morn Post' publishes a mysterious *communiqué*, announcing a s prising turn in the policy of the Tuileries. Is this latest cha intended seriously? Time will show. Mere letters s phrases will hardly suffice to allay from day to day the de

rooted distrust which Bonapartist ambition has excited in this country. If the conversion announced by the 'Morning Post' be sincere, it must be welcomed as a wholesome result of the meeting at Teplitz.

The prorogation of Parliament can hardly be expected before the end of next month. With reference to the present collapse of public business, Disraeli has spoken some bitter truths to the majority. They had upset, he said, Lord Derby's Government nominally on two grounds: one, because the country was supposed to demand a democratic reform of the House of Commons; the other, because the policy of that Government would endanger the continuance of friendly relations with France. The deceptive character of that fac-simile complaint was manifest. The moonshine measure of reform had to be withdrawn, because the country decidedly disapproved of such a democratic innovation. Then came the phantom Treaty of Commerce, which was to inaugurate the era of perpetual peace, but which in reality had compelled the Prime Minister to confess that the country must [illegible] be secure, at any cost, and as soon as possible, against [illegible]h invasion.

London: July 31, 1860.

[illegible]rday's *communiqué* in the 'Morning Post' was inspired not by the English Government, but by Persigny, on the authority of a private letter from Napoleon. It is very [illegible]at the real author of this letter was the French [illegible]ssador himself.

Persigny, the only man who still believes in the maintenance of the Anglo-French alliance, has hastened to communicate the letter to the English Ministry. The first impression produced by it was probably not such as he expected; at least Lord John describes the Emperor's lan-

guage as extremely vague. To-day's 'Times' alludes to the incident in a way that indicates the profound scepticism with which the shifts and shuffles of the Proteus on the Seine are watched in this country. 'These rival armaments,' says the city paper, 'go on till it is discovered that war is less costly than peace, and that it is better to take a course which admits of a speedy conclusion, than one which brings you deeper and yet deeper into the slough.'

The Syrian Convention is as good as concluded, though not yet formally signed. The assent of the Porte has removed the chief difficulties. The draft strikingly illust[rates] the manner in which the elasticity of the French lan[guage] has been abused, especially since Thouvenel's appointment [to] those who are in the secret of the farce, it must seem a l[ittle] irony to say 'que S.M. l'Empereur des Français *cons*[ent] envoyer des troupes,' &c. The whole thing seems to b[e] so much a deep-laid scheme as a piece of jugglery, intend[ed] divert the attention of the French from home affairs. '[Ex]dition chrétienne sur la base d'une convention europé[enne]' is a phrase which will not fail to produce its effect.

On behalf of English interests, Lord Dufferin is g[oing] Civil Commissioner to Syria. He is almost a *novus* [homo] business of State,[1] but has made a name in the litera[ture] by his 'Letters from High Latitudes,' containing a [record] of the voyage in his yacht to Iceland. His journey [out] to the East may have been the immediate occasion o[f the] sent appointment.

London: August 1, 1860.

Napoleon's private letter to Persigny, dated St.-Cloud, July 25, 1860, appears in an English translation in the news-

[1] He had been attached to Earl Russell's special mission to Vienna in February 1855.

papers. The commentary of the 'Morning Post' reads almost like a criticism, which, if not directly inspired by the Prime Minister, at any rate reproduces in journalistic language that statesman's ideas. Italy has become a matter of minor importance. The wish expressed by Napoleon that that unfortunate country 'may obtain peace, no matter how, only without foreign intervention,' has naturally fallen here upon thankful ears. The Syrian question evidently forms his chief reason and incentive for making one more effort to allay the 'petty jealousies and unfair mistrust' of the English Government. *In caudâ venenum.* In the last paragraph unpleasant thoughts are awakened by finding the Imperial letter writer anxious to make it believed that he was undertaking the Syrian expedition reluctantly and against his will: firstly, on account of its great expense; and secondly, because he feared that the intervention might involve the Eastern question. The latter reason explains chiefly the anxiety expressed in this country, which will not be lessened by the Emperor's naïve addition, 'but on the other hand, I do not see how to resist public opinion in my country.' *Risum teneatis, amici!* were the words in which an English statesman summed up to me yesterday his opinion of this strange communication. To talk of the expense was, to say the least, bold, since the French draft of the Convention would throw it all upon the Sultan. Napoleon seems to have no notion that people here are in possession of facts which go far to show the fallacy of his assertion that he is only undertaking the expedition under compulsion. It is known that the Sultan wished some months ago to send a corps to Syria, in order to check the Syrian difficulty in the bud. It is also known that the French Ambassador in Constantinople interposed his veto, and thus prevented this prudent measure of precaution.

London: August 3, 1860.

The original text of the Emperor's letter to Persigny, now published in the 'Moniteur,' continues to form the leading topic of conversation. It is conjectured that Napoleon intended to discredit Lord Palmerston with his colleagues. This explains the cool language with which Lord John Russell alluded to the incident in Parliament. The prominent, not to say ostentatious, manner in which Lord Palmerston's name was introduced, may have caused the Foreign Secretary some annoyance. What, however, has given the most offence to the Government is the intention, read between the lines, of inducing the House of Commons to reject the scheme of national defence. Yesterday's sitting will have destroyed any illusions of this kind. The resolution moved on July 23 stood on the orders of the day. A Mr. Lindsay moved as an amendment, 'That, as the main defence of Great Britain against aggression depends on an efficient navy, it is not now expedient to enter into a large expenditure on permanent land fortifications.' The amendment, skilfully framed, was brilliantly supported in a sarcastic speech by Bright, but rejected, after a humorous reply from Lord Palmerston, by a majority of no less than 268 to 39. Another amendment had even a worse fate, and the original resolution of the Government was then formally agreed to.

London: August 4, 1860.

The negotiations respecting the intervention in Syria reached their conclusion yesterday in Paris, as has been stated to both Houses by Lord Wodehouse and Lord John Russell. The protocol signed by the representatives of the five Great Powers and the Turkish Ambassador in Paris provides for the despatch of a body of European troops, limited,

at the Sultan's wish, to 12,000 men. France agrees to furnish half, and is authorised to embark her contingent immediately. The Sultan undertakes the provisioning. The period of the occupation is fixed at six months.

The statement made in the House of Lords by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had been elicited by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The House followed with almost reverential attention the words of this veteran statesman. If any one understands the Eastern Question, it is the former English Ambassador in Constantinople. He can boast of having stayed for years the downfall of the Turkish Empire. A passionate enemy of Russia, and combating with youthful indignation the encroachments of Bonapartism, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has always shown himself a disinterested friend of the Porte. He now describes the intervention of the European Powers as a necessary evil, and appears doubtful as to the future of the Turkish Empire. All the more impressive, therefore, was his exhortation to the Peers, to use every effort to place the country in an efficient state of defence against that tremendous war, so long impending and now so rapidly approaching, which is to decide the possession of Constantinople.

The Porte is making superhuman efforts to repair past neglect. Fuad Pasha, who is invested with absolute powers, has at his disposal a well-equipped expeditionary corps of 26,000 men. This is concentrated near Beyrout, and is shortly, as the Turkish Ambassador yesterday informed me, to be raised to 40,000 men.

London: August 7, 1860.

Her Majesty the Queen, the Prince Consort, and the young Princes and Princesses arrived here yesterday afternoon, and in the evening continued their journey to Edinburgh.

The Prince of Wales landed on July 23 at St. John's, Newfoundland, and on the 24th stepped on American soil. According to all reports his reception leaves nothing to be desired.

Last night the Ministry came victorious out of the last Parliamentary contest of the Session. Strenuous efforts had been made to whip up all available combatants on each side. Pressing letters and telegrams had summoned back those members who were travelling on the Continent, or gone for grouse-shooting to Scotland. Lord Palmerston assembled in the morning some 170 members of the Liberal party, to urge upon them strongly the reduction of the import duties on foreign paper. The Premier on this occasion cited, in proof of the success of his foreign policy, the news of Garibaldi's landing in Naples. This gave rise to some irritation among the Roman Catholic members of the Ministerial party. However, the incident had no result, since Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell agreed in representing the Resolution proposed by the Government as the fulfilment of obligations contracted in the Treaty of Commerce. A dilatory amendment, moved on behalf of the English paper-makers, was supported by Disraeli, but rejected by 260 against 233 votes.

London: August 11, 1860.

The Queen held a review at Holyrood, on the 7th, of upwards of 21,000 Scotch volunteers, a second edition of the grand National review which we saw in London on the 23rd of last month. Some 200,000 spectators had assembled, and her Majesty was welcomed by the armed as well as the unarmed multitude with the usual enthusiasm. The official lists of the volunteer corps show a total of 138,000 men. The formation of these corps not being allowed, as may well be

understood, in Ireland, this reserve army has been recruited exclusively from England and Scotland.

The House of Commons has voted this year nearly 30,000,000*l.* for the army and navy, and on Wednesday finally passed the Bill which provides for the amalgamation of the former army of the East India Company with that of the Queen. The Bill was read a second time yesterday in the House of Lords, after the Duke of Cambridge had replied at length to the objections urged against it by Lord Derby and Lord Ellenborough, and strongly recommended on military grounds the measure of the Government.

Lord Palmerston's Fortifications Bill also passed yesterday in the House of Commons the important stage of second reading. An attempt of the Radical party to delay it proved a failure, and the amendment of the member for Marylebone was rejected by a majority of no less than 111 (143 to 32).

At length Lord John Russell has made a statement to the House of Commons of the present state of the negotiations respecting the French proposal, declined by England, to recognise Spain as a Great Power. These negotiations remind me of a saying of the late Prince Metternich, which I heard a few months before his death in Dresden. He spoke to me not without bitterness of the misuse of the term 'Great Power' in State papers since 1848, especially in those of Prussia. International law recognised no distinction whatever between Great and Small Powers, and he himself had carefully abstained in his despatches from laying stress on the practical difference between them.

From Syria the news is favourable. The vigorous action of Fuad Pasha may possibly make the landing of the French troops superfluous and occasion their return home soon.

CHAPTER XXI.

LONDON.—1861.

Ill-feeling against France—Palmerston's Dictatorship confirmed—Disraeli at Windsor—Opening of Parliament—Lady William Russell—The 'old Italian Masters'—Capitulation of Gaëta—Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy—La Marmora at Berlin—The Situation in France—The Macdonald Incident at Bonn—Coronation of William I. of Prussia—Death of the Duchess of Kent—Death of Cavour—Ricasoli—Earl Russell—Ministerial Changes—Close of Parliament—The Situation in Germany—The Author's Pamphlet recommending the Establishment of an hereditary and constitutional German Empire by mediatising Austria, Prussia, and all the German States—Typhus Epidemic in Portugal—My Journey to Lisbon—Death of Prince Albert—A Rose-water *Emeute*.

NOTWITHSTANDING the favourable result of the Commercial Treaty, the new year saw a steady growth of the deep-rooted feeling of distrust entertained by the Government and people of England against France and her ruler. Even the jointly won laurels in China had failed to revive the earlier *entente*. Napoleon's incessant preparations for war, especially the increase of his ironclad fleet, were observed with suspicion. A consequence of this suspicion was the dictatorship which all parties tacitly conferred on the veteran Lord Palmerston. By *all* parties, I mean, of course, only those which could undertake the Government. The Radicals and the Manchester school still grumbled at the millions which were squandered, as they contended, on the coast defences, and showed a confidence akin to credulity towards the shuffling policy of France.

The private agreement between the Conservatives and Palmerston, which had checked the barren party contest of the previous year, was renewed before the Session began, and even obtained the secret sanction of the Court. After Lord Palmerston in January had submitted to the Queen and Prince Albert his programme for the current year, and had promised in particular the vigorous prosecution of the works for national defence, Disraeli was invited to Windsor. The Prince, to his no small satisfaction, received the assurance from the leader of the Opposition that the Tories, although 300 strong, had no thoughts of undertaking the Government, so long as Lord Palmerston continued to safeguard the Conservative interests of the State. Disraeli added that it rested only with the present Prime Minister to exercise a power such as none of his predecessors had wielded since Pitt. The Prince did not fail to acquaint Lord Palmerston of his favourable disposition. The Speech from the Throne ratified the private agreement by making no mention whatever of Parliamentary Reform. The skirmishes that took place during the Session had therefore no practical importance, and only served to conceal from the public, and the parties themselves, the understanding already effected between the leaders. Lord Derby entertained the House of Lords during the debate on the Address, by satirising the Ministry in general for coquetting with the Revolution in Italy, and Lord John Russell in particular for his October despatches. Disraeli handled the same theme in an academic fashion in the House of Commons. But there was no idea in either House of moving an amendment hostile to the Government.

The Queen had opened Parliament in person on February 5, and been received by the people with more than usual demonstrations of enthusiasm. The state of uncertainty on

the Continent increased the loyalty of the public. All felt that the Crown alone was the common strength and safeguard.

Among the elder ladies who in those days exercised some influence over Government circles was the widow of the former British Ambassador in Berlin, Lady William Russell. She was a clever, experienced lady, an admirable mother to her sons, the present Duke of Bedford and Lord Ampthill, who died lately as Ambassador in Berlin. Her house was the constant resort of visitors, who liked to chat with her, even if they did not come, like her brother-in-law, Lord John Russell to consult her on politics. As a Roman Catholic, she was no admirer either of Cavour or Garibaldi, and used to laugh at the Italian sympathies of her brother-in-law and Lord Palmerston, whom she called the 'old Italian masters.'

These old Italian masters had the satisfaction, shortly after the opening of Parliament, of hearing of the fall of Gaëta (February 13). Napoleon had finally resolved to let the Piedmontese do as they pleased. A French steamer conveyed the King of Naples and his beautiful wife, who had gallantly endured the bombardment, to Cività Vecchia, whence they proceeded to Rome under the protection of French bayonets. The King occupied there the empty Farnese palace, which gave an uncomfortable enough shelter to the exiles. With what dignity Francis II. endured his misfortune is well known, as is also the fact that, like Louis XVI., he had to suffer innocently for the faults and shortcomings of his predecessors.

Victor Emmanuel liked to strike when the iron was hot. Five days after the fall of Gaëta, he summoned the first Italian Parliament to meet at Turin. The watchwords of 'Italy for the Italians,' 'Unity under Victor Emmanuel,'

had been so constantly repeated by the secret societies in all the provinces, that the establishment of the young kingdom under the House of Savoy was effected without any difficulty. Victor Emmanuel regretted in his Speech from the Throne the recall of the French Envoy, but was careful to express the gratitude of Italy to the French Emperor.

On March 17 the Turin Parliament declared Victor Emmanuel 'King of Italy,' and on the 19th the British Government hastened to recognise this new title. France delayed *pro formâ* the recognition, which followed, however, at the end of June. In January, Victor Emmanuel had sent La Marmora to Berlin, under the pretext of congratulating King William on his accession, notwithstanding the protest of the Prussian Government against the annexations by Sardinia. The General himself revealed the secret of his mission.[1] As a soldier who had served with distinction in the Crimea, particularly in the battle on the Tschernaya, his choice was bound to be agreeable at Berlin. A man of far higher breeding than Cavour, this general had also a more upright character than the Prime Minister and the majority of his colleagues. If La Marmora then preached to deaf ears, still his allusions to the similarity of national interests between Prussia and Sardinia were not forgotten.

In Paris the situation as regards the Emperor was becoming daily more critical. Napoleon opened the Chambers (February 4) with a Speech from the Throne, which was intended to reassure all parties, but had precisely the contrary effect. The English public were offended by the peremptory tone in which the Emperor described the annexation of Savoy and Nice as a maintenance of his right, notwithstanding the opposition of Europe. The debate in the French Chamber

[1] *Un poco più di luce*, by General La Marmora. Florence, 1873.

gave rise to some remarkable outbursts, and, in particular, to a thorough-going revolutionary speech from the 'Red Prince.' Extravagant speculation and unexampled luxury formed the background of the Imperial tragi-comedy. But if this or that speculator was occasionally handed over to the police, most of them escaped scot-free, it being inconvenient to expose high personages.

Although Rome was still occupied, and the Pope protected in the Vatican, the French clergy had never forgiven Napoleon for having promoted the territorial gain of Italy at the expense of the Holy See. The priests denounced the Imperial policy from the pulpit. All warnings and measures on the part of the Government were of little avail against this opposition, which produced an influence on the educated classes. Napoleon III. had at an earlier time been tolerated, if not admired, as the 'saviour of society.' Now, for the first time, he was despised as a crowned Socialist. He was nicknamed 'Badinguet,' after the bricklayer whose hod he had borrowed when escaping from Ham.

As between England and France, so also between the British and Prussian Governments, relations were then seriously strained. Prussia's attitude during the Crimean War had not yet been forgotten in England, when in the autumn of 1860, just as the Queen was passing Bonn on her journey home, an incident, trivial in itself, excited popular passion in both countries. One Captain Macdonald, an English tourist, unknown in the higher circles of London society, had been arrested by the local authorities, in consequence of a quarrel with the railway officials. Whether Palmerston's 'civis Romanus sum' had got into his head, or whether it was that, not knowing German, he had not understood the order to change his seat for another, the police found themselves

obliged to take the uncompliant tourist into custody. The English residents espoused their countryman's cause, and the English newspapers denounced the 'brutal tyranny' of the Prussian authorities. A paper war began between the two Governments, which made up a voluminous Blue-book. Palmerston, always ready to humour the opinion of the day at the expense of his neighbours, indulged in extravagant outbursts in Parliament, and condoled with the Prussian people for the 'miserable laws' under which they lived. Lord John Russell wrote a number of despatches for home consumption, and Baron Schleinitz, in his replies, did not forget Goethe's saying: 'Coarse logs require coarse wedges' ('Auf groben Klotz 'nen groben Keil'). This exchange of despatches, to which undue importance was attached by the newspapers, might have led to serious consequences to both countries, had the two Courts allowed themselves to be influenced by them. The Macdonald incident did not, however, prevent the Queen from sending over to King William I. on his accession to the throne the Order of the Garter with a solemn Embassy. Later on, at his Coronation (October 18), her Majesty sent one of her most eminent statesmen, Lord Clarendon, to represent her. This statesman was able to satisfy himself abundantly at Berlin what mischief had been caused by the tactless despatches of Lord John Russell, and the not less tactless outbursts of the English Press. Clarendon thought it his duty earnestly to recommend the English Ministers to discontinue these fruitless polemics.

In the meantime occurred almost unexpectedly a death which occasioned the most poignant sorrow to the Queen. Her Majesty's mother, the Duchess of Kent, died at Frogmore on March 16.

Another death in this year, so fatal to political person-

ages, excited more sensation than it deserved. Count Cavour succumbed on June 6, in his fifty-second year, to the vexation caused by Garibaldi's attacks in Parliament, and to the lancet of the Italian physicians. As he had been regarded, though unjustly, as the creator of Young Italy, the English friends of the new State feared the worst consequences from this event. It was soon seen that Victor Emmanuel understood how to fulfil his mission even without this instrument which had served its turn. The new Prime Minister, the Florentine Baron Ricasoli, insisted with reckless precision on the completion of the Italian programme. In statesmanlike calmness and patience he showed himself superior to his too impressionable predecessor.

In the English Ministry a change took place through Lord John Russell's elevation to the House of Lords. Lord Palmerston was not sorry to see his rival, now created Earl Russell, removed to the serener atmosphere of the Upper House. Shortly before the close of Parliament died Sir James Graham and Lord Herbert of Lea (Sidney Herbert). The latter was succeeded at the War Office by Sir G. Cornewall Lewis. Lord Herbert's death was a national loss. This statesman was one of the few who unite in themselves the various qualities which are indispensable for a Prime Minister.

During the later years of Prince Albert's life I had more than once an opportunity of discussing with him the state of things in Germany, in which country he always took the warmest interest. From his Prussian point of view he rejected the 'Trias' idea as impracticable, and spoke of the Empire of seventy millions as a chimæra. I told him I had my own ideas on the subject, and would endeavour, during the recess of Parliament, to put them on paper, a project in which he encouraged me.

Parliament was prorogued by Commission on August 6. During my leave of absence I had an opportunity in Dresden of studying the situation. In Austria the February Patent had tended to aggravate, if anything, the existing discontent. The Magyars opposed more insolently than ever the attempt of Schmerling to effect in a new form the administrative unity of the monarchy. In Prussia, the Ministry of the 'new Era' had shown themselves more or less incapable of stemming the contrary currents of the time. The 'Junkers' and the priests, as the Conservative members of the House of Peers were called, opposed all liberal reforms; while the Progressists, risen like a phœnix from the ashes of the 'mad year,' were threatening to become extremely troublesome. Confronted by these conflicting tendencies, King William, on the occasion of his Coronation—a ceremony conducted with great pomp—had subscribed to a political confession of faith, which the knights-errant of the 'Kreuz-Zeitung' extolled as a glorification of Divine Right. The return visit paid by his Prussian Majesty to the French Emperor at Compiègne was a mere act of courtesy, and, as such, gave no occasion either to misconstruction or alarm; though it undoubtedly failed to lessen the exaggerated notions formed in Germany of the power of Napoleon since the lamentable issue of the Italian campaign. Meanwhile the 'National League' was putting out feelers in all directions on behalf of Prussia and Prussian supremacy. The Diet, it was universally admitted, no longer corresponded to the national requirements. Nevertheless, it was due to Prussian opposition that all the reforming efforts of the minor German Governments had proved, and were bound to prove, a failure. Bismarck's removal from Frankfort to St. Petersburg produced in this respect no change.

In the hope of obtaining a clearer conception of the situa-

tion, I took up my pen. I drafted a Memorandum, with the object of formulating the programme of German unity, and showing how the German Empire could be organised on a parliamentary basis under an hereditary Emperor of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine. It was my intention to submit this Memorandum to Prince Albert.

Scarcely had I completed the draft, when a pamphlet reached me which had been inspired, if not actually written, by Count Bernstorff, recently appointed Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs. This semi-official pamphlet [1] categorically demanded that the supreme command of all the contingents and fortresses of the Bund should be vested in the King of Prussia. I thought it seasonable therefore to publish my Memorandum under the title 'Mediatising of Austria and Prussia, the *sine quâ non* of a monarchico-parliamentary solution of the German problem,' with the motto 'Viribus unitis suum cuique.' Alas! the Prince for whom I had originally intended my work was now no more. He had been called to his rest while the pages were in the press. Considering the slender expectations I could have entertained of the success of an anonymous pamphlet, I was surprised to learn from several letters addressed to the publisher that my ideas had met with some sympathy. Among these letters was one from an American statesman, who expressed his pleasure at seeing the German problem solved on a sound federative basis. Still more surprising was the announcement that the Austrian Consul-General in Leipzig had sent several copies of the pamphlet to Vienna. In consequence of this, a report got about that it was inspired by Count Rechberg. I kept silence. It was not until my publisher drew my attention again to the *brochure* on the day after the battle of Sadowa,

[1] *Preussen vor den Wahlen*, 1861. Berlin, 1861.

that I confessed to Baron Beust that I was the author. At the conclusion of my pamphlet I had asked this question: 'If to-day the Emperor Francis Joseph were to summon a meeting of the German princes and invite his exalted confederates to attend in person at Ratisbon or Frankfort, in order to deliberate with his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty upon the present state and future prospects of the common Fatherland—who would stay away?—The King of Prussia?—Perhaps.—But how long?'

Whether this pamphlet induced the Austrian Government to summon, as they did two years afterwards (1863), a meeting of the German princes at Frankfort, I cannot pretend to decide. It has been stated so on several sides. I never had occasion to speak on the subject with Count Rechberg or any of his intimate advisers. The failure of the Frankfort meeting, which, in any case, came a year too late, is not to be attributed alone to Prussia's opposition. Count Rechberg having begun the work, had not the courage to finish it.

In referring again, after a lapse of five-and-twenty years, to this long-forgotten pamphlet, I do so not without some diffidence. Events of world-wide importance—such as the battle of Sadowa, the downfall of Napoleon, the Coronation of the German Emperor in Versailles, and the triumph of the Northern over the Southern States of America, a triumph so pregnant with consequences for Republicanism—have so completely changed the general aspect of the world, that it is not easy in 1886 to enter once more into the feelings and movements which filled and dominated Germany in 1861.

My pamphlet was scarcely completed, when the Duke of Oporto and his brother Dom Juan arrived at Dresden, on a visit to their sister, the Princess George. The two Princes

came from Königsberg, where, as deputed by the King of Portugal, they had been attending the Coronation festivities. Their meeting with their sister was saddened by the unexpected news of the illness of Dom Pedro V. and the death of the Infante Dom Fernando. The young Princes hastened their return home, but had not the happiness of reaching Lisbon before Dom Pedro died. The Duke of Oporto received the news of his decease at the mouth of the Tagus, and was saluted as King when still on board the vessel. Pedro V., who had been always ailing since the sudden death of his Queen, was seized with typhoid fever at the same time as his brother Ferdinand, and died on the 11th of November, keenly afflicted by Ferdinand's death. These three deaths, following so shortly one after the other, made all the more sensation, as two more Infantes were attacked by the same illness, one of whom, the strongest of all, Dom Juan, succumbed shortly after his return from Germany (December 22).

Having been accredited since 1859 not only in London but also in Lisbon, I had to undertake a second winter's journey to Portugal.

On my arrival in London, I wrote to Prince Albert to ask him whether he wished to see me before my departure and give me any messages to take to Lisbon. Contrary to his usual practice, the Prince did not write to me himself, but sent a letter by his secretary, stating that he was ill. He was laid up with a gastric fever, which was not then supposed to be serious. I embarked without any anxieties, and was all the more painfully surprised when King Ferdinand received me with the news of the Prince's death. Prince Albert had breathed his last at Windsor on the 14th of December, and the telegram had reached King Ferdinand on the night before my arrival.

Lisbon, otherwise so sunny and serene, now looked gloomy and mournful, as a kind of typhoid epidemic was raging, and the place was panic-stricken. Politically, also, it seemed likely that the change of sovereigns would not take place without disturbance of the peace. I witnessed one of those harmless *émeutes* which are peculiar to Portugal. The terrified Ministers had left their official residences and taken secret refuge in the Sailors' Hospital. The most good-humoured anarchy prevailed for four-and-twenty hours. In a large square, on one side stood with much shouting and gesticulation what was, in reality, an extremely harmless crowd; and on the other, some battalions of infantry, standing at arms, and waiting for what might happen. Neither the troops nor the mob seemed to have the least desire to come to close quarters. All at once a tall gentleman in a black morning suit made his appearance and asked us—namely, the British Ambassador, Sir Arthur Magennis, and myself—what was the matter. 'If your Majesty cannot tell us,' I replied to King Ferdinand, 'we have not been able here to find out anything about it. All that we are told is that the machine of State has been standing still for four-and-twenty hours, and that the Ministers have fled for protection to the sailors.'

'Bah!' said King Ferdinand, 'the farce has lasted long enough. Just wait a moment, and you shall see how we put down revolutions in this country.' He stepped forward quite alone towards the nearest shouting crowd. They had scarcely got sight of him when they raised a ringing cheer for the King. On his asking them good-humouredly why they were not in bed, they answered, 'We couldn't go home till the soldiers had been withdrawn.' Thereupon the King ordered the commandant to conduct the troops back to

barracks. This was done, and the crowd dispersed, with continued cheers for King Ferdinand. The latter turned to us and said, 'Vous le voyez, messieurs, ce n'est pas plus malin que cela!'

When one thinks that this titular King was not called on to interfere in this affair, and that he simply did so because a man of action was required, one will understand how useful to the young and inexperienced Dom Louis was the popularity his father had acquired by his affable manners.

CHAPTER XXII.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE—1861.

London, Feb. 24: Interview with Disraeli—Tactics of the Opposition—Italy a Vassal State of France—Disraeli defends Palmerston against Urquhart.—London, Feb. 26: The latest Blue-book and the Italian Policy of England and France.—London, March 3: Denmark declines the Propositions of England, France, and Russia.—London, March 9: The Danish Cabinet's Attitude of Resistance—Embarrassment of the Opposition with regard to Italy—Occurrences at Warsaw—Anxieties.—London, March 12: The Spectre of Tilsit—Napoleon III. and Poland.—Windsor Castle, March 19: Prince Albert to Count Vitzthum on the Death of the Duchess of Kent.—London, March 19: Retrospect of Austria's Policy towards Italy—A lost Opportunity.—London, March 24: Rumours of a coming Ministerial Crisis—Debates on an old Blue-book—Defeat of the Ministry in the House of Lords—Disraeli expects an *événement*—Lord Derby's Answer to Lord Granville.—London, March 26: Lord John Russell on the Situation generally.—London, April 10: Sanguinary Conflict at Warsaw—Lord Palmerston's pet Theory—Lord John Russell's good Advice respecting Hungary—Lord Wodehouse on the Holstein Question.—London, April 21: Lord John Russell reassures the Austrian Ambassador as to England's Attitude in the German Question.—London, May 6: Disraeli's View of the Situation in England and Affairs in Italy, France, and America.—London, May 9: Co-operation of England and Russia in the East—Alexander II.'s Conversations with the British Ambassador.—London, May 15: Rumours from Italy—Queen Christina at Paris with confidential Messages from the Pope—The Anglo-Russian *Rapprochement* a Consequence of the Occurrences at Warsaw—England's Declaration of Neutrality in the Civil War in America—Death of the Duke of Bedford.—London, May 28: Holiday Trip to Paris—The Tactics of Silence—Maintenance of the *status quo*—Lord Malmesbury at the Tuileries—Family Quarrel among the Bonapartes—Teleki's Suicide.—London, July 15: Lord John Russell's Reply to a Question as to Holstein.—London, July 15: Attempt on the King of Prussia at Baden-Baden—Changes in the Ministry—Lord Herbert's Retirement—Lord John Russell's Removal to the House of Lords.—London, July 16: Lord John Russell's Peerage—First Impressions.—London, July 20: Lord John Russell's last War Speech in the House of Commons.—London, July 22: Lord John Russell's

Farewell Speech —Rumoured Cession of the Island of Sardinia—Position of the Ministry.—London, July 26: Meeting of the Privy Council—Appointments—Earl Russell compares himself to Charles V.—London, July 31: The Government demands a Vote for Ironclads—Disraeli's conciliatory Attitude—Lord Derby's Speech on Reform—Lord Palmerston's View of the Hungarian Question.—London, August 5: Marriage Contract of the Princess Alice—The King of Prussia does not go to Châlons—Earl Russell on the bad Impression caused in Paris by his Farewell Speech.—London, August 6: Close of Parliament—Reorganisation of India—Death of Lord Herbert of Lea—News from America.

London: February 24, 1861.

I HAD learned from several quarters that Mr. Disraeli had heard of my return to London and expressed a wish to see me. I took the opportunity, therefore, to-day, being free from business, of paying him a call. He spoke to me of the prospects of his party with his habitual optimism, but in a more measured and reserved tone than before.

'There are two facts,' he said, 'the importance of which must not be underrated. The abandonment of the Reform Bill has created an incurable split in the Liberal party, which is extremely useful to us. In the next place, the bye-elections since Parliament was prorogued have shown a reaction in our favour throughout the country. The Roman Catholics have been driven into our camp by Lord John's hostile policy to the Court of Rome. To-morrow, in Yorkshire, the Conservative candidate will gain a victory no less decided than decisive. In Wiltshire, Sidney Herbert was so sure of his seat that he thought he could make a present of it to the Government candidate. The efforts made by the Roman Catholics have blown these hopes to the winds and given us a no less brilliant than unexpected triumph. We Tories have not lost a seat, while the Whigs have lost so many, that our compact and well-disciplined party in the House of Commons outnumbers all the Liberal sections. If the Ministry, deserted on some vital question or another by

the Radicals, were to dissolve Parliament, there is every prospect that the new elections would give us a working majority, like that which Sir Robert Peel had at his disposal in 1841. We could very easily have beaten the Government on the Address. But we could not, if only for principle's sake, vote with the Radicals, simply to shelve the miserable question of Reform. Besides, a premature attack would perhaps have healed the schism among the Liberals. It is clear that the more Conservative the Ministers are in their home policy, the more Radical they must seem to be in their foreign one. It is the well-known old game of Lord Palmerston. We are not blind to the dangers caused to England's position and *prestige* by the continuance of the present revolutionary policy. All traditions will be insulted, and all our national interests imperilled; while the Government seem to forget that for a power like England foreign questions are matters of the first importance. Forty years ago Lord John, when a young man, tried to oppose Lord Castlereagh's policy both before and during the Vienna Congress. How can anybody wonder that he is now striving his utmost to undo the work of that Congress which he has never ceased to detest? And yet how can we prevent him, so long as we have not a working majority? We have not forgotten the lessons taught us by our last experience of office. They taught us that it is hopeless to think of pursuing such a foreign policy as we desire until we have a dependable majority of forty or fifty at our backs. With such a majority we should be able to settle the affairs of Europe in a day.

'Looking, therefore, to these facts and also to public opinion, which has gone mad about Italy, we were obliged in the debate on the Address to tread as lightly as possible on the burning questions of the day, and not attempt to deal with them

exhaustively. We avoided, as you may well understand, a direct attack, in the hope that events themselves will refute the popular fallacies now prevailing. I contented myself with telling the Government plainly that they are playing France's game in Italy. Whether that country comes out of her present difficulties with a federal constitution, in the sense of the Preliminaries of Villafranca, or as a united monarchy, our Ministers have created nothing but a French dependency. All they have done is to strengthen France, on the eve of a war which is bound to come sooner or later, and place a million bayonets at the disposal of the Imperator of the Latin race.'

I availed myself of this opportunity to refer to Mr. Urquhart's charges against Lord Palmerston. The editor of the 'Portfolio,' in his paper, 'The Diplomatic Review,' accuses the Prime Minister of having come to a secret understanding with Russia. I mentioned that I had been asked about it on the Continent, and had described the whole affair as a pure invention.

Mr. Disraeli confirmed me in this view, and remarked in substance as follows: 'Mr. Urquhart was very properly removed in his time by Lord Palmerston from his post at Constantinople, for having intrigued against his then chief, Lord Ponsonby. Ever since then the ex-Secretary of Legation has pursued the Premier with blind hatred. It was my duty to sift the charges you refer to, as, of course, I should have been glad to get weapons against my political opponent. I went to the bottom of the matter. Urquhart is a man of intelligence, if not genius; but his pretended revelations are based simply on his imagination.'

London: February 26, 1861.

Part VII. of the Blue-books relating to the affairs of Italy was presented to both Houses shortly after the opening of Parliament. By the light of the impressions I obtained in Paris I have studied this correspondence, which covers the period from May to December of last year.

What must strike one, above everything, is the inconsistency displayed by the Italian policy of both England and France. The study of the carefully selected 'Documents diplomatiques,' which the Cabinet of the Tuileries laid before the French Chambers, must refute the widespread delusion that Napoleon carried through in Italy a settled programme with rigid consistency. *On prête toujours aux riches.* The so often admired astuteness with which the French Emperor pursued his advantage, is nothing more, after all, but a policy of profiting by, not mastering, events. The Italian difficulties reveal most plainly the contradictions entailed by Napoleon's anomalous position as a ruler. He cannot escape the law to which he owes his power. Never has the fatal character of the Bonapartist system been more naïvely exposed than in Laguéronnière's latest pamphlets, nowhere are the variations between the positive and negative currents of his policy so plainly revealed as in these semi-official publications. Judging from the events that have taken place in Italy, one might be tempted to suppose that the victories of Garibaldi, like the annexations of Victor Emmanuel, are the results of a preconcerted game between the latter and Napoleon, and that French diplomacy had only brought about those events in order to attain, by means of a vassal State, the object of its ambition, namely, absolute supremacy in the Mediterranean. This delusion is dispelled by the official documents. The fact is that France wished to prevent Garibaldi's descent on

the Neapolitan mainland, and formally proposed that France and England should interfere by force of arms to prevent it.[1]

Had the English Cabinet taken Napoleon at his word, the disturbances in Naples and the march of the Piedmontese to the South would have been prevented. But, it may be objected, was not this official invitation a mere sham? Was not Thouvenel well aware from the beginning that England would not accept it? Possibly so; but it is certain, nevertheless, that France did not venture to interfere in Southern Italy against the Revolution without England. In Northern Italy the refusal of England to intervene has prevented any further action on the part of Napoleon in favour of the Revolution. Persigny insists that he has done his utmost to induce the English Ministers to demand at Vienna, in concert with France, the cession of Venetia. He says that a British Secretary of State had been already selected for this extraordinary mission, when Count Apponyi, by his representations to Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, made the English Government change their mind and prevented the execution of the plan. In point of fact, Apponyi returned just at the right time to spare his Court this embarrassment.

Still more striking and important than the vacillations of French policy are those of the English during this period of the Italian Revolution. The despatch addressed by Lord John Russell on October 27 to Sir James Hudson[2] contradicts most remarkably all the earlier verbal and written declarations of the Foreign Secretary. The customary recognition

[1] Compare Thouvenel's despatch, which bears date in the English Blue-book the 23rd, and in the French *Recueil* the 24th of July, 1860, and was answered in the negative by Lord John Russell on the 26th of the same month.

[2] See for further details respecting this despatch—of which Brunnow said, 'Ce n'est pas de la diplomatie, c'est de la polissonnerie'—and the change which it indicated in Lord John Russell's policy, the *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, by the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. ii. pp. 237–38.

of *faits accomplis* does not suffice to explain this change of view. It is true that Sir Henry Elliot's Memorandum of August 31, 1860, written at a time when King Francis II. had not yet left his capital, represented the annexation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to Sardinia as the only possible solution. Considering the value which Lord John attaches to the political judgment of his brother-in-law, this document may have done something to modify his original view. But the real reason for the change lies deeper, and was explained to me, quite recently, by Disraeli, with perfect accuracy. Lord John recognised that the first warnings with which he had met the Piedmontese intrigues had been thoroughly distasteful to the English public. He knew already, in October, that the existence of the Ministry was at stake, unless he renounced his efforts for Parliamentary Reform. He knew, also, that his only means of consoling the Radicals for this disappointment was to allow them to control his foreign policy. He made, therefore, what Italians call a *volte-face*. How far by doing so he has played into the hands of France, is a question for the future to decide. At present it is certain that Napoleon does not think the moment come for a rupture with England. On the contrary, he is doing all he can to flatter the Government of this country and lull them to sleep.

'J'irai avec l'Angleterre jusqu'aux dernières limites du possible,' he said last December to an intimate friend, and added, with a look that meant mischief, 'et le jour où cela ne sera plus possible, je jouerai mon va-tout.'

London: March 3, 1861.

Yesterday evening the news arrived by telegraph that the Danish Government had declined the propositions of the three

non-German Great Powers. This joint declaration was not a proposal in the proper sense of the word, but a kind of award. The three Powers consider that the Bund will be entitled to proceed to execution if Denmark refuses to assure to the estates of the German Duchies their constitutional rights. Count Bernstorff, who has been labouring for months to combat the blind partisanship with Denmark, had prevailed on Lord John Russell to formulate in writing the view of law on which that joint declaration is based, as the view entertained by the English Cabinet. Should Denmark declare Federal execution to be a *casus belli*, and repudiate as null and void all the negotiations that took place in 1851 and 1852, the danger of a French intervention, on which Lord Palmerston is continuously insisting, might be realised. If Napoleon is seeking for an excuse to gratify his desires for the Rhine frontier, he can always find one in the Danish complications.

London: March 9, 1861.

As the French Ambassador, Count Flahault, remarks to me, the attitude of resistance taken up by the Copenhagen Cabinet has not a little astonished the British Government; but the latter, nevertheless, have not abandoned the hope of a peaceful compromise. This hope is strengthened by the news from Holstein, where German interference seems to be more feared than in Copenhagen.

The leading article in to-day's 'Press' conceals rather than expresses the views of the Opposition on the situation in Italy. The leaders have to tread lightly and feel their way, so as not to run their heads against the dominant feeling of the day. In the mean time it would have been desirable had they ventured to give utterance in the Commons to even the tame criticism of the 'Press.' The Opposition, however,

follow the tactics of silence, and leave events to show the folly of the policy now pursued by the feeble Ministry amidst the applause of the public. Not until necessity compels a union of the Whigs of the old school with the Tories of the new, can any hopes be entertained of the revival of a sound system, harmonising with the interests of England and Europe.

The present Cabinet is merely held together by the personal *prestige* of Lord Palmerston. He has no idea, so the Duke of Cambridge assures me, of consenting to the reductions in the army and navy which are now being advocated in many quarters.

The apprehensions continually kept alive by the policy of France have been increased by the occurrences at Warsaw. The Government here regard these disturbances as the work of the Tuileries Cabinet, intended to convince Russia of the necessity of the French alliance. This view explains why they attach more importance to the differences in the Syrian affair than is suspected by the public. The evasive answers of Lord John Russell and Lord Wodehouse have not remained unnoticed on the Stock Exchange. The funds have not fallen, in fact rather risen, but the dulness of business, with a discount of eight per cent., cannot be ascribed only to the troubles in America. Unless a favourable change soon occurs, the question which is cheaper, war or peace, will be seriously mooted in the City.

London: March 12, 1861.

The inertness of the local authorities at Warsaw, and the helplessness shown at St. Petersburg in face of a demonstration long previously prepared, are facts which, at a moment like the present, are bound to breed all sorts of surmises and

which deserve some attention on account of the crisis in the East.

The origin of these surmises is to be looked for in the Franco-Russian *entente*, admitted by Prince Gortschakoff himself. Here nothing is known about it, except that it was brought about in April, 1859, and, according to the ambiguous assurances of the Russian Minister, is not to disturb English interests. It is not difficult to trace the effects of this secret agreement on all the events of the last few years. The rumour of this Alliance, like the fabulous sea serpent, has been cropping up in all directions ever since Villafranca to the Warsaw Conference, where, if the French Yellow-book is to be believed, Russia acted simply as the mouthpiece of France. No wonder if the ghost of Tilsit is now seen to be stalking in the streets of mourning Warsaw. That the Palais Royal, if not the Tuileries, played a part in these disturbances, does not admit of doubt. But it is impossible to suppose that the puppets of the 'Société Agronomique,' under the patronage of the governor, should have been worked behind the scenes by the St. Petersburg Cabinet. The persistency with which the Russian 'Nord' keeps on reviving the absurd myth of Austrian emissaries is as suspicious, to say the least, as the unction with which that paper announces that the Emperor Alexander will not suffer himself to be prevented by puerile and unexpected proceedings from granting to the Polish nation the long prepared reforms. Those who regard the Warsaw disturbances merely as a sham demonstration, intended to deceive the world and, particularly, the German Powers as to the secret aims of the Franco-Russian *entente*, recall to mind French swaggering in Italy. Certainly, as much capital could be made out of the Polish craze for nationality, as out of the bloody hereditary feuds of the Druses and Maronites. Should

the St. Petersburg Cabinet really think, or be driven to think, of playing out a constitution only half satisfying the leaders of the Polish movement, the present moment would be a most unfavourable one for the German Powers. After all, Poland has still far more sympathies for Slavonic Russia than for Germany. A reunion of all the Polish provinces under the Russian sceptre would satisfy, as an instalment, the Polish cry of nationality, and, if not, it would serve at least to enable Paris journalists to extol the victor of Solferino to the credulous public as the protector and saviour of all oppressed nationalities. But would not the announcement of such a plan be the signal for movements in Galicia, Posen, and Hungary, which must threaten Austria and Prussia in the rear, and render very difficult the defence of the Mincio and the Rhine? The revelations made by Michael Pagodin[1] as to the aims of the Panslavist movement deserve more attention than they have hitherto met with in Germany. The Government at Vienna, especially, would find in this book some information which might prove useful in dealing with the agitation among the Czechs and Southern Slavs.

My Prussian colleague, with whom I discussed all these matters yesterday, does not share the fears of the pessimists in this country, but believes that the disturbances at Warsaw will sever Russia's intimacy with France, and make her return to her old allies.

One anecdote in conclusion, which throws some light on the Italian drama. A prince of the Church, who is devoted to Napoleon and highly esteemed by the Emperor, recommended to him urgently on his death-bed the interests of the Holy See. 'Tout cela est vrai,' replied the Emperor, deeply agitated, 'mais vous ne savez pas, Monseigneur, ce que c'est

[1] *Politische Briefe aus Russland.* Leipzig, 1860.

que de vivre comme moi avec la pointe d'un poignard sur la poitrine.'

Prince Albert to Count Vitzthum.

(Autograph.)

Windsor Castle: March 19, 1861.

MY DEAR COUNT,

Let me assure you of my sincere thanks for your sympathy in the heavy loss we have sustained.[1] The Queen is as well in body as her grief will allow.

Your King has sent us a very kind telegram.

Ever yours faithfully,

ALBERT.

London: March 19, 1861.

The enforced delay of my return has not allowed me to follow step by step the negotiations in which Austria has been seeking since the Peace of Zurich to maintain her territorial position in Italy. It would be carrying coals to Newcastle (*Eulen nach Athen tragen*) were I now to attempt to recover lost ground. The study of the chief documents could only strengthen me in the conviction I had already acquired at Paris, that the history of Austria has again been enriched by a lost opportunity. The proof of this fact would, of course, have a purely historical interest if the reaction caused by Keller's speech at Paris is as complete as optimists believe. Had Austria replied to Cialdini's descent on the South and the Piedmontese invasion of the Marches by an immediate declaration of war, things in Venetia would be now in a better position than they are. In September, of course, the Vienna Cabinet could hardly have guessed what had become a matter of public notoriety at Paris in December. France was fully prepared for a declaration of war by Austria, and had aban-

[1] The death of the Duchess of Kent.

doned Victor Emmanuel to his fate. Even the Lombardy question would perhaps have found a different solution. It was only because Austria neglected at the right moment to cross the Mincio, or rather the Po, so as to put an end to the troubles in Central Italy, that Russia ventured to dish up at Warsaw, in the name of France, the well-known Four Points to her German allies. But it is easy to be wise after the event. The inertness of Austria is explained by her experiences in 1859, by the birth-throes of the October Patent, and by the consideration she was forced to pay to Hungary. The Western Powers saw merely the fact of her impotence, and speculated upon it on finding that the hope of restoring the old Northern Alliance was not realised at Warsaw. This is the only explanation of the happily baffled intrigue, the sole object of which was to acquire Venetia by diplomatic means for Victor Emmanuel.

Apponyi, in his conversation last November with the British Ministers, had expressed his private opinion by stating that, if he were Rechberg, he would reply to any attack by Italian volunteers on Austrian territory by a declaration of war against the King of Sardinia. Weeks elapsed before the Ambassador learned whether his language was approved at the Austrian Court. The last messenger brought over a despatch from Count Rechberg, officially confirming Apponyi's declaration. Victor Emmanuel's proceedings against Naples were described in sharp terms as a violation of international law, and no doubt was left that the Emperor of Austria would reply to similar attempts against his Empire by an immediate declaration of war. The despatch concludes with an *argumentum ad hominem*. If French volunteers, asks Count Rechberg, threatened Ireland, would not England be justified in making the French Government responsible for such a breach

of the peace? This despatch of January 17, which Prince Metternich hailed with delight, was not intended for communication, but only for the instruction of the two Ambassadors in Paris and London. The secret, however, does not appear to have been kept strictly in Paris. In consequence of this, it was found necessary to soften down these utterances by an explanation, which Rechberg vouchsafes in a despatch of January 31, while adhering firmly to the principles laid down on the 17th.

London: March 24, 1861.

The weakness of the Government is shown strikingly every day in both Houses of Parliament. Rumours are gradually gaining ground of a probable crisis after the Easter recess.

In the House of Commons Mr. Dunlop's motion for inquiring into the alleged mutilation of certain official despatches raised a regular storm against the Premier. The charges referred to an old Blue-book of 1839 and sins committed by the Melbourne Ministry. Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, was accused of having brought about the unfortunate war in Afghanistan, by disbelieving his agents who were on the spot. It having been a matter of importance to palliate the defeats then sustained, garbled extracts from the despatches were fabricated, which made those agents report contrary to what they actually did. Lord Palmerston, instead of letting this half-forgotten piece of thoughtlessness on the part of the deceased Lord Melbourne remain unnoticed, thought fit to represent these mutilations as quite regular. The Commons were extremely indignant, and nothing but Disraeli's intervention saved the Ministry.

In the House of Lords the Government have suffered a formal defeat by the rejection of Lord Shelburne's Bill for the establishment of a monster hotel in the Strand. Among

the minority voted all the Cabinet Ministers who have seats in the Upper House, and two of the bishops appointed by Lord Palmerston.

With a view of ascertaining the real state of affairs, I called to-day on Disraeli, who is going early to-morrow into the country.

'I can only say,' he remarked, 'what Napoleon said to me shortly before the opening of the Italian campaign, and what he has recently repeated in a somewhat ominous manner to one of my acquaintances: "J'attends un événement"—I, too, am expecting an "event." Something must turn up, and this something, whatever it may be, will determine our attitude after the Easter recess. The Ministry is in our hands. That Palmerston will dissolve, as people think he will if the Government falls on the Budget, seems to me doubtful. It would be playing our game. In Ireland the Liberals could hardly count on a dozen seats, while in England and Wales they would lose so many that the surprise of 1841 might easily be repeated. At that time the general election, brought about by the Whigs, gave Sir Robert Peel a majority of ninety. Palmerston's friends, however, think that he will not give way without playing out this last card. He is now seventy-six, and feels that to retire would be to retire for ever. The Queen could hardly disagree to a Dissolution, seeing that the present Parliament was chosen under Lord Derby.'

On my asking him whether this last circumstance would not prevent the Conservatives, if they took office, from dissolving, he replied very decidedly, 'Not at all! We have the right to dissolve any House of Commons which refuses to support us provided there is a prospect of being able to strengthen ourselves by a new election. But we should hardly find it necessary to do so.'

A propos of this conversation I will mention an anecdote, for the truth of which I can vouch. Lord Derby is on the most friendly footing with his political opponent Lord Granville. The latter added to a business letter a postscript with this question: 'When will you turn us out?'

The Tory chief answered: 'I am thinking day and night how I can manage to keep you in, but it will be devilish difficult.'

London: March 26, 1861.

During the funeral of the Duchess of Kent a seat was appointed to me in St. George's Chapel next to Lord John Russell. Having to wait half an hour before the ceremony began, I had an opportunity, in the pauses of the conversation between the Foreign Secretary and his other neighbour Count Bernstorff on the Holstein question, of discussing in confidence the general situation.

The distrust with which the Government here look forward to Napoleon's next 'move' was shown repeatedly by the remark, 'I wonder what he means to do.' I conclude from this, that they know nothing more on this point than the rest of us. Lord John Russell assured me that there was no question of withdrawing the French garrison from Rome. The strong minority of sixty-one in the Senate, as well as the speeches made in the Corps Législatif, especially that of Keller, had convinced the Emperor that public opinion was against such a step. No doubt this argument has been employed to resist the constant importunities of the British Ambassador and request him to forbear from unceasingly recommending the Emperor to leave Rome to the Piedmontese and the Pope to his fate.

Lord John alluded not without malicious pleasure to the financial embarrassments of France and to Fould's refusal

to resume office. There must be an end then at length, he said, to this prodigal expenditure.

Even in Italy, where everything seemed rose-coloured to the noble lord, he did not deny the growing straitness of finance, but hoped that Cavour would relieve it by means of a loan. At Naples, he said, trade had vastly improved under Piedmontese rule, and the inexhaustible resources of the country were now at length apparent. This means, in other words, that England prospers by the present system of prodigality.

With reference to the Franco-Russian alliance, Lord John repeated to me what he had frequently stated in Parliament, that personally he did not believe in it. No doubt the Old Russian party were raving, as they had always done, for the French alliance; but the internal condition of the Empire, especially the want of money, made it hopeless to think of foreign enterprises.

The confiscation of the arms smuggled into the Danubian principalities was referred to. Lord John believes that this despatch of arms was connected with the preparations for the Italian campaign of 1859, and that they had arrived too late for their original purpose. He thinks they were intended for the Revolutionary party in Hungary and, as Türr declares, came originally from France. The arms had been brought from Marseilles to Genoa, and from there conveyed on board Sardinian vessels to the mouths of the Danube. Whether Garibaldi had a hand in the affair remains yet to be seen; Sir James Hudson telegraphs that he has ordered ten thousand red shirts in Genoa.

Lord John does not believe that Russia is at present in a position to embark on any undertaking against Turkey. The Government, however, are fully alive to the danger of a Franco-Russian occupation of Constantinople, and would not

forget the studies made on the spot during the Crimean War.

I inclose, as a curiosity, an appeal signed by twenty-four members of the House of Commons, the object of which is to start a subscription for Kossuth. Unfortunately, this 'noble exile' can still reckon on active sympathy in this country.

London: April 10, 1861.

The telegraph brought yesterday the first news of the sanguinary encounter in Warsaw. The 'Morning Post' puts the blame of it on a misunderstanding, which will be disavowed in St. Petersburg. The 'Times,' in an article evidently written before the receipt of the telegram, indulges in speculations on the restoration of Poland. Lord Palmerston's well-known theory, that Austria will strengthen (!) herself by surrendering Italy, is applied to Galicia and Posen. How strong would Austria become, if not only Italy, Galicia, and Hungary, but Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, and Dalmatia, were sacrificed to the Moloch of the Nationality mania! That Prussia would only be enabled to fulfil her proper mission by surrendering the Grand Duchy of Posen, is a proposition which cannot surprise any reader of this organ for regenerating the world. The dream of the City paper, to sever Poland from Russia, and give her a wholly independent constitution, will remain, as it is now, a mere dream. At any rate the Emperor Alexander does not seem disposed to 'strengthen' himself in the manner recommended... The Czar has emphatically denied the existence of a Franco-Russian alliance, and more weight is attached at Berlin to the Emperor's word than to any gossip in newspapers.

While the Press continues to preach Revolution, the Government appear to be mending their ways. Lord John

Russell the day before yesterday, at an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, used language which shows that he and his colleagues are hesitating to play the same game in Hungary as they did in Italy. The Secretary of State had, in particular, urgently recommended the Cabinet of Vienna to avoid the mistake committed in 1848 by giving to the Assembly in Pesth the control of the army. It was an axiom of statecraft, he said, that the monarch in constitutional countries, as the supreme arbiter of war, should have absolute power over the armed forces of the nation. England had suffered too heavily from the evils of a Parliamentary army during the Long Parliament to allow that axiom to remain in doubt. Whether Lord John will have the courage to use the same language in Parliament, should open war break out in Hungary, is another question. In any case the German advisers of the Emperor Francis Joseph will be able to appeal to the authority of the Liberal British Minister, if it comes to checking the centrifugal elements let loose in Pesth.

Lord Wodehouse, in replying yesterday to a question of Lord Ellenborough's on the subject of the Holstein budget, explained and amplified his statement of the 18th of last month. The Foreign Under-Secretary of State accepts the Danish interpretation of Article 13, and insists that Denmark has done all in her power to accede to the warnings given by England and France. However, neither Lord Wodehouse's statement, nor the woe emphatically denounced by Lord Ellenborough against those who should provoke the war, will arrest the progress of events or influence the decision of the Diet, which is to be given to-morrow.

London: April 21, 1861.

The Austrian Ambassador, in obedience to instructions from his Government, questioned Lord John Russell yesterday as

to the attitude of England in regard to the German efforts for unity. Count Apponyi reminded him how the Vienna Cabinet had long renounced all hope of coming to an understanding with England on the subject of Italy. In the same manner, the settlement effected in the question of the Danubian Principalities had shown how little British co-operation could be counted on in the East. His Government were, therefore, all the more anxious to learn what attitude they were to expect in Germany? Lord John's answer was satisfactory and re-assuring. England had no other interest but to see Germany strong and united, and would not sanction or encourage any revolutionary attempts. People here are convinced that real unity can only be accomplished by a civil war. Lord Palmerston has expressed himself very decidedly to the same effect.

London: May 6, 1861.

Disraeli is satisfied with the result of the debate on the Budget. A victory would hardly suit his purposes as well as the compact minority which has declared in favour of retaining the Paper Duty. Since just as many Conservatives voted with the Government as Liberals with the Opposition, this division gives a measure of the strength of parties. In the Ministerial camp it is believed that there will be another division to-morrow. Disraeli emphatically denies this. The Opposition will allow the Resolutions to pass, but perhaps, if a Bill is actually introduced, venture another party contest on behalf of the Paper Duty. Its success can hardly be anticipated. Should events abroad falsify the estimates of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the duty, once abolished, could certainly not be reimposed, and the deficit would have to be covered by an addition to the income tax. This explains the

dislike said to exist in the Cabinet to Gladstone's financial scheme. The desire to smooth over the differences that arose last year with the House of Lords is merely a pretext. The real reason which has induced Lord Palmerston and the majority of his colleagues to give way is the consciousness of their own weakness and of their inability to dispense with Gladstone.

Lord Derby's speech at the Mansion House dinner is described by Disraeli as a 'heavy blow' for the Ministers. 'Patience,' however, is still the watchword in the Tory camp. Their leaders are expecting a short Session without a crisis. Disraeli counts on a Conservative Ministry next year, with a dependable majority.

'It is satisfactory,' he remarked, 'that the Emperor Napoleon now wishes for peace. Austria thus gains time to settle her difficulties in Hungary. If she does, it is to be hoped that next spring she will be in a position to act. That is all we desire. The sooner, then, the inevitable war breaks out the better. The Italian card-house can never last. Without Rome there is no Italy. But that the French will evacuate the Eternal City is highly improbable. On this point the interests of the Conservative party coincide with those of Napoleon.'

Disraeli shares the suspicion that Palmerston's coarse outburst against Prussia, in the matter of Captain Macdonald's arrest at Bonn, was directed not so much against the Berlin Cabinet as against the English Court. The reason of his grudge against Prince Albert he does not know. Palmerston's friends attribute his ill-humour to the German efforts for unity, which in his view are bound to provoke an interminable civil war and tend to strengthen French influence.

It was interesting to me to gather, as I did from my

yesterday's conversation, the scarcely concealed satisfaction felt by the Conservative party at the troubles in America.

'The effects on England,' said Disraeli, 'are incalculable. Considering the probable loss to English trade, we cannot, of course, proclaim openly the satisfaction we naturally feel at the collapse of republican institutions. But, speaking privately, we can only congratulate ourselves if the monarchical principle comes into favour on the other side of the Atlantic. In Europe, Hungary is the burning question of the day. If this is settled promptly and satisfactorily, we shall be in a position next year to take in hand seriously the pacification of the Continent.'

London: May 9, 1861.

The feeling that prevailed in St. Petersburg immediately after the Paris Peace of 1856, the misgivings with which people in England watched the signs of a secret Franco-Russian understanding, the anxieties lately caused by the complications in Syria, must all tend to increase the surprise at the present turn of affairs.

The British Ambassador in Constantinople received instructions a few days ago, which offer a prospect of joint action by England and Russia in the East. These instructions are the fruit of a very comprehensive understanding between the Courts of St. Petersburg and St. James. As to the origin of this unexpected and here at least unhoped-for *rapprochement*, I have learned on good authority the following details.

The Emperor Alexander had expressed to the newly appointed British Ambassador his regret that it had not yet been found possible to resume those friendly relations between the two Courts, which had been disturbed ever since the Crimean War. This statement, as people here believe, was made without the previous knowledge of Prince Gortschakoff. The ini-

tiative thus taken by the Emperor led to confidential conversations, reminding one of those with which Sir Hamilton Seymour had been honoured in 1853. Lord Napier was instructed to reply that nothing was more inconsistent with the traditions of English policy than petty animosities. Nobody would be more pleased than the Queen at the resumption of friendly relations with a Power whom the English had learned to respect in war. Gratified by these assurances, the Emperor Alexander rejoined that the English Government would doubtless share the distrust he himself entertained at the ambitious and reckless policy of the French Emperor. This distrust, he added, would sufficiently explain his desire for an understanding in the mutual interest of both countries. Lord Napier could only confirm this remark, and assure him how ready and willing was England to co-operate with Russia in all European questions, the Eastern one alone excepted. The Emperor Alexander, to the British Ambassador's surprise, did not wish this question to be an exception, but assured him, on the contrary, that he had no other desire as regarded the East than the maintenance of the *status quo*. He would cheerfully support all the efforts of England for the maintenance and strengthening of the Turkish rule. This language of the Emperor explains the instructions which have been given to Sir Henry Bulwer.

If one may hope after this to see the Eastern spectre disappear for a while from the public stage, it is not less a subject for congratulation that the occurrences at Warsaw should have put an end to the dream of a Franco-Russian alliance.

London: May 15, 1861.

A well-informed Italian, who told me of the Savoy transaction some weeks before it was formally announced, declares

that the secret negotiations between Thouvenel and Cavour respecting the recognition of the Kingdom of Italy have reached a conclusion. That is very probable. But when my informant proceeds to add that Victor Emmanuel has purchased the French evacuation of Rome by the cession of the island of Sardinia, his statement at any rate remains to be verified. An agreement of that kind would excite here, if possible, more indignation than the annexation of Savoy and Nice. It is said that the presence of King Francis II. in the Farnese palace may serve the French as a pretext for retiring from Rome. An attempt would be made to explain the withdrawal of the French garrison on the ground that the tricolour could not be used as a cloak for Bourbon intrigues.

Lord John has received confidential intelligence of the approaching arrival of Queen Christina at Paris. It is believed that her Majesty is entrusted with a message to Napoleon from the Pope, who hopes that she will succeed in preventing, or at least postponing, the evacuation of Rome.

The *rapprochement* between the Courts of St. James and St. Petersburg was confirmed to me yesterday, with the additional remark that it was a consequence of the occurrences at Warsaw. The police inquiry instituted in the Polish capital on April 8, has left no doubt as to the French origin of the disturbance.

Lord John had expressed his regret in the House of Commons that the inhabitants of Warsaw were not warned in time. A despatch of Prince Gortschakoff's refutes this view by referring to the proclamations and official warnings posted up at all the street-corners of the city. The Russian Ambassador has taken care to leave a copy of this despatch and its enclosures in the hands of the Secretary of State.

At the last meeting of the Privy Council, presided over by the Queen, it was determined to maintain an attitude of neutrality during the Civil War in America. The 'London Gazette' of to-day publishes the Proclamation to that effect. Mr. Adams, the newly appointed Minister of the United States, has just arrived here.

Yesterday afternoon, at two o'clock, died the Duke of Bedford, in his seventy-third year. This is a heavy loss for the Whigs. The deceased had the reputation of being one of those large landowners who understood how to administer his vast estates to the best advantage and with a proper sense of his responsibilities. His countless farms are model establishments of their kind. His only son and heir, the Marquess of Tavistock, is seriously ill, and has been obliged to leave the conduct of the funeral ceremonies at Woburn Abbey to his uncle Lord John Russell, and his cousin Mr. Hastings Russell, the heir presumptive.

London: May 28, 1861.

My brief holiday trip to Paris has not brought me in much booty. The tactics of silence are observed more strictly than ever at the Tuileries.

For Italy the watchword is: the maintenance of the *status quo*. Not a word is said as yet about recognising the new title bestowed on Victor Emmanuel at Turin. There is no intention of being in a hurry, but rather of keeping everything as long as possible in abeyance. Thouvenel, Persigny, and Walewski have vied with each other in settling the Romish problem. Napoleon has listened to each of them in turn, but pigeon-holed their proposals as impracticable. No negotiations are now pending with the Vatican. The Duc de Gramont's attempt to win over Cardinal Antonelli in favour of

the recognition of the Kingdom of Italy has met with a simple *non possumus*. And yet the Duke had offered in return for it the prospect of Victor Emmanuel's guaranteeing the temporal possessions of the Pope. Lord Cowley had made repeated attempts before his departure to obtain some intimation as to the proposed settlement of the Roman question. He had in vain represented to Napoleon that the English Ministers would give him a free hand, and only wished to know his intentions, in order to answer any questions in Parliament in the sense that he desired. The Imperial sphinx declined to utter more than meaningless phrases: 'Nous verrons; c'est une question délicate; les événements nous guideront.' Even Prince Metternich, who is on intimate terms with Napoleon, and is treated with the greatest *empressement*, has not been able for the last six weeks to boast of the smallest allusion to politics. The Austrian Ambassador is completely reassured about Venetia. He is convinced that negotiations are pending with regard to the recognition of the Kingdom of Italy. That Victor Emmanuel will consent to purchase that recognition by an international guarantee of the temporal possessions of the Holy See is considered extremely doubtful. Rumours of territorial cessions, like that of the island of Sardinia, crop up daily, but vanish as quickly as they appear. Prince Metternich does not believe in them, and regards peace as assured for a year or two. A rupture with England, he says, is possible, no doubt, but not probable, since the French Imperator is afraid of it, and will do all he can to avoid it. Napoleon had shown this in the Syrian question, in which he exposed his over-zealous Ministers, and dismissed Lord Cowley with the assurance that he would keep his word, whatever Thouvenel might suggest to the contrary. The affair cost too much money, and was in

itself too unimportant, to justify a coolness in his friendly relations with England.

Lord Malmesbury's latest visit is said to have left a deep and lasting impression on his Imperial friend. The late Foreign Secretary has stated in the name of his party that the Tories, if again in power, would be able to maintain the present good understanding even better than Lord Palmerston. If the Conservatives could not sanction Napoleon's dallying with Revolution, his Majesty would soon be convinced that their conduct was only in harmony with the well-understood interests of the French Crown.

The serious quarrel in the Imperial family, brought about by the election of Prince Napoleon as Grand Master of the Freemasons, is regarded in England as a grave symptom of the state of things in France. Prince Murat had challenged Prince Napoleon in a letter, the terms of which exceed all bounds of moderation. It is hoped that the Emperor will prevent the duel between the two cousins, and withhold his sanction to the election of Prince Napoleon as Grand Master. The Freemasons, who have hitherto kept aloof from politics, are said to have recently allied themselves with other secret societies, which might become dangerous to the Imperial throne. According to the telegram received to-day, the Emperor seems to have had the courage to checkmate the game of the 'red Prince.' This would be all the more gratifying, as symptoms are not wanting of premature decay: 'L'Empereur baisse,' 'Sa Majesté faiblit,' are expressions only too constantly heard from persons in the Emperor's immediate *entourage*.

The news of Count Teleki's suicide has fallen on the Palais Royal like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. Thouvenel is said to have been involved with the Count in political transactions

of a questionable kind, to a deeper extent than he can perhaps afford to own. Teleki's suicide, fortunately for Austria, puts an end to difficulties which can scarcely reappear. Among the Polish emigration party, the sudden disappearance of this leader, initiated in all the plans of the Revolution, has caused a most unpleasant surprise.

The difficulty of finding a proper residence for the Austrian Ambassador has been got over. The French Government have let him a house on suitable terms. Prince Metternich had just moved in and was in the best possible mood when I took leave of him. 'We are out of the wood—even politically,' were his last words.

London: July 15, 1861.

At Friday's sitting the Holstein affair came again under discussion. A member well disposed to Germany, Sir Harry Verney, called the attention of the House to the present state of the question, and moved for copies of the correspondence of 1860 and 1861. Notice was taken that forty members were not present, but the Speaker's bell summoned the necessary quorum in time, and Lord John Russell could not forbear from giving a reply. The communication of the correspondence he declined, as being undesirable at the present moment. He stated that he was glad to hear that it was likely that the King of Denmark would make propositions, either to the Diet or to Austria and Russia, by which it was to be hoped that Federal execution might be postponed for the present year, and negotiations entered on. What those negotiations, or what the terms proposed by the King, might be, he was not able to say; but he conceived that the negotiations might end in a solution of the whole question. The question of succession was, in his opinion, finally settled by the Treaty of London in 1852. That treaty had no other

aim but the maintenance of the Danish monarchy in its integrity after the death of the present King, who is childless. What might be the effect of that treaty when that eventuality occurred, he said that no one could tell. But it was binding on all the Powers that signed it.

London: July 15, 1861.

The news of the—thank God!—abortive attempt on the King of Prussia reached the Prussian *chargé d'affaires* here yesterday afternoon, through a telegram from the Prince of Hohenzollern. The Crown Prince left Osborne immediately to hasten to Baden Baden.

The retirement of the Minister of War, Lord Herbert of Lea, will create extensive changes in the Ministry. Sir G. Cornewall Lewis will succeed to the War Office, Mr. Cardwell to the Home Office, and Lord John Russell is to go to the Upper House. Considering the preponderating importance of the House of Commons in home questions, it always seems almost an act of political suicide when a party leader determines to accept a peerage. In the present case the motives are easily divined. If Lord Palmerston intends, as it is said he does, to introduce a Reform Bill next year, it will come far short of Lord John Russell's promises. Reproaches for broken engagements and disappointed expectations will not reach the Reformer in the Olympus of the Upper House. Apart altogether from this, it was thought important to arrange beforehand the distribution of parts which will become necessary when the present ultra-septuagenarian Premier departs this life. Lord Palmerston's popularity and Parliamentary tact have given the weak Ministry a new lease of life. The Whigs would have no prospect without him of remaining in office, unless they could make sure of Gladstone. The latter, however, would certainly not keep to them, except

as leader of the House of Commons. It is not to be overlooked that by the retirement of Lord John Russell, in addition to Sidney Herbert and Sir Richard Bethell, the new Lord Chancellor, the House of Commons, or rather the Ministerial party in it, is losing a third speaker of first-rate ability.

London: July 16, 1861.

The comments of the newspapers on Lord John Russell's acceptance of a peerage read almost like a funeral sermon. If the removal of a party leader to the Upper House, after nearly fifty years of hard work in the Commons, is to be regarded as a retreat, the retreat in this case is effected with all honour. In addition to his earldom, Lord John, who of course retains his office as Foreign Secretary, is to be decorated with the Blue Ribbon—distinctions which his political opponents do not grudge the son of the Duke of Bedford.

In the House of Commons this event has not made a favourable impression. It is thought there that Lord Palmerston's Cabinet contains too many peers already. One of the leading Tories remarked that if the House of Commons had been three months younger, it would have resented Lord John's retirement. He consoled himself, however, by adding that when one brick is taken from a crumbling wall, the rest soon follow.

London: July 20, 1861.

Lord John will retain his family name by entering the House of Lords as Earl Russell, and to-morrow he will take leave of his constituents in the City.

A question put yesterday by Kinglake, who has made himself conspicuous by his passionate treatment of the cession of Savoy and Nice, gave the Foreign Secretary a welcome opportunity of delivering an important farewell speech to the House

of Commons. Kinglake had put together, not without skill, all the evidence tending to prove the existence of a secret agreement between the Cabinets of Paris and Turin, and the intended cession, under certain eventualities, of the island of Sardinia. He appealed to the authority of Nelson, to show that if the Bay of Cagliari passed into the possession of a great naval Power, Malta would become valueless and England's supremacy in the Mediterranean be endangered. Sir Robert Peel and several of the Conservatives spoke to the same effect. Lord John concluded the debate and recognised in plain terms at once the importance of the question addressed to him. The Foreign Secretary assured the House that he had left nothing untried to come to the bottom of the truth. Thouvenel, as well as Ricasoli, had officially and privately denied any such design. It was impossible to believe that the Emperor Napoleon would attempt to embark on a scheme of that sort, so seriously disturbing the distribution of power in Europe.

'I have,' added Lord John, 'repeatedly expressed in my despatches the importance which her Majesty's Government would attach to such an act, and have never concealed the inevitable consequences it would involve. The attempt at such an annexation must put an end at once to any intimate alliance between this country and France. The Emperor Napoleon is very powerful. Everybody sees the great power that he possesses. But at the same time, if it was his intention, as I believe it is his intention, to preserve the peace of Europe and remain upon the most friendly terms with England, I am not at all sure—I cannot rest in any perfect confidence—that the state of public opinion in France, in the French Chambers or the French army, might not in a most sudden manner alter the whole policy of the Government. . . . There are two things that we ought to do: in the

first place, we ought to be very watchful with regard to the events which are taking place in Europe, events which are not altogether connected with the policy of Sovereigns and Courts; and secondly, I trust that no shortsighted view of our interests, no narrow spirit of saving with regard to any particular tax, will induce this country, in the present state of Europe and the world, to maintain a navy and army which are not adequate in all respects to the position we ought to occupy. . . . The knowledge that this country is able, and in a just cause is ready, to assume the offensive, is a guarantee for the independence of nations, and a security at the same time for the peace of Europe.'

London: July 22, 1861.

The speech with which Lord John Russell took his leave on the 19th of the House of Commons has attracted no small attention outside as well as inside the palace of Westminster.

One misses, it is true, the definite statement that the cession of Sardinia would be a *casus belli*. Several Ministers—for instance, Gladstone—are strongly of opinion that an annexation of that island would not affect English interests so seriously as to justify a declaration of war. Nevertheless, the tone of the speech was at once so decided and cautious, as to produce the impression that the Foreign Secretary has wished it to be thoroughly felt both here and in Paris, that he knows more of French intrigues than he thinks it desirable to say. At any rate, his intention clearly was to prepare seriously for the possibility of an open rupture. A statesman of eminence considers this speech the most important event of the Session, as containing the first intimation, couched in clear and decisive, though necessarily cautious terms, of England's being prepared to undertake the offensive. Whether Lord Palmerston would really reply to such an agreement between France

and Italy by a declaration of war, is another question. It can hardly be supposed that Napoleon will demand the island of Sardinia. Hitherto, he has only talked of giving that island to the Pope as an equivalent for the States of the Church. It was with this view that Pietri, the well-known *entrepreneur du suffrage universel* in Savoy, had been busy in that island and had sent private reports to Napoleon during his visit to the baths at Vichy. Many people believe that the Sardinian idea is only a mask intended to conceal the ulterior design of seizing the island of Sicily under the pretext of terminating the anarchy prevailing there, and that Sicily, and not the island of Sardinia, is the price stipulated for the evacuation of Rome.

In consequence of Lord John Russell's elevation to the Upper House, Lord Wodehouse has ceased to be Under-Secretary of State. Lord Wodehouse's rumoured appointment as Ambassador at the Austrian Court is improbable. Lord Bloomfield likes, and is liked at, Vienna; and there is no reason, therefore, for recalling him. The changes rendered necessary by Lord Herbert of Lea's retirement will easily make it possible to satisfy Lord Wodehouse's ambition.

The 'Times' and the 'Saturday Review' call attention to the difficulties in which Lord Palmerston is now placed. These difficulties have not been lessened by the unexpected wish of Lord John Russell to go to the House of Lords before the end of the Parliament. However the Premier may sort his cards, the reconstructed Ministry will bear a more or less provisional character. A Coalition is talked of. A few years ago, when Lord Derby proposed the same thing, a co-operation on the part of Lord Palmerston with the leader of the Tories could have secured to the country a strong Government, with a promise of permanence. But it is now too late to revert to that idea. Palmerston has become older, and the Whig party

weaker, while the Tories have been strengthened. Lord Derby will, therefore, hardly desire his own party to renounce the undivided possession of power.

London: July 26, 1861.

The Queen presided yesterday at a meeting of the Privy Council at Osborne, in order to sanction the changes in the Ministry. Sir G. Cornewall Lewis has been appointed Secretary of State for War; Sir George Grey goes to the Home Office; Mr. Cardwell is Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Sir Robert Peel becomes Secretary for Ireland, without a seat in the Cabinet. It is believed that Lord Wodehouse, whose successor is not yet known, will go as Ambassador to Constantinople. The 'Times' plainly expresses its disapproval of the latest changes in the Cabinet. The most serious thing is, that even those who are immediately affected by them are just as little contented. The choice of the new War Minister, however, has not displeased the army. Sir G. Cornewall Lewis is, perhaps, no specialist, like his predecessor, but a cool-headed, upright man of business, who with his sound common sense will soon acquire the necessary mastery of details.

Earl Russell, who is to be introduced this evening into the House of Lords, has taken leave of his constituents. He has not omitted to magnify the exploits of the Liberal party: Parliamentary Reform, Roman Catholic Emancipation, Free Trade, the removal of Jewish disabilities—nothing was forgotten. He remarked of himself that he felt like the great Emperor who, three centuries ago, having been engaged in all the great transactions of his time, and thinking that he would like to see what would happen after his death, had all the pomps of his funeral prepared, and assisted himself as chief mourner at the ceremony. How far Lord John is

entitled to compare himself with Charles V. need not be too closely examined.

The Ministerial Whitebait Dinner is to take place on the 31st, and it is hoped that on the 6th of August Parliament will be prorogued by Commission.

At Vichy the French Emperor still flatters himself with the hope that the King of Prussia will attend the manœuvres at Châlons. This report has created here an unfavourable impression. The Prussian Embassy had not heard anything yesterday on the subject.

London: July 31, 1861.

The Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian and the Archduchess Charlotte, who are expected here this evening, intend to stay a fortnight in England in the strictest *incognito*. The day after to-morrow they will pay a private visit to the Queen at Osborne.

A demand made by the Government of an additional vote for ironclads, though unimportant in itself, the sum required being only 250,000*l*., gave rise on the 26th to an interesting debate. The Government could not disguise the fact, that at least ten times that amount would be necessary to compete approximately with the naval armaments of France. The peace party were at first extremely indignant. But when Lord Palmerston confirmed the statements made by the Secretary of the Admiralty with an emphatic 'we know,' and proved that France would in a year and a half or two years possess twenty-seven ironclads, including eleven floating batteries, the Manchester men held their peace. Even Disraeli's suggestion that it rested with diplomacy alone to give effect to the friendly understanding proposed by France herself as to fixing the relative proportion of the two navies, failed to cool the warlike enthusiasm of the House. The Prime Minister and

the leader of the Opposition had to some extent changed parts. Disraeli's conciliatory attitude is not altogether approved by his own party. It is explained, however, by his wish to secure a friendly reception in the Tuileries, in the event of the Tories coming into office next year. In connection with Lord Russell's speech of the 19th, this debate shows that the coolness in the relations between England and France has again become intensified.

The day before yesterday Lord Derby in the Lords taunted the Government on their half-hearted efforts for Reform, and expressed a hope that, after the experiences of the last two years, they would abstain from fresh attempts in this direction.

In the House of Commons yesterday the Prime Minister gladly seized the opportunity given by a question put to him by Mr. Darby Griffith, the friend of the Magyars, to lay before the House his views on the Hungarian question. Some time ago, Mr. Dunlop, an attaché of the British Embassy at Vienna, was sent to Pesth, but was recalled at the instance of the Austrian Government. Mr. Griffith moved that the despatches of this agent should be laid before the House. Lord Palmerston refused to communicate them, as being confidential, and remarked: 'We attach due importance to the maintenance of the Austrian Empire, as a great Power in the centre of Europe, holding, I may say, a sort of balance between opposite and conflicting interests; and we should consider it a great misfortune to Europe if that Empire were to be dissolved by any internal convulsion which could possibly be prevented. It has not on the other hand been deemed by the Government right or fitting, or their duty, to take any part in the dissensions now unhappily prevailing between the Austrian Government and the people of Hungary. These are matters in which

really we see it would do no good to interfere. We do not feel called on even to express an opinion as to which party is in the right, and which in the wrong. We confine ourselves to the expression of a fervent hope that these differences may be settled amicably, and in such a manner as shall leave Austria a great, powerful, and prosperous State in Europe. When I am asked whether we take part with liberty against authority, or with authority against liberty, my answer is that we leave liberty and authority to settle their own disputes in Hungary, and that we do not presume to judge which party is in the right, and which in the wrong. . . . We hold with regard to the unfortunate dissensions in Hungary the same course that we hold in regard to the dissensions on the other side of the Atlantic—namely, a position of entire neutrality.'

London: Aug. 5, 1861.

Count Görtz, the Envoy of the Grand Duke of Hesse, arrived here yesterday. He brought me a letter of introduction from Count Platen. Count Görtz is commissioned to sign the treaty for the marriage of Prince Lewis and Princess Alice. I invited him to accompany me to Pembroke Lodge, and introduced him to Earl Russell, who was very anxious to bring the matter to a formal conclusion and wait to-morrow with the Count upon the Queen.

Earl Russell was under the impression that the King of Prussia had distinctly declined the invitation to Châlons. The Secretary of State expressed his satisfaction at this. Since Loftus has been at Baden-Baden, the Government here have been well informed. Lord Russell confessed to me that his speech of the 19th of last month had given great displeasure in Paris. He had been asked why he had not contented himself with saying that France did not want the

island of Sardinia. 'Good heavens!' exclaimed the noble lord, 'I could not say that: first, because I don't believe it myself; and secondly, because the House would never have believed me. That Napoleon means peace, I am fully persuaded, however great may seem his craving for peaceful conquests. For instance, he would be only too glad to pocket Naples and Sicily.'

London: Aug. 6, 1861.

The Speech from the Throne, settled yesterday at the Privy Council at Osborne, was read to-day by the Lord Chancellor for the Queen, and Parliament was then prorogued. It has been one of the most barren of Sessions. The only measures of any importance relate to India. The Anglo-Indian Empire has been reorganised with astonishing rapidity since the last crisis. Parliament, with its accustomed resignation, accepted without alteration the proposals of the Government. In the Upper House, Lord Ellenborough made an ineffectual attempt to amend the Bills introduced in the Commons by Sir Charles Wood. The machinery of administration, simplified already by the abolition of the Company, will now be able to be brought into regular working order. The new Viceroy undertakes, under more favourable circumstances than his predecessor Lord Canning, the heavy responsibility of governing with almost absolute power this most important of the dependencies of the English Crown. The Native as well as the Company's army have disappeared from the scene. Notwithstanding all the radical changes, the financial condition of the country, thanks to the elasticity of British administration, has now, for the first time after many years, been established on a satisfactory basis. The loans readily granted by Parliament are intended for railway undertakings on an extensive scale.

Lord Herbert of Lea, sent home from Spa in a dying state, breathed his last at his country seat, Wilton Abbey, in the fifty-first year of his age. This statesman was regarded as the future Prime Minister. His own party, as well as the country, suffer a heavy loss in his premature decease.

The rout of the Federals at Bull's Run, on the 21st of last month, has created here, as was to be expected, the greatest excitement. Much as one may pity the Unionist generals, intimidated by public opinion, it is impossible to feel sorry for the bitter lesson taught to the arrogant Northerners.

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CHAPTER XXIII.

LONDON.—1862.

General Grief at the Death of Prince Albert—Sir Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*—Bacon's Pioneers in Virginia—Civil War in America—James Buchanan—His View of the Slave Question—The 'Trent' Affair—French Expedition to Mexico—Battle of Bull's Run—The Saviour of the North—The Three Friends at Chicago—Grant's Military Career—Lord Derby saves Lancashire from the Cotton Famine—International Exhibition of 1862—Bismarck's Programme—Aspromonte—The Greek Insurrection and the Ionian Islands—Affairs in Germany.

On returning to my post from Lisbon, I found people in London not yet recovered from the shock caused by the sad event of December 14, 1861. Every one was still talking about it. The grief was general and sincere. All felt that the void occasioned by Prince Albert's death could never be supplied, his loss was irreparable. The same papers which only a few months before had been heaping suspicion and calumny on the Consort of the Queen were now profuse in their eulogies. As so often happens in life, people never valued the blessing till they had lost it. What the Prince had been to the Queen, what he had done for the State, was only known by a few in his lifetime. Of this the public knew nothing. The Ministers had to keep it secret, in compliance with the wishes of the deceased. The past was suddenly unveiled in the anxiety about the future. How stunned was Lord Palmerston by the blow, I heard through the Duke

of Cambridge. But Disraeli showed me, in the clearest and most emphatic terms, the calamity suffered by the State.

The Queen has raised a monument to the deceased, of more value than all monuments of brass and stone. Her Majesty was pleased to entrust to an eminent man of letters the papers left behind by her husband. Sir Theodore Martin has compiled out of these materials, placed with royal munificence at his disposal, his 'Life of the Prince Consort,' an historical work of the first rank, which combines with the most perfect impartiality the freshness and charm of an autobiography. To this monumental portrait nothing could be added.

A century after the discovery of America, and a few years after wind and weather had destroyed the Spanish Armada, Lord Bacon conceived the happy idea of seeking in the New World that point of Archimedes from which England would be able to put an end to the maritime supremacy of Spain. The territories on the shores of the Potomac, discovered by the adventurous Raleigh, were named Virginia, in honour of the Virgin Queen Elizabeth, and thither went the earliest colonists of the Anglo-Saxon race. These first emigrants, under the charters granted by Elizabeth, were, for the most part, gentlemen adventurers, attached to the Anglican Church. They founded the Southern States. In the reign of Charles I., a different class of emigrants proceeded to New England. They were people persecuted on account of their faith, and they transplanted to America the virtues and faults of the Anglo-Saxon race. Their fellow sectaries who remained behind in England formed the element that fomented that bloody revolution which put an end to the absolute monarchy of the Tudors and Stuarts. Cromwell's Ironsides and the puritan settlers in America were brethren

of the same faith. How pregnant with consequences has been this fact, too often disregarded, on the fate of Great Britain and her North American colonies, is shown by history. Bacon's grain of mustard seed had spread luxuriantly upon this virgin soil. A century and a half after his death the descendants of those Puritans, with the aid of the French nobility, fought for, and achieved, their total independence of the mother country.

However important in the world's history was the struggle which George Washington conducted and brought to a victorious termination, it can hardly be supposed that his contemporaries were as deeply interested in it as were all thinking politicians of our time in the Civil War that broke out in 1861. The effects of this war on Europe will become the more palpable as the power and wealth of the young Transatlantic Republic develope and increase.

The last President before the War of Secession, James Buchanan, was Minister of the United States at the English Court when I came to London—a big, strong man, with snow-white hair, called the Cockatoo, because he held his head awry. He was a friend of England and of peace, but in politics a thorough Yankee. At the beginning of the troubles in the East, and just at that awkward situation described by Clarendon as 'drifting into war,' Buchanan said to me, 'Do not you think it is just the moment to settle our little accounts with the mother country?' However, he left that to others, and contented himself with entertaining us now and then with his dry paradoxes.

After the Civil War had broken out, I recalled to mind a conversation I had with this colleague at a time when the Slave question had not yet become urgent. Buchanan, who was interested in anthropological studies, and attached great

importance to the structure of the skull, declared downright that he had always been extremely doubtful whether negroes were human beings at all. On my citing several cases of highly educated negroes in answer to this paradoxical assertion, Buchanan said he had never in his experience come across a negro capable of understanding a syllogism. He defended slavery on the ground of humanity. The blacks, he said, if not a complete race of apes, were at any rate a race who, from their permanent childishness, required, in their own interests, to be under continual guardianship. There was no greater disgrace to a white man, he said, than to have a drop of negro blood in his veins.

As is well known, it was precisely these prejudices which, at least outwardly, provoked the crisis that seemed to threaten the existence of the United States. At the bottom, however, of the slavery question, which served as a mer pretext for the war, lay in all probability the conflicting interests of agriculture on the one side, and manufacturing industry on the other. It was, therefore, easy to understand that the agricultural and more aristocratic slaveowners of the South should meet with warm sympathy in the highest circles of English society, whilst the people from the very first took the part of the democratic manufacturing classes of the North.

Nevertheless, when the captain of a war steamer belonging to the Northern States, in violation of all international law, arrested the diplomatic representatives of the South, who had taken ship to Europe on board the English mail packet 'Trent,' all parties joined in demanding satisfaction for this insult to the British flag. The good star of England decreed that Prince Albert, on his death-bed, was able to avert the threatened quarrel, by suggesting in a Memo-

randum such alterations in a despatch of Earl Russell's as enabled the Washington Cabinet to give the desired satisfaction.[1]

The peaceful settlement of this episode had a decisive influence on English policy. Had the 'Trent' affair led to war, the first step of the English Cabinet would have been the recognition of the Confederates as an independent belligerent power, and the second step, an offensive and defensive alliance with them. That was what Napoleon wished. He had almost simultaneously with the outbreak of the civil war in America begun a war with Mexico. Some more or less doubtful money claims by French subjects, for whom Morny had interested himself, served as a pretext. In reality Napoleon's object was to inflict a crushing blow on the Republican party in France by establishing a monarchical counterpoise to the Transatlantic Republic. At first England and Spain seemed inclined to take part in this enterprise. Both countries, however, thought better of it. Palmerston did not venture to challenge the Manchester school by recognising the South. He availed himself of King Leopold's mediation to explain this to the French Emperor. Thus France was obliged to conduct to a termination alone by means of a large force the expedition unsuccessfully begun. How severely her whole military system was strained was not revealed till afterwards. Mexico was destined to be to Napoleon III. what Spain had been to Napoleon I.

At first the struggle in the United States was uncertain. The undisciplined volunteers had to be trained as soldiers by fighting. The battle of Bull's Run excited the derision of military men in Europe. In England as well as in Germany

[1] The facsimile of this last political memorandum written by the Prince is given in Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. v. p. 422.

the faith in Republican institutions sank in a manner not a little satisfactory to the friends of monarchy. The opinion was universal in Europe that the Transatlantic Republic would not survive the Civil War, but would fall to pieces in the anarchy of a number of free States after the pattern of the earlier Spanish colonies. But, as events were soon destined to prove, this opinion underrated the tough perseverance of the Anglo-Saxon race, and overlooked the fact that, *cæteris paribus*, the North is always superior to the South.

With regard to the man who saved the North at this crisis, I heard afterwards some characteristic details dating back to 1862. In the rising commercial town of Chicago were living, when the Civil War began, three friends. One of them was foreman in a tanyard at a monthly wage of ten to fifteen dollars. The second was head of a boot and shoe shop, and thus was brought by his business into daily intercourse with the first. The third, and best-to-do of the three, one Washburne, had some influence with the State authorities. When the war broke out, and volunteer corps were formed, and the first misfortunes roused the people, Russell Jones, the shoemaker, reminded Washburne that their friend, the tanner Grant, had been to the military college at West Point, and could possibly render good service to the State by his knowledge of strategy. Washburne mentioned Grant to Governor Yates, who took him into his office. But this did not satisfy Grant. He told his friends that he would return to his tanyard, unless he was given active employment against the enemy. Amongst the young men who offered themselves as volunteers, there were a number of low fellows and loafers who were ripe for any mischief, and gave much trouble and difficulty to the already overworked police. The Governor proposed to Washburne to appoint Grant as Colonel, on

condition that he would rid the town at once of the rabble collected there, form out of this rabble a regiment, and take it away by the next train to join the army. Grant accepted the offer. He was popular with the working classes, and in two days he had a complete regiment under his command, which he purposely led by a circuitous route to meet the enemy in ten to fourteen days. Thanks to the iron discipline he enforced, the regiment held its ground in the first brush with the enemy, and soon learned to fight admirably. Before a month was over, Washburne and Russell Jones had the pleasure of seeing their friend's name extolled in all the newspapers. At the same time they received a letter from Grant stating that he had been made a General, but had no money to buy an outfit. The friends consulted together, opened a subscription, and soon raised enough money to enable them to send him the necessary uniform and horses, as a present from the grateful patriots of Chicago.

Grant rose step by step till, as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern army, he brought the Civil War to a victorious end, and subsequently was elected President of the United States. As such he applied again to Washburne, requesting his friend to undertake the post of Minister at Paris. This request came to Washburne unseasonably. He was unwilling to go to Paris unless his friend Russell Jones was appointed Minister at Brussels. Grant promised accordingly, and thus Washburne became Minister at Paris, whilst Russell Jones was my colleague at Brussels. The latter showed me at that time more than once some autograph private letters from Grant, indicating clearly the intimacy existing between the former tanner and former shoemaker.

The longer the American Civil War continued, the more seriously were the consequences felt which the blockade of the

Southern ports was bound to produce on English industry. England got her raw material in cotton almost exclusively from America. All the extemporised attempts to cultivate the cotton plant in India and Egypt seemed for the time to be unproductive. Most of the manufactories were obliged to leave off work when the stock in hand was exhausted. A large number of unemployed workmen were thrown on private charity, the State, as such, being unable to provide for them, except as paupers under the Poor Laws. The district most affected was the county of Lancashire, where the cotton famine was really terrible. The half-ruined manufacturers were unable, with all their willingness, to cope with the distress. Relief committees were formed, composed in many cases of Radicals, who tried to make social and political capital out of the calamity. Fortunately, there stood at the head of the large landed proprietors of that county a man, who had not only his head and heart in the right place, but also the means to avert the threatened danger. This man was Lord Derby, the chief of the Tory party. His first offers were coolly received; but he scorned to be discouraged or annoyed, and showed the Radicals by deed that his talent for organising at this critical juncture was of almost more value than all the money which he expended with such profusion. Earl Russell was forced at last to recognise officially in the House of Lords that Lord Derby alone, without any help from the Government, had saved the county of Lancashire from famine.

In the midst of this crisis the International Exhibition of 1862 was opened in London. A convenient site was chosen at Brompton. This time it was not necessary to raise a monster edifice over the heads of centenarian elms in Hyde Park, as Paxton had done in 1851. The preparations for this colossal undertaking had occupied the thoughts of Prince

Albert to the last, although he wisely refused the direct control. The grandest feature of this second Exhibition in London was the Loan Gallery, a collection of historical curiosities and valuables, contributed by the Court, the nobility, and the merchant princes. The value of the objects thus lent was estimated at no less than 6,000,000*l.*, and these treasures gave, perhaps, a more faithful picture of the wealth of England than the specimens of modern industry collected in the Exhibition.

Among the Royal visitors to the Exhibition were the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony, and the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar. The Russian Ambassador, Baron Brunnow, gave a large dinner to the latter, at which I was present. Among the guests was the Prussian Minister in Paris, Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen, who had a long conversation with Disraeli after dinner. The following is part of this conversation which the leader of the Opposition repeated to me on the same evening.

'I shall soon,' said in effect the Prussian statesman, 'be compelled to undertake the conduct of the Prussian Government. My first care will be to reorganise the army, with or without the help of the Landtag. The King was right in undertaking this task, but he cannot accomplish it with his present advisers. As soon as the army shall have been brought into such a condition as to inspire respect, I shall seize the first best pretext to declare war against Austria, dissolve the German Diet, subdue the minor States, and give national unity to Germany under Prussian leadership. I have come here to say this to the Queen's Ministers.'

Disraeli's commentary on this programme, which has since been carried out step by step, was, 'Take care of that man! He means what he says.'

During the last six months of the year the attention of the Cabinets was occupied with the events in Italy and Greece.

Garibaldi, the inveterate intriguer, had soon repented of having submitted to the King of Italy. Notwithstanding the state of anarchy still prevailing in the Apennine Peninsula, Victor Emmanuel was not the man to allow himself to be frightened by the Red Shirts. He showed himself master, beat the volunteers at Aspromonte, and sent Garibaldi prisoner to Spezia. Some clamour was raised, but all sensible people took the side of the King.

The Bavarian Prince who wore the Crown of Greece was not so fortunate. The offensive manner in which Palmerston had treated the Greek Government in 1850 may have undermined the authority of King Otto. Mistakes of Ministers, badly managed finances, and national disappointments, combined to account for the lamentable insurrection which brought the feeble *régime* of Otto of Bavaria to a miserable end. In our days, however, it is easier to displace a king than to find one. In vain did the Greeks, now free, make offers of their crown. In England, the proposal that Prince Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh, should mount the empty throne, was rejected by the Government with scorn. On the other hand, the English Ministers declared themselves ready to renounce the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, and to cede them to Greece. This decision created a disagreeable surprise among the Conservatives, who would have been glad to retain this naval position in the event of a war. There was no doubt that the islands cost the British Government more than they brought in. Palmerston and Russell gladly seized the opportunity of justifying in respect of Greece that principle of nationality which they had glorified so strikingly in Italy.

In the eyes of the Opposition, however, the whole affair was too trivial to waste many words about it in Parliament. The assent of the co-signataries of the Treaty of Vienna was obtained in the following year, and the group of islands ceded as a kind of dowry to the Danish Prince, whom the Greeks after a long search had chosen for their King. Whether the Ionians themselves have gained by the change remains to be seen; in any case the English have done more for beautiful Corfu than the poor Greeks could ever have accomplished.

In Germany I found matters, after Parliament had prorogued, much in the same plight as I had left them. In Prussia the dissolution of the Landtag and the change of Ministry had not helped forward the organisation of the army which had been planned by the Crown. Barren party squabbles were still in full swing when the King resolved to address a *Quos ego* to the disputants, and entrust the conduct of the Government to the man who, careless of constitutional conflicts, was destined to solve the German as well as the Prussian problem. As to the full significance of Bismarck's appointment as President of the Prussian Ministry (Sept. 21, 1862), I was left in no doubt after Disraeli's confidential communications to me on the subject.

CHAPTER XXIV.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.—1862.

London, Jan. 11: General Consternation at Prince Albert's Death—Disraeli's View of the Event.—London, Jan. 11: Settlement of the 'Trent' Affair—Summoning of Parliament for Feb. 6.—London, Jan. 12: Count Bernstorff's Despatch of Dec. 20, 1861.—London, Jan. 15: Illness and Last Days of Prince Albert—Characteristics of the Deceased.—London, Jan. 26: King Leopold in London—Relations with America—Prospects of the Session.—London, Jan. 30: Earl Russell's Despatch to Lord Lyons on the 'Trent' Affair—Peaceful French Speech from the Throne—Warlike Rumours from Italy—Lord Palmerston's State of Health.—London, Feb. 4: King Leopold—The Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian and Mexico.—London, Feb. 11: Address in Answer to the Queen's Speech—Condolences.—London, Feb. 20: Passive Attitude of the Opposition—Cavour's Letters—Lord Clarendon.—London, March 1: Cavour's Letters from Plombières.—London, March 4: Ricasoli's Dismissal—Rattazzi—News from Paris.—London, March 12: French Armaments—The Island of Sardinia—Fear of Troubles in the East.—London, March 17: Rattazzi and Venetia—Declaration of Austria—Italy and the Greek Insurrection.—London, March 21: Earl Russell on German Efforts for Reform.—London, April 27: Impressions of Paris—Contradictions and Embarrassments.—London, May 3: Lord Clarendon's View of Affairs in Prussia and Germany.—London, May 12: Earl Russell on the Situation in Germany, Belgium, and Italy.—London, Aug. 8: Close of the Session—Lord Palmerston and the Radicals.—London, Aug. 15: Exchange of Despatches between England and America—Rechberg's Criticism of the Guarantees granted by Italy to Prussia.—London, Aug. 25: Conversation with Earl Russell about Garibaldi and the Italian Complications.—London, Sept. 1: Departure of the Queen—Earl Russell's Partiality for Garibaldi—Arrest of Garibaldi.—Gotha, Sept. 18: Earl Russell to Count Vitzthum—Prince George's Visit to Reinhardsbrunn—Earl Russell's Pilgrimage to Dresden.—London, Dec. 7: Conversation with Persigny at Paris: Haussmann's wasteful Expenditure—The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce.

London: Jan. 11, 1862.

When King Ferdinand received me at Lisbon with the news of the death of Prince Albert, I foresaw at once what a

deep impression the event of December 14 last would create in England. But the consternation I found prevailing on my return among all classes of the people surpassed my utmost expectations.

Mr. Disraeli spoke to me with deep and heartfelt sorrow of the irreparable loss that England had sustained. 'With Prince Albert,' he said, 'we have buried our Sovereign. This German Prince has governed England for twenty-one years with a wisdom and energy such as none of our kings have ever shown. He was the permanent Private Secretary, the permanent Prime Minister of the Queen. If he had outlived some of our "old stagers," he would have given us, while retaining all constitutional guarantees, the blessings of absolute government. Of us younger men who are qualified to enter the Cabinet, there is not one who would not willingly have bowed to his experience. We are now in the midst of a change of government. What to-morrow will bring forth no man can tell. To-day we are sailing in the deepest gloom, with night and darkness all around us.'

The Duchess of Cambridge, whom I saw yesterday, had been the first to venture to write to the Queen. She described to me the answer of Princess Alice as heartrending. The Queen stares vacantly before her all day in unutterable despair. It is only with difficulty that the Royal sign-manual can be obtained for the most urgent business of State.

The possibility of the Prince's death was foreseen by none. Old Lord Palmerston, who had so often been unjust to the deceased, and had contributed much to embitter his life, is said to have wept and sobbed like a child on learning the news of his death.

London: Jan. 11, 1862.

The differences occasioned by the 'Trent' affair between the Cabinets of London and Washington have happily been adjusted. The English Government have paid dearly enough for this diplomatic victory, though, of course, a war with the United States would have cost much more. As it is, the outlay incurred for armaments and preparations is estimated at 5,000,000*l*. The crisis has brought out this fact of importance, that Canada has shown her power to defend herself. The loyalty of the Canadians has stood proof in the hour of danger. The unexampled rapidity with which the British troops were conveyed across the Atlantic, at the most unfavourable season of the year, is a subject of legitimate praise. The merit of this is due to the Duke of Cambridge.

The Emperor Napoleon has established cheaply enough a claim on the gratitude of England. The French Ambassador at Washington was well informed in the 'Trent' affair, and had repeatedly declared that the Americans would yield at the eleventh hour. When Thouvenel therefore, in his despatch of December 3, represented strongly the justice of the English demand, he risked little and only gave a fresh proof that the Tuileries prefer siding with the gods rather than with Cato. This despatch was received by Mr. Seward on December 25, two days after Lord Lyons had delivered his Ultimatum. It was immediately published with the papers relating to the 'Trent' affair, and probably was a welcome means to the American Ministry for justifying their conciliatory conduct in the Senate.

It has been thought here and there that some of the English Ministers regretted this amicable settlement. I can positively state from my own knowledge that Earl Russell does not share this regret. He is all the more rejoiced at the moral

victory obtained, the general state of affairs not being such at present that England can afford to paralyse her action in regard to Europe.

The Queen, who bears her irreparable loss with admirable fortitude, has held her first Privy Council since the Prince's death. The meeting took place in her Majesty's private room. The Duke of Newcastle, Lord Granville, and Sir George Grey went to Osborne to attend it. The subject of discussion was the summoning of Parliament, which is fixed for February 6. Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell have not yet seen the Queen.

The Prince of Wales's journey to the East, which had been planned by Prince Albert, is not abandoned. His Royal Highness will probably start at the end of this month.

The marriage of Princess Alice is to take place in June, very quietly and without any festivities.

Any serious party contests during the coming Session are hardly to be expected. Lord Derby is doubly delighted at the settlement of the quarrel with America, because now Lord Palmerston will remain Prime Minister to the end of his life.

London: Jan. 12, 1862.

The Prussian *chargé d'affaires* asked me to-day what I thought of Count Bernstorff's despatch to Savigny of the 20th of last month, which has now been published. I answered that, as a friend of Count Bernstorff, I could only wish that the despatch had never been written and printed. It was destitute of any new ideas, and was simply a *réchauffé* of the well-known programme of the 'Pauls-Kirche.' The author's long absence from Germany explained his inability to recognise at once by intuition the present condition of affairs. Silence, in any case, would have been better than to attempt to trans-

late the resolutions of the National League into the language of diplomacy. To effect such a complete transformation of Germany under the garb of Reform, would prove just as impossible for the Prussian Government as it did at Frankfort. Force, and force alone, could accomplish such a change; such 'reforms' involved a civil war.

'It is no use giving alarm,' said Count Brandenburg. 'The only way to solve the German question is the one already taken by the military Convention with Coburg.'

I cut short further discussion on the subject by observing that nobody in Germany thought of wishing to alarm Prussia, only it would be as well if the fact were recognised at Berlin that we too should not allow ourselves to be intimidated.

London: Jan. 15, 1862.

The Duke of Cambridge, who is at present staying with his mother at Kew Cottage, invited me the day before yesterday to a small dinner. The only guests were Count Apponyi and myself. The conversation, after the ladies had retired, lasted longer than usual. The Duke, who was already too ill to attend Prince Albert's funeral, has been confined to his room ever since the Prince's death. After recovering from an attack of gout, he seemed to feel the need of having a talk. I am indebted to him for some invaluable private details connected with the last days of Prince Albert's life.

The illness which snatched away the Prince so suddenly in his forty-second year was at first nothing but a gastric fever, as his private librarian Mr. Ruland had informed me by letter on the day before I left for Lisbon. This so-called Windsor fever, so frequently recurrent at that season in the badly drained town, soon, however, became typhoid. The Prince did not seem to be really ill, though as early as the

23rd or 24th of November his mind strangely wandered. His old valet felt instinctively what was necessary. 'Living here will kill your Royal Highness,' he frequently repeated; 'you must leave Windsor and go to Germany for a time to rest and recover strength.' These well-meant warnings passed unheeded by the patient, who showed the listlessness so foreign to his nature, but so characteristic of this disease. The most serious sign was sleeplessness and a total want of appetite. All the symptoms show that I had the same illness myself last year. My own experience, therefore, makes me feel convinced that the sick man, from the indifference he showed for everything, especially for the preservation of his own life, had no idea of the danger he was in. This is the peculiarity of typhoid fever, which so completely shatters the nervous system. It requires, after timely diagnosis, complete rest and gentle treatment. When once the blood-poisoning has reached a certain stage, no human aid can avail.

Above all things, the Prince seems to have had no doctor attending him who was capable of recognising the gravity of the disease in time. Unfortunately, his physician, Dr. Baly, had been killed in a railway accident the year before. Sir James Clark, fifty years before a distinguished physician of the old school, had virtually retired from practice, and probably had but a limited knowledge of the advance made by modern science in the treatment of typhoid diseases. As physician to the Queen, his position had been for twenty years a sinecure. Her Majesty enjoys such excellent health that she does not know what it is to be ill. Hence to the last moment she clung to vain hopes in regard to the condition of her husband, which Sir James very possibly confirmed. In consequence of the urgent representations of the Ministers, Dr. Watson and Sir Henry Holland were summoned, in addition to Dr. Jenner.

Sir Henry Holland is said to have had the courage, when it was too late, to tell the Queen the truth.

The news of the death of King Dom Pedro, whom the Prince had loved as a son, had deeply affected him. From that moment he showed an unusual irritability, which was all the more striking as the Prince's cool temperament and indescribable patience enabled him always to preserve his equanimity. As he himself confessed, he hardly closed his eyes from the time he received the news till the fever actually set in. The troubles with America also embittered his last hours. He was so tired that at times he nodded off to sleep when standing. He felt always cold, and ate scarcely anything. Already, in the autumn at Balmoral, he had a presentiment of his death. So strong was this feeling ten days before he died, that he enjoined Princess Alice, having ascertained that the Queen was not in the room, to write and tell her sister in Berlin that their father would not recover. The next day he asked the Princess whether she had done so, and she replied that she had not. On the 13th, the day before his death, he got up and transacted some business with his private secretary Mr. Ruland. The Queen drove out, and during the drive appeared much easier about her husband's condition. On her return she found him in bed, unconscious, and with the extremities ice-cold. Now for the first time they all realised the danger. Princess Alice, on her own responsibility, sent for the Prince of Wales, who was then at Cambridge. Sir Charles Phipps telegraphed during the night for the Duke of Cambridge, who left London by the first train on the 14th, and arrived at Windsor at eight o'clock in the morning. The alarming symptoms had increased, and the doctors did not conceal that the Prince had only a few hours to live. The Queen alone still deceived herself with hopes,

and telegraphed early on the 14th to Berlin, 'Dear Vic, Papa has had a good night's rest, and I hope the danger is over.' A similar telegram was sent the same day to the King of Portugal. In the evening at seven o'clock, the Prince was able to rise and get up, which seemed to indicate a favourable crisis. The dying man showed a wonderful vitality, even when the lungs refused their office. The Duke of Cambridge, who had been called to town on account of urgent business—the embarkation of the Guards for Canada—received the news of the Prince's death about midnight. He had considered it his duty, on his return from Windsor, to inform Lord Palmerston of the danger. The Prime Minister was so affected that he fainted away several times in the presence of the Duke, who expected him to have a fit of apoplexy, and still fears that his days are numbered. However, he recovered again in the afternoon so far as to be able to receive Baron Brunnow, who perceived nothing unusual about him.

Just as the Queen had failed to recognise the danger till the last moment, so also she appears not to have realised, for the first few days after all was over, the full extent of her loss. Her composure was almost unnatural, and it was not till her return to Osborne that she awoke to the full consciousness of this unexpected blow. 'Her Majesty is unnaturally quiet,' was the remark of an eyewitness two days after the event.

All who saw the corpse speak of its wonderful beauty. The regular features, not in the least disfigured, were as if glorified. Only the body, which had become almost too stout, seemed to have shrunk away. The Duchess of Cambridge described with touching emotion the impression produced by the beautiful corpse covered with flowers. She spoke with tears in her eyes of the almost unparalleled happiness of his twenty-two years of married life, now brought to such a sudden

end. In all that clear and sunny sky there was only one cloud. How gladly would the Queen have shared her crown with the husband who helped her to wear it and was her all in all. In vain, already in Sir Robert Peel's time, had she expressed her wish to bestow the title of King upon her husband. The constitutional scruples of the deceased Tory Minister were urged still more emphatically by Lord Palmerston when, later on, the question was again mooted. The promotion of the Prince to the title of 'Prince Consort' was the consequence of a compromise. Prince Albert was naturalised in 1840, and obtained in the same year, by Letters Patent, precedence next to the Queen. Nevertheless, he was not a British Prince, and both at Court and the Privy Council his eldest son, on attaining his majority, must have taken precedence of him. 'For the Prince of Wales,' as the Duke of Cambridge says, 'is, and remains, Prince of Wales.'

The value which the Queen attached to her husband's precedence is explained by the submissive veneration she invariably showed him in great as well as small affairs. He was complete master in his house, and the active centre of an empire whose power extends to every quarter of the globe. It was a gigantic task for a young German Prince to think and act for all these millions of British subjects. All the threads were gathered together in his hands. For twenty-one years not a single despatch was ever sent from the Foreign Office which the Prince had not seen, studied, and, if necessary, altered. Not a single report of any importance from an Ambassador was allowed to be kept from him. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary for War, the Home Secretary, the First Lord of the Admiralty, all handed to him every day just as large bundles of papers as did the Foreign Office. Everything was read commented

upon, and discussed. In addition to all this, the Prince kept up private correspondences with foreign Sovereigns, with British Ambassadors and Envoys, with the Governor-General of India, and with the Governors of the various colonies. No appointment in Church and State, in the army or the navy, was ever made without his approbation. At Court not the smallest thing was done without his order. No British Cabinet Minister has ever worked so hard during the Session of Parliament—and that is saying a good deal—as the Prince Consort did for twenty-one years. And the Ministers come and go; or at any rate, if frequently and long in office, as was the case with Palmerston and Russell, they have four or five months' holiday every year. The Prince had no holidays at all, he was always in harness.

The Continental notion that royalty in England is a sinecure was signally refuted by the example of Prince Albert. As for the charge sometimes alleged against him, that owing to his Liberalism he yielded too much to the Ministers—in other words, to Parliament—it is wholly groundless. The influence exercised on the Government by the Crown is a power which makes itself felt not merely in crises at home and abroad, but continually. This influence is, however, indirect, and wears a different garb in England to that which it assumes, for example, in Russia and France. Prince Albert's task was all the more difficult, since his decision depended on unknown data, and he had to reckon with the changing factors of a constitution, the foundations of which have been undermined for years by the rising waves of democracy. If, in spite of all this, the Crown's game, as Prince Metternich expressed it, has been well played, this result is doubly creditable to the late Prince, inasmuch as he could only direct the game, and not play it himself. With what

tact and skill he did so, is proved by the fact that, with the exception of the British Ministers and a few intimate friends, no one had any idea of the actual position of the Prince during his lifetime. Those who knew it were pledged to keep the secret, which now for the first time since his death has been revealed to the nation.

As truth appears to have been the most prominent attribute of the Prince, this necessary game of concealment must have been all the more painful to him. The daily regard for public opinion gave rise to misunderstandings, to overcome which required an amount of elasticity which was bound gradually to weaken. Sparing as the deceased was of sleep, it is difficult to understand how he found time to grapple with the mass of business. He could never call an hour his own. The continual receptions, notwithstanding the uniformity of an almost cloister-like Court life, no less than the mere physical strain caused by the continual change of residence, cut up the day into pieces and left scarcely any time for rest and reflection. The wonder is how he found it possible, in the midst of these occupations, to attend with laborious conscientiousness to the cares of government; to conduct personally the education of nine children; to prosecute his studies in all branches of human knowledge; to astonish men of science with the results of those studies; and at the same time to live, as he did, for art, himself a student and constant patron of music, painting, and poetry.

No one who thinks of all this can be surprised that the body was bound to succumb to this excessive strain upon the mind.

London: Jan. 26, 1862.

King Leopold arrived in town last Thursday from Osborne and put up at Buckingham Palace. Owing to the severe cold

which has set in, the physicians recommend his Majesty to postpone his intended visit to Broadlands. The King's state of health is satisfactory. The main object of his purposed interview with Lord Palmerston is to facilitate the transaction of public business between the Queen and her Ministers.

With regard to her Majesty's state of health the King speaks in terms of satisfaction. Although she has not yet been able to dine with her relatives, now staying at Osborne, the Princess Hohenlohe and Prince Louis of Hesse, she is, physically speaking, well and outwardly composed.

The peaceful settlement of the 'Trent' affair has led to several analogous and favourable decisions. In no less than three cases of alleged outrage to the British flag, the Cabinet of Washington has given reparation spontaneously. Unfortunately, the conciliatory attitude of President Lincoln and his Ministers affords no guarantees for the maintenance of peace. On the contrary, the weakness hitherto shown by the North in the conduct of the war may possibly encourage England and France to take common action. People already talk of not recognising the blockade of the Southern ports, and of compelling, if necessary, their being opened. However, I think I can assure you that the secret negotiations now pending between Paris and London, as to an eventual recognition of the South, have not yet led to any tangible result. Napoleon's dislike of the democracy of the North is becoming daily more marked, notwithstanding all the counter-efforts of Prince Napoleon. Some people go so far as to think that he intends, even without the active co-operation of England, but counting on her moral support, to dictate peace on the other side of the Atlantic.

The political notabilities have come to town earlier than

usual. Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli have arrived. It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this fact any particular stir on the part of the Opposition. Everything points to a short Session, devoid of any party struggles. The Ministry, as may well be imagined, will not quit their passive attitude so long as the leaders of the Opposition intrench themselves behind their loyalty. It is their duty, Lord Derby preaches to his party, to respect the Queen's sorrow, and not trouble her Majesty with party contests or any ministerial crisis.

London: Jan. 30, 1862.

To-day's newspapers publish Earl Russell's despatch to Lord Lyons of the 23rd inst. The principles of maritime law, propounded by Mr. Seward in his long Note, are refuted with a frequently crushing application of the authorities cited by the American statesman. This despatch concludes, it is to be hoped, the correspondence on the 'Trent' affair. As regards the future, it is important to note that England has protested in the most emphatic terms against the American contention, that plenipotentiaries of a belligerent Power may be treated as contraband of war. Just as decisively does Lord John Russell deny the right of a belligerent Power to stop on the high seas, in order to commit *des actes d'hostilité* on board it, a neutral mail steamer conveying passengers and letters from one neutral harbour to another. By a happy coincidence the liberated Southern Commissioners, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, landed safely at Southampton on the very day that Earl Russell's despatch was published.

The French Speech from the Throne has strengthened the hopes of peace created by Fould's financial plan. And yet, according to trustworthy accounts, the French garrison in Rome is said to consist not of 25,000 or 30,000, but of no less

than 40,000 picked troops. The officers make no secret of their profound contempt for the Piedmontese, and openly announce that the French would put a stop at once to the anarchy at Naples. Rumours are circulating there at the same time of a rising in favour of Prince Murat. Is it possible that Lavalette's zealous efforts to remove King Francis II. from Rome have some connection with this?

The conclusion drawn from the barren correspondence between Prussia and Denmark on the Holstein question, which has been published to-day, is that the German Bund simply wishes to keep the question open.

Lord Palmerston has refuted in person the disquieting rumours current about his state of health. He came up to town the day before yesterday, waited on the King of the Belgians, and returned to Broadlands the same evening. From there he travelled yesterday to Osborne, and returned again to his country seat after an audience of her Majesty. Persons who have seen and spoken to the Prime Minister express no uneasiness whatever about his condition. He has been able to ride again, and to take part in a fox-hunt. This will probably have sufficed to comfort one of his political opponents, who said to me lately, quite seriously, that it would be neither decent nor loyal of Lord Palmerston if he were to die at the present moment.

London: Feb. 4, 1862.

King Leopold returned on Sunday, not to Brussels, but to Osborne. His prolonged visit is explained by the secret negotiations now pending with a view to establishing a constitutional monarchy in Mexico. The intention of the three intervening Powers is to induce the Mexican people, after internal tranquillity is restored, to elect the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian. The Austrian Cabinet, as such, has to my

knowledge not yet been informed of this intention. Napoleon, however, has applied direct to the Archduke, who has not absolutely refused the offer of a Transatlantic t[illegible] founded by means of French and Spanish bayonets. He is not inclined to push himself forward, but insists on waiting till his intended subjects invite him, and even then would like first to examine the guarantees which the intervening Powers might offer him. People, nevertheless, are under the impression that the Archduke himself, like his royal father-in law, is secretly working for the realisation of this Quixotic plan. To-day's 'Morning Post' attempts to establish the Archduke's lawful title in a manner not exactly flattering to the Bourbon dynasty in Spain. The indirect object of this genealogical argument, derived probably from French sources, is to advocate the joint intervention of England, which the Conservative papers strongly disapprove. It could only be a question at most, says the 'Morning Post,' of about 700 marines, who would have to occupy some points on the coast, while the French and Spanish troops put down anarchy in the capital.

London: Feb. 11, 1862.

King Leopold took leave of the Queen yesterday, and has gone to Buckingham Palace, after stopping at Claremont on his way. His Majesty will embark this evening at Dover on his return to Brussels.

In the Address, which has been unanimously voted at the opening of both Houses, two paragraphs were devoted to expressions of sympathy on the part of Parliament. The debate formed a real ovation for the late Prince Consort. All party passion, all personal rivalries are silent before the sorrow of the Queen and the scarce closed grave of the royal statesman. Lord Derby surpassed himself. Never did happier expressions

come from the lips of the great orator than when giving utterance that evening to the feeling of the House and the [redacted] and rendering the common tribute of gratitude to the [redacted]. Even Mr. Disraeli has shown that his eloquence can dispense with the clever use of irony. If he failed to say in plain terms that England mourned for her Sovereign, he implied it clearly enough when stating how the Prince had gained for himself the position of the 'Prime Councillor of a realm the political constitution of which did not even recognise his political existence.' Lord Palmerston did justice to the eloquence and feeling displayed by the leader of the Opposition, and added that it was no exaggeration to say that as far as the word 'perfect' could be applied to human imperfection, the character of the late Prince deserved the term. Whigs and Tories—Palmerston, Derby, Granville, Russell, Disraeli—all had but one wish, to give expression in a becoming manner to the feeling of irreparable loss. The Queen, for the first time in her life, has had the reports of the speeches laid before her, and has expressed to the leaders of the Opposition her warmest acknowledgments. As decency required, politics were only touched upon *honoris causâ* in the debate on the Address. The Ministers promised to give all desired information, documentary and verbal, respecting the blockade of the Southern ports, the intervention in Mexico, the Convention with the Sultan of Morocco, and other subjects referred to in the Speech.

London: Feb. 20, 1862.

The proceedings in Parliament so far show that the Opposition, as was foreseen, do not intend to prepare any serious embarrassments for the Government. Two unexpected electioneering triumphs for the Tories have not influenced their attitude of abstention.

The letters addressed by Cavour to his colleagues during the Paris Congress of 1856 have created here no small sensation. Lord Clarendon, who has always kept clear of any one, gerated Italian sympathies, is openly accused by [illegible] He is Sardinian Minister of having promised him the material support of England, should Piedmont become involved in a war with Austria. The glaring contradiction which these pretended revelations present to Lord Clarendon's official statements and speeches in Parliament has been exhibited in a pamphlet in so odious a manner that the former Foreign Secretary could not ignore the affair. His reports, brought six years ago from Paris as first British Plenipotentiary at the Congress, gave him no materials for an explanation, as he attached too little importance to his conversations with Cavour to mention a word about them. When therefore he resolved to contradict flatly the late Count's statement, as he did in the House of Lords on the 17th, his task was not without its difficulties. Nevertheless, no one could doubt that Clarendon's word was of very different weight to Cavour's scribbling. The British Minister repents now of having entered into confidential conversations with such a thoroughly untrustworthy man as Cavour. Some persons believe that the publication of Cavour's letters was inspired from Paris, with the intention of compromising Clarendon not only with his former colleagues, but also with the Austrian Cabinet. The Government, however, have been assured that the Emperor Napoleon was extremely indignant at their publication.

London: March 1, 1862.

Italy is decidedly unfortunate. It is as if a Nemesis were forcing all who took part in Cavour's intrigues to throw aside their masks and become self-accusers. Scarcely have Cavour's

confidential letters, published by Rattazzi, been to some extent forgotten, when the former Sardinian Minister at Paris, Count Villamarina, finds himself constrained to throw into the market Cavour's letters from Plombières. To those who are behind the scenes, these confidential letters contain little that is new. The public learn from them for the first time the details about the conspiracy of Plombières, which prove that Napoleon had then already struck his bargain with Cavour, and was resolved to provoke Austria to war at any price. If therefore a 'crime' is at the bottom of the campaign of 1859, as Lord Derby, in an unguarded moment, had the misfortune to declare, the noble lord knows now, as does all the world, that the authors of that crime are not to be looked for in Vienna. The letters of Cavour are only known here as yet from the meagre extracts which the 'Gazette de France' had the boldness to publish. These suffice to explain the ebullition of wrath with which a French Prince honoured Austria in the Senate.

London: March 4, 1862.

The news of Baron Ricasoli's dismissal reached London on the evening of the 1st, and that of Rattazzi's appointment on the 2nd. It is known that Ricasoli's request for leave to retire had been prompted by a letter from Victor Emmanuel. The King had openly told the Minister-President that he had lost the confidence of his Sovereign. The crisis has been here a most unpleasant surprise, though the Government had been informed some time ago of palace intrigues in favour of the Piedmontese Rattazzi. The latter is regarded as the most servile tool of French policy. Hopes are indulged that Ricasoli will show himself strong enough in Parliament to have the fate of any Ministry in his hand. At the same time there is no concealing the possibility of a *coup d'état*, which might

turn the youthful Constitutionalism of Turin into the French rut. This explains why in England the present crisis is regarded as a danger and misfortune to Italy.

Matters in France also are exciting here the liveliest interest. The exchange of notes occasioned by the insulting language of Prince Napoleon in the Senate against the ally of his Imperial cousin, and concluded in a manner so satisfactory to Austria, is already regarded as an incident belonging to history. All the more excitement is caused by the coming vote in the Chamber on the Bill granting a dotation to General Montauban. It is expected that the Bill will be rejected, and people are wondering how Napoleon will receive this first act of opposition to his personal authority.

The Duke of Brabant, who arrived yesterday at Osborne, is so unwell that the physicians have prescribed a long stay in the South for the Belgian Heir-Apparent. The Prince will embark in a few days at Southampton *en route* for Seville through Lisbon and Cadiz.

In reply to the question of the Spanish Cabinet whether the British Government had any negotiations with the King of the Belgians about the candidature of the Count of Flanders for the Mexican Throne, Earl Russell has stated that he had not exchanged a word with King Leopold on the subject of Mexico.

As to the re-appointment of Prussian Ambassadors in London and Paris, all at present is mere rumour. Persons in high position lament this interim of seven months, and the lack of men fit for the posts.

London: March 12, 1862.

The latest events in Berlin and Turin fill English statesmen with anxiety for the welfare of the Parliamentary system.

In a soil so undermined by extreme parties, as is the case with Germany and Italy, that system has not struck its roots as deeply as was here wished and hoped. Still graver fears are caused by the armaments of the French Emperor, which are not kept sufficiently secret. The British Ministers, as a rule, conceal the distrust inspired by their restless neighbour. However, Lord Palmerston has lately considered the strength of the French army a matter demanding grave attention. He estimates that army, without reckoning the National Guard, at a total of 800,000 to 1,000,000 bayonets. The military attaché of the French Embassy in London declares the active strength to be 700,000 men. He does not dispute how extremely important the island of Sardinia would be to France as a *place d'armes* for Algeria. He says that no importance is attached to the possession of Genoa. Well-informed authorities see no immediate danger either for the Rhine or for Venetia, but apprehend a crisis in the East. The movement in Greece is ascribed to French machinations. King Otto's situation is all the more desperate as he has no money. The Bavarian Minister asked Lord Palmerston lately what England meant to do as a protecting Power? 'Our naval officers,' was the cool reply, 'have orders to place a man-of-war at the command of the Greek King and Queen in case of need.'

There are disturbances also in Moldavia and Wallachia. Considerable depôts of French arms still exist there, of which only a small portion were confiscated last year and taken to Constantinople. In like manner a numerous general staff of the Magyar and Italian revolutionary army has been collected in those provinces.

The Russian Ambassador assured me of his own accord that there was no question of Russia's possibly taking action

in the East in concert with France. On the contrary, the need of friendly relations with Austria was felt to be far more necessary at St. Petersburg than Count Apponyi, who was not always well informed by Count Rechberg, seemed to suspect.

London: March 17, 1862.

Earl Russell several times repeated to me, directly after the change of Ministry in Turin, that the difference between Ricasoli's and Rattazzi's programmes was that the former aimed chiefly at the conquest of Rome, while Rattazzi sought above all to win Venetia with the aid of France, and attached comparatively little value even to the possession of Naples. Agreeably with this view, the Foreign Secretary told Count Apponyi that the British Government considered an attack upon Venetia quite possible, notwithstanding Ricasoli's declaration to the contrary. Lord Bloomfield is instructed to make a similar statement to Count Rechberg. Palmerston's language is in striking contradiction to this view. In a conversation yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador, he took precisely the same ground as was taken recently by Layard in the House of Commons. In the Prime Minister's opinion Rattazzi is bound by the declaration made by Ricasoli, in the name of Victor Emmanuel. Palmerston believes that the new Minister is endeavouring to come to an understanding with Garibaldi in order to render him harmless. Considering the fears notoriously entertained by the Premier on account of the French armaments, his attempt to quiet Apponyi gave small comfort. The latter contented himself by referring to the declaration made by Austria a few days ago here and at Paris, and communicated by her to Turin. According to this declaration, the Vienna Cabinet makes the Government of Victor Emmanuel responsible for

any attack on Austrian territory by Garibaldi or other volunteers. In other words, any such attack would be regarded as a declaration of war by Italy.

Signs of a new Italian intrigue are manifest even at Athens. The Sardinian Envoy there has confessed to his Turkish colleague that a Græco-Albanian Committee had been formed at Naples. He added that the Porte need have no anxiety on the subject, since, if the object were to prepare difficulties for Austria, his Government would choose the shorter way to Hungary by Fiume, and not the longer one by Albania. 'That certainly does not sound very reassuring,' was Earl Russell's comment on receiving the Turkish representative's despatch. A private letter from Rome gives the key to this transaction. In this letter the Sardinian Envoy at Athens is directly accused of having brought about the Greek revolution. The Central Committee, which conducted the whole movement, is stated to have met in his office. Their aim, it is said, was the expulsion of the Bavarian dynasty, and the elevation of Prince Thomas, Duke of Genoa, to the vacant throne of Greece. Russia accuses France, and France accuses Russia, of having contrived the Greek and Eastern complications; whilst England suspects now France, now Russia, and now both. It would be amusing if, after all, the Revolutionary party in Italy alone were found to have concocted those difficulties, with the view of obtaining, by way of exchange or mediation, the peaceful possession of Venetia.

The day before yesterday the Queen laid the foundation-stone of the Mausoleum, which she intends to erect to her deceased husband and herself at Frogmore. The similar structures erected by Rauch for King Frederick William III. and Queen Louisa have been taken as the model.

Lord Derby, who two days ago was at Windsor, and Lord

Clarendon are at the head of the Committee appointed to carry out the scheme of an Albert Memorial in Hyde Park.

London: March 21, 1862.

The indifference displayed by Earl Russell with regard to German efforts for reform has struck me on various occasions, and I have more than once referred to it in my despatches. The same impression has been produced on Count Kielmansegge since his first conversation, after a long absence from his post, with the Foreign Secretary. Earl Russell gave him to understand that it would be time for the British Government to interest themselves in the question when a definite scheme for reforming the constitution of the Bund had been brought forward and obtained the full assent of Austria and Prussia. Time was too precious to study one-sided attempts to solve the question. He blamed Bernstorff's proceedings and his despatch of December 20 as unwise, though at the same time he did not deny that if Austria required the Bund to guarantee her non-German possessions, the task of reform in Germany would not be lightened.

As for Apponyi, he is satisfied with Earl Russell. The *nil admirari* has so become a second nature in this Minister, that nothing disturbs his equanimity, and he listens to all with apparent indifference, bestowing neither praise nor blame. In this way he gains time to weigh the impressions he receives, and mentally to digest what he hears. He listened in silence to Count Rechberg's despatch, repeating the threat that Austria would treat any attack made by the volunteers as a declaration of war by Victor Emmanuel. After a few days Earl Russell reverted to the question, and asked whether he should not inform the Turin Cabinet of this announcement. Apponyi replied with the same indifference, 'We have made

no such announcement any part of our communication to Turin; but, if you like to inform Sardinia of our unalterable resolve, you are quite at liberty to do so.' The Austrian Ambassador is thoroughly persuaded that Austria could count, in certain cases, on England's support in the Adriatic. But any definite promises he has neither demanded nor received; and such promises would be at variance with the habits of English diplomacy.

London: April 27, 1862.

All that I could ascertain at Paris was that French as well as foreign politicians have by this time given up guessing the intentions of the Imperial Sphinx respecting Italy. One thing only is certain, that troubles in that quarter are thickening. Contradictions which cannot be reconciled confront you at every step. It is now the Vatican and Revolution, now Francis II. and Victor Emmanuel, now Austria and Piedmont, or, in the precincts of the Eternal City itself, the French Ambassador and the General in command. The quarrels between these two appear to have brought the Marquis de Lavalette to Paris during the quiet time of Easter. People there talked of his recall. He denied this report emphatically, and announced that he should soon return to his duties. Private business alone, as the papers maintain, could not have prompted this flying visit; moreover, in that case he would not have needed the Secretary of the Embassy who came with him. A notion has got about, which is apparently not unfounded, that there is a question of removing King Francis II. from Rome.

The Jesuits, in their quiet seminary in the Rue Vaugirard, are labouring to adjust the differences which have occupied the Christian Church for centuries. The question is no less a one than how to heal the schism which divides the Greek Orthodox

from the Roman Catholic Church. My stay at Paris was too short to get to the bottom of the matter. That this bold scheme is being attempted in all seriousness seems certain. Prince Gagarin, an ex-officer in one of the Russian regiments of the Guards, who left the Greek Church to join the Jesuits, was named to me as one of the most active instruments of the Society in this project. With the astuteness peculiar to the disciples of Loyola, they seem to be avoiding all controversy involving fundamental doctrines, and anxious to effect at once a practical settlement of the question on the volcanic soil of the Ottoman Empire. Father Gagarin has gone to Rome to obtain special concessions for the Catholic missionaries from the Pope. As a first step, Bulgaria, whose half-barbaric population is accustomed to the rites of the Greek Church, is to be brought to the chair of St. Peter, the missionaries being allowed to introduce as few variations as possible in the orthodox usages of the country. After the reception the Papal Nuncio met with at St. Petersburg, and considering the value apparently attached there, on account of Poland, to an understanding with Rome, such schemes are now less wild than they were. The subjection of the Turkish Christians to the power of the Vatican would be anything but displeasing to Napoleon, as his interests in the East are identical with those of the Pope.

With these rumours is connected another, to which a greater political significance might be ascribed. It is said that Napoleon is resolved to procure the tiara, after the death of Pius IX., not for his cousin, Prince Canino, or for a French prelate, but for Cardinal Wiseman. No candidature could be be more useful to France, and none more objectionable for England, on account of Ireland.

Meanwhile Sir James Hudson continues to rave for Italian

unity, and assures the Government in his despatches that the College of Cardinals have already virtually assented to the surrender of the temporal power.

With what distrust Napoleon's enigmatical policy is just now being watched in England, I learned yesterday from the Duke of Somerset. Reticent and cautious beyond any other man I know, the First Lord of the Admiralty is not the one to give rash expression to a passing impulse. 'Never,' he remarked in all seriousness, 'has there been more need of watchfulness than at present; never before have we been so near a rupture with France.'

The Duke of Cambridge has employed his holidays in personally examining the coast defences. He returned yesterday, sunburnt and satisfied with the results of his inspection.

The newspapers give accounts of the Prince of Wales's journey to the East. He visited the mosque containing the tombs of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and their wives. No other Christian has ever been allowed to enter this sanctuary since the time of the Crusades.

The Queen is expected to-morrow at Windsor, where the Crown Prince of Prussia is to arrive the following day. The latter goes straight from Dover to Windsor. He will reach London on the 30th, and put up at Buckingham Palace, and then return, after the opening of the International Exhibition, to Berlin.

London: May 3, 1862.

Yesterday, for the first time in this dull year, I had an opportunity of speaking with Lord Clarendon. He has come to town for a few days, and intends to return to-morrow to his country seat. Although Lord Clarendon has left the political stage, he still enjoys to an eminent degree the personal confidence of the Queen. For this, if for no other reason, the

views he formed last autumn at Berlin, after his journey to Königsberg to represent her Majesty at the Coronation, deserve particular attention. His strong Liberal tendencies are well known. When he once called us Germans 'une grande nation politiquement châtrée,' he cannot be blamed for the remark from his particular point of view. I reminded him of it, and he was not in the least disposed to retract his opinion.

'All my political sympathies,' he observed, 'are for Prussia, the greatest Protestant Power in Germany. The marriage of the Crown Prince with the highly gifted daughter of our Queen has only knitted still closer the old ties between the two countries. Unfortunately, not everything I saw and heard in Berlin tended to strengthen me in my natural sympathies. The King, a man of perfect honour, has no idea of the duties of a Constitutional Sovereign. Besides this, his Majesty has the misfortune not to possess a single statesman in his kingdom. What Bernstorff is, we know. He is the most honourable man in the world, but seldom has there been a weaker Minister. He told me candidly that he made a great sacrifice in taking office, but that he thought he could be useful to his master and country, as he had studied the parliamentary system in England. The fruits of these studies are now seen: blunder on blunder, contradictions and inconsistencies without end. All Prussian officials overrate themselves and are self-conceited, and none more so than Bernstorff. I am beginning to think that Constitutional government in Prussia is impossible. Certainly neither the King nor his Ministers have any notion of the volcano seething underneath their feet. I told Lord Russell so plainly on my return. As for Germany, I did not conceal from people in Berlin how foolish it was to demand from the German Princes sacrifices for the common cause which Prussia herself refused to make.

The real difficulty lies in the Prussians overrating themselves. At the same time I am bound to confess that the proposals for Reform made by the Saxon Government [1] do not appear to me practical.'

I took care to urge everything that could be said in defence of our attempts to solve the problem, and pointed out in particular how those attempts had already helped to clear the situation. My remark, regretting that the idea of a meeting of all the German Princes had not been realised, called forth some expressions highly complimentary to Austria, who had followed the Constitutional path more uprightly and cleverly than Prussia. Nevertheless, Lord Clarendon thinks that an assembly of princes, convoked by Austria, would be of just as little good as the one-sided settlement attempted by Prussia. The duty of the minor States, especially the four kingdoms, was to bring about an understanding between Austria and Prussia. Without this it was practically useless to think of reforming the Federal Constitution. I could only remind the noble Lord that in the execution of this duty we had experienced obstacles, ever since 1849, of which the outer world had no idea.

London: May 12, 1862.

A confidential conversation I held yesterday with Lord Russell has impressed me with the belief that he still prefers the maintenance of the *status quo* to any Federal reform not embracing the whole of Germany. The Secretary of State quite agreed in our view of the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Commerce, and expressed the hope that Austria would not separate from her German ally on the question of trade politics.

[1] See the reforms proposed by the Saxon Government in the Memorandum published in Count Beust's Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 279–98.

The illness of King Leopold gave rise to the remark that his death would be most inopportune at the present moment. Whether the Heir-Apparent would be able to govern with the Belgian Constitution as well as his father had done, remained to be seen. Napoleon, however, would keep quiet in the event of King Leopold's death, for in the first place he had no money, and moreover he was growing old, was fond of comfort, and wished to rest on the laurels he had gained so unexpectedly at Magenta and Solferino.

With regard to Rome, there was a talk, it was true, of new projects, but they meant really nothing more than did the journey of Prince Napoleon to Naples. On my remarking that, so long as the French garrison continued in Rome, it was not to be supposed that Napoleon had any notion of abandoning that position, Lord Russell replied: 'That is what Odo Russell writes to me every day. The French Emperor, I am convinced, will hold Rome as long as he lives; as to what happens afterwards he doesn't care.'

London: Aug. 8, 1862.

An unusually quiet Session, almost as void of legislation as of party contests, was brought to a close yesterday with a Speech from the Throne, the utter colourlessness of which leaves nothing to be desired and nothing to be said. The only event of the Session is the seemingly irremediable split between Lord Palmerston and the Radicals, who complain that their three watchwords, Economy, Non-Intervention, and Reform, are not realised under the administration of the present Premier. Cobden, in an elaborate indictment the other day in the House of Commons (Aug. 1), reckoned that Lord Palmerston had cost the country 100,000,000*l.* sterling. The latter, who answered the bitter attack of the Free Trader

with an indifference bordering on contempt, assured his opponent that he could not rate his own services so high. Among the Tories some importance is attached to this passage of arms. It is thought that the Radicals will employ the prorogation to prepare the way for Lord Palmerston's overthrow. At present there is a truce, and until Parliament reassembles the Prime Minister of England will govern with a plenitude of power such as rarely has been wielded by any but an actual sovereign. So long as 'old Pam' is at the helm we need have no care about the honour and interests of England —such is the leading thought of the public since the settlement of the difference with North America. This thought consoles the starving cotton-spinners of Lancashire no less than the rich, who are taxed to an extent unparalleled in time of peace. Never has the saying *Si vis pacem para bellum* been exalted into a maxim of State with more recklessness of expenditure.

As for *la haute politique*, it is asleep.

To-day Earl Russell goes to Ireland to take possession of the estates his inheritance of which enabled him to accept the earldom. Lord Palmerston meditates a visit to Sheffield. The usual exodus of the diplomatic body from the now deserted West End has begun. The French Ambassador, Count Flahault, goes to Scotland to take rest at the country seat of his wife, Baroness Nairne. Brunnow goes to St. Leonards, where the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess Michael are staying for the sea-bathing. The Austrian Ambassador is expecting the Archduke Louis Victor, who is anxious to visit the Exhibition before it closes, but in the strictest *incognito*.

The Duke of Cambridge gave a dinner in honour of the Crown Prince and Prince George of Saxony the day before

their departure. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Prince Lichtenstein, and Prince Reuss were among the guests.

London: Aug. 15, 1862.

Among the Blue-books published since the prorogation there is a thin volume ('North America, No. 12') containing two despatches which illustrate very clearly the principles on which each Government relied. The despatch addressed by Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams on May 28, and communicated by the latter to Earl Russell on June 19, was obviously written under the impression produced by the first news of victory, and is not wanting in the high-flown phrases so popular with the Transatlantic democracy. Earl Russell prudently waited for events before answering. But when the conquerors of May became the conquered of July, the moment seemed to have arrived for publishing the Seward despatch and examining the boundless optimism of the young Republic in the sober language of an old Monarchy. Although Earl Russell's reply declares plainly the neutrality of England, the ironical tone of the despatch will not allay the excitement now prevailing in the North against the Mother country.

That the Austrian Government also understand how to give a forcible reply to their opponents is shown by Count Rechberg's despatch to Karolyi of the 26th of last month. This despatch leaves no doubt as to the value attached by Austria to the guarantees which Prussia flatters herself she has obtained by recognising the Kingdom of Italy. In Rechberg's opinion those guarantees were not worth the paper they are written on, an opinion which General Durando would share.

London: Aug. 25, 1862.

Napoleon has lately told the Marquis de Pepoli the view which he takes of the Garibaldian movement. 'Garibaldi,'

said the Emperor, 'Garibaldi dit: "Rome ou la mort." Si c'est comme cela, je dis: c'est la mort.'

For all that, the Ministers in Paris are far from underrating the difficulties created by the latest complications in Italy. They do not conceal from themselves that public opinion in England is pronouncing more and more decidedly for Garibaldi and against Rattazzi—for unity, with Rome as the capital, and against the protection of the Pope by a French garrison. Until now the Ministers have kept silence about all this. However, Lord Russell has deemed it advisable to shorten his stay in Ireland and to go nearer London, where Lord Palmerston is expected to-day from Walmer Castle.

Yesterday I visited Lord Russell at Pembroke Lodge. His trip to Ireland has done him a great deal of good, and neither the Italian troubles nor the no less serious ones in Servia have marred his indestructible temper. He has condemned the mischievous enterprise of Garibaldi, as was to be expected, and officially promised the moral support of England to the measures of repression on the part of the Turin Cabinet. At the same time it is unmistakable that the Government here are not disinclined to await the course of events before pronouncing more decidedly. As a proof of this may be cited the fact that the British representative at Rome has received orders to take at once his leave of absence. The prudent uncle naturally wishes that his nephew, Odo Russell, should come away, in order to spare him the embarrassments which revolutionary demonstrations might cause to the British *chargé d'affaires*. The recollection of Lord Minto's mission may possibly have served as a warning.

Lord Russell informed me that he was to accompany the Queen to Germany, and to stay himself at Gotha, as the

little shooting-box of Reinhardsbrunn could hardly provide the necessary accommodation for her Majesty's immediate attendants.

London: Sept. 1, 1862.

The Queen, who returned two days ago to Windsor, held a Privy Council there, in order to make the necessary arrangements for the period of her absence. Lord Palmerston did not attend this sitting, but has come to town to receive her Majesty's last commands. The Queen embarks to-day at one o'clock at Woolwich, and goes first to Brussels, to meet for the first time the Princess Alexandra and her parents. A few days later the Prince of Wales will also come to Brussels, when the betrothal will be officially declared. The indiscretion of the newspapers, which speak of the betrothal as a settled affair before it has actually been announced, has given great annoyance at Windsor Castle.

While calling yesterday on Lord Russell to take my leave, the news arrived that Garibaldi had been taken prisoner. The Secretary of State could not conceal his partiality for the guerilla leader. He regards him as a victim of Mazzini's, but is glad at the victory of the Italian troops, since it must serve to strengthen order, unity, and the throne of Victor Emmanuel. The 'Times' expresses the same view as the Government, while other papers violently attack Victor Emmanuel, asserting that he is guilty of ingratitude, and has forfeited the title of *Re Gentiluomo*.

Earl Russell to Count Vitzthum.

(Autograph.)

Gotha: Sept. 18, 1862.

Dear Count Vitzthum,—I went to Reinhardsbrunn yesterday, and took an opportunity of speaking to the Queen about the proposed visit of Prince George of Saxony. Her Majesty appreciated

the kindness of the King of Saxony, whom she regarded, she said, in the light of a relation.

The Queen has no room in the house she inhabits to lodge any one, but if the Prince George could come any day after to-morrow (Friday) about three o'clock to pay her a visit, she would be happy to see him.

The Prince of Wales is in high spirits, and willingly accepts congratulations on his marriage.

I was all the better for my pilgrimage, and I hope *Notre Dame de San Sisto* will protect her worshipper.

I remain, yours very truly,

JOHN RUSSELL.[1]

London: Dec. 7, 1862.

Shortly after my arrival at Paris I saw Count Persigny in his wife's *boudoir*. They both invited me to visit them at Chamarande, a country seat which the French Minister of the Interior has recently purchased, and furnished in the English style. I found Napoleon's confidant looking puffy, aged, and more than ever *dans les espaces*. He complained of his office, the Minister of the Interior having always to bear the brunt of everything. He spoke of the embellishment of Paris as his own work. He had not troubled himself about the details, but had found in Haussmann the man who could carry out his ideas. Haussmann's predecessor wished to spend only the four million francs which the municipality of Paris had gained by lengthening the Rue Rivoli, in making further improvements. 'L'imbécile!' ex-

[1] The Foreign Secretary had made a pilgrimage, as he expressed himself, from Gotha to the shrine of the Sixtine Madonna at Dresden. His Lordship called upon the Author, who was afterwards instructed to make arrangements for Prince George's visit to Reinhardsbrunn. His Royal Highness went thither on behalf of the King, his father, to wait upon the Queen after the visit which the Prince of Wales had paid to the Saxon Court in the beginning of September.

claimed the Minister. 'He would not understand that these four millions merely represent interest, and that a capital of a hundred millions was at their disposal to begin in all earnestness the rebuilding in Paris. Haussmann understood this in a moment, and immediately set to work on improvements, enlargements, and embellishments, which were estimated at a hundred millions. That is only the beginning. We have other plans altogether, and can well afford to lay out three to four milliards more on public works; to connect every town in France with the system of railways, and so on. The timid members of the Conseil d'Etat, thorough cockneys, are always thinking how to throw this small but necessary expenditure on the shoulders of future generations, but I shall convert them.'

There are people who think Persigny mad. If so, there is method in his madness. He is personally thoroughly honest, and abhors the gambling on the Stock Exchange, so compromising to most of his colleagues. This makes it all the more serious that this 'millions-fever' should attack him also. Any opposition on his part to the frivolous lavishing of money is not to be expected. 'Remuer les millions' remains a maxim of State, and, like Madame de Pompadour, the present rulers comfort themselves at lucid intervals with the 'après nous le déluge.'

With this preface, I will mention a conversation into which we chanced to fall. The Franco-Prussian Treaty of Commerce was the subject, and Persigny's enquiry how matters stood in Prussia brought it up. I had answered his question by saying that it remained to be seen whether the successor of Count Bernstorff would be able to dispose of the difficulties bequeathed to him by the latter, and allay the distrust occasioned on all sides by the despatch of December 20. As a proof how

deep-rooted was this distrust, I mentioned the opposition made to the Treaty in question by the Southern States of Germany. I insisted that this opposition, which was of a political character, was aimed not against France, but against Prussia. In conclusion, I expressed a hope that we, who adhered firmly in this question to the principle of a common fiscal policy, would succeed in bringing the Southern States to reason.

Persigny told me that, for his own part, he should not be sorry if the negotiations for the Treaty fell through. 'For you see,' said he, 'all the advantages are on the side of Germany. Every reduction of the tariff will tell in favour of the Customs Union, if only on account of the difference in the value of money. What you buy in London for a pound sterling, costs in Paris twenty francs, and in some parts of Germany only a thaler. Nothing astonished me so much at the Exhibition as the cheapness of the German products and manufactures. Thus, for example, the Austrian leather goods are fabulously cheap and excellent. If France gained far more advantage than England from her Commercial Treaty with that country, in like manner Germany would gain much more by free trade, in comparison with France, thanks to the low wages of her artisans. The American crisis has reduced our exports by some four hundred millions, and yet the balance has been altogether about a hundred millions more in our favour. And why? Because we have exported to England alone five hundred millions more than formerly. These five hundred millions represent the sixth part of our whole exports, and about the sixteenth of the whole exports of England. And even if, as Gladstone maintains, England will cover her losses occasioned by the American war, by the increase in her exports to France, still the advantage

gained by the Treaty is relatively greater to France. The wonder is, that the increased movement in trade has strengthened each of the two parties to the Treaty in the delusion that they have overreached the other. Only two examples. The loudest complaints came from the iron manufacturers of Lorraine. They declared that they were ruined by the Treaty, being unable to compete with the cheap English iron. It is found, however, that the iron manufactured in Lorraine by means of charcoal has certain qualities which English iron has not. Hence a gigantic exportation has been set on foot, and the Lorraine ironworks have never been so flourishing before. The Empress lately visited our woollen manufactories at Rheims, and noticed there Scotch stuffs, linsey-woolseys and such like. "What?" she asked, "are those materials here? Do you fetch all that from Scotland?"—"On the contrary," answered the manufacturer, "*we* send the stuffs to Scotland, where they cannot be made as cheaply as by us." Thus the Treaty has saved us from a crisis, with which we should otherwise have hardly been able to cope. A loss of four hundred millions would have led to a crisis which it would have been a difficult matter to tide over. But what are four hundred millions against the losses imposed by America on English trade?'

CHAPTER XXV.

LONDON.—1863.

'*Napoléon III. et la Pologne.*'—The Polish Question—The Political Situation compared with that of January 1815—The Princess of Wales—The Prince and Princess George of Saxony at Scarborough—Meeting of German Princes at Frankfort and its Consequences—Death of Frederick VII. of Denmark—Napoleon's Invitation to a European Congress—England declines to join it—The Schleswig-Holstein Question—Secret History of the London Protocol of 1850—Treaty of London of 1852—'A German who is fond of Facts'—Prospects and Dangers.

On my way back to London I stayed for a few days in Paris, where public attention was beginning to be occupied with Poland. One of those sensational pamphlets so popular in France, 'Napoléon III. et la Pologne' had recently been published, and was talked of more than its contents deserved. Madame de Kalergis, who had just come from Warsaw, gave me a picture of the state of things there. This niece of the Chancellor Count Nesselrode had a subjective rather than objective enthusiasm for the Poles. Profiting by her relations, she had obtained some passports for compromised Poles, and thus saved them from an involuntary journey to Siberia. I asked her in joke whether she had written the pamphlet which appealed to the French Emperor to restore Poland. She said she had not, and added, 'If the French succeed in restoring Poland, I shall ask but one favour, as a reward for all I have done for the people of that unhappy land—the privilege of never setting foot in the country again. Left to themselves, the Poles would so hate, harry, and persecute

each other, that it would be impossible to live among them.' This view of the Polish insurrection, from the mouth of a lady much admired in Warsaw, and clever, if somewhat eccentric, was always present to my mind during the not exactly interesting negotiations that followed.

In London it was remembered that the restoration of Poland had figured in the programme of the Second Empire as early as 1853 and 1854. The fear now was that Napoleon would make political capital out of this question, by proceeding once more, and this time indirectly by way of Warsaw, to obtain, if possible, a revision of the Treaties of 1815. This fear of Bonapartist ambition, the growing infirmity of Palmerston, the naïve inexperience of Lord Russell in the region of high policy, the credulity of the public, and, lastly, the inflammatory language of the superficial daily press—all this explains the errors and inconsistencies of a Government which was hovering between war and peace. The public had no idea that the uncalled-for interference in a purely domestic question, not really affecting England in the least, brought the world again to the brink of a general war. The British Ministers did not wish for war; on the contrary, their wish was to prevent Napoleon from possibly picking a quarrel. But, on the other hand, they were anxious not to be outflanked by the French, and thus they found themselves in a vortex of embarrassments, from which nothing actually saved them but the indifference prevailing in France and England alike with regard to Polish nationality.

For the unfortunate Poles it would have been better if people had not troubled themselves about them either in Paris or in London. The weakness of the Russian local authorities, the slowness of the military operations, and the illusions created and encouraged by Wielopolski, who acted as *Adlatus*

to the Grand Duke Constantine, explain how it was that this insurrection, originally quite unimportant, assumed European dimensions.

Unfortunately the Great Powers of Germany were just then quarrelling about Federal reform. Bismarck's first proceedings as Premier had given offence at Vienna. An understanding on the Polish question was not to be thought of. The sequel has shown that the Prussian Government acted in their own well-recognised interests, in resolving, regardless altogether of French or English threats, to give their moral support to Russia in putting down the insurrection, and even to prevent its further spread by echeloning troops along the frontier. It would have been better for Poland had Austria been able to follow this example. But the Vienna Government had no choice. Threatened by revolution in Italy as well as in Hungary, their only hope of weathering the crisis was to co-operate with England and France. Thus at the moment when war seemed inevitable, the Great Powers of Europe were found arrayed as they had been arrayed in January 1815—namely, England, France, and Austria on one side, and Prussia and Russia on the other. It was not the merit of the leading statesmen that Europe was spared another war. All sparks of enthusiasm had long been extinguished when General Muravieff at length succeeded in putting an end to the senseless shedding of blood.

On March 7, the Prince of Wales's bride made her entry into London. The population was afoot from an early hour. The first impression was decisive. An ode by the Poet Laureate, welcoming the Princess as the 'Sea-King's Daughter,' helped to increase the enthusiasm for this young and graceful princess. For months she could never drive out without being

saluted by crowds. The admiration paid her intensified later on the blind partiality of the public for Denmark.

On the 10th came the marriage at Windsor. St. George's Chapel could scarcely hold the number of guests. The Chapel was tastefully decorated, and the solemn ceremony, in which the Queen took part unseen in a private closet, made a deep impression on all who were present. The confusion at the railway station when the special train was leaving was incomprehensible. We men were in uniform, and the unfortunate ladies in full Court attire and covered with jewelry. It had never occurred to the police to close the entrances to the platform, and the returning guests were hemmed in by a noisy and disorderly crowd.

In the course of the summer Prince and Princess George of Saxony went to Scarborough for the sea-bathing. They met me, after their stay was concluded, at Leamington, whence we visited Warwick Castle, Stratford-on-Avon, and Kenilworth. We then returned through Oxford to London, and the Duchess of Marlborough insisted on showing their Highnesses the historical mansion of Blenheim. On the way to Dover I accompanied the Prince and Princess to Tunbridge Wells, where the old Queen Amélie, widow of Louis Philippe, received her relatives in the most amiable manner. She had lived through many vicissitudes of fate, this unfortunate Queen, but in cloudy as in sunny days she had always retained the charm of a singular grace.

About this time we received through the Rothschilds the first news of the meeting of German princes, convoked at Frankfort by the Emperor Francis Joseph. All of them were present, with the exception of the King of Prussia. It was said that this monarch had promised the Austrian Emperor at Gastein that he would attend, but had written afterwards,

at Bismarck's advice, to decline the invitation, on learning something of the proposals intended to be submitted to the meeting by the Austrian Cabinet. The assembled Princes, who were welcomed by a cordial address from the Emperor, resolved to make one more attempt to persuade King William, then staying at Baden-Baden, to take part in their deliberations. The King of Saxony undertook this thankless task, but returned without achieving his object.

This assembly of Princes came two years too late. Had it been summoned in 1861 things might, perhaps, have taken a different turn. In Berlin the helm of State had meanwhile been entrusted to vigorous hands, and the newly appointed Minister President had based his programme on the principle that the German problem could only be solved by 'blood and iron.' Moreover, the Austrian proposals of a Directory with a Federal Council and an Assembly of Delegates were scarcely adapted to correspond with the expectations of the German people and to give to the whole of Germany the much-coveted position of a great European Power. The problem has since been solved upon the battle-field. It may seem superfluous to revert to the reasons which made the assembly of Princes in 1863 a failure. And yet to German patriots it is interesting to inquire whether the latest attempt to unite the whole of Germany under *one* head was shipwrecked simply and solely on the passive resistance of Prussia? Without falling into the exaggerations of hero-worship, I may be allowed to observe that much depends on the man who undertakes to solve a political enigma. Suppose, for a moment, the parts of the leading Ministers changed—namely, Bismarck the Austrian Chancellor in August 1863, and Count Rechberg the Prussian Prime Minister—what view would the former have taken of the task which the latter had undertaken to achieve? Judg-

ing from experience, it is not, I think, too bold to assume that Bismarck would have prepared, to some extent, the ground beforehand. He would have taken care to station some army corps in Bohemia, Tyrol, and the Vorarlberg before attempting to persuade the Emperor to go to Frankfort. Once there, he would have found ways and means to induce the Kings of Bavaria and Saxony, of Hanover and Würtemberg, to entreat Francis Joseph I. to accept without more ado the Imperial Crown of Germany, and have let himself be crowned at Frankfort. Lastly, he would have summoned a German Parliament, with the assembled Princes as one House and the Estates as another. After that, he could quietly leave the Prussian Premier, Count Rechberg, to think over the matter. As the Prussian Government was then situated, this process of reflection would not have been a long one; on the contrary, the new German Parliament at Frankfort would have developed an irresistible power of attraction. Had any attempt of this kind been made by Austria—in a word, had they resolved on action, the world would have passed a very lenient judgment on Rechberg's so-called *coup d'état*. 'Ce n'est pas un coup d'état,' said a French Ambassador to me then, 'c'est un coup d'épée dans l'eau.'

This failure had lamentable consequences for Austria as well as Germany. In the first place, it discredited the existing Diet, whose sittings had now been resumed. The diplomatists assembled at Frankfort, split asunder by continual jars and petty jealousies, were somewhat in the position of a British Ministry, who, beaten in the Commons, had dissolved Parliament, and were awaiting the result of the elections. But the lesson drawn in Austria from the Frankfort proceedings was this: that since the other Princes declared that Federal reform was impossible without Prussia's co-operation, the

simplest thing would be to ignore the Diet altogether, and endeavour to effect a direct understanding with Prussia. It was forgotten that Metternich had created the Diet as a tool of Austrian hegemony in Germany, and that Schwarzenberg had revived it in the hope that Prussia would be kept in check by the majority of the confederate Princes. To use a German proverb, the 'gun was thrown into the corn' ('Man warf die Flinte in das Korn'), and Bismarck hastened to take Count Rechberg in tow. Bad luck decreed that shortly after the Frankfort assembly the death of Frederick VII. of Denmark changed the chronic Schleswig-Holstein malady into an acute one.

On the Seine there was much rejoicing at the failure of Austria's policy at Frankfort and the growing confusion in Germany. Once more Napoleon hoped to fish in muddy waters, and profit by the idea of a Congress, which had been revived in the course of the unfortunate Polish negotiations, to realise his dream of a reconstruction of the map of Europe. When France, in November, just at the time when Frederick VII. died, played out her invitations to a European Congress, some surprise at first prevailed in all quarters.

As the British Minister at Dresden did not know what England meant to do, but it was instinctively felt on the Continent that it would mainly depend on the British Government whether there should be a Congress or not, I received orders to return in all haste to my post. My first conversation with Lord Russell completely reassured me. The British Government had seen through Napoleon's game, and declared that it was not the revision of the Treaties of 1815, but the Treaties themselves, as far as they still existed, which would have to form the basis of discussion at any general Congress. The project, which was unripe and by no

means popular at St. Petersburg, fell to the ground. England refused her assent to it in a not exactly obliging form, which left behind at the Tuileries a sediment of displeasure that proved useful to Germany in the Danish question.

This unhappy dispute had been made the pretext in Germany ever since 1848 for a deep-reaching national agitation. As is frequently the case at such times, a song, which since 1848 had been repeated in every key and in every street, played a great part in exciting the passions of the people. More lyrical than the French, we Germans are not content with *one* Marseillaise, but follow Goethe's counsel:—

> Hie, man, along!
> And on the incident compose a song[1]—

and compose a national song appropriate to every occasion. Arndt's 'Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?' and Becker's 'Rheinlied' were the precursors of 'Schleswig-Holstein, meerumschlungen.'

The exaggerations of professors unlearned in statesmanship might appear regrettable. But there was an undeniable violation of law which stirred the general wish to prove Germany's power against foreign countries. The Eider-Danish democrats, who had directed the Government at Copenhagen under Frederick VII. and his all-powerful mistress, and who had wantonly provoked the confusion, forced Christian IX., three days after his ascending the throne (November 18), to grant a Constitution. This decreed without more ado the incorporation of Schleswig. The Danish Government thus broke the promises made by them in 1851 and 1852 to Austria and Prussia before the signing of the Treaty of London. The

[1] 'Tummle dich, Wicht,
Und der Gelegenheit mach' ein Gedicht.'

London Treaty of 1852 was intended to provide for a certain eventuality, and to represent the integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark as a European interest. Without consulting the agnates and Estates, it was now sought to alter the existing order of succession, and, passing over nineteen nearer claimants, to declare Duke Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Glücksburg the heir of the childless Frederick VII.

Notwithstanding the oceans of ink wasted on the Schleswig-Holstein question, the genesis of this wonderful Treaty has remained a mystery even to the Argus eyes of the British Press. Nay, not one of the Governments who in 1852 authorised their representatives to sign the Treaty knew anything of the secret history of the Protocol of 1850, by which the Treaty was prepared. Lord Malmesbury, who signed that Treaty for England, did so in conformity with the well-known principle that British Ministers are bound by the diplomatic acts of their predecessors. The responsible author of that transaction was Lord Palmerston. This most arbitrary of all British Ministers had allowed himself to be tempted in 1850 into coercive measures against Greece, which were seriously disapproved by the two other protecting Powers, France and Russia. France, under Cavaignac's dictatorship, recalled her Ambassador from London, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys demanded his passports. This fact was carefully hushed up, and is but little known.[1] The diplomatic rupture with the one protecting Power threatened to extend to the other. Baron Brunnow, the Russian Minister, took up an attitude which made Lord Palmerston fear lest he too would demand his passports. At

[1] See for further details Greville's *Memoirs*, vol. iii. p. 330 *sqq.* On p. 332, after having told all about Drouyn de Lhuys' recall, Greville says, 'This is the greatest scrape into which Palmerston has ever got, and it will be curious enough to see how he gets out of it.'

the same time a serious storm in Parliament broke over the head of Lord 'Firebrand.' The House of Lords passed a direct vote of censure on his Greek policy by a majority of no less than thirty-seven (June 17, 1850). Had the breaking off of diplomatic relations with France been known, and had Russia followed this example, the House of Commons would probably have joined in the censure passed by the Lords. To Lord Palmerston such a blow, especially with the evident displeasure of the Court at his behaviour, would have been tantamount to his disappearance from the political stage. At this crisis, so threatening to his future, Palmerston turned to the Russian Minister with the enquiry, whether there were no means of reconciling the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. After some consideration Brunnow proposed a bargain: 'Give us Denmark,' he said, 'and then we will give you Greece and forget the past.' Of course it was not a question of ceding the Danish kingdom, but of converting it into a Russian dependency, and giving the Emperor Nicholas a prospect of obtaining the harbour of Kiel. With this object, Brunnow invented certain hereditary claims, to be preferred by the Russian dynasty, after the death of Frederick VII. without children, against the so-called Gottorp portion, including Kiel. These claims, which Peter III. and Paul I. had renounced for themselves and their successors, were a myth, which Brunnow made use of to represent the integrity of the Danish kingdom to the English Minister as a European interest. The possession of Kiel harbour would of course have changed the Gulf of Finland into a *mare clausum*, and established Russia's supremacy in the Baltic. Palmerston, in closing with this bargain, possibly fancied he was defending a real, if very remote, English interest. He overlooked, however, the fact that in order to prevent Kiel from falling into Russian hands in a

distant future, he was really precipitating the danger of subjecting the whole of Denmark to Russian dominion. In fact the Emperor Nicholas's only object in giving the hand of his eldest daughter to the Danish heir-presumptive, Prince Frederick of Hesse, had been to obtain at some future time, in the person of his son-in-law, a willing tool at Copenhagen. That scheme was frustrated by the early death of the Grand Duchess, and so another means was sought to gain the same object. This means could only be found in an alteration of the order of succession. In Denmark Proper the law allowed female succession, in the Duchies the succession was restricted to the male line. Had, therefore, no provision been made for the future, the integrity of Denmark would have been at stake after the death of Frederick VII. In Denmark Proper the Landgravine of Hesse, mother of Prince Frederick, would have become Queen, while Holstein and Schleswig would have fallen to the share of the nearest legitimate male relative. The latter was certainly not Prince Christian of Glücksburg. On the contrary, according to the statements of German jurists, there were no less than nineteen members of the wide-spreading house of Schleswig-Holstein who stood nearer than he did to the throne. Without consulting either a single one of these agnates, or the Schleswig-Holstein Estates, the existing succession was altered in conformity with the secret compact made between Palmerston and Brunnow, and Prince Christian was declared, by an arbitrary *dictum* of Europe, the heir to the throne. Russia by this obtained a prospect of acquiring not only the so-called Gottorp portion, but also Denmark itself. Prince Christian had only three sons, of whom one, as King of Greece, renounced his rights to Denmark. After the extinction of the Glücksburg branch, Russia would have been able to assert her claims to the whole

Danish kingdom, the integrity of which it had been the object of the London Treaty to secure.

Of all the English statesmen Prince Albert alone saw through the Russian game. But he had made it a rule of conduct to abstain from bringing any direct influence to bear on the English Ministers, in a matter his treatment of which might expose him to the charge of sympathising too warmly with his German Fatherland. All that he did was to advise the Prince of Noër, one of the overlooked, not-consulted agnates, to protest against this arbitrary European decision. The Prince followed his advice, and declared that he would acquiesce in the new order of succession, but only on condition of its being solemnly established, by an international treaty, like the Treaty of Utrecht, that the Crown of Denmark should in no case devolve upon the Emperor of Russia. This condition was not fulfilled. The official letter of the Prince of Noër throws however the clearest light on the transaction.

Austria and Prussia consented to sign the Treaty of 1852 out of regard to Russia, and Napoleon was unwilling to cause any embarrassment to his devoted Lord Palmerston. Thus, notwithstanding the opposition of the Prussian Government, was concluded in 1852 the Treaty which the democratic Cabinet of Copenhagen regarded as a settlement of the question in dispute. Austria and Prussia had not acted, as they had in the settlement of the Belgian question, as mandatories of the Bund. The Treaty of 1852 was not even submitted, after its conclusion, to the German Diet. It is true that most of the German governments declared separately their acquiescence, but, like Saxony, under the express reservation of the Diet's approval. In addition to this the Eider-Dane party had delayed submitting the treaty to the Holstein

Estates. The latter never recognised the new order of succession arranged behind their backs, and appealed to their old constitutions and privileges to vindicate the inseparableness of Schleswig from Holstein. They invoked the protection of the Bund. Austria and Prussia, for their part, saw in the new Danish Constitution of November a violation of the promises which they had obtained from Denmark in 1851 and 1852. Hence a quarrel arose, which it seemed all the more difficult to adjust, since the view taken by the German Great Powers differed at first from that adopted by the Bund. After rejecting the compromise proposed by Saxony, the Diet, by a majority of *one*, resolved on proceeding to Federal execution. Simultaneously with this decision, Austria and Prussia took up the matter, as European Great Powers. While insisting, however, on the fulfilment of the promises made them by Denmark, they still clung to the fiction of not being actually at war with King Christian and of intervening to maintain the integrity of Denmark. This divergence of views between the two Great German Powers and the majority of the Bund was indirectly, as we have shown, a consequence of Count Rechberg's unfortunate attempt to solve the German question at Frankfort.

The very pronounced sympathies of the English Government for Denmark were supported by the public opinion of the day. The task of German diplomacy in London was not an enviable one. It was made more difficult still by the passionate temper of Palmerston, who construed any doubt on the validity of the London Treaty as a personal offence.

In a country where the Press is a power, prejudice and passion must be fought with the weapons furnished by the Press itself. Being sure of the discretion of the chief editor of the 'Times,' Mr. Delane, I sent him in December 1863 a

short Memorandum. It professed to treat the Schleswig-Holstein question *ab ovo* in a spirit of impartiality, and was published in the 'Times' with the signature of 'A German who is fond of Facts.'

Firmly convinced as I was of the justice of our cause, I could not conceal from myself that first and foremost the question was one of power. If it came to a general war, the integrity of the minor States of Germany was no less at stake than that of Denmark. Ideas of dividing Germany into two parts, giving the one north of the Maine to Prussia, and incorporating all the southern States with Austria, were then afloat. In Paris it was thought not impossible that Austria might be compensated for Venetia at the expense of Bavaria and Würtemberg. Moreover, it seemed more than doubtful whether Prussia would spend her blood and money to conquer the Elbe Duchies for the Augustenburgs. Could the newly-formed little State be entrusted with the defence of the harbour of Kiel? Was not Saxony working 'pour le roi de Prusse' in upholding the rights and political independence of the 'sea-girt Duchies'?

The dangers threatening our little Saxon gun-boat were easier to recognise in London than in Dresden. I took care to send a private warning beforehand as follows: 'I seem like a sailor on the look-out. I give notice of breakers ahead, of all the rocks and shoals that I can see, leaving the experienced pilot to steer the vessel on her course and reef in the sails when necessary.'

CHAPTER XXVI.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.—1863.

London, Jan. 1: The Austro-Prussian Difference—Earl Russell preaches Peace.—London, Jan. 12: Disraeli's Plan of Campaign for the Session—The Ionian Islands—Denmark—Austria and Prussia.—London, Jan. 24: General Grey's Mission—The Coburg Candidature—King Leopold's State of Health—Baron Gros—Talk with Baron Brunnow.—London, Feb. 3: Earl Russell's Advice respecting the Differences in Germany.—London, March 19: French and English Proposals for the Settlement of the Polish Question—Verbal Answer of Prince Gortschakoff.—London, April 9: Joint Proceedings of England, Austria, and France at St. Petersburg.—London, April 20: Ministerial Changes—Visit to Pembroke Lodge—Difficulties with America - The Dano-German Conflict.—London, April 24: Oliphant's Secret Mission to Poland—His View of the Situation there.—London, May 12: The English Ministers and the Polish Problem—Belgium—Bernstorff's Anxieties.—London, May 18: Proposal of an Armistice in Poland.—London, June 2: Austria's Acceptance of the French and English Proposals—News from Mexico—Discouragement of the Poles in Paris—Brunnow's Optimism—Apponyi's Fears.—London, June 21: The Conference *à huit*—Indifferenee of Public Opinion to Poland—Fear of French Intrigues.—London, June 24: Roebuck and Napoleon III. at Fontainebleau—Disraeli's Criticism of Palmerston's Revelations.—London, July 7: A Conversation with Earl Russell on Poland—Lord Clarendon and Polish Nationality—Rumoured Dissension between Palmerston and Russell—The Premier's State of Health.—London, July 17: Peaceful Disposition of the English Ministers.—London, July 23: The Russian Reply—A Telegraphic Postscript—Brunnow's View.- London, August 6: England's Rejoinder—Co-operation with Austria—Assembly of Princes at Frankfort.—London, August 14: Apponyi's Leave of Absence—Brunnow's Enthusiasm for the German Diet.—London, August 27: Sir William Armstrong's Opening Speech at the National Science Congress.

London: Jan. 1, 1863.

On the German question public opinion here is not exactly on our side. The explanation which Bismarck has lately had with Karolyi is not yet known in its details, as the report of

the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin has not arrived. However, enough is known to raise serious apprehensions. Lord Russell has thought it his duty to counsel moderation at Vienna. The answer given him has been that it was Prussia, not Austria, who was forcing matters to a head. The Foreign Secretary, on the contrary, maintained that in the Delegate question Prussia was formally in the right, since organic changes required unanimity of votes. Apponyi contented himself by pointing out that this was a question to be decided at Frankfort. Prussia had been striving for years to discredit the Constitution of the Bund. The question was, therefore, how to put an end to the agitation which Prussia had kept alive. Prussia stood alone; even Baden was against the proposed Assembly of Delegates, as being an inadequate reform. However, all this is merely pretence. Sabres are being rattled at Berlin, in the hope of escaping from a false position at home by making a noise abroad.

'Granted all this,' was Lord Russell's reply, 'still I cannot help advising you to abstain from all reforms and urgently exhorting you to peace and moderation.'

'Who would have predicted three years ago,' exclaimed Apponyi, 'that Lord Russell would restrain Austria from advancing too rapidly on the path of reform?'

This remark was too much for the little man's gravity, and he could not refrain from laughing.

The situation is sufficiently described by saying that the prevalent feeling here is one of serious apprehension, and in Paris of an undeniably spiteful pleasure. However good an Austrian Drouyn de Lhuys may be, he is too thorough a Frenchman not to rejoice at the growing entanglement of affairs. It is striking to observe the frankness with which Bismarck has spoken of the occupation of Hesse and Hanover

as a matter of course. He expressed himself with equal plainness to Metternich some months ago. The latter warns his Government against underrating the Prussian Premier, and predicts that Bismarck will succeed in gaining the confidence of the Chancery of State.

The Whigs are being sharply attacked, and their Danish sympathies employed as a means of popular agitation. General Oxholm, who accompanied Princess Alexandra to this country, and went with her to Osborne, is said to have informed his Government at Copenhagen that Lord Russell's fall is imminent.

Bernstorff actually fears a Derby Ministry. *Tempora mutantur*. . . .

London: Jan. 12, 1863.

A long conversation with Mr. Disraeli has only strengthened my conviction that 'à moins d'événements imprévus,' we have no reason to anticipate any serious party contests, or a Ministerial crisis, or even, as was feared in some quarters, a dissolution of Parliament.

After sketching very frankly the situation at home and abroad, the leader of the Opposition remarked, 'I have not, indeed, yet settled with my friends our plans for the coming parliamentary campaign; but I think I can tell you at once that there will be no serious fighting. Something, of course, may turn up, but at present there seems to be nothing that could force us to quit our waiting attitude. We shall not form a weak Ministry a third time. We can wait, and shall upset nothing. If we take the helm again, we shall do so with the prospect of a longer and safer future. Whether this will happen or not before Lord Palmerston dies, I don't know; for the present, at any rate, the old man need fear no serious attack from us.'

The public, nevertheless, expect a speedy onslaught on the Ministerial policy: firstly, on the subject of the troubles in America (the Opposition is supposed to be more inclined than the Government to try the mediation urged by France); secondly, with regard to Greece and the Ionian Islands; and thirdly, on the Dano-German question.

About America I had no opportunity of talking with Disraeli.

On the subject of Greece and the Ionian Islands I found him badly informed. He blamed the overthrow of the Government at Athens, criticised Gladstone's Memorandum, but appeared to believe that the Ionians would pronounce against the project. If they did, no fault could be found with Palmerston's move. The Coburg candidature for the vacant throne of Greece appeared to him a matter of no moment, since the Duke was childless, and therefore the question of succession would remain open.

We discussed the Danish question in the fullest detail. Disraeli was under the impression that the 'Gotha despatch' was a concession of Lord Russell's to the Queen. Her Majesty, like her late husband, was entirely on the side of Germany in this question. Nevertheless that could not prevent Russell's attempt at mediation from being regarded in England as an uncalled-for interference. I contested with some success this, as I believed, entirely erroneous view, and stated that the late Prince Consort, conscious of his sympathy for his own country, intentionally avoided taking sides in the Danish question. It was, therefore, scarcely conceivable that Lord Russell had followed a higher inspiration when he championed the Conservative interests of the Continent against the Danish democrats. All that the sensible and Conservative statesmen of Germany desired was to settle the

unfortunate dispute as soon as possible, in order to prevent its being made a means of agitation. If an English Minister had had the courage to formulate the terms of a possible compromise, it was certainly not for the Tories to reproach him for so Conservative a step. Moreover the despatch was quite in harmony with the views of France and Russia, and demanded nothing from Denmark but the fulfilment of solemn and repeated promises.

With regard to the German dissensions, Disraeli's views are those of the present Ministers. He believes that Bismarck's only object in raising these disputes was not to solve the German question, but to make it still more complex and confused. He had evidently reckoned on France, and had come to France too late. Last year something might have been done; Napoleon then would have willingly listened to and perhaps encouraged him. But now the Mexican blister, in connection with certain other circumstances at Paris, had wrought a wholesome change. Thouvenel's overthrow and the return of Drouyn de Lhuys were events which were bound to have serious consequences not for Italy alone. Drouyn de Lhuys was cautious and peaceable, and regarded the English alliance as the pivot of his policy. He would never be tempted into Prussian adventures, if only out of consideration for England. Accordingly, when Bismarck was last in Paris, they had shown him the cold shoulder. These remarks are not to be undervalued, my authority being generally well informed as to the temper prevailing at the Tuileries. The 'chaste Joseph' may therefore not be able again so soon to leave his mantle, as he once boasted, behind him in the hands of the Parisian Potiphar.

In Austria, Disraeli observed with satisfaction that the internal situation was beginning to improve, and with it also

the credit of the Austrian Government abroad. Madame Blaze de Bury had opened a *salon* a short time ago, to which Roebuck, Kinglake, and others had free entry. This *coterie* undertook the task of converting the press, especially the provincial newspapers, in favour of Austria. Disraeli regrets that he cannot give this lady his direct support, as the language she uses against Napoleon is too indiscreet and passionate.

London: Jan. 24, 1863.

General Grey, who returned yesterday from Brussels, has given Lord Russell a report on his mission. The Foreign Secretary states that the Duke of Coburg put a number of questions, but did not refuse the Crown of Greece, and would therefore be recommended at Athens. The Duke appears to have made special enquiries about the sum-total of the Civil List to be granted him, the fate of his German duchy, and the amount of support which the protecting Powers, and especially England, would be able to give him. As to his chances of being elected in Greece, nothing is yet known; but Lord Russell states that the Greek colony in London is not averse to the idea. No Russian protest has yet arrived, but possibly it is on its way. Brunnow makes merry over the ideal King whom England is looking out for, and will scarcely succeed in finding. With regard to King Leopold's health, General Grey's report is extremely serious. Considering the unimpaired vigour of his mind, the decay of bodily strength is very remarkable. Those about him complain of his daily exceeding the diet prescribed him. The nervous system is much shattered. The King looks forward with unusual anxiety to the operation, which is now unavoidable. All the symptoms tend to make one fear that the patient will hardly live to see the marriage of the Prince of Wales.

The first impression made by the newly appointed French Ambassador, Baron Gros, is a favourable one. 'He appears to be a very civil man,' said Lord Russell after his first conversation with him, a verdict one was prepared for by Lord Elgin's despatches from Pekin. The Baron, like Count Bernstorff, will not deliver in person his credentials to the Queen, but will probably soon be received at Osborne. On February 11, the Court will remove to Windsor.

The truth of the disclosures made in the 'Morning Post,' but denied in the 'Journal de St. Pétersbourg,' about the sending of Russian arms to Servia, has been maintained in a tolerably sharp article in the former paper. Brunnow laughs at the credulity of English journalists, but when he talks of the warlike designs of the new Sultan as a source of apprehension to all the Christian Powers, one is reminded of the well-known fable of La Fontaine.

London: Feb. 3, 1863.

The substance, if not the words, of Lord Russell's despatch to Lord Bloomfield of the 14th ult. is probably now known. It expresses a fear lest the conflict between Austria and Prussia might assume proportions endangering the peace of Europe. Lord Russell, ever ready to give good advice, formulates three points, the acceptance of which, he says, will restore the good understanding between the two German Powers. Austria might withdraw her scheme of an assembly of Delegates, while Prussia, on the other hand, abandoned those hankerings after hegemony which Count Bernstorff expressed in his despatch of December 20, 1861. Lastly, Austria and her German confederates might concede to Prussia a position in the Bund more conformable than at present to her relations as a first-class Power.

Count Rechberg's answer of the 22nd ult. occasioned an

interview with regard to which I can vouch for the following particulars. The first point was at once disposed of by the Diet's refusal to accept the project of reform. As to the second point, the Austrian Ambassador could only say that Austria and Germany would be very grateful to Lord Russell if he succeeded in inducing Prussia to abandon her pretensions, as formulated by Count Bernstorff. Apponyi's task, therefore, was confined to the third point, the real kernel of the difficulty. Lord Russell, after some hesitation, suggested an alternate Presidency of the Diet as a concession likely to satisfy Prussia. The Austrian Ambassador replied that Austria and her German confederates would not object to that suggestion if it offered a prospect of securing peace. But that, he said, was hopeless. Prussia would regard the concession simply as an instalment, and redouble her efforts to realise Bernstorff's programme. Lord Russell shares these apprehensions, and yesterday expressed his warnings against the concoction of secret schemes by Bismarck.

Since then the English messenger has brought another despatch from Count Rechberg, of the 30th, stating tersely Austria's firm determination not to allow herself to be diverted from making timely efforts for reform. The suspicion that Austria desires to diminish Prussia's influence, he emphatically repudiates.

The negotiations with the Duke of Coburg about his acceptance of the Crown of Greece may be regarded, since the receipt of yesterday's telegram from Gotha, as at an end.

The Speech from the Throne was settled at the last Privy Council. The Prince of Wales will take his seat in the House of Lords immediately after the opening of Parliament.

London: March 19, 1863.

The first step in common proposed by France in the Polish question was not to take place in St. Petersburg, but in Berlin, as is shown by the draft of the *Note collective et simultanée* given in the Paris Yellow-book. Austria declined to take part in that step, on the ground that she had likewise refused to join the Prusso-Russian Convention of February 8. Austria's refusal of the French proposal has caused England to follow her example. Bernstorff declares that it would be owing to the English Government alone if Napoleon should be compelled to give up his adventurous schemes, so dangerous to the peace of the world. It is true that Lord Russell, by his Circular of the 5th inst., had communicated to the Congress Powers his despatch to Lord Napier, and recommended those Powers to support the English proposals, namely, the maintenance of the concessions promised to the Poles in 1815, and the grant of a comprehensive amnesty. However, no great value is attached here to this support. The Austrian refusal has been received almost with satisfaction. It was expressly urged in that refusal that the restoration of the Constitution destroyed by the Revolution of 1831 would by no means satisfy the Poles. What they demanded was the re-erection of the Polish Kingdom within the frontiers of 1772. Lord Russell's satisfaction is explained by his fears of an excessive intimacy between Vienna and Paris. Those fears, which had been augmented by Metternich's journey to Vienna, seem now to be allayed.

Prince Gortschakoff has given a verbal answer to the English despatch. Lord Napier's report of his answer strangely enough reached Brunnow earlier than Lord Russell, Gortschakoff having begged the British Ambassador to give him a copy of it before sending it off. Of course, Russia declines

English proposals. Referring to the very vague language of the Act of the Vienna Congress in respect of Poland, the Russian Minister asserts that Alexander I. granted concessions to the Polish kingdom, in the plenitude of his power, which the Emperor Nicholas, after putting down the insurrection of 1831, was fully entitled to revoke. The correspondence which had passed between the two Courts in 1831 and 1832 suffices, in Gortschakoff's opinion, to disentitle England to interfere in any manner in the affairs of Poland. The Prince declares that Alexander II. will not allow the present insurrection to divert him from the path of reform, on which he has already entered, but that there can be no question of an amnesty till after the movement is suppressed.

On being asked what he would do in case the Russian answer were in the negative, Lord Russell replied that he would perhaps send a rejoinder. Are we to have, then, a continuation of polemics—a mere exchange of notes? Events will show. The English Ministers will hardly quit their passive attitude, and will prefer to have an understanding with Austria, instead of embarking on French adventures. Empty words and meaningless despatches will probably not deceive people on the Continent. Jingling phrases are now for once, it seems, in vogue with British Ministers.

London: April 9, 1863.

The negotiations with regard to Poland have resulted in *common* action by England, France, and Austria. Each of the three Powers will address a despatch to the Russian Cabinet, the terms of which are to be arranged after a mutual exchange of drafts. The object is to persuade Russia to grant [redacted] institutions to the Poles as shall secure, as far as possible, the establishment of a durable peace. England and

France will advocate these institutions from a European point of view, and Austria as a neighbouring Power. England, strongly averse to any territorial change, regards this common step as a means of keeping a hold over France. The Government here are anxious to prevent any separate agreement between Paris and St. Petersburg, or between Paris and Vienna. While France in her draft ignores altogether the Treaties of 1815, Lord Russell seems desirous to insist most particularly on their maintenance, as far as they still exist. Austria, like France, takes no notice of the treaties, but speaks exclusively of her interests as a territorial neighbour, and studiously avoids anything that could be interpreted as an uncalled-for interference, or still more as a threat. The community of the step consists entirely in this, that the three despatches are to be communicated to Prince Gortschakoff, if possible, on the same day.

The Prussian Embassy here received yesterday a telegram, stating that the Emperor of Russia had given orders to place six army corps on a war footing. Probably the sixth army corps is meant. I have not been able to obtain any certain information on the subject, as Bernstorff has been for some days in the country. Russia is preparing in all earnestness. Lord Napier, however, has been assured that these preparations are not made with any ulterior designs of an aggressive character.

London: April 20, 1863.

Nothing is yet known officially as to who is to be the new Minister of War. Two days ago there were fears of a thorough shuffling of the Ministry. But I hear that a simple solution has been found: that Cardwell is to be Minister of War, and Clarendon Chancellor of the Duchy of Lanca[illegible] with a seat in the Cabinet. A martyr to gout, he appe[illegible]

have declined to undertake a more important portfolio. The business connected with the Duchy of Lancaster will leave the former Foreign Secretary ample leisure to give the Cabinet the benefit of his long experience. Lord Palmerston thinks it important, at a moment when clouds are looming on the political horizon, to obtain a counterpoise to the arbitrary proceedings of Lord Russell. The Ministerial duumvirate in respect of foreign policy may thus be changed into a triumvirate. In all home questions Lord Palmerston is absolute lord and master, and Lord Clarendon's re-entry into the Cabinet will make no difference.

Lord Russell, whom I visited yesterday at Pembroke Lodge, was, in spite of his sanguine temperament, unusually serious. He has good reason to be so. The Ministers of President Lincoln seem to be actually seeking a quarrel with England. Moreover, certain irregularities are taking place, not calculated to lighten the task of the friends of peace. Thus, for example, the otherwise so cautious American Minister granted a safe-conduct, not long ago, to an English vessel bound for Mexico. Now comes an incident without precedent. England is at peace with France and Mexico. The cargo, consisting of material for war, was intended for the Mexicans, and therefore against the French. But for Mr. Adams's safe-conduct, the ship would have been seized by the American [illegible]isers.

Bernstorff, whom I met at Pembroke Lodge, had communicated to Lord Russell several despatches on the Danish question, and in doing so had pointed out how directly opposed was the latest move of the Copenhagen Cabinet to the views [illegible]ertained by England. Prussia seems determined to ab[illegible] from any one-sided interference, and to do nothing [illegible]ut a previous understanding with Austria and the Diet.

The pamphlet entitled 'A Statement of the German-Danish Question,' Lord Russell had not read. It contains an admirably clear explanation of the German view. Bernstorff thinks that France is endeavouring to keep the Danish question open, and that England will not attempt again, since her last failure, to assist in its settlement so long as it is not a question of averting a real danger of war.

The definite answer from Copenhagen as to the acceptance of the Crown of Greece by Prince George of Schleswig-Holstein had not yesterday been received. Lord Russell hoped to induce Prince Christian to give his son the desired consent. The family is decidedly averse to his accepting this crown of thorns.

London: April 24, 1863.

Some six weeks ago the British Government sent a secret agent to Poland, to procure some authentic information as to the state of things in that country. A very competent man was entrusted with this delicate mission. Mr. Oliphant, formerly Lord Elgin's private secretary in Canada, Pekin, and Yeddo, and, when Secretary of Legation, severely wounded at the attack on the British Embassy in Japan, had just returned from Italy when the Polish insurrection broke out. Hospitably entertained in the forests by some leaders of the insurrectionary bands, he arrived, after wandering about in all directions for six weeks, at Warsaw. There he entered into communication both with the representative of the Russian Government, the Marquis Wielopolski, and with the members of the secret Revolutionary Committee. He returned home a few days ago. His reports have probably exercised some influence on the decisions of the British Ministers. He confirmed to me, for the first time, the fact, repeatedly asserted by the Russian Government, that the real object of the

scription, an act of necessity, was to prevent the insurrection, which had long been secretly concocted. The Revolutionary Committee, consisting originally of pure Social Democrats, had been required by the Central Committee in London to bring about a rising in May. The Russian Government, being informed of this by the police, hoped to render the leaders of the movement harmless by means of the conscription. The unsuccessful outbreak was deplored by none more than by the aristocratic party. The latter had been unwilling at first to have any dealings with the Warsaw Committee; but, being afterwards drawn into its proceedings, they sought safety in electing a dictator, and chose for that post the only leader who possessed any military capacity at all. Langiewicz's flight marked a new stage in the insurrection. A Committee had recently been formed, which was independent of the Central Committee in London. The nobles and democrats had made common cause, and were now fighting together for national independence and the restoration of the frontiers of 1772. Among the insurgents, Oliphant had not been able to discover a single man of any capacity. Such a thing as military organisation was unknown. Single bands, without concert or coherence, exposed to wind and weather, scattered now by snowstorms, now by the Russian troops, were fighting without any plan, but with the fanaticism of despair. To think of stifling this guerilla warfare, which was spreading in all directions, like fire in a forest, was well-nigh hopeless until Poland had her ancient frontiers restored to her. Defeated in a military sense, the insurrection would always break out afresh. Moreover, the middle classes also had entered the lists since 1831.

Not understanding precisely the purport of the last remark as applied to Russia and Poland, I begged for a definition.

'By the middle classes,' replied Oliphant, 'I mean all those who belong neither to the nobility nor the peasantry: all working men, not merely those in the towns; all men in any employment; and officials, including the police, provided they are of Polish origin. All these elements are in full ferment. The terrorised nobles follow the lead of the middle classes, who, conscious now for the first time of their power, are beginning to detect the weaknesses of Russia. Therein lies the novelty of the present revolt. Russian rule has lost its moral *point d'appui*, and is just as little feared as liked. Were I a Russian, I would do as does the Grand Duke; were I a Pole, as does the leader of the insurrection. Each, from his own point of view, is in the right. Wielopolski has laboured honestly to effect a reconciliation, but in vain. He flattered himself that he would be able to guide his countrymen; but they do not trust him, and as a tool to Russia he is useless. In any case he is played out. The quarrel he sought to solve is insoluble.'

London: May 12, 1863.

Rarely has it been more difficult than just at present to describe accurately the policy of the British Ministers. In truth they do not know their own minds, nor what view to take in regard to the Polish problem. To-day it is the fear of Napoleon, to-morrow a nervous dread of public opinion that predominates in the disunited Cabinet. To-day they are anxious not to be duped, to-morrow not to be outdone by the French. Scarcely had the friends of peace picked up courage from Lord Russell's moderate speech on the 8th, when they took fresh fright at the interpretation put on the Minister's words. These words are already construed as a recognition of the Polish insurgents as belligerents, and a twelvemonth's armistice is talked of, to be proposed by England. Lord

Bloomfield has been instructed to request the Austrian Cabinet to join in recommending this proposal at St. Petersburg. Bernstorff meanwhile has been labouring in vain to impress on Lord Palmerston the dangers of such a step. The Prime Minister, with that versatile jauntiness, which, of course, is often a mere mask, and serves as a means of intimidating others, pretended not to see the contradiction which this proposal of an armistice would offer to the statements made by Lord Russell in the House of Lords. On the Prussian Ambassador's remarking that the recognition of the Polish insurgents as belligerents would be tantamount to the recognition of Polish independence, Palmerston answered that would be no misfortune. When Bernstorff added that Prussia would never allow this, the Premier appears to have treated the remark with the greatest indifference. On being asked what the English Government understood by the term Poland, whether the so-called Congress Poland or the Poland of 1772, Palmerston's reply was, 'At present the former; but Austria will have to give up Cracow.'

The English Ministers wish for peace—that is to say, they do not wish for war. Should Napoleon, however, take up their crude and undigested proposals, he will be master of the situation, as he was in 1854. He has it entirely in his power to make the British ship of State drift about helplessly on the stormy waters of high politics until the moment comes when the British Ministers, to escape the Scylla of a Ministerial crisis, will fall into the Charybdis of a war against Russia.

At the Tuileries, Belgium is said to be again occupying Napoleon's thoughts, and the question is being seriously discussed what is to be done if the King were suddenly to die. M. Van de Weyer comforts himself with Lord Russell's repeated assurance that England would never consent to

Antwerp's falling into French hands. Brunnow rightly asks whether King Leopold also considers this stronghold of such importance as to regard its guarantee as a sufficient compensation for the loss of his kingdom.

The French Emperor's words, 'Nous irons par mer et nous reviendrons par terre,' have not failed to produce an impression on Bernstorff. He confessed to me that the British Government might possibly allow Napoleon to send a fleet with from 40,000 to 60,000 troops to the Baltic, under the pretext of the disturbances in Poland. When I remarked, in reference to such fears, how much I deplored as a patriot the political and politico-commercial dissensions in Germany, Bernstorff replied, 'Even now I do not regret the conclusion of our Commercial Treaty with France. Its principles correspond with the true interests of Prussia and Germany. Nevertheless, were I now Minister I would give up that Treaty, together with everything it brings us, if by so doing I could secure the cordial co-operation of Austria and Germany against France.'

How deplorable it was that, in the very midst of this sudden European crisis, the two Great Powers of Germany should be mutually neutralised, Count Bernstorff admitted at once. He then proceeded to revert to the past—to the questions of Federal reform and the National League, to his despatch to Savigny and the identic Note, and complained of the hostility shown by Austria. I did not think myself called on to pursue these barren recriminations. However, the Ambassador drew from them the following conclusions:—

'Federal reform is dead. *We* shall never take the initiative again. We are not so foolish as to suppose that Ernest I. and the National League are labouring for us. What we desire is the maintenance of the *status quo*. To proposals

such as those which have been already rejected at Frankfort, we neither can nor will assent. The Prussian monarchy is a unit, and the military and political forces of that monarchy will not be placed at the disposal of either an Assembly of Delegates or any sort of Executive Committee. The only practical ground of an agreement is that of commercial policy. Here I should be ready, for my part, to make every possible concession.'

London: May 18, 1863.

The English proposal of a twelvemonth's armistice has been received with joy at Paris, although Baron Gros has called it 'une idée fabuleuse.' At the Tuileries they would never have conceived the idea, and they are only too glad to be able to throw the responsibility of it on the British Ministers. Austria, on the contrary, refuses point-blank to take part in a proposal which is certain to be declined at St. Petersburg. The Austrian Cabinet is making every effort to dissuade England and France from this idea, and will, if they still persist in it, leave the responsibility to them.

Messengers come and go, and strange use is made again of the telegraph. The most sinister rumours as to affairs in Poland meet with ready belief in the highest circles. One day General Berg is said to have fallen out with Wielopolski and to have been recalled; the next day the Russian soldiers have received orders not to obey their officers any longer, but only their non-commissioned officers. The simultaneous outbreak of the revolt in Lithuania, Volhynia, and the Ukraine, is considered doubtful.

Brunnow is very preoccupied, and the members of the Russian Embassy by this time have given up putting a good face upon the matter.

The Duke of Cambridge spoke to me yesterday most

seriously about the situation. He regards the purchase of horses by the French as a particularly suspicious sign, and contemplates Federal execution in Holstein as very dangerous.

London: June 2, 1863.

Count Rechberg, in his two identic despatches of the 23rd ult. to the Austrian Ambassadors in Paris and London, announces Austria's concurrence in the proposals which England and France desire to address to St. Petersburg. He agrees to the Conference of the eight Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna, and promises to suggest to the Emperor Alexander the idea of a 'suspension d'armes.' This is the idea which Baron Gros described as 'fabuleuse,' and Drouyn de Lhuys as 'lumineuse.'

During my brief stay in Paris I informed Prince Metternich that I had left Brunnow in excellent spirits, and that he expressed to me his confident hope that in three weeks the Polish insurrection would be completely quelled. 'Nobody would rejoice at it more than we should,' remarked the Austrian Ambassador; 'but alas! confidence in Russian optimism has hitherto always been deceived.'

Drouyn de Lhuys expressed his satisfaction at the Austrian despatch of the 23rd ult. to one of my acquaintances in the following words: 'Tout marche à souhait. Si la Russie accepte la conférence à huit tout se réglera facilement, si elle refuse il faudra voir.'

The public have heard nothing about this latest turn in events. With the exception of the 'Mémorial diplomatique,' the French newspapers give nothing but the vaguest hints about a declaration of assent from Austria.

The Paris Press is wholly engrossed in the electioneering agitation which Persigny is labouring, with more zeal than

discretion, to manufacture. The Emperor himself has no anxiety whatever as to the result. In the worst event the Opposition, consisting now of five members, would be increased to about a score. Napoleon is no more afraid of old Berryer than he is of old Thiers. As for the latter, he has two means of disposing of him—either by crushing him morally by a published letter, or by making him Minister. The last expedient is considered not altogether impossible, though highly dangerous in the interests of peace.

Meanwhile, Napoleon is far more preoccupied with Mexico than with the elections. The latter give the same sort of amusement to the Parisian *badauds*, as do the Turcos and Spahis in the Bois de Boulogne. The news from Mexico is decidedly bad. At Puebla every house is being defended. The defile between that city and the capital has been converted by the Mexicans into a fortress, which may possibly keep the French at bay till the end of the rainy season, which has now set in.[1] People are already comparing the difficulties encountered by the Second Empire in Mexico with those that prepared the downfall of the First Empire in Spain. The comparison contains a more evident truth, inasmuch as the French fleet, including all available transports, is being detained, as long as this campaign lasts, across the Atlantic, and thus made useless for any other enterprises.

Nobody, therefore, thinks it possible that war will break out this year, however often Napoleon may keep repeating that 'il faut faire quelque chose pour ces pauvres Polonais.' Notwithstanding this assurance, the Poles are hanging down their heads. The Committee are in the depths of dejection. No belief is placed any longer in the Cracow telegrams fabricated at Paris. The reinforcements from Posen and Galicia

[1] Puebla itself was captured on May 18.

have ceased. Even from Cracow the telegraph brings news of Russian victories. Lithuania is devastated; in the Ukraine the insurrection has collapsed, Alexander Branicki, who was considered its head, having been arrested and imprisoned at Saratoff. His brother Xavier, a friend of Prince Napoleon, is said to be utterly disheartened by this unexpected blow.

Baron Brunnow, whom I found on my return in as good spirits as he was when I left him, confirmed to me this news from Paris. He thinks a Conference *à huit* not altogether impossible. The Baltic expedition he considers humbug, and has no belief in a war at present.

Apponyi on the contrary looked very black, and remarked: 'If peace is altogether hopeless, Austria can never dream for a moment of undertaking, with any chance of success, with allies such as Prussia and Russia are now, a war against France and England. We must choose our colours, and we have chosen them. To remain neutral, as we did in the Crimean war, would be sheer folly. *Væ victis!* If war is to come, we will be on the winning side. That need not hinder us from doing our utmost to avert the catastrophe. With England we are at one. Whether we affect to like it or not, is indifferent. As for the Conference, Austria and England will not join it unless it consists only of the eight Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna, and confines its deliberations exclusively to Poland.'

The constellation of January 1815 reappears on the political horizon: Austria, England, and France against Russia and Prussia. But Napoleon and not a Bourbon is now at the Tuileries, Lord Russell and not Castlereagh is at the Foreign Office, and Rechberg instead of Metternich is at Vienna.

London: June 21, 1863.

Is Prince Gortschakoff's optimism based on private communications with France or on his own hallucinations? If Russia accepts the Six Points formulated by England, France, and Austria as the basis for a Conference *à huit*, there is every prospect that the representatives of the eight Congress Powers will meet. But will their meeting solve the problem? Can the problem ever be solved by a Conference?

When Prince Gortschakoff has before him to-morrow the results of these seven weeks' negotiations, he may possibly be convinced that England and France desire something more than 'enfoncer une porte ouverte.' The documents in explanation of the principal despatches contain demands with which Russia will not find it so easy to comply. Such, in particular, is the requirement of an armistice, which forms the main point in those despatches.

England is indisposed, as she has always been, to go to war for the liberation of Poland. Lord Palmerston, with his often-proved Parliamentary tact, will find no difficulty in resisting the attack which the Ultramontanes, supported by a few Conservatives, are now anxious to make upon him in the House of Commons.

'The "Times" is quite right,' said a British statesman to me; 'the public are not yet stirred up, and are far more sober than they were before the Crimean war. Everything depends, however, on the French Emperor. If he wishes for war, the negotiations up till now afford ample material for dragging us into it. For it lies in his power to let loose such a storm of public opinion as no English Minister could withstand. He is already stirring up the Paris Press. The fire-eating articles of the "Patrie" would never be published without his sanction. One thing is clear, he will not begin the war alone.

If the Conference comes to pass, there are a thousand ways of shuffling the cards and making the outbreak of the war next spring unavoidable.'

Baron Brunnow cannot understand how such a credulous ear could ever have been given at St. Petersburg to the phrases of Montebello. His government were now astonished at having been deceived by a monarch with whom deceit was a trade. The Russian Ambassador is quite prepared for his recall, and makes no secret of it.

London: June 24, 1863.

The present Cabinet, which owes its existence to the popularity of its leader, prolongs its life by shirking every difficulty, postponing every decision, and renouncing all initiative. A time when Cobden can conclude a Commercial Treaty with Napoleon, is a blossom-time for third and fourth rate politicians. Of these, Mr. Roebuck, the Member for Sheffield, is one. He has lately taken upon himself a mission to enlighten the French Emperor as to the wishes of the English people. To those who know this tribune of the people it is vastly comic to see him posing as a representative of Old England, and discussing questions of high policy with the conqueror of Solferino in the gilded *salons* of the beautiful Diana of Poitiers. Mr. Roebuck has his own ideas, and a simple ingenuousness in expounding them. He had given notice for the 30th of a motion for an Address, praying her Majesty to negotiate with the Great Powers of Europe, in order to obtain their co-operation in recognising the Southern States as a Government. In the interests of this motion he thought the simplest thing would be to ask the French Emperor himself whether it was true that his Majesty had modified his policy in regard to America. He hoped by this means to parry beforehand Lord Palmerston's favourite

device of an evasive answer. Accordingly, after having made sure of an audience, he hastened on the 22nd to Fontainebleau, and returned the day before yesterday, delighted with the reception he had met with. I am able, on the best authority, to confirm and complete the meagre account of this audience given by the 'Times' correspondent at Paris.

Mr. Roebuck boasts of having received important declarations from Napoleon's own lips. He says that so far from being discouraged by the refusal of his previous proposals of mediation, the Emperor designated the present as the most suitable moment for a joint Anglo-French intervention in America. Baron Gros had already been instructed in this sense. Mr. Roebuck, thereupon, encouraged Napoleon to act *alone*, in case Palmerston refused to co-operate. England would be sure to follow if only the matter were once set on foot. Without flatly declining the proposal, the Emperor appears to have silenced the importunity of the man of the people by promising to consider the matter. With regard to England also, as well as America, Mr. Roebuck avers that revelations have been vouchsafed him at Fontainebleau. Thus, he has discovered that Lord Palmerston just now is not at all in Napoleon's good books. In reply to a casual question from the Emperor, as to what people in England thought about Poland, Roebuck is said to have stated: 'Only gossips busy themselves about that question in England. Every serious politician knows that England has no idea of going to war for Poland.'

'Just the same as with us,' replied the Emperor; 'you can be quite sure that there will be no war on account of Poland.'

Mr. Roebuck now finds it quite unintelligible why poor Lord Cowley should still be always racking his brains to try

and fathom the real intentions of Napoleon. Has not the Emperor assured him, Roebuck, that he would not go to war for Poland?

On this point the 'Times' does not share Roebuck's blissful state of confidence. With regard to America, however, it advocates the recognition of the Southern States, and condemns the passive attitude of the Government.

At the sitting on the 22nd, Mr. Disraeli sharply criticised Lord Palmerston's unexpected disclosures respecting the proposals submitted to the Russian Government.[1] Strange to say, his strictures led to the mistaken conclusion that the Opposition were in favour of the complete severance of Poland from Russia. Perhaps an opportunity may be found in the House to-day of explaining this misunderstanding. Mr. Disraeli himself is convinced that the present insurrection will only lead to Poland being completely Russianised. For that very reason he is opposed to any intervention on the part of foreign Powers, especially of England. Such intervention, he thinks, would only prolong the struggle and postpone the ultimate decision.

London: July 7, 1863.

The Polish storm appears to be dispersing and the political barometer rising. The Foreign Office are awaiting without either impatience or anxiety the Russian reply to the three despatches, copies of which were communicated to Prince Gortschakoff on the 27th of last month. Lord Napier's reports have prepared the Government for its contents. Lord Russell has this morning had the following confidential conversation with one of my friends, whom, to avoid naming him, I will designate as A.

[1] Mr. Pope Hennessey's motion for an address expressing the regret of the House at learning that the Russian Emperor had set up a claim to the sovereignty of Poland, was postponed this day after a division.

A.—So you have received intimations as to the reply we may expect from Prince Gortschakoff?

Lord Russell.—We have reason to hope that it will be conciliatory and pacific. Russia will certainly decline the armistice, and probably also the Congress. Meanwhile the door will remain open, and we may still hope to bring about the Congress, if we demand it in all earnestness. Our Six Points, with the exception of the second, would be accepted as a basis of the negotiations.

A.—With the exception of the second?

Lord Russell.—At any rate, with a modification of the second. Russia appears willing to concede to the Polish Assembly of Deputies the right of voting taxes, but not that of fixing the Army Budget.

A.—And you will agree to this modification?

Lord Russell.—I should hardly think so.

A.—Is it true that the Poles insist on a European guarantee?

Lord Russell.—At the Poles' claims we cannot be surprised. A formal guarantee would impose on us too serious an obligation. If the moral guarantee, consisting in the despatches and notes lately exchanged, fails to satisfy the Poles, and if they regard the concessions of Russia merely as a stepping-stone, we must leave them to their fate. I, for my part, do not believe in the settlement of the Polish question. All paper concessions will not extinguish the smouldering fire of insurrection. Europe will be troubled for sixty or perhaps a hundred years more with Polonism, and in the end nothing will remain but separation from Russia.

A.—But if the St. Petersburg Cabinet merely pretends to accept those Six Points to gain time, what then?

Lord Russell.—No doubt, if Russia assents to our pro-

posals of pacification simply to put us off; if she declares her readiness to join the Congress merely to let it be dissolved again without achieving any results; if she agrees to meaningless concessions merely to revoke them later on, then nothing will remain but . . . .

A.—But . . . .?

Lord Russell.—But, at any rate for the present, not to trouble ourselves any further about the tiresome affair. Fortunately they have come to the same conclusion in Paris. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has altered his warlike tone and let fall a few days ago words which we have hastened to notice with satisfaction. 'Toute puissance,' were his *ipsissima verba*, 'qui voudra tenter quelque chose pour la Pologne sans le concours des deux autres, serait insensée.'

Lord Clarendon uses the same language. I asked him this evening, whether he had already made his preparations, as the newspapers asserted, to represent England at the expected Congress.

'Two are necessary for that, thank God!' replied the noble Earl; 'the one to appoint the plenipotentiary, and the other to undertake the mission; the latter will not be I.'

'We all know,' I remarked, with a smile, 'how enthusiastic you are for Poland.'

'Certainly. I always thought that a cause must be a good one which can enlist an advocate like Zamojski. Even in Paris they seem to be more sober. There has hardly ever been a movement more distinctly stamped as artificial, than this rave for Poland. The whole thing was hollow from the first. Parisian enthusiasm is like soda-water, mere effervescence, and nothing more; the gas is now used up.'

It seemed to me not unimportant to gain some insight into Clarendon's views, as the rumour of his re-entry into the

Cabinet gains consistency. There is a talk of serious differences in the Ministry; Palmerston and Russell in particular are said to have fallen out again about the Polish question. They have not used the same language in Parliament. The Foreign Secretary has always declared that the Government will not go to war for Poland. The Prime Minister has carefully abstained from such a statement. Lord Russell blames the needless disclosure of the Six Points; nay, he has refused to defend Lord Palmerston in this matter in the House of Lords. It is true he had agreed to those Points being divulged, in the event of the Government's being pressed in the Commons. This eventuality, however, did not occur. The House had already buried the Polish debate, when Lord Palmerston began to prattle of his own accord an analysis of the British despatch. *Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus;* especially if he is in his eightieth year, and is tormented by the gout. With regard to Austria also the leading Ministers are not thoroughly at one. Palmerston cannot conquer his inveterate hatred, his deep-rooted distrust; while Russell takes the rosiest view possible of the Constitutional experiments in Young Austria, and believes he has found in that Empire the counterpoise to France. Only lately, after studying the debate on the Address in Bloomfield's comprehensive reports, he congratulated Apponyi on this 'very good debate,' and especially on the loyal behaviour of the Galician deputies. For all that, Lord Russell denies the existence of any serious difference of opinion, and protests that perfect unanimity prevails in the Cabinet, the veteran Premier being as anxious for the maintenance of peace as are his colleagues.

The existence of the Cabinet depends on that of Lord Palmerston, whose reappearance in the House of Commons, supported on two crutches, has not exactly tended to reassure,

though the Premier's friends boast of his looking so
Without Palmerston the Ministry would not long
together. On this point the Whigs indulge in no illu
On the other hand, the Tories are convinced that as
as Palmerston lives, and is tolerably competent to co
business, a change of Ministers would be neither in t
terests of the Conservative party nor in those of the co
Thus matters stand at the close of this barren Session e
as they stood when it began.

London: July 17, 1863.

Yesterday Count Bernstorff drew Lord Russell's attention to the warlike article in the 'Morning Post,' a paper supposed, rightly or wrongly, to be the organ of the Prime Minister. It could not, therefore, be wondered at if people on the Continent believe in the existence of a serious difference of opinion between the two leading Ministers. Lord Russell has plainly stated that no such difference prevails, and added an *au contraire*, out of which the Prussian Ambassador could make nothing.

I have accidentally found the key to the riddle. The peaceful disposition of the present Government, of which I have previously informed you, has been most emphatically insisted on a few days ago in a confidential despatch to Lord Cowley. As is the usual practice, in the case of important State papers, the draft was first submitted to the Prime Minister, and after receiving his corrections returned to the Foreign Office. The only purport of these amendments was to formulate still more strongly the declaration that England would not take up arms for Poland. This fact disposes of the rumour as to differences of opinion. The conclusion to Lord Russell's *au contraire* would, therefore, run thus: 'On the contrary, Palmerston is still more zealous than I am for

the maintenance of peace.' I can add, that Lord Russell, since sending off his despatch of the 17th ult., the answer to which has not yet arrived, has only once written to Lord Napier. This was done with the good object of warning the Russian Government against the danger of exciting public opinion in Europe by undue severity, and thereby rendering it more difficult for the Governments to give effect to their peaceful intentions. Lord Russell especially begs to recommend moderation to General Muravieff. There is hardly a more thankless task than giving admonitions of this kind. The British Government would scarcely have undertaken it had they not perceived in the excitement of the public mind a common danger to all Governments alike.

Lord Derby's speech in the debate of the House of Lords on the 13th was based on Austrian inspiration. The leader of the Opposition had called on the Austrian Ambassador the day before, in order to discuss with him the situation. What impression this debate has created in Paris is seen in the 'Morning Post.'

The 'Times' publishes an account from Lemberg, which gives a graphic but gloomy description of the doings of the insurgents in the Polish forests.

London: July 23, 1863.

The long-expected Russian answer arrived on the 17th. It was forwarded the next day to Lord Russell at his private residence in Chesham Place, and immediately submitted by him to the Cabinet. The first impression is said to have been unfavourable. On Saturday, the 18th, the Russian Ambassador received a telegram, which he gave me to read. It is a postscript, by no means unimportant, to the despatch. Gortschakoff telegraphed that the English and French Ambassadors had asked him what form the preliminary consulta-

tions with Austria and Prussia, which Russia desired instead of the declined Conference, were intended to take. He had replied that these consultations could take place at St. Petersburg, the Six Points might be formulated in a protocol or treaty, and the document then submitted to England and France. Brunnow lamented that the despatch had been sent off without the telegraphic postscript, which placed Russia's love of peace in the right light.

I took the liberty of asking whether it would not perhaps have been politically more prudent to support the English Ministers in their peaceful intentions by using more conciliatory language than that contained in the despatch?

'I cordially agree,' replied Baron Brunnow. 'But unfortunately Prince Gortschakoff is one of those ministers who cannot leave ink alone, and love writing more than acting. I recommend you to read to-day's money article in the "Times." I am glad to learn from it that the prospect of a war has created an "unquestionable aversion" in the City. I have likewise nothing to complain of in Gladstone's and Palmerston's speeches in the House of Commons. That Napoleon and his Ministry are furious is immaterial. My chief task is to make it clear to the British Government that they will gain far more by maintaining peace than by launching on a war. Any one can go to war. But neither the present nor future generations will applaud them if they do. To imagine that Russia desires war is absurd. The despatches expected to-day or to-morrow from Vienna will help to clear up the situation. Next Saturday the Cabinet is to meet again. On Monday, the 27th, I hope to know where we are. I see no use in prolonging the controversy, but a reply from the three Powers is indispensable. I am quite prepared for my recall. It is more comfortable to pack up in July than in February. The packing up in 1854 was not altogether pleasant.'

London: Aug. 6, 1863.

The rejoinder of the English Cabinet to the Russian despatch on the Polish question was confidentially communicated in draft to Count Rechberg. He has just telegraphed that the Austrian Cabinet entirely concur, and will employ as far as possible the same line of argument, and do their best to obtain the adoption of a corresponding view in Paris. The concert between Austria and England on this burning question of the day is important also in respect of German affairs. The latter seem to have entered on a decisive stage. A telegram has just been received by the Rothschilds, stating that the Austrian Emperor has invited the German Princes to meet at Frankfort on the 16th. This news, it is true, is not yet officially confirmed. However, it can occasion no surprise, since it was known that Austria was preparing resolutions of extreme importance both to the German Princes and the people.

London: Aug. 14, 1863.

Count Apponyi has received by telegram leave of absence for two months on the understanding that he should return to London if the Polish question required his presence. He is going first to Frankfort, in the hope of witnessing his Emperor's entry. He will be able to tell you better by word of mouth than I can by writing how matters stand in England.

Brunnow, of course, is enthusiastic about the Diet, and calls it the 'wisest institution of the century,' which should not be disturbed. From the Assembly of Princes he expects quite as little as do most of the English journalists. He calls the Mexican affair 'l'affaire Maxicaine,' and hopes that it will breed dissension between Austria and England.

London: Aug. 27, 1863.

The annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science was opened yesterday at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, under the presidency of Sir William Armstrong. Five-and-twenty years have elapsed since the Congress was last held at this town, situated in the very heart of the coal-mining districts. The famous inventor of the most perfect instrument of destruction of modern times took the opportunity to cast a retrospect on the progress achieved by science during the last century. His speech is a masterpiece of popular exposition, and will find responsive readers in industrial Saxony. Particularly interesting are the statistics, elaborately dwelt upon by the President, with regard to the supply of coal. The conclusion drawn by Sir William Armstrong is, that if a check is not placed on the present wasteful consumption of this material, the British coalfields must inevitably be exhausted in a period of 212 years. He urges the importance of encouraging all inventions tending to economise this invaluable means of combustion, and even suggests that the Government should control the now unlimited outputs from the basins. Considering the aversion to any State-meddling in this home of self-government, this suggestion deserves notice. The importance of the 'black diamond' to the national prosperity is shown pretty plainly by the fact that the 'Times' gives greater prominence to Sir William Armstrong's inaugural address than to the Speech of the Austrian Emperor, or to the German Princes at Frankfort. 'Coal,' says the City paper, 'heat, gas, electricity, and short-hand are powers which have transformed the face of the world, and have exercised a far more important influence, even in political matters, than the King of Prussia or the Prince of Lippe-Detmold.'

CHAPTER XXVII.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1863—(*continued*).

London, Nov. 16: Conversation with Earl Russell on the French Proposal of a Congress.—London, Nov. 27: England's Refusal to join the Paris Congress—Death-knell of the Anglo-French Alliance—'A German who is fond of Facts'—The Schleswig-Holstein Question *ab ovo* (*Times*, Dec. 2, 1863).—London, Dec. 7: News from Copenhagen—Lord Wodehouse's Mission—The German Revolutionary Party in London.—London, Dec. 8: The Danish Question of Succession and the Treaty of 1852.—London, Dec. 13: Interviews with Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston on the Danish Question.—London, Dec. 17: Baron Brunnow's Utterances on the Holstein Question—The Secret History of the London Treaty.—London, Dec. 21: Doubts and Difficulties in the Treatment of the Danish Question—Position of the Ministry.—London, Dec. 31: Conversation with Charles Villiers on Denmark and Germany.

London: Nov. 16, 1863.

A WORD in explanation of my telegram: 'Le dîner encore problématique. Les gastronomes anglais indécis. Ils se méfient de l'appétit de l'amphitryon; tiennent au cru de quinze pour ce qui en reste, et réclament avant tout le menu et un programme raisonné du festin.'

After my arrival here this morning, I was fortunate enough to get a ten minutes' interview with Lord Russell, who was just going to the Cabinet Council. I told him he would guess the reason of my returning so soon. We were extremely anxious to know what England meant to do, a question on which the British Minister in Dresden could not enlighten us.

Lord Russell replied: 'Hitherto we have done very little. We told the French first of all that we considered the Treaties of 1815 not as obsolete, but as binding on all parties where they have not been formally repealed. We enquired, first, what proposals the French Emperor thought of making to the Congress; and, secondly, what authority the Congress was supposed to have? Drouyn de Lhuys answered me evasively, stating that a detailed exposition of the questions to be submitted to the Congress would be prejudicial to the freedom of discussion.'

In reply to my question, whether I might report to my Government that England did not desire a picnic, Lord Russell said:—

'The Emperor Napoleon also desires no picnic, but a regular dinner, to eat up part of his neighbours.'

The British Government desire and hope to go hand in hand with Austria. Lord Russell, however, has not concealed from me that the position of the two Powers is very different. England covets nothing, and now that the protectorate over the Ionian Islands is given up, she possesses nothing that others covet. Austria has to defend Galicia against the Poles and Venetia against the Italians.

I suggested whether it would not be possible to have an understanding with Austria about Italy.

'Impossible,' replied the Foreign Secretary, 'for Austria declines altogether to negotiate about Venetia, not having any intention of surrendering it.'

By the 'authority of the Congress' is understood here the question whether the majority, according to the French Emperor's view, is to be entitled to compel the minority, if necessary by force, to accept their decision. The British Government are decidedly against such an interpretation of

the word 'authority.' No hurry will be made either here or at St. Petersburg. Even at Paris there seems to be no desire to hasten the meeting of the Congress.

London: Nov. 27, 1863.

The Congress has come to nothing. The rejoinder of Drouyn de Lhuys to Lord Russell's despatch of the 12th was communicated here on the 24th. Its purport, however, was already known from Lord Cowley's despatch, and the Cabinet determined finally, at their meeting on the 19th, to take no part in the Congress proposed by France. Lord Russell had already framed his despatch. The draft was unanimously approved by all the Ministers, and was submitted the next day to the Queen at Windsor for her sanction. The receipt of the last French despatch was only waited for as a matter of form.

After his return from Windsor on the 20th, Lord Russell informed the Austrian Ambassador, under the seal of secrecy, of the decision thus arrived at, and added that the Queen had given her assent with pleasure to the refusal to take part in the Congress. Rechberg, therefore, must have known this decision early on the 21st. The language which the Austrian Ambassador here was instructed to use may have contributed not a little to strengthen the British Ministers in their objection to the proposed Congress. Lord Russell expressed a hope that Austria would follow England's example. Apponyi declared that he would wager his head that she would do so. 'Then the Congress is dead and buried,' said the Foreign Secretary, 'for without Austria and England it can never take place.'

Russia had stated from the first that she could not take part in any Congress in which all the Great Powers were not represented. Brunnow's commentary on the English 'unable

to attend' runs thus: 'All is going swimmingly. We shall do the same as England. The Polish troubles have at any rate done us this good, that they have shown us pretty clearly the real value of the French alliance and cured us of this delusion.'

A Cabinet Minister expressed to me yesterday his unmixed satisfaction at the result. 'The foolish catchword,' he said, 'which not even Gladstone has spared us, is now put by in the lumber-room. There will be no more talk now of the beneficent Anglo-French alliance. The common sense of the people has seen through the tricks of the French juggler. Backed by public opinion, we have put an end to this humbug, and averted the disgrace that Louis Napoleon sought to inflict on Europe, when posing as the arbiter of the universe. No doubt, he is now thinking of revenge, since he cannot possibly accept this *fiasco* as indifferent. What he is meditating, I do not know. His silence in the Holstein affair is ominous. But let him do what he likes, we are not afraid of him. We have seen through the man and his games.'

In this death-knell of the Anglo-French alliance, which is now being rung in all quarters, many persons see already the signs of a European coalition against Bonapartism.

COUNT VITZTHUM TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'TIMES.'

The Schleswig-Holstein Question ab ovo.[1]

London: Dec. 2, 1863.

SIR,—Charlemagne declared Holstein a province of the German Empire (803); his successors, the great Saxon Emperors, Henry I., Otto I., and Otto II., conquered Schleswig (931 to 975). The town of Schleswig became the seat of a

[1] Published in the *Times* of December 4, 1863.

Saxon bishop. The province itself, however, having never been formally incorporated, the Congress of Vienna inherited a doubt of a thousand years' standing. Denmark got the benefit, if any, of that doubt. Schleswig was not considered to belong to the German Confederation.

But the connexion of Holstein and Schleswig is older than the German Bund, and has not been abrogated by the settlement of 1815. By the Constitution granted by Waldemar, King of Denmark, in 1326, the distinct pledge was given 'that Schleswig shall never be annexed to Denmark.' The Dukes of Schleswig died out in 1375, and the country was united with Holstein. Erich, King of Denmark, tried, it is true, to disturb that union, and the Counts of Holstein lost Schleswig for 23 years (1412 to 1435), but the German Hansa having come to the rescue, King Erich lost not only Schleswig, but his three crowns—Denmark, Sweden, and Norway (1439). Erich's nephew, Christoph of Bavaria, succeeded in Denmark, but died without issue. The Danes offered the vacant throne, first to Adolphus VIII., Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, who declined, and then to Christian I. of Oldenburg, who accepted (1448). Adolphus VIII. having died without issue in 1459, the Schleswig-Holsteiners elected King Christian I. to be their duke. He declared in his letters patent of 1460, 'that the prelates, lords, cities, and inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein having elected him by their own free will and out of good will to be their Sovereign, and having sworn the oath of allegiance to him, not as King of Denmark, but as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, the order of succession in those two duchies shall not be altered, and belong exclusively to the male line;' whereas, in Denmark, King Juan Otto (991 to 1014) had introduced the succession of females. The 'capitulation' upon which Christian I. took the oath, and which

he signed for himself, his heirs, and successors, is in fact the 'Magna Charta' of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, and their 'Bill of Rights.' These are the principal rights and privileges enacted therein :—

'Schleswig and Holstein never to be separated; the citizens not to do any military service out of their country; no tax to be imposed without the vote of the Estates in Parliament assembled; no currency to be introduced which is not received at Hamburg and Lubeck; citizens exclusively to be appointed to public functions; no citizens to be judged by a foreign tribunal—no Dane, no foreigner, to be their judge; the Sovereign promises to make no war without the consent of Parliament; Parliament to meet every year. Every successor shall confirm these privileges by his oath; should he object to take that oath, the Schleswig-Holsteiners are at liberty to elect any other male descendant of Christian I. to be their Duke.'

Since 1660 Denmark has begun to try to infringe those privileges; but the people, who are the sons of the old Saxons, and who claim the same forefathers as the English, resisted and withstood all those encroachments.

The first Danish statesman who openly took the line of proposing the incorporation of Schleswig was Orla Lehmann, in 1836. His party became powerful after the death of King Frederic VI. Christian VIII. was led by that party to sign the letters patent of 1846 (July 8), declaring the Danish (female) order of succession to be the rule forthwith in the German Duchies. This was resisted as a breach of privilege. The Stadtholder resigned, the Duke of Augustenburg protested, the Estates joined in the protest, and brought the question before the German Diet. '*Hinc illæ iræ.*' War broke out in April, 1848, and lasted, with a short interruption after the truce of

Malmö, until July, 1849. After Olmütz, Austria undertook the settlement of that long-pending quarrel, and acted, in fact, as arbiter. The Austrian and Prussian plenipotentiaries were throughout those negotiations with Denmark the spokesmen of the Diet. Peace was made, an Austrian army having occupied the Duchies. Austria and Prussia promised to settle the succession question according to the wishes of Denmark, and to acknowledge by a European transaction the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, under the condition that Denmark would fulfil faithfully her engagements towards the Duchies, respect their ancient privileges, never try to separate them, and never incorporate Schleswig into Denmark proper. The German Powers kept their word; the treaty was signed in 1852. Did the Danes keep theirs? The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Bluhme, who directed in 1851 and 1852 all those negotiations, has answered that question. The speech he made on the 13th of November last in the Senate of Copenhagen shows that the treaty of 1852 stands or falls, as far as the German Powers are concerned, with the pledge given by M. Bluhme in the name of Denmark—that Schleswig shall never be incorporated, never separated from Holstein. But M. Bluhme shows, moreover, that even as far as the non-German Powers are concerned, the principle of the integrity of the Danish monarchy would fall to the ground should the Danes accept a Constitution which excludes Holstein and Lauenburg, because the Danish monarchy, which the Powers who signed the treaty of 1852 wanted to uphold, was composed of Denmark Proper, Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg, and not only of Denmark Proper and Schleswig.

The case stands simply thus: There is a treaty which everybody who signed it wants to uphold; but that treaty will and must remain a dead letter, and cannot be acted upon

as long as the Danes will not fulfil their part of the compromise of 1852—viz., withdraw the illegal proclamation of March, 1863, and cancel the Constitution, which the present King has only signed by compulsion and under the threat of a revolution—a Constitution which would incorporate, *de facto*, Schleswig, and destroy for ever the integrity of the Danish monarchy.

The Germans do not want to make any conquest; that is all sheer nonsense. It is not a question between 'poor little Denmark' and 'big Germany.' The 'big boy' in the case is Denmark, and the 'poor little one' is Holstein. It is, in one word, a question of privilege, not a question of power.

A GERMAN WHO IS FOND OF FACTS.

London: Dec. 7, 1863.

According to a telegram, dated Copenhagen, December 6, a Royal Ordinance has revoked the Letters Patent of the 30th of March last. The news was known yesterday at Pembroke Lodge, and was received with evident satisfaction. The Danish Government appear to have recognised at length the necessity of giving way.

Lord Wodehouse attended yesterday at Windsor to receive the Queen's commands, and is going to Copenhagen on the 9th, to convey her Majesty's congratulations to the King of Denmark on his accession to the throne, and at the same time give him some well-meant advice from the British Government. The choice of Lord Wodehouse is remarkable. It was he who only last Session attacked Lord Russell's policy of mediation in a speech which nobody could say was impartial. The ambition to obtain some practical result, the extreme importance attached here to a peaceful settlement of the

Danish dispute, the reaction of public opinion in favour of Germany, and, perhaps, the regard for the Queen, may possibly have toned down the harsh views entertained by the former Under-Secretary of State. 'The Devil is not so black as he is painted,' he said yesterday to Count Bernstorff. 'I shall preach peace to the Danes, and advise them to make every concession to the German Powers which does not imply an absolute impossibility.'

Lord Russell is far from reckoning among impossibilities the demands made by Austria and Prussia.

Bernstorff is in low spirits and dissatisfied with the turn of affairs. The withdrawal of the Proclamation of March 30, and the repeal of the November Constitution, virtually incorporating Schleswig, do not content him. He thinks that, to effect even a tolerably satisfactory settlement, there is nothing left but to join the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein with Denmark Proper by means of a dynastic union, after the example of Sweden and Norway.

The opinions given by the Prussian lawyers in 1851 on the Danish question of succession have recently been published at Copenhagen. It is clear from them that, according to German law, not a single member of the Schleswig-Holstein line is qualified by birth to succeed. Endless confusion would therefore arise, if the London Protocol were deprived of force.

G——, who visited me yesterday uninvited, and boasted of some secret commissions from Bismarck, gives me an edifying account of the proceedings of the German revolutionary party in London. The latter, under the leadership of the well-known Marx, are working openly for war, and consider the present condition of Europe extremely favourable for their designs. Russia, they say, is busily occupied with Poland, Austria with Venetia, and France with Mexico, and England

will only bark, not bite. This extreme party starts with the view that the German Governments had shown themselves incapable of doing justice to the national aspirations in the Schleswig-Holstein affair. It cherishes the Quixotic notion of placing the Elbe Duchies under the protection of Louis Napoleon, and is meditating, for this purpose, a mass deputation to Paris. This would open the door to the Congress of Peoples, recommended by Emile de Girardin in lieu of the abortive Congress of Princes. G—— declares that this childish idea has not only been discussed, but actually resolved upon.

London: Dec. 8, 1863.

In the course of my last interview with Lord Russell I did not omit to draw his attention to the actual text of the Reservation, under which we had assented in 1852 to the Treaty of London.

'If the question,' I added, 'had then been submitted to the Diet, we should probably have voted to accept the Treaty. Only the question has never been submitted to the Diet, and hence has remained open. That is not our fault, and we cannot be blamed if, after having expressly reserved our liberty of action, we hold a different opinion now, under wholly different circumstances, from that which we should have held ten years ago. That the question has remained open may be a matter of regret. In point of fact, it cannot be helped. Neither can it be wondered at if, in the present state of excitement, some advantage should be taken now of this neglect in an anti-Danish sense.'

Count Bernstorff personally regrets the incorrect declaration concerning the London Treaty, made by Austria and Prussia on the 28th ult. to the Diet at Frankfort. He finds fault in particular with the unwarranted assertion that, putting aside the Treaty of London, Prince Frederick of Hesse is

the next legitimate heir of Frederick VII. The hereditary title of that Prince, says Bernstorff, rests in reality solely on transmission; his mother, Louise Charlotte, the daughter (born October 3, 1789) of the late Crown Prince Frederick of Denmark, became the lawful Queen of Denmark after the death of Frederick VII. Had she actually succeeded to the throne, she could have laid no claim either to Schleswig and Holstein or to Lauenburg, the succession in each of those duchies being limited by law to males. As to the revocation of the Letters Patent of March 30, Bernstorff regards it as a mere sham concession, and neutralised by the Eider-Danes. Proclamation to the inhabitants of Holstein and Lauenburg. 'It is the old game,' said Bernstorff, 'of the democratic party to govern by terrorising. The Danish Government hope to win over the European Powers by this ostensible yielding, and to silence us Germans. My own consolation is that our Government at Berlin are fully alive to the gravity of the situation, as is shown by their entrusting the supreme command of the army to Prince Frederick Charles. They will probably prefer to let events compel them to renounce the Treaty of 1852.'

The Prince of Wales, as would naturally be expected, takes the side of his father-in-law and Denmark. Paget also threatens that England will reply with a declaration of war if the German Powers refuse to recognise the Treaty of London.

It is to be regretted that the German Great Powers should not have thought fit to accept the proposal made by Saxony at the Diet at Frankfort.[1] Nevertheless, it cannot be denied

[1] The purport of Saxony's proposals was, first, to convert the execution in Holstein and Lauenburg into occupation during the discussion of the question of succession; and secondly, to augment the force, originally fixed by the Diet at 6,000, which was to be sent into the Duchies.—*Correspondence respecting Denmark and Germany*, part iii., p. 294, 1863.

that the speeches of Count Rechberg and Bismarck in their own Chambers have helped materially to convert public opinion to our side. The only thing that produces any impression on the British Cabinet is the unanimity of the German Governments; and it would be, in any case, a political blunder to expose to foreign countries the differences of opinion exhibited in the Diet.

London: Dec. 13, 1863.

I had an opportunity to-day of discussing the Dano-German dispute in the afternoon with Lord Russell, and in the evening with Lord Palmerston.

Lord Russell was engaged at Pembroke Lodge with the representatives of Russia, Austria, and Greece, and could only spare me a short time. I congratulated him first of all on the success of his policy of mediation which he had espoused last year, and which was now approved by public opinion in England. Lord Wodehouse also had reaped his just reward by being obliged now to defend those very principles at Copenhagen which some months ago he had so wantonly denounced.

Lord Russell received my congratulations with evident pleasure, and remarked: 'Now, of course, the Danes will be sorry for not having followed my well-meant advice. They may think themselves lucky if they get off so cheaply. That public opinion, notwithstanding the criticisms of Lord Derby and Lord Wodehouse, now shares my view, affords me more satisfaction than surprise. Nobody had ever taken the pains to study the question.'

With regard to the resolution of the Diet, Lord Russell said plainly that he neither understood nor approved our opposition.

'Nobody who knows the present feeling in Germany,' I

replied, 'can help regretting that Austria and Prussia did not support the Saxon Government's proposal, which would not have prejudiced either of those Powers in the least. That proposal would then have been accepted unanimously. After all that Rechberg and Bismarck have experienced since then in their own Chambers, both those Ministers are probably now sorry for having prevented a unanimous resolution of the Diet.'

'Be assured,' replied Lord Russell, 'that Austria and Prussia have done good service to the cause of Germany by having boldly resisted the attempt to catch at popularity. The two Powers have, at the same time, enabled Europe to exercise a pressure at Copenhagen, which can only tend to promote the maintenance of peace.'

'It is time to shout when out of the wood,' I rejoined. 'The future will show who represent the German people better in this question, the majority of the Diet, or Austria and Prussia. We Germans are regarded, and perhaps not altogether wrongly, as theorists who attach greater value to the letter of the written law than to facts. In dealing with a deep-rooted national movement, one must take the people as they are. You English statesmen have to deal with a practical people, whose mouths you can stop with the favourite word expediency; we have to deal with theoretical idealists. To lead these you must take care not to shock them by needless professions of political faith. Otherwise, you run the risk of impairing the people's respect for the law, shaking their confidence in the Governments, and increasing, instead of allaying, the excitement. The first has been already done, because the Austro-Prussian Declaration ignores the fact that the Danish question of succession is an open one as regards the Diet. The object of our proposal, on the con-

trary, was to face manfully this fact, and honestly admit it. Austria and Prussia, by their Declaration, have simply heaped fuel on the fire, and they will not succeed in preserving either the integrity of Denmark or the Treaty of London.'

'Possibly; but that does not prevent the fact that the acceptance of Saxony's proposal of an occupation of the Duchies would have brought about the war which we are anxious to avoid. Denmark has declared to us that she will not resist Federal execution in Holstein and Lauenburg, but that she will certainly resist an occupation. In that case, Europe, at any rate England and Russia, would have decidedly taken part with Denmark.

'In the draft of the Saxon proposal which I have read, there is not a word of occupation. In reality all the German Governments at Frankfort were entirely agreed as to the end to be attained. They were anxious to terminate at length these wearisome disputes. They were anxious to prevent them from being made a means of agitation, and not to leave them, therefore, to be settled by the masses, or the National League,[1] or France. The only real difference was as to the means of attaining that end. Had Austria and Prussia accepted our proposal, the Federal troops would have occupied the Duchies in question and national passions would have been allayed. Time would have been given to the Governments to decide the question of succession quietly and in the proper quarter. Then would have been the time for Austria and Prussia to work for the maintenance of the London Treaty.'

'Names are nothing to the point. What you wished was

[1] For the address of the National Verein 'to the German people' on the Schleswig-Holstein question (Nov. 24) see *Correspondence respecting Denmark and Germany*, 1863, part iii., p. 287.

Federal execution pure and simple, under the guise of occupation. The latter would have led to war, with the former we still hope to preserve the peace. This is our practical view of the matter.'

The Danish Declaration, to which Lord Russell alluded, arrived here, I am told, last Friday. A letter of the Minister, M. Hall, states that everything will depend on the reasons given by the Bund. Denmark will not resist Federal execution in Holstein and Lauenburg, but if by this execution it is meant to submit the question of succession to the decision of the Diet, the honour of Denmark would compel her to resist German tyranny. There seems to be here a *hysteron proteron*. The Danish Minister must have known, at any rate by telegraph, before taking up his pen, that the eventuality involving the honour of Denmark would not occur. The Declaration, however, has not failed to produce its effect here in influential quarters.

Lord Palmerston, who sat next to me last night at dinner, himself brought up the burning question of the day by the remark, 'I am astonished at Baron Beust.'

'Your astonishment,' I replied, 'only shows that you have forgotten what Baron Beust told you last year about public opinion in Germany.'

'People in Germany always forget the leading facts. Austria and Prussia, when they signed the Treaty of 1852 as mandatories of the Diet——'

'As mandatories of the Diet? Pardon me, my dear Lord Palmerston, Austria and Prussia never did sign the London Treaty as mandatories of the Diet.'

'No matter. Austria and Prussia, at any rate, by signing the Treaty of 1852, undertook obligations not only towards Denmark, but towards us, France, Russia, and Sweden. In

that Treaty there is not a word of any obligations incumbent on Denmark as a condition of the arrangement then made by the Six Powers for settling the succession to the throne. How, then, can a statesman like Baron Beust refer to a stipulation which had no existence at all ?'

'Allow me, I must again interrupt you, for you are misinformed. That is precisely the point on which we disagreed with Austria and Prussia. We, too, shared the view of the British Government, that there was no formal stipulation in the Treaty of 1852 that the non-fulfilment of the promises made by Denmark should invalidate that Treaty; and just for that reason we would have wished to leave that argument alone, and stick simply to facts. Now the fact is that the London Treaty was never laid before the Diet. The blame of this oversight may lie with Lord Malmesbury, who signed the Treaty, not Lord Palmerston, who was its author. So far, therefore, as the Diet is concerned, the Treaty has no existence, and the Landgravine Louise Charlotte of Hesse is the lawful Queen of Denmark. The latter, according to the existing constitution of the country, would be incapable of reigning either in Schleswig or Holstein, or of delegating rights to her son or daughter which she herself did not possess. The question, who is the legitimate sovereign of Holstein and Lauenburg, remains an open one for the Diet, so long as the latter is not a party to the London Treaty. Here lies the difficulty which the German Governments have to settle, a difficulty which can neither be ignored nor denied, but must be faced frankly and resolutely.'

I am not sanguine enough to suppose that I produced any lasting impressions by my remarks. I can only thankfully acknowledge that the veteran Premier, who is not fond of talking at table, displayed an unfeigned interest by putting a

of questions. As to the competence of the Diet, he not, of course, hear of it. The Diet, he said, was no agus, no supreme tribunal for the affairs of Europe. ther it recognised the Treaty or not, did not alter the that Austria and Prussia were bound by the Treaty, as ropean Powers. That the Constitution of November 18 incompatible with the obligations undertaken by Den- k towards Germany, Lord Palmerston admitted, but he ised patience, as passions were quite as much excited in Copenhagen as in Germany.

On my observing, after this dinner-table conversation was concluded, that it was our misfortune that this question bored everybody so much in England, Lord Palmerston replied, with a smile, that history was made up of a series of just as dull questions as this.

At any rate, an advance is noticeable, when comparing the present language of the two leading Ministers with their former attitude. Only last year Palmerston advocated the Danish view with passionate energy in the House of Commons, while Russell did not venture to defend his proposal of mediation in the Lords.

Brunnow declares that Lord Wodehouse left for Copenhagen without instructions. The Government, he says, had simply commissioned him in the first instance to enquire at Berlin what Austria and Prussia demanded, and would wait for his report before giving him the necessary directions as to the language to be used at Copenhagen.

The next meeting of the Cabinet is to take place on Wednesday. It is possible that England's policy in the Danish question will be then finally resolved upon.

At Kew Cottage great anxiety is felt at the turn of affairs. The Duchess of Cambridge assured me that she seemed to

have fallen from the clouds on learning that the su
question was not finally settled. Her German heart sh
not disown, but poor King Christian was much to be pit
the more as he had no ambition and regarded the c
which had fallen to him as a burden. She had not conce
from her niece, the Queen, that the November Constitu
ought never to have been sanctioned. Her Majesty
replied that it could not be helped; it would have
hopeless to resist.

London: Dec. 17, 1863.

Baron Brunnow does full justice to the good intentions of the Saxon Government, but doubts whether a unanimous resolution of the Diet in our sense would have prevented the excitement in Germany.

'It is a pity,' he remarked, 'that nowadays everything is made a personal matter. People talk no longer of Saxony, but of Baron Beust; no longer of Russia, but of Prince Gortschakoff. That is a bad habit, which interferes with fairness of judgment. The costs of Federal execution and the annoyances of billeting will, it is to be hoped, bring the Holsteiners to reason. If Germany refuses all the concessions which we are now, in concert with England, recommending at Copenhagen, war is inevitable. A war waged by Germany for the conquest of Schleswig will bring about at once the participation of Sweden, and in the spring the blockade of the North Sea and Baltic Coasts and the appearance of a French army on the Rhine. Russia, too much occupied with her own affairs to take up arms, will always prefer to see the Swedes in Schleswig rather than in Finland. As regards the Treaty of London, Lord Palmerston and I were firmly convinced that Austria and Prussia had signed it in the name and on behalf of the German Bund. If

had not been expressly invited to take part in it, ssible that Prussia might have prevented such an n, in order to leave a back door open. The right of nce of the Duke of Augustenburg to the whole of has nothing to do with the London Treaty, and is doubtful, owing to his father's renunciation. What think about the Gottorp portion? I know very little all this. Has Prince Frederick really a right also to leswig?'

As a commentary on these questions, the Russian Ambassador gave me the collection of the official documents relating to the London Treaty. This small Blue-book has been printed at Copenhagen by command of the Danish Government. In reference to the question of law, the Warsaw Protocol (No. 6) is not without interest, and the Notes of May 8 and 24, exchanged between the Russian and Danish envoys, deserve also some attention.

With respect to the secret history of the London Treaty I have heard the following from a trustworthy source:—

In June, 1850, Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, found himself in a painful embarrassment in consequence of his arbitrary proceedings against the Greek Government. The Jew Pacifico, a questionable adventurer, had invoked Palmerston's protection as a British subject, and Palmerston, without the previous knowledge of the Crown or his colleagues, had misemployed the British fleet to extort from the feeble Government of King Otto their agreement to Pacifico's demands. One remembers the general indignation excited by this piratical enterprise. France and Russia, the two other protecting Powers, took especial umbrage at this measure of coercion. France under Cavaignac's dictatorship was not in a position to reply with a declaration of war, but recalled

Drouyn de Lhuys, then French Ambassador in Lond[illegible] Baron Brunnow made himself conspicuous by his al[illegible] the official dinner on the anniversary of the Queen's b[illegible] As Lady Palmerston seemed disposed to regard the [illegible] Minister's non-appearance as an insult to the Queen, B[illegible] went to Prince Albert to explain to him the reaso[illegible] prevented him from accepting Palmerston's invitation[illegible] Prince blamed the British Minister. The House of Lo[illegible] their sitting on the 17th of June, 1850, passed a formal [illegible] of censure against him by a majority of 37. Palmerston was afraid that the Commons would follow the example of the Lords, in case Brunnow, as well as the French Ambassador, should demand his passports. Had they done so, Lord Palmerston's political future would have been destroyed. In order to keep himself in office, he went to Brunnow and asked him whether there were no means of arranging the affair. 'Do ut des,' was the Russian Minister's reply; 'give us a free hand in Copenhagen and we will do the same for you in Greece.' The bargain was struck, and the Protocol of July 4, 1850, sealed it, and assured the integrity of Denmark which Russia had desired. The Treaty of May 8, 1852, though signed by Malmesbury, was therefore the work of Palmerston and Brunnow. No wonder, then, that these two *compères* should just now, when it is a question of tearing up that Treaty, be moving heaven and earth to save it.

London: Dec. 21, 1863.

'London makes one modest,' says Brunnow, who has been able to study for a whole generation the ups and downs of politics in this human ant-hill. I trust, therefore, that you will acquit me of any want of zeal if I have failed hitherto to enlist any solid support on behalf of Saxony's view of the Dano-German question. I am quite isolated. You know my

league, and are aware how excellently he is
cted by his Government. He assured me yes-
strictest confidence that ever since 1852 he
eived a single line from Munich on the tedious
stion—a question which, as he confessed to me,
er understood. He hoped, however, that all would
ly, as the articles in the 'Allgemeine Zeitung'
more peaceful.

Hanoverian colleague is above all things the son of his
r. The latter, a large landowner in Holstein, looks for
remedy to a reconciliation with Christian IX. The expenses of quartering the troops, rendered necessary by Federal execution, in addition to the Samwer Bonds, will yield the net result that Frederick VIII. would cost the rich nobility more than Christian IX. This Holstein calculation seems to find acceptance with the Hanoverians, who have made the somewhat late discovery that a ducal sovereign with some half million of subjects would necessarily become a mere vassal of Prussia. Of these, thinks Count Platen, there are quite enough in North Germany already. This latter consideration, coupled with the dreaded *quarta riscossa*, may have induced the Austrian Cabinet to give a willing ear to the British sermons on behalf of peace.

In Lord Russell we should lose the only Minister who has made a decent study of the question. If the Duke of Newcastle is compelled from ill-health to quit the Cabinet, the link is broken that keeps the 'happy family' together. Newcastle has succeeded in playing, with admirable self-denial, the part of buffer between Palmerston and Gladstone. The Tories boast of fifteen new seats in the bye-elections. If we attack Schleswig, Palmerston may very likely, to keep himself in power, make a demonstration with the Channel fleet against

us; while Napoleon, on the other hand, may b
begin his campaign on the Rhine, if he is sure o
England against him. Bamberg notes are issue
discount. The credit of the German minor St
and every one is speculating for a fall. The pub
forgotten that we could have prevented, as they
Crimean War, if we had sided at the beginning wit
instead of with Prussia. From the German Great P
can scarcely, under present circumstances, expect any s
and it could not surprise us if the odium of war were s
on the Bund.

I seem like a sailor on the look-out. I give notice of breakers ahead, of all the rocks and shoals that I can see, leaving the experienced pilot to steer the vessel on her course, and reef in the sails when necessary.

London: Dec. 31, 1863.

I had an opportunity yesterday of discussing thoroughly the legal points of the Holstein question with Mr. Charles Villiers, Lord Clarendon's brother. This Cabinet Minister is considered in England a Radical. In Germany he would be called a Conservative. As a lawyer he listened to my remarks with more attention than did his colleagues. The substance of them was as follows:—

'The integrity of Denmark,' I said, 'is a mere phrase. Whether in the North there is one State with 2,600,000 inhabitants, or two States, one with 1,100,000, and the other with 1,500,000, is a question of perfect indifference to the world, and in particular to Great Britain.'

Mr. Villiers seemed to agree with me thoroughly on that point, but reverted constantly to the remark how dangerous it was to break treaties, as tending necessarily to demoralise the public conscience. I listened with great interest to his

on the state of feeling in Germany, which he ery year since 1848.

outh,' he said, 'I have been particularly struck nge of feeling among the middle classes. Until o the impressions left by 1848 were still vivid I was told again and again that anything was Socialism and street riots. Since about the last , deep-seated ferment has become apparent, a ng that things cannot go on as they are: that of little States, the divisions, and the sense of impotence abroad were evils that could no longer be endured. The Governments will do well not to under-estimate the importance of the present agitation. The German people care in reality very little about Schleswig-Holstein; but, nevertheless, all parties see in that question a welcome means of showing other nations for once the power of Germany. Any one who supposes that the German people will be content, after settling the Danish question, to return to their former system of petty States, is mistaken. Wherever I go I hear complaints that too much forbearance was shown in 1848, and that the minor Princes ought to have been sent off bag and baggage, in order to exterminate the mischief. What people want is a German Parliament, no matter what the price. Telegraphs and railways have spread about the new ideas, which have sunk deeper into the public mind than the Governments appear to think.'

'That something must be done,' I replied, 'to satisfy the urgent need of unity, and remedy the palpable evils arising from this system of petty States, is universally admitted. It was the recognition of this that took the German Princes to Frankfort. Popular feeling is not to be studied in coffee-houses and at *tables-d'hôte*. Here in England the

newly landed foreigner sees in the declamation
aristocracy and the House of Lords abundan
revolution which is to upset all existing instituti
the English people are fond of their Lords, jus
mans are fond of our Princes. For that reason
not proceeding in England from the Lords, and
from the Princes, is sure to remain without a
result. For all that, it would be tantamount
suicide were the German Princes to ignore a nat
ment, or actually leave its leadership to the Nation
and the "Turn-Vereine," solely because that movement might be abused to promote excesses.'

Mr. Villiers, at any rate, is going to oppose Palmerston's warlike policy at the next meeting of the Cabinet, and do his best to prevent England from taking an active part in the Dano-German war. Once already he has done like service to his country, when, shortly after the present Ministry was formed, the question of war was before the Cabinet, and Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone were outvoted. It is true that the peace-loving Sir G. Cornewall Lewis was then alive, and that behind the scenes stood Prince Albert, who led with a firm hand the so-called Court Party, in other words the supposed ciphers of the Cabinet, in opposition to their nominal head.

As for the Conference *ad hoc*, Mr. Villiers has no more belief in it than has the French Ambassador. The latter admitted, indeed, that Lord Russell was very anxious to obtain it, but he does not think it likely that his Emperor will assent to its being held. Any conference to which only the signatories of the London Treaty and the representatives of the German Bund should be invited, could not possibly lead to anything. Each party present would in that case be at once plaintiff and

there would be no authority to impose peace. e Latour d'Auvergne thinks that the proposal as the German troops are to cross the Eider nd occupy Schleswig. This would be equivalent, eclaration of war. Even if a respite were ob- d be almost impossible to maintain peace during the Conference.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

LONDON.—1864.

Lord Robert Cecil preaches War against Germany in the *Quarterly* [redacted] Lord Palmerston's Plan of the War—Interview with Disraeli—Baron Beust's Answer to a Despatch of Lord Russell respecting the London Treaty—Private Letter to Lord Russell—Correspondence with Lord Derby—Attitude of the Queen—Lord Derby's Peace Sermon in the House of Lords—The Queen's Victory over Lord Palmerston—Newspaper Duel with Lord Robert Cecil in the *Times*—Passive Attitude of France and Russia—Garibaldi in London—Summoning of a European Congress to meet in London—Failure of the Conference—No Peace, but cancelling of the London Treaty—Debates in Parliament on the Danish Question—The Government, defeated in the Lords, are saved by Cobden's Amendment in the Commons—Germany protects the Elbe Duchies—Peace of Vienna.

THE Conservative 'Quarterly Review' opened the year 1864 with a somewhat long article by Lord Robert Cecil, giving violent expression to the view current in England on the Danish Question, and preaching war against Germany. From the position held by the writer in the ranks of the Tory party, this article attracted much attention. Lord Palmerston hailed it with delight, as a proof of the warlike feeling of the Opposition. He told his more peaceable colleagues that the Ministry would be upset, unless they maintained the London Treaty by force of arms.

Any doubt as to the validity of the Treaty of 1852 offended so deeply the *amour propre* of the Prime Minister, that he was capable of going any lengths. The plan which he devised, to save his work, was to attack with one portion of the British

e North Sea and Baltic coasts of Germany, portion Trieste and Venice, to support with zini and Garibaldi in Italy, and Kossuth in s kindle a general conflagration. I learned time, and put the serious question to he Conservative party had agreed to this y and would give Lord Palmerston a free once threw Lord Robert Cecil overboard. that the article in the 'Quarterly Review' only his lordship's private opinions, and not in any way those of his party. Lord Derby was still occupied in studying the question, and would be thankful to me for any information.

Meanwhile, I received Baron Beust's reply to a despatch which had been addressed by Lord Russell to the British Minister in Dresden in reference to the Dano-German question. I communicated this reply to the Foreign Secretary together with a private letter, in which I urged that the London Treaty was manifestly imperfect, inasmuch as the Danish Government had neglected to submit it to the Holstein Estates. This private letter was published, with the two despatches, in the 'Dresden Journal.' I was thus justified in communicating the three documents to Lord Derby. I received from him an elaborate answer. My reply, in which I combated the Tory chief's arguments, led to decisive interviews. I succeeded in convincing, first Disraeli, and afterwards Lord Derby also, that the integrity of the Danish monarchy was a phrase, and that absolutely no State interest of England was involved, sufficient to justify in the slightest the warlike policy of Lord Palmerston. It is very likely that Lord Derby was told something of the same sort at Osborne. The Queen, supported by the majority of the Cabinet, had already refused

her assent to a threatening Speech from th
Lord Palmerston had been anxious she sh
was not until the day before Parliament
Majesty approved the colourless Speech
on her behalf. Every one was awaitin
anxiety the debate on the Address, and t
was crowded when Lord Derby (Feb. 4)
three hours' speech. I stood on the steps o
by the front railing. It so chanced that L
who had been fetched by the Duke of Argyll,
next to me, and thus I was able to watch the impression produced on the Prime Minister by the eloquence of his opponent. The House listened with breathless silence to Lord Derby's solemn admonitions on behalf of peace, in which he enlarged with statesmanlike tact and rare skill on the proposition that a war with Germany would be the gravest calamity to England. A perfect storm of applause was the orator's reward. Lord Palmerston left the House in evident uneasiness. His game was up. His colleagues were all the more disposed for peace, as it was no secret that the Queen had summoned Lord Derby to Osborne. The Tory chief had promised me that he and his party would not drive Lord Palmerston into war. He brilliantly kept his word. That particular danger was over. Twice more, however, in the course of that Session did Lord Palmerston attempt to drag the Cabinet along with him and carry out his project of a war. Each time he was outvoted. Thrice did the Queen gain a victory over the would-be Dictator in the bosom of his own Cabinet.

Meanwhile Lord Robert Cecil continued to excite public opinion in favour of Denmark in the columns of the 'Times.' He did this in a manner which showed me plainly that the noble lord, like most of his fellow-countrymen, had not

mastered the legal question. I undertook the task of refuting him, under the pseudonym of 'Audiatur et altera pars,' my official position not allowing me to write under my own name. I begged, at the same time, another Tory, who, like Lord Robert, was a member of the House of Commons, to second me. Lord Robert Montagu, brother of the Duke of Manchester, did this the more willingly as he had already once protested in the House of Commons against the validity of the London Treaty shortly after it was signed.

The British Ministers, in their passionateness, committed the mistake of inciting France and Russia against Germany, overlooking the fact that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, like that of Paris, was only too happy to read Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell a lecture. At St. Petersburg they had not forgotten England's interference in the Polish affair. At Paris they had taken umbrage against England for her inactivity in that very question as well as for her unfriendly refusal to take part in the proposed Congress. Russia and France, by letting the German Powers have their way and not preventing their passage of the Eider, were anxious to let England see that she was unable alone to protect Denmark. The more vigorous the action of the German troops, and the more incapable the Danes appeared to resist them, the more intense became the excitement in London.

Just at that moment Lord Palmerston thought fit to offer a spectacle to the London mob which was calculated to inflame still more their revolutionary passions. Mindful of the *panem et Circenses* of the Roman Emperors, the veteran Premier sought to please the people by showing them Garibaldi. The latter, who had been released from his imprisonment after the affair at Aspromonte, was to be employed, if Palmerston succeeded in carrying through his scheme, against Venetia

and, if necessary, against Rome. Ovations were showered on the guerilla leader from the moment of his landing. In London he was met at the railway station by the Duke of Sutherland, and conducted in pomp through the leading thoroughfares to Stafford House. Countless multitudes thronged the streets and hailed this triumphal procession with acclamations. There had scarcely been such crowds at the entrance of the French Emperor and Empress in 1855 or at that of the Princess of Wales. Garibaldi was lodged like a prince at the Duke of Sutherland's mansion. Thither came the most distinguished ladies of the Whig aristocracy to court the favour of a look or a word from the fêted champion of freedom. The Ministers and the leaders of the Opposition met together at a banquet given in his honour at Stafford House. London society filled the splendid apartments in the evening and thronged round the lion of the day. Lord Derby and Lord Malmesbury were blamed by many of their party for accepting the invitation. The Marquis of Bath, who acted as whipper-in of the Tories in the House of Lords, tendered his resignation, declining to serve under a chief who paid homage to the hero of the Italian revolution. Among those most profuse in their attentions was the Duchess of Sutherland, lately the Mistress of the Robes, who gave a luncheon party at Chiswick to the adventurer, and received him like a king at the door of her mansion, dressed in full attire and covered with diamonds. Lord Clarendon, not to miss this festivity, postponed his journey to Paris, where he was to make the last fruitless attempt to induce Napoleon to take action. There was something indescribably comic in this exaggerated display of British hero-worship. The only man who was unaffected by it was Garibaldi himself. The old sailor was not the least imposed on by it all, not the least impressed. He made his appearance

in the gilded saloons without coat or waistcoat, and paraded in his red flannel shirt. In the streets he wore his black felt hat with a red feather. Festivities and dinners bored him intensely. He made no secret of his aversion to old women, even though they wore the ermine of duchesses. After the banquet at Stafford House he said that he was not accustomed to sit so late and so long at his meals. He called for his pipe of tobacco. The dowager Duchess overcame her dislike to tobacco-smoke, took Garibaldi into her *boudoir*, lit his pipe with her own hands, and never left him till he had finished it.

My Italian colleague was placed in a position of some embarrassment by these ovations, since the vanquished one of Aspromonte was still grumbling for ever against Victor Emmanuel. Lady Palmerston arranged a *modus vivendi*, and D'Azeglio struck a kind of truce with Garibaldi during the period of his visit in England.

Lord Palmerston failed to attain his end. The spectacle was a nine days' wonder and no more, and the meditated *quarta riscossa* was never accomplished.

In the Danish affair the Ministers, as events showed, misook the real feeling of the country. Parliament did not press for taking part in the war, the outbreak of which the Government had done nothing to prevent. The opportunity for action was neglected. The successes of the German arms created a surprise and an impression. It was now too late for England to take the sword. The Government proposed a European Conference, to check the effusion of blood and avoid the danger of a serious struggle in Parliament. A Conference was invited to meet at London, without a basis and without an armistice. Austria and Prussia were not sorry to take advantage of it, in order to escape from the false position

in which they had placed themselves as belligerent Powers and co-signatories of the London Treaty. Both of them declared their readiness to attend the Conference, on condition that the German Bund received, as such, an invitation also. It was the first time, since its existence, that the Diet had been invited to attend and vote at a European Conference. The choice of its representative fell on the Saxon Minister of State, Baron Beust, the most active advocate of the Federal standpoint. He accepted the choice, but was unable, from the haste in which the matter was arranged, to reach London on the 20th of April, the day fixed by the impatient Lord Russell for the opening of the Conference. Prussia and Austria declared their refusal to take part in any sitting without the representative of the German Diet. The first meeting passed by without any result being obtained. The Conference was not really opened until April 25.

As was to be expected, the Conference ended in a failure. A failure, because it neither checked the war nor established any solid foundations for peace. Germany, however, had good reason to be satisfied with the ultimate result. Baron Beust had declared that the Diet refused, and would always refuse, to recognise the Treaty of London, and that the only solution possible was the complete separation of the Duchies from Denmark. Lord Clarendon, who, though nominally second, was in reality the first British plenipotentiary, induced Lord Russell, with a view of checking the bloodshed, to propose the separation of Holstein, Lauenburg, and South Schleswig. The neutrals, Russia and France, agreed to this, but the Danish representatives declared that their instructions were exhausted, and thus the matter remained to be settled by the sword. Austria and Prussia, whose representatives allowed themselves willingly to be guided by the plenipotentiary of the Diet, were

thus extricated from their false position, and the London Treaty was then and there torn up for ever. It might, perhaps, have been saved, had the British Ministers acknowledged from the first that the value of a treaty, intended to settle a *quæstio de futuro*, an eventuality of the future, depended on the circumstances under which that eventuality occurred. A very different importance attaches to treaties which, like those of 1815, deal with *faits accomplis* and establish the final results of a war lasting over many years. Palmerston and Russell committed in their zeal a political blunder when they declared that to cancel the Treaty of London was tantamount to unsettling everything else. Had not Napoleon been then so seriously occupied in Mexico, he would have taken the British Ministers at their word. But, be that as it may, the Treaty was now dead. The Conference had not only united Germany, but also served as a safety-valve against an explosion in Parliament. The saying that no change of Ministry is to be thought of after the Ascot Races was verified anew. The Ascot meeting was fortunately over. Nevertheless, before the Session came to an end, the Ministers were doomed to suffer a humiliation without a parallel.

Scarcely had the protocols of the Conference been laid before Parliament, when the leaders of the Opposition in both Houses moved an address to the Crown, with the view of criticising, as it well deserved, the policy pursued by the Government in the Danish question. The debate in the Commons lasted several nights; in the House of Lords it was concluded at a single sitting. Disraeli opened the attack in a brilliant speech. He justly reproached the Government for their uncalled-for policy of intervention, and advocated in the strongest terms the maintenance of peace between Germany and England. The reaction of public opinion, both within

and without the walls of Parliament, was complete. The Ministry would have fallen, had not Cobden come to their rescue, as the champion of Lord Palmerston. Cobden drafted, and induced Mr. Kinglake to move, an amendment, congratulating the Ministers on their love of peace, and simply acquitting them on the ground that they had avoided a war with Germany.[1] In reality, the old Premier had been moving heaven and earth to kindle a war, and had only been prevented by the Queen and the majority of his colleagues from taking a step which was described in the course of this debate as an act of insanity. Kinglake showed him a list of all the members of the Ministerial party who intended to vote for Disraeli, in case Palmerston refused to accept Cobden's amendment and advise his followers to vote for it. The Premier had no choice. He was bound either to retire from office, or swallow the bitter pill offered to him by the Manchester school, and pledge himself to maintain the strictest neutrality. He chose the latter alternative as the only means of salvation, and was overjoyed when ultimately a majority of eighteen determined his continuance in office.

In the House of Lords, where the division took place, almost simultaneously with that in the Commons, in the early morning of July 19, the Government were defeated by a majority of nine.

Thus was sealed the Parliamentary victory of Germany over the warlike ambition of Lord Palmerston. Lord Russell, utterly astonished at the reaction of public opinion, was finally compelled to admit the justice of the view consistently

[1] The terms of the amendment were as follows: 'To express the satisfaction with which we have learnt that at this conjuncture her Majesty has been advised to abstain from armed interference in the war now going on between Denmark and the German Powers.'

adhered to by the German Bund. Events proved the statesmanlike foresight of Prince Albert, who had never approved of the Treaty of 1852. The German arms, now unmolested by foreign interference, safeguarded the legitimate rights of the Elbe Duchies, to the possession of which Denmark renounced all claim by the Peace concluded at Vienna on October 18.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.—1864.

London, Jan. 3: Cabinet Council—Ratification of the Treaty respecting the Ionian Islands—Lord Russell asks Germany to suspend Action against Denmark—Exhaustive Discussion with Disraeli about Palmerston's Plan of War, and the Attitude of the Conservative Party in the Danish Question.—London, Jan. 4: Count Vitzthum to Lord Russell: Delivery of the Saxon Reply respecting the London Treaty—Enclosures: Count Beust to Count Vitzthum (Dresden, Dec. 29, 1863); Lord Russell to Mr. Murray (London, Dec. 17, 1863).—London, Jan. 8: Count Vitzthum to Lord Derby: Confidential Communication of the three last-mentioned Documents respecting the London Treaty.—London, Jan. 10: Lord Derby to Count Vitzthum. Reply: Validity of the London Treaty; Criticism of German Policy.—London, Jan. 13: Count Vitzthum to Lord Derby. Rejoinder: Defence of the German View; Exhortation to Peace; Warning of the Danger of unwarranted Interference on the Part of England.—London, Jan. 22: Favourable Impression caused by the Despatch of Dec. 29, 1863, and the private Letter to Lord Russell; Lord Robert Montagu; Urquhart; News from the Theatre of War; Two Attempts at a Settlement.—Lord Robert Cecil upon Germany and Denmark, the *Times*, Jan. 22, 1864—*Audiatur et altera pars*, Germany and Denmark, the *Times*, Jan. 23, 1864.—London, Jan. 23: Count Vitzthum to Lord Robert Montagu: 'Please answer a paragraph in Lord R. Cecil's Letter to the *Times*.'—London, Jan. 24: Lord Robert Montagu to Count Vitzthum: Sending of the desired Answer to the *Times*—Lord Robert Montagu: Germany and Denmark, *Times*, Jan. 25, 1864—Lord Robert Cecil upon Germany and Denmark, *Times*, Jan. 25, 1864—*Audiatur et altera pars*, Germany and Denmark, Jan. 29, 1864.—London, Jan. 24; Cabinet Council—Enquiry addressed to the Signatories of the London Treaty—Prince Latour d'Auvergne's View—Interview with Disraeli—The Tories strongly opposed to any Interference in the Dano-German Quarrel.—London, Jan. 25: Threatened Employment of the Channel Fleet.—London, Jan. 31: Decisive Interview with Lord Derby—His Promise not to drive the Government into War with Germany.

London: Jan. 3, 1864.

THE opening of Parliament is to take place, in accordance with the wish of the Premier, on February 4. At yesterday's

Cabinet Council, neither Lord Palmerston nor the Duke of Newcastle were present, owing to illness. All decisions respecting the Danish question are postponed until the next meeting, when Palmerston hopes to attend. Is England going to treat the entry of the Federal troops into Schleswig as a *casus belli*? This is the main question, which is to be decided next Tuesday.

The ratifications of the Treaty of November 14, concerning the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece, were exchanged yesterday. Lord Russell made use of the opportunity to explain to the Austrian and Prussian Ambassadors, that England was anxious, above all, to gain time. There was reason to hope that Denmark might be induced to revoke the November Constitution. The resolution of the Diet on the Austro-Prussian proposal of the 28th of last month might with advantage be deferred, and the military preparations not unduly hastened.

I employed a long visit to Disraeli to-day in furthering the interests of peace. I begged him to tell me candidly whether Lord Robert Cecil's warlike article in the 'Quarterly Review,' as well as the anti-German language of the Tory papers generally, corresponded with the view intended to be maintained by the Conservative party in Parliament. Disraeli replied emphatically in the negative, and assured me that Lord Robert Cecil had only expressed his private opinion. In like manner Seymour Fitzgerald's letters in the 'Morning Herald' represented a policy which neither Lord Derby nor himself, Disraeli, approved. Lord Derby was just now busily engaged in studying the Danish question at Knowsley, and would be grateful to me for any enlightenment on the subject.

'That being the case, we can talk openly,' I said. 'You

have a secret understanding with Lord Palmerston. You have left him free to act in foreign affairs, provided he represents your home policy. This understanding has certain limits, as is shown by Lord Derby's veto against an attack on Venetia. Are you Tories aware what is now going on? Do you know what plan the old Lord "Firebrand" has now in his head? He is furious at the turn the Danish question is taking,—furious from wounded self-love, because the London Treaty preconcocted by him with Brunnow has become untenable. From sheer offended vanity he is now scheming a general war. He wants to blockade and embargo the German ports on the North Sea and Baltic, send a second fleet of ironclads to the Adriatic in order to lay Trieste and Venice in ashes, and lastly—and this is the chief point—to let slip the hell hounds of Revolution and cry havoc with them in Germany. A million pounds are ready for Mazzini and Garibaldi, and another million for Kossuth. The former are to set Italy in flames and organise the *quarta riscossa*, the latter to set fire to Hungary and the frontier districts of Turkey. The majority of the Ministers are strongly opposed to this plan. But the old man holds you over their heads and tells his colleagues, "If *we* do not begin the war, the Tories will turn us out in order to do it themselves." That is how things stand, and the only question is whether you and Lord Derby are willing to undertake the responsibility of such a general conflagration, which would imperil all the Conservative interests of Europe. What is the integrity of Denmark? A meaningless phrase. How can British interests be affected by the existence or non-existence of a petty State of 2,600,000 inhabitants?'

Disraeli listened to me with the greatest attention, and replied, 'I quite agree. The integrity of Denmark is all

humbug. Should the little country ever again possess a fleet, it would fight in the next war, not for England, but for Russia and France. We should therefore be compelled to bombard Copenhagen once more, as we did fifty years ago, and burn the Danish ships. 'To allege dynastic alliances as factors determining the national policy of this country is downright childish.'

'England has taken good care not to undertake a guarantee,' I continued. 'There is no *casus fœderis* before you. The present Ministers were delighted when a dynasty, installed by England herself, was expelled from Greece. They exulted when the hereditary dynasties in Parma, Florence, Modena, and Naples were overthrown by Garibaldi's volunteers or Piedmontese bayonets. What right would these same Ministers have to force a dynasty on the Holsteiners and Schleswigers, which the people neither wish for nor acknowledge as legitimate? And is this to cause a European war? Would that not be playing Louis Napoleon's game? Would he not hasten, as soon as England took up arms for Denmark, to enter the lists for the oppressed nationalities? Could he not conclude a lion's league with Prussia, threaten Belgium and the Rhine country, and end by incensing the whole continent against "perfidious Albion"? These are real, palpable dangers, not mere chimeras like the integrity of a little State.'

Mr. Disraeli agreed with me on all these points, and repeated that the integrity of Denmark was too insignificant an object to justify a European war. He considers that England's first duty is to keep a watch on the Emperor Napoleon and abstain from any interference.

Count Vitzthum to Earl Russell.

Private. Hobart Place: Jan. 4, 1864.

DEAR LORD RUSSELL,—I wrote this morning in order to request the honour of an interview with your Lordship. But as you will scarcely be able to receive me to-morrow, before the Cabinet meets, when the Holstein question is to be discussed—as I understand—I take the liberty of sending you the enclosed copy of a despatch[1] which reached me this morning. It is Baron Beust's answer to your despatch of the 17th of December.

You will kindly recollect that we never made use of the argument which you impugn in that paper, and that we always maintained, that the rights of the German Duchies were based on a stronger and safer ground. Our principal reason for disagreeing with the majority, in the sitting of the federal Diet of the 7th of December, has perhaps been that we could not detect a *formal* connection between Danish engagements of 1851 and the Treaty of 1852, although we could not deny the existence of a *moral* connection. We did not and we do not say: 'the Treaty of 1852 is null and void, as long as Denmark does not keep the engagements of 1851.' What we do say, is simply this: 'there is a Treaty by which certain arrangements for the future have been contemplated; but the contingency for which the said Treaty has been prepared did not arise. King Frederick VII., it is true, died without issue; but he died also without having been able to establish lawfully and rightfully in the German parts of his domains the new order of succession which the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1852 had in view, and which they would have been bound to

[1] See p. 300.

uphold had those arrangements been really completed. This not being the case the treaty is *imperfect* by itself. To make it perfect three essential conditions are still wanting:

1. The consent of all the Agnates;
2. The consent of the Estates of Holstein and Schleswig;
3. The consent of the German Diet.'

The history of Germany offers a precedent of striking analogy—I mean the so-called 'Pragmatic Sanction.' Charles VI. having no male heir wanted to change the existing order of succession in favour of his daughter. He made treaties with all the leading Powers of Europe; but did these treaties satisfy him? No. He thought it right and wise to submit the 'Pragmatic Sanction' to all the different Estates and provincial Diets of his dominions, and they accepted it. The consequence was, that, when afterwards some foreign Powers endeavoured to deprive Maria Theresa of some parts of her inheritance, the people stood up for her rights.

If, in the present case, Frederick VII. had acted with the same wisdom as Charles VI., and if the Holsteiners and the Schleswigers had declared openly in favour of Christian IX., as the Austrians and the Hungarians did for the Empress-Queen, do you think Germany would have interfered and questioned the legality of the order of succession which the Treaty of London endeavoured to create?

I trust you will kindly excuse these few remarks, and enable me, after having seen Baron Beust's answer, to write home that you cannot but acknowledge that the conduct of the Saxon Government has been entirely consistent with good faith. Believe me, &c.

VITZTHUM.

Baron Beust to Count Vitzthum.

Dresde: le 29 decémbre 1863.

Monsieur le Comte ![1]—Mr. Murray vient de me communiquer une dépêche de son Gouvernement, concernant l'affaire des Duchés de Schleswig-Holstein et dont vous trouverez ci-joint une copie.[2]

Il vous sera facile de constater que la dépêche de Lord Russell s'attache à combattre une manière d'envisager la validité du traité de Londres du 8 Mai 1852, qui n'a jamais été celle du Gouvernement du Roi. Ce n'est pas à nous qu'il appartient de la discuter, et conséquemment je pense que Mr. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique jugera inutile que nous acceptions le débat sur ce terrain. Le Gouvernement du Roi se trouve simplement en présence d'une question, dont la Diète, organe de la Confédération germanique, a été saisie à la suite du décès de S. M. le Roi Frédéric VII de Danemarc. L'envoyé de feu Sa Majesté près la confédération a présenté des lettres de créance, pour être admis comme représentant du Roi Chrétien IX en sa prétendue qualité de Duc de Holstein et de Lauenbourg. En même temps le Ministre de Bade a produit des pleinpouvoirs comme mandataire du Prince héréditaire d'Augustenbourg, faisant valoir des prétentions, à titre d'agnat, sur les dits Duchés. Dans cette occurrence la Diète est appelée à se prononcer.

Le Gouvernement du Roi pour sa part, fidèle aux principes qu'il a invariablement pratiqués dans des cas analogues, ne saurait prendre d'autre ligne de conduite que le respect du droit.

Après avoir voté à la Diète pour les mesures qui lui semblaient les plus propres à assurer l'exécution pleine et entière de ses décisions, il s'est consciencieusement appliqué à étudier les titres constituant les droits de succession; ce sera d'après le résultat de cet examen qu'il donnera sa voix.

Quant au traité du 8 Mai 1852 il ne sera pas inutile, puisque Lord Russell veut bien nous le rappeler, d'entrer à son sujet dans quelques explications.

Cet acte, ayant pour objet d'établir un nouvel ordre de succession dans le Royaume de Danemarc, a été accepté et sanctionné par le

[1] This and the next despatch are printed in the *Dresden Journal* of Jan. 12, 1864. [Mr. Murray's account of his interview with Baron Beust on Dec. 26, when reading to him Earl Russell's despatch of the 17th, is given in the *Correspondence respecting Denmark and Germany*, 1864, part v. p. 449.—Tr.]

[2] See p. 298.

'Reichstag' danois. Mais pour qu'il devînt légitime et exécutoire pour les Duchés allemands, il fallait obtenir le consentement des agnats appelés par droit d'hérédité à y succéder, ensuite celui des Etats, et enfin celui de la Confédération germanique.

Aucune de ces trois conditions n'a été remplie. Par conséquent la Diète n'a pas besoin de prendre en considération les griefs, que depuis nombre d'années elle a à faire valoir à la charge de Danemarc, relativement à la violation des engagements contractés par cette puissance, pour arriver à contester au traité du 8 Mai 1852, toute espèce d'effet par rapport aux Duchés allemands.

Le Gouvernement du Roi invité dans le temps par les signataires du traité de Londres à y accéder, ne s'est pas refusé à déclarer son assentiment—non pas son accession—à une combinaison laquelle, si le Danemarc avait loyalement rempli ses engagements envers l'Allemagne, aurait pu réussir; car alors il y aurait eu chance d'obtenir le consentement de tous les intéressés dont l'adhésion était indispensable pour rendre le traité valide. On n'a pas seulement tenté de s'assurer de ce consentement par la raison qu'en présence des actes émanés du Gouvernement danois et attentatoires aux engagements contractés par lui, on en reconnaissait d'avance l'impossibilité. C'est ainsi qu'on en est arrivé à laisser le traité incomplet et non exécutoire dans une partie essentielle et ce n'est certes pas à la Confédération, ni à ses membres que les signataires du traité auront à en faire un reproche.

Le Gouvernement du Roi—le Cabinet britannique ne saurait l'ignorer—a fait de plus dans le temps la réserve expresse qu'il ne prétendait point anticiper sur les résolutions que la Confédération par l'organe de la Diète *pourrait être amenée* à prendre dans cette question. Cette éventualité, prévue alors, se présente aujourd'hui et le Gouvernement du Roi use de la liberté qu'il s'est sagement ménagée.

J'ose espérer, que cet exposé du véritable état des choses amènera Lord Russell à une appréciation de notre conduite conforme à son esprit bien connu d'équité et de justice. Il suffit en effet d'être de bonne foi pour reconnaître que le Gouvernement du Roi n'a pas songé à s'en écarter.

Veuillez, Monsieur le Comte, donner lecture de ma présente dépêche à Mr. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les affaires étrangères et lui en laisser copie. Agréez etc.

BEUST.

Earl Russell to Mr. Murray.

Foreign Office: Dec. 17, 1863.

SIR,[1]—Her Majesty's Government have seen with surprise and pain the language which has been held with regard to the Treaty of London of May 1852.

The Powers who signed that Treaty, or who subsequently acceded to it, must recollect that they bound themselves thereby not to Denmark alone, but to Great Britain, France, Russia, and Sweden, who were parties to it, and to all the other States and Powers whose accession thereto was asked for and obtained, and that the declared object and purpose of that Treaty was not to regulate the reciprocal relations of Denmark and Germany, but to serve as an arrangement essential for the general interest of Europe.

A violation of the engagements taken by Denmark in 1851-52 towards Germany is an offence which may be properly resented, and for which redress may be justly demanded. But such violation cannot cancel a solemn European engagement taken towards other parties. The promises made by Denmark in January 1852, regarding Holstein and Schleswig, may have been the prevailing motive with Austria and Prussia for entering into the Treaty of May 1852; but those Powers cannot with any show of reason allege as an excuse for not remaining faithful to the obligations of that Treaty, that their expectations as to the fulfilment by Denmark of her engagements, taken at another time and in other documents, have been disappointed.

The whole foundation of the treaty stipulations of Europe would be subverted if such a reason could be admitted as an excuse for breaking a plain and simple treaty engagement. Any Sovereign

[1] The text of this despatch is taken from the official *Dresden Journal*. [The English official text of the despatch, as printed in *Correspondence respecting Denmark and Germany*, 1864, part iii. p. 383, reads 'concluding' instead of 'cancelling' in the fourth paragraph, and makes the last paragraph run as follows: 'You may read this despatch to M. de Beust, *but you will not give him a copy of it*.' There is evidently a mistake here, for Mr. Murray, in his despatch to Earl Russell of Dec. 28 (*Correspondence, &c.* part iv. p. 449), writes: 'I called on M. de Beust, after his return from Munich, and, in obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 17th instant, I read the despatch to him, *and left him a copy of it*.' The point, of course, is unimportant, except as affecting Baron Beust's publication of the despatch in question. Baron Beust sent the despatch to Count Vitzthum and published it, before it was communicated to Parliament.—TR.]

when called upon to fulfil his engagements might say: 'My motive for cancelling that treaty with you was that I had other engagements with one of the parties to that treaty. Those other engagements have not been kept, and therefore my treaty with you is null and void.'

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that the Court of Dresden will see that such a process of reasoning, if admitted to be valid, might shake to pieces any existing treaty. I forbear from quoting instances in which such a loose and capricious mode of interpreting treaties might prove seriously injurious to the German Powers themselves.

Let it suffice at present for her Majesty's Government to declare that they would consider any departure from the Treaty of Succession of 1852 by Powers who signed or who acceded to that treaty, as entirely inconsistent with good faith.

You are instructed to give Baron Beust a copy of this despatch. —I am, &c.,

RUSSELL.

Count Vitzthum to Earl Derby.

Private. Hobart Place: Jan. 8, 1864.

DEAR LORD DERBY,—Mr. Disraeli tells me that the enclosed correspondence,[1] respecting the Dano-German conflict, may perhaps have some interest for you at the present moment. I beg to add the copy of a private letter which I have written to Lord Russell on the subject.

We are accused of indulging in 'a loose and capricious mode of interpreting treaties'; we are told that her Majesty's Government 'would consider any departure from the Treaty of Succession of 1852' as 'entirely inconsistent with good faith,' and all this because we doubt whether the German Diet has any right to compel the Holsteiners and the Lauenburgers to recognise King Christian IX. as their legitimate Duke. I do not recollect that the much-abused German Sovereigns have shown great admiration for the 'loose and

[1] See the author's private letter to Earl Russell and enclosure, pp. 298–301.

capricious mode of interpreting treaties' which prevailed in Italy, and a few months ago in Greece. With regard to the London Treaty, I need not remind you that there are treaties of a very different character and importance: treaties which regulate the past, which legalise accomplished facts, which settle *de jure* a *status quo* brought about by a war or by a series of wars, as the treaties of Vienna for example; and treaties which endeavour to regulate the future, which are made for certain contingencies, certain eventualities. The former are more solemn engagements, are of a more binding force than the latter, for this simple reason, because *tempora mutantur* and *nos mutamur in illis*; because circumstances may change and events may take an unexpected turn; because the contemplated contingency may never arise after all, or present itself under circumstances which those who signed the treaty had not, and could perhaps not have foreseen, when they signed the engagement. The Powers who signed the London Treaty of May 8, 1852, for instance, had they not a full right to expect that the new order of succession which they contemplated would have been rightfully established, would have become the law of the land, before King Frederick VII.'s death?—Unfortunately this has not been the case. Denmark failed, and the treaty, as far as the German Duchies are concerned, has been left imperfect. Some of the Agnates—I do not speak now of the Duke of Augustenburg and his son—have not assented; the Estates of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg have not assented; the German Confederation has not. The Frankfort Diet could not ignore these facts. The *stet pro ratione voluntas* system does not answer, nowadays, when you have to deal with a deeply roused popular feeling. People will reason; we cannot prevent that. They study Vattel, as we do, and they find that

it has always been considered as an axiom of international law, that every treaty is null and void in itself by which two Powers would engage themselves to do wrong—for example, to deprive of his rights a third Power or individual who is no party to the treaty and who has not formally agreed.

I venture to hope that you will excuse me with your usual kindness for having troubled you with these cursory remarks, and that you may perhaps discover therein some arguments in favour of the late Lord Melbourne's favourite maxim,[1] which you recommended last year—so wisely, as the events have shown—on another occasion to her Majesty's Ministers in one of your eloquent speeches.

Please to present my best regards to Lady Derby, and believe me, &c.

VITZTHUM.

Earl Derby to Count Vitzthum.

Knowsley: Jan. 10, 1864.

DEAR COUNT VITZTHUM,[2]—I have to thank you for your kindness in communicating to me the correspondence between Lord Russell and Baron Beust, and your private letter to the former. I regret, however, that I cannot concur in the views which your Government takes of the binding nature of the Treaty of 1852, though Lord Russell's view of the obligations imposed by it might have been more courteously, I would almost say less offensively, expressed. I am very unwilling to enter into controversial discussion of this very complicated question, which appears to threaten hostilities, the extent of which it is impossible to foresee; but you will not, I hope, take it amiss if I tell you shortly and frankly in what respects I am unable to concur in the doctrines laid down by Baron Beust. I observe with satisfaction that your Government does not found its objection to the validity of the treaty upon any violation, real or supposed, by Denmark of the engagements taken

[1] 'Cannot you leave it alone!'

[2] See also Lord Malmesbury's *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, vol. ii. p. 310.

by it towards Austria and Prussia in the preceding year; although this objection is not repudiated, but rather waived as unnecessary, the alleged invalidity being, in Baron Beust's opinion, sufficiently established on other grounds. Those grounds are that, to give effect to the treaty, it was necessary that, before taking effect, it should have the assent first of all the Agnates, second of the States, and third of the German Confederation. Now I have not the text of the treaty by me; but if it had been intended that all these consents should be preliminarily required, it is impossible but that so material a modification should have been plainly set forth in the treaty itself, which I am pretty confident was not the case. Indeed if all the parties who might be supposed to have an interest in the result had been agreed with respect to the proposed change, I do not very clearly see what was the necessity for any treaty at all; and if it were in the power of any one of the then possibly dissentient parties to put a veto upon its operation, the treaty would have been little better than waste paper. But it is incredible that it should have been left to the Estates of Holstein, and left too by implication, to set aside a treaty entered into between six Great Powers, exclusive of Denmark, in the avowed interests of Europe, for the preservation of the integrity of Denmark, and which, for that purpose, secured to the present King all the rights enjoyed by his predecessor over all parts of his dominions, including the Duchies. Of course the question of succession is completely distinct from that of the Federal obligations binding on the King as Duke of Holstein and Lauenburg, the alleged violation of which, by his predecessor, is made the pretext for Federal execution in Holstein. And I must say that a totally new character is given to that execution, when, under the protection of Federal troops, the pretender to the Duchy is allowed openly to put forward his claims and to receive the allegiance of his would-be subjects. This is going a great deal farther than 'doubting whether the German Diet has any right to compel the Holsteiners to recognise King Christian IX. as their legitimate Duke.' But to return to the question of assents—I do not deny that it would have been *desirable* that, if possible, those assents should have been all obtained; but I do deny that they were necessary to the validity of the treaty; and Baron Beust admits the impossibility of obtaining the assent of Holstein, except upon terms which would have been tantamount to the dissolution of the Danish monarchy. But with regard to the Diet, I have always understood (I may be mistaken) that in the Treaty of 1852 Austria and Prussia assumed to act as

their plenipotentiaries; and it is difficult to see how they at least can reconcile a repudiation of the treaty on the ground of its non-acceptance by the Diet. And, of all causes to be taken up, that of the Duke of Augustenburg seems to me the most indefensible. His father, guilty of a treasonable rebellion against his Sovereign, having had his estates confiscated, and having incurred for himself and his heirs the penalties attaching to treason, signs for himself and them an absolute renunciation of any possible rights which he might have, and under the most solemn sanction pledges himself and them never to disturb the peaceable enjoyment by the present King and his heirs of the rights conferred on them by that treaty. By the King's free will and indulgence he received a compensation of, I think, 3,000,000 thalers for his estates, the proceeds of which the present claimant has accepted, and now enjoys; never did he even protest against the surrender of his vested interests, till the money had been paid and seven years had elapsed since the conclusion of the treaty. If private morality is to be carried into public affairs, I know not in what terms to stigmatise pretensions put forward on such grounds.

I have frankly stated to you the view which I take of the obligations imposed upon the signatories of the treaty—Saxony was not one—and I am unwilling to discuss the amount of difference between her *assentiment* and her *adhesion*.

We are at a most perilous crisis; and the entrance of a single German soldier into Schleswig will alter the whole complexion of the case as it stands at present, and render inevitable a war which may become general. It is as a friend of Germany not less than as a lover of peace that I earnestly hope such a war may even yet be avoided. The minor States of Germany, who are most eager in pushing matters to extremities, would be the first to suffer from the results; though I have heard that some of them are thinking, if Austria and Prussia should hang back, of a new Confederation of the Rhine under the protection of France!! I cannot for a moment believe, even in their present excited state, in such a suicidal insanity!

Forgive me if, in the frankness of a strictly private and confidential letter, I have expressed myself too strongly. I regret more than I can say what appears to be the discrepancy of our views; but I will not abandon the hope that means may even yet be found to escape the calamities of war, notwithstanding the vacillating, and at the same time offensive, course of Lord Russell's diplomacy. Believe me, &c. DERBY.

Count Vitzthum to Earl Derby.

Private. London: Jan. 13, 1864.

DEAR LORD DERBY,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your kind letter of the 10th with deepfelt gratitude. Frankness in a case like this is real kindness. I took it as such. I have nothing to forgive, only to thank. If there is yet any chance of peace, it lies in the hope that the statesmen of England will take the trouble of mastering that complicated question in all its tiresome details, in order to arrive at a clear, unbiassed, and unprejudiced view of the case. I venture to hope they will then come to the conclusion that the best they can do is to leave it alone, in order to 'localise' the war, if—what God forbid!—war is to be.

I certainly do not feel competent to enter into a controversial discussion of such a question with a statesman of your power, with the greatest orator of the British Parliament, not to say of our age.

Laying confidentially before you the correspondence which had passed between our Governments, my object was not to complain of her Majesty's Ministers or to criticise their conduct. My object was to forward to you a fair and genuine *exposé* of the views entertained, not only by the Saxon Government, but by the overwhelming majority of the German nation. Saxony is a small unit, but in that case may be taken as *pars pro toto*. The Government are what you would call 'Liberal-Conservatives.' They have just been able to reduce considerably the taxes and to increase at the same time the salaries of the public servants up to 25 per cent. Saxony, if an island, would be a 'happy island.' We cling to the peculiarities of our race as all the German races do; we are

devoted to our dynasty which has ruled over us for a thousand years. Foreigners are often mistaken: the Germans are fond of their Princes, and cannot do without them; just as the English are fond of their Lords, in spite of Messrs. Cobden and Bright. Still, there are certain things those Princes cannot do, not more than your Lordships can. They cannot run against the tide of national movement such as we have not seen since 1813. They are between two dangers: a war or a revolution; all of them, from the Emperor of Austria down to the Prince of Liechtenstein. This is a sad, but a sober truth. You may depend upon it, the minor German States are wide awake just now; they know quite as well as you do that their existence is at stake. No childish wish to court popularity, no foolish desire to make political capital out of this unfortunate quarrel, have determined their course. You are quite right in disbelieving the story of a new Confederation of the Rhine under French protection. Nobody dreams of such a suicidal insanity in Germany. The times are past when such things were possible. Heaven be thanked! No Minister would be able to keep power for a single day, could he even be suspected of such a folly, which would be looked upon as an act of high treason. There is, it is true, a good deal of nonsensical excitement and perhaps even of criminal agitation on the surface; but there is also a not-to-be-mistaken undercurrent of a sober and genuine public feeling against every sort of foreign interference. People look upon the London Treaty as an act of foreign dictation. It was the Emperor Nicholas, they say, who dictated that arrangement when on the height of his power, when Austria had, in an unfortunate hour, been induced to accept his assistance, when Prussia lay at his feet in a state of utter prostration after having returned from Olmütz. The Russian diplomacy,

they say, frightened Lord Palmerston out of his wits, by inventing some unfounded claim which Russia might perhaps put forward some day in order to secure the Gottorp part of Holstein and the harbour of Kiel; and they invented also the phrase of the 'integrity' of Denmark being a necessity for the balance of power in the north of Europe. A monarchy of two millions and a half, a European necessity!? . . .

'Well!' the English answer; 'but, after all, Austria and Prussia signed the treaty, and they at least, if not Germany, are bound by it.'

Allow me, in the first place, to state as a fact which is openly admitted by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, that Austria and Prussia signed the Treaty of 1852 on their own account, and not as plenipotentiaries of the German Confederation, and that they never brought it before the Diet. I may add that you would scarcely find any statesman, either at Vienna or at Berlin, who would not acknowledge that Austria and Prussia had no business to sign that treaty, and that, if it were to be done again, they certainly would not do it. The conduct of the Great German Powers is only to be understood in bearing in mind their, may I say, amphibious position as European and as German Powers. I think you will find therein the key to the whole complication.—*But* 'why had they no business to sign that treaty?' Our answer is: because that treaty is inconsistent with the fundamental laws of the German Confederation: because the Federal Act of 1815 and the Final Act of 1820 are, at all events, older engagements than the Treaty of 1852; and, if this treaty is inconsistent with those former engagements (because the German law does not admit that the order of succession in a German State can be altered without the

assent of the Agnates and of the Estates)—why, Austria and Prussia have placed themselves in the dilemma: either to repudiate the treaty, or repudiate their former engagements, viz., to break the Federal Constitution.

With regard to the doubt, whether the want of the consent of the Estates of Holstein—though desirable—could invalidate a European transaction, allow me to explain our view by a fair analogy. Supposing, for argument sake, William IV. and his Hanoverian advisers had arrived at the conviction that it would be in the interest of the Kingdom of Hanover never to be separated from England; supposing the King, in order to secure that object, had persuaded one of his Hanoverian Ministers to sign a treaty with some foreign Powers, a treaty by which those Powers would declare the 'integrity' of the British Hanoverian Empire and the introduction of Salic law in England to be a matter of European interest: do you think the British Parliament would have been bound to acknowledge such a treaty? Do you believe the Duke of Cumberland, in whose favour the supposed treaty would have been made altering the lawful order of succession in Great Britain, would have had the remotest chance of being recognised by the Lords and Commons of England as their legitimate Sovereign? Why, I think in such a case as this you would have been the first to rise and to denounce such a treaty as utterly null and void because the British Parliament had not been consulted! I know very well this is assuming practical impossibilities, but I come to the point. And the point is this: that right is right, and that there cannot be two rights and measures, as far as right is concerned, for Great Britain and Holstein. Should it become the fashion in Europe to act on the doctrine that international law is only made for those who are strong enough to take care of

themselves, and that those who are not are obliged to accept meekly without any protest nor opposition what five or six stronger Powers have settled between themselves, without consulting the interests of those who are lawfully concerned; then there would soon be an end of international law altogether, there would be a state of perpetual war and violence, of bloodshed and anarchy, and the Cimbers and Teutons would not be wanting from without to achieve the destruction of our much-boasted-of civilisation.

The question of the assents is the real question at issue. It is this question of right against might which has stirred up the dormant national feeling in Germany; and the minor States, in defending the rights of the Duchies against what they call 'foreign interference,' are convinced that they defend their own rights; they feel that it would be suicidal to leave that defence to the democrats, the *Turners*, and the National-Verein. All this may appear very strange to strangers. Still, I think you will find that I did my best—in a language which is not my own—to explain to you the things as they are. I will not deny that strong objections may be put against those views. But that is not the question now. The question is: what are the views of the overwhelming majority of the German nation? And I do not think your diplomacy well informed on that point. If they were, they would above all avoid threats in order not to be told, as Baron Beust has been obliged to tell, or, in fact, to write, to Mr. Murray: 'que pour tout Gouvernement jaloux de son honneur et de sa dignité, il serait difficile à imaginer un moyen plus efficace pour lui faire braver les conséquences d'une décision dictée par le sentiment du devoir, que ne l'est l'emploi de la menace.'

This unfortunate question has been dreadfully mismanaged;

and I think everybody who meddled with it has been more or less to blame. I am not for Shylock's 'pound of flesh' doctrine, but that I must say, until now the German Duchies have not even received from Denmark a fair offer of compensation. Nobody has said to them: 'For thy three thousand ducats, here are six,' and so it is natural enough that they want their 'pound of flesh,' viz. the separation.

I have never been able to get a sensible answer to the question what it can matter to England whether Denmark keeps the Duchies or not?

The insignificance of the object appears to me self-evident. The Spanish succession, the Austrian succession, the 'integrity' of the Ottoman Empire may justify a European war. But the Danish succession, the 'integrity' of an Empire of two millions and a half?—As long as you keep out of the quarrel, France will; as soon as you move, she will. In that case, you expose Antwerp to save Copenhagen! Peace and war, in a European sense, depend entirely on you. The whole imbroglio will remain a storm in a tea-pot as long as you keep quiet. The danger is, I think, the weakness of the present Government. They may be driven drifting into war by a single speech of your lordship.

Excuse this long letter and all my sins against the Queen's English. Whatever its faults may be, it has been written by a lover of peace and truth and by a faithful admirer of your Lordship. Believe me, &c.

VITZTHUM.

London: Jan. 22, 1864.

The publication of Baron Beust's despatch of the 29th of last December, and of my letter, enclosing it, to Lord Russell, has made the desired impression in German and English

circles in this country. The logic of our argument against the validity of the London Treaty has nowhere been contested, but on the contrary approved. The feeling in official circles has, it is true, remained unchanged. A proof of this is the letter published in to-day's 'Times' from Lord Robert Cecil, the author of the article in the 'Quarterly Review.' I shall not forget to refute the errors contained in this statement. Meanwhile, I am receiving daily through the post anonymous communications, testifying to the growing sympathy of the British public, and showing that the view we have taken meets in various quarters with approval.

The letter of a Mr. Fenton to the Editor of the 'Dewsbury Reporter' of the 12th of January, 1863, is a protest suggested by the British sense of justice against the European *coup de main* attempted by the London Treaty. The reader is reminded of an attack on the treaty made in the House of Commons in 1861 by Lord Robert Montagu, brother of the Duke of Manchester. A 'count-out,' arranged by Lord Palmerston with the leader of the Opposition, silenced on that occasion the youthful champion of the rights of the Duchies. When Parliament reassembles, I shall place some of our batteries at the disposal of our Tory friend, which I hope he will bring to bear against the Government in a full house. Another pamphlet, entitled 'Reasons for abrogating the Treaty of London of May 8, 1852,' emanates from the Lancashire Foreign Affairs Committee, formed under the presidency of Mr. David Urquhart. The latter, a passionate enemy of Russia and Lord Palmerston, has been for years accusing the Prime Minister of a secret understanding with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The London Treaty gave him a welcome means of establishing this favourite charge. Urquhart has studied the official documents, and his statement explaining why the

Treaty of 1852 is null and void shows the impartiality of his judgment. He has published, moreover, the answers given by Clarendon and Palmerston to various questions put in Parliament, together with a correspondence with Lord Malmesbury, and a prophetic memorandum stated to have been presented by Baron Usedom to the King of Prussia on February 4, 1851.

Sir Augustus Paget telegraphed two days ago that Christian IX. had resolved to recommend to the Rigsraad the repeal of the November Constitution. The delight awakened by this news will soon subside. At any rate, to-day's 'Times' and 'Morning Post' hold very cautious language. The Berlin Correspondence in the City paper is anxiously studied.

In the Austro-Prussian camp it is hoped that the Danes will not resist the passage of the Eider, but withdraw behind the Dannewerke.

Two attempts to settle the question have been mooted. The one—a dynastic union during the lifetime of Christian IX., and then the complete separation of the Duchies under the Augustenburgs—is ascribed to Schmerling. The other seems intended to silence the Prussian Chamber. It proposes to hand over Holstein to Prussia, who is to compensate the Augustenburgs and renounce all claims to Schleswig.

In official circles the greatest satisfaction is expressed at the proceedings of Austria and Prussia, and yet those very proceedings are only increasing the danger of war.

Lord R. Cecil upon Germany and Denmark.

To the Editor of the Times.[1]

Sir,—I regret that in consequence of absence from town I have not been able sooner to reply to the letter which Dr. Forchhammer, Professor of the University of Kiel, has addressed to you in reference

[1] Published in the *Times* of January 22, 1864.

to some remarks of mine that appeared in your columns. Much, however, of his letter does not require further discussion, inasmuch as it has been fully answered by your correspondent 'H. T. P.' Much, also, of the Professor's letter is beside the questions at issue. The grievances under which he alleges that the Schleswigers suffer, the restraints upon their press and upon their right of meeting, may or may not be well founded. This may be the fault of the Danish Government or of the German Opposition; but in any case they are not matters of international complaint. Denmark has not promised to Germany that she will give the Schleswigers a free press; and, except in those cases in which Denmark has bound herself by positive promises to govern Schleswig in a particular manner, no foreign Government has the shadow of a right to interfere in the internal politics of that Duchy. The Germans have, or believe themselves to have, a right to protest against all laws which favour the Danish Schleswiger to the disadvantage of the German Schleswiger. But that right exists, if at all, only by virtue of certain stipulations which were alleged to have been made in 1852. This limited right does not give the German Powers any sort of title to interfere in respect to other laws which they may or may not approve, but which apply to Dane and German equally. If, indeed, the German Powers are entering upon a general crusade for the freedom of the press and the freedom of association, they may not pay much regard to the limitations of their legal right; but in that case it would be better to begin with their own race in Livonia or Alsace, and they may even find a profitable field for their efforts within the limits of the Confederation itself.

At a moment when war is impending, the only questions of interest are those out of which, in appearance at least, it is likely to arise. The Diet goes to war to defeat the Treaty of London; Austria and Prussia go to war to defeat the Constitution of November last; and these two points are, therefore, the only ones that are of importance now. Professor Forchhammer's mode of dealing with the Treaty of London is very popular in Germany, but it is absolutely unintelligible in England. He simply inveighs against that treaty, and appears to imagine that when he has done so he has made it less binding on those who signed it. The Treaty is attacked because it was concluded without the assent of the Diet, of the Assemblies of the Duchies, and of a certain number of the Agnates. There was a good reason for the omission in each case. The Diet was not consulted, because Austria and Prussia, who did sign the treaty, were at the time its mandatories in respect to the

affairs of Holstein, and the idea of a Diet which should set Austria and Prussia at defiance had not occurred to the statesmen of that day. The Assemblies of the Duchies were not consulted, because they were provincial bodies, of modern origin, and of a competence strictly limited by their charters, which gave them no authority to deal with questions of succession. The mass of the Agnates were not consulted, because the Duke of Augustenburg, who stood first in that line of succession, had renounced his claim for a large sum of money; and his renunciation was held, according to certain well-known European precedents, to be abundantly sufficient to bar those who claimed through him. It is not sufficiently remembered upon the German side that but for this rule the Emperor of Russia would be the rightful heir of Kiel. Either an heir, by renouncing his claim, can bind those who claim through him, or he cannot. If he can, then the renunciation made by the Duke of Augustenburg in 1852 bars his son Prince Frederick. If he cannot, then the renunciation of his undoubted right to Kiel made by the Emperor Paul, in 1773, does not injure the title of the present Emperor Alexander. Either way Prince Frederick has no right to the homage of Professor Forchhammer at Kiel. Every Englishman must concur in the strong language which your correspondent 'H. T. P.' has used with respect to the conduct the pretender and his father have jointly pursued in the matter of this renunciation. 'We promise for us and our family, by our princely word and honour, not in any way to counteract the resolutions which his Majesty may have taken, or in future might take, in reference to the arrangement of the succession to all the lands now united under his Majesty's sceptre.' So wrote the Duke of Augustenburg in 1852, and received full payment for the promise. In 1863 he executes an act of renunciation in favour of his son, specially for the purpose of enabling that son to upset the succession which eleven years before he had pledged himself 'not to counteract.' He receives money in consideration of a special promise; he breaks the promise, but he does not refund the money. If 'the Germans of moral character,' to whom Professor Forchhammer appeals, approve this mode of dealing with a 'princely word of honour,' I can only express my surprise.

Even, however, if these objections were as strong as they are weak, they would be worthless now. The fact that the consent of the Diets, the Estates, and the mass of the Agnates had not been obtained was as patent in 1852 as it is now. Austria, Prussia, Würtemberg, and Hanover knew of it as well as they do now; and

yet they signed or adhered to a treaty in which those consents are not so much as mentioned. If they may now plead an alleged omission, which they carefully forebore to notice then, as a ground for dishonouring their signatures, no security can be attached for the future to any international obligations. There is no treaty in existence about which it may not be pretended that some adhesion was not obtained which ought to have been obtained.

The last point noticed by Dr. Forchhammer is, perhaps, the most important, as it is the one upon which Austria and Prussia have elected to go to war. The assertion that the Constitution of November last 'tends to incorporate' Schleswig with Denmark is constantly made, but the exact point in which this tendency appears is never specified. No attempt has been made to define this momentous word 'incorporate,' upon which the issues of peace and war are made to turn. There are several degrees of combination in which two different communities constitutionally governed may exist together under the same Sovereign; and these degrees are marked by the relative position of the legislative bodies in each. There is the purely dynastic union, where each community has its own Legislature, co-ordinate and independent. There is the Federal system, where common affairs are managed by a common assembly, and provincial affairs by a provincial assembly, each being within the limits of its own competence independent and self-subsisting. There is the anomalous system of our own empire, in which one supreme Parliament controls a cluster of subordinate Parliaments; and, lastly, there is the complete combination to which the metaphor 'incorporation' is more properly applied, and which takes place when the local or subordinate assembly is altogether superseded, and the central Parliament assumes the entire government. The Irish Union is a case in point. The second of these—the Federal system—is that which is sanctioned by the Constitution of November. The provincial Parliament of Schleswig is independent, and within its own sphere supreme. The tie that binds Denmark to Schleswig could only be made looser than it is by converting it into a purely dynastic union; and no one can read the correspondence of 1851–52 without seeing that a dynastic union was the last arrangement contemplated under those engagements. A common assembly for common affairs, and local assemblies for local affairs, is the brief description of the scheme sketched out in that correspondence; and it is also a true description of the Constitution of November. Austria and Prussia have not pointed out what the objections are which they take to that measure, nor

have they stated in what other way they require that the relations between Denmark and Schleswig shall be adjusted. They are going to war, in short, for a vague metaphor which they refuse to define, and in order to establish a state of things in Schleswig the nature of which as yet they are not able to describe. And they attach so much importance to these objects that they decline to forego them even for a few weeks till a European Conference can decide upon them! Under such circumstances it is not to be wondered at that their sincerity is regarded with suspicion.

I have the honour to be, your obedient servant,

ROBERT G. CECIL.

January 21, 1864.

Count Vitzthum to the Editor of the Times.[1]

GERMANY AND DENMARK.

SIR,—Lord R. Cecil's letter, which you printed in the 'Times' to-day, contains assertions so utterly inconsistent with the facts that, in the interests of truth, you will allow me to point out some of the most glaring errors, which, if not contradicted, might prevent your readers arriving at a fair and unprejudiced view of the case. I trust the noble Lord himself, who, unwittingly, and in perfect good faith, I am sure, has committed these errors, will admit the fairness and, upon enquiry, the truth of the following corrections:—

1. Austria and Prussia did not act as mandatories of the German Diet, when they signed, on May 8, 1852, the Treaty of London. Both signed that Treaty on their own account as European Powers. No Austrian, no Prussian statesman has ever thought of denying this fact.

2. The Diet was not consulted, because the signataries had every reason to doubt whether they would be able to carry the consent of that body to an arrangement which is considered as utterly inconsistent, not only with German, but with inter-

[1] Published in the *Times* of January 23, 1864.

national law, because the assents of the interested parties have not been obtained.

3. The claim of Russia with reference to certain parts of Holstein (the so-called 'Gottorpsche Antheil,' including Kiel) is not recognised in Germany as founded in law, because, in consequence of the negotiations (of 1750–73), the Imperial House of Holstein-Gottorp, which now reigns over Russia, have exchanged their claims on the 'Gottorpsche Antheil' against the counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst. Should they desire to rescind that arrangement, and revive their title with regard to certain parts of Holstein, they would be obliged to restore the equivalent which they received for it—viz. the dominions of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. This they cannot do, because the Grand Duke, according to the Treaty of Vienna, has become a Sovereign Prince, perfectly independent of his cousin, the Emperor Alexander. This will be sufficient to show that the pretensions of Russia, assumed in the Protocol of Warsaw, will be found, after further investigation, utterly abrogated by the Treaties of Vienna.

4. The Duke of Augustenburg by his declaration, or, as it is wrongly called, his 'renunciation,' could never bind his eldest son, for the simple reason that this son was of age already in 1852. To make the Duke's 'renunciation' lawfully binding on Prince Frederick the assent of the latter was wanted. The Danish Government, by an oversight which would appear strange, were this the only fault of omission they committed, have never thought of asking Prince Frederick's adhesion, and he has never put his name to any paper which could be possibly interpreted as an adhesion or an assent to his father's 'renunciation.' If a British peer were to dispose of his entailed property, or even of his rights and expectations to an entailed property, which some day may be

obtained by him, without the consent of his son, this son being of age, would such an arrangement be perfect and binding on the son, according to English law? I do not know; but what I do know is that, according to German law, it would be utterly null and void, as far as the son's title and birthright are concerned, provided he had been of age 'at the time' when his father thought fit to dispose of his inheritance or his expectations.

5. The Duke of Augustenburg has never 'received full payment for the promise' not to counteract the arrangements made for the Danish succession. The money which he received has never been considered, not even by Frederick VII. and his advisers, as an equivalent for any promise, but as an *indemnity for the estates which were the private property* of the Duke, and which the Danish Government compelled him to sell in a given time, for the same reasons of political expediency which induced the present French Government some years ago to compel the Orleans Princes to sell their private estates in France. The Danish Crown *bought land and no promise*. If King Christian IX. would consent to restore these estates to the rightful owner, the House of Augustenburg would be too happy to recoup his Majesty by paying back the comparatively very scanty indemnity which the Duke received in 1852.

I know very well the common report, which says that the Duke was a 'rebel,' and that as such the King of Denmark had 'confiscated' his property. *Væ victis!* But I think there are in these happy islands many who, if they knew the true history of this 'rebellion,' would exclaim with Cato, '*Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*' The fact is, that there has never been a judgment against the Duke, and that the whole accusation rests upon *ex parte* statements of the

Danish Government, who had the power, but certainly not the right, of confiscating the private property of a princely house connected with the reigning Sovereign.

I inclose my card, though my name would give no more weight to the foregoing statement, which is based on facts undisputed, as will be easily ascertained.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

AUDIATUR ET ALTERA PARS.

January 22, 1864.

Count Vitzthum to Lord Robert Montagu.

Hobart Place, January 23, 1864.

DEAR LORD R. MONTAGU,—Allow me to call your attention to a letter which appeared this morning in the 'Times' under the signature 'Audiatur et altera pars.' This letter refutes the most glaring errors of Lord R. Cecil's composition which was printed in yesterday's 'Times.' Still, there is an assertion of Lord R. Cecil which has been left unanswered, viz. 'The Assemblies of the Duchies were not consulted, because they were provincial bodies, of modern origin, and of a competence strictly limited by their charters which gave them no authority to deal with questions of succession.'

Every word of this paragraph is an error. The Assemblies of the Duchies were not consulted, because the Danish democrats, who ruled over the King and the State of Denmark, knew perfectly well that the Estates of Schleswig and Holstein would never be fools enough to commit the suicidal insanity of accepting the London Treaty. These Assemblies were not more nor less 'provincial bodies' than the Rigsraad of Copenhagen where Denmark proper is exclusively represented. To state that the Estates of Schleswig and Holstein are of 'modern origin'

and had no competence nor authority 'to deal with questions of succession' shows only that the writer has not taken the trouble of studying the question. He would have found that a Parliament which actually exercised its competence and authority, not only to deal with, but to decide *proprio motu* the question of succession in 1460 (in the time of Richard of York), can scarcely be looked upon as one of 'modern origin.'

If the Estates of Schleswig and Holstein (the Knights, Prelates, and Cities, as they are called) had not had the 'competence' and the 'authority' which Lord R. Cecil contests, why, the title of the reigning House of Oldenburg would be forfeited, because the Holsteiners and Schleswigers elected Christian I. (of Oldenburg), King of Denmark, to be their Duke, and he—the forefather of all the Holstein branches now living—confirmed the rights and privileges of those 'provincial bodies of modern origin' by a letter patent, which goes under the name 'Die tapfere Verbesserung,' and recognised therein expressly their right to elect another male member of the reigning house, should the heir object to taking the oath which he, King Christian, as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein took to uphold and to protect the ancient privileges of the Estates.

We have not forgotten in Germany the chivalrous speech you made in June 1861 in favour of the rights of the Duchies when you denounced the London Treaty as the London conspiracy, and when a 'count-out' was found to be the only means of silencing the champion of right against might. I trust that this year you will find a full house to listen to your manly speeches in favour of a good cause.

Should you want facts, dates, documents, I have an arsenal at your service. For the moment I think a little skirmishing with Lord R. Cecil would do no harm, and I am certain the

'Times' would be most happy to print a statement of yours based on the facts which I have taken the liberty to recall to your mind.

Yours very truly,

VITZTHUM.

Lord Robert Montagu to Count Vitzthum.

January 24, 1864.

MY DEAR COUNT VITZTHUM,—I wrote yesterday, in a very hurried manner, an answer to Lord Robert Cecil's letter which I had just seen. In my haste the passage to which you allude escaped my notice; although the error attracted my attention when I first read his letter. I have therefore sent a short P.S. to the 'Times' Office. I fear they will not print my letter, as I am no favourite with the Editor. As far as I can make out from the Blue-books, the Duchies (and Germany) do not desire to break the treaty, if only the ancient rights of the Duchies be preserved and their autonomy maintained.

I am sorry that I missed the honour of seeing you when you called. Any information that you may consent to give me, I shall be most thankful to receive.

Yours very faithfully,

ROBERT MONTAGU.

GERMANY AND DENMARK.

To the Editor of the Times.[1]

SIR,—I had barely two hours after reading the letter of 'Audiatur' in your impression of yesterday, and that of Lord Robert Cecil in the preceding number, to write a few remarks on the inaccuracies which they contained.

In my haste a most serious error in Lord Robert Cecil's letter escaped my attention. He says: 'The Assemblies of the Duchies were not consulted, because they were provincial bodies, of modern origin, and of a competence strictly limited by their charters, which gave them no authority to deal with questions of succession.' Of modern origin! They are of as ancient an origin as our House of Commons. In 1460 they, of their free and absolute authority,

[1] Published in the *Times* of January 25, 1864.

determined the succession to their throne. What 'charters' can Lord R. Cecil be thinking of? When they elected Christian I. they required no charter to authorise them; their 'competence' was not then strictly limited to paltry provincial matters. From Christian I. the Kings of Denmark, the Augustenburgs, and the Glücksburgs have descended. From him the Kings of Sweden derived their origin, and the Emperor of Russia has come down. Yet Christian I. had to wait, cap in hand, for the free election of those maligned and contemned Diets. Had it not been for the assemblies of the Duchies, where would have been the Kingdom of Denmark and the rival claimants to the throne?

When Christian I. had obtained the desired boon he swore to maintain the ancient rights of those Duchies, and every King since his day has taken the same oath, and sworn to maintain their authority. Now they are set aside as of 'modern origin, and strictly limited competence.'

If you will be good enough to append this as a P.S. to my letter of yesterday evening, or if you will grant it a place in a succeeding number, you will oblige

Your obedient servant,

ROBERT MONTAGU.

January 24, 1864.

LORD R. CECIL UPON GERMANY AND DENMARK.

To the Editor of the Times.[1]

SIR,—Your correspondent who signs himself 'Audiatur et altera pars' accuses me of 'glaring errors' and of 'assertions utterly inconsistent with the facts.' So grave a charge must be my excuse for again troubling you with a demand upon your space, which I have already taxed so heavily. The statements which have been impugned are based upon well-known documents. It will not be necessary that I should quote them at length. A brief reference to them will suffice to satisfy your readers that my assertions are quite consistent with the facts, and that the error is not on my side.

1. His first correction rests upon a misapprehension of my meaning. I did not say that Austria and Prussia signed the Treaty of London on behalf of the German Diet. What I did say was that when Austria and Prussia signed the treaty they were mandatories

[1] Published in the *Times* of January 25, 1864.

of the Diet in regard to the affairs of Holstein, and that that fact, joined to the then undisputed supremacy of those two States in the Diet, presented to the non-German Powers a sufficient reason for considering that it was superfluous to consult the Diet formally. I do not quite understand whether your correspondent doubts that Austria and Prussia were mandatories of the Diet in regard to the affairs of Holstein at the time the treaty was signed. If so, I can only refer him to the Federal resolution of two months later (July 29, 1852), by which that mandate was formally terminated.

2. The reason which induced the Great Powers not to associate the Confederation with themselves in the Treaty of London may be a matter of conjecture; but the reason which prevented Denmark from asking for its accession at the time that she asked for that of the other smaller Powers is on record. It was simply that England declined to assent to her doing so. In the circular of the Danish Minister, M. Bluhme, of September 9, 1852, the following passage occurs:—

'The Confederation is not to be found among the States enumerated in the inclosed list, because there is reason to believe that, in reference to the invitation of that political body, the contracting Powers will be less unanimously agreed. According to information recently received from the King's Minister in London, it appears certain that the British Government, which looks upon a simple notification as sufficient, will refuse to apply for the accession of the Germanic Confederation.'

Simple notification, it must be observed, was the course taken towards the least important Powers. The British Minister of the day probably acted from mere considerations of international etiquette; but, whatever his motive, it certainly could not at that time have been, as your correspondent has imagined, any fear that the Diet would reject a proposal upon which Austria and Prussia were agreed.

3. Your correspondent writes to expose my 'glaring errors,' and among them he enumerates my statement that Russia, under certain contingencies, has a claim to Kiel—a claim which he says 'is not recognised in Germany.' I must decline to admit that every fact which is not recognised in Germany is a 'glaring error.' It is a point of at least equal importance that the claim is very strenuously upheld in Russia, as the readers of recent telegrams may have observed. That either of the disputants for the right to so good a harbour as Kiel should 'recognise' the title of the other is an amount of impartiality which few will be unreasonable enough to

expect. The dispute upon this matter is a complicated one, like all that belong to this case.

The material point of it is that the Emperor Paul (then Crown Prince) in 1773 ceded his portion of Holstein, not to the Kings of Denmark generally, but only to Christian VII. and his brother Frederick, and their male descendants. Their lineage is now extinct. It seems to be an inevitable result that the cession, which was made only to those descendants, has ceased to be operative. If so, the right to Kiel and some other parts of Holstein reverts to the Emperor Alexander, the heir of Paul. By the Protocol of Warsaw that right is renounced in favour of the present King and his male heirs. But the protocol expressly provides that if the arrangement by which King Christian was to inherit the whole Danish monarchy should fail, the renunciation of Russia would cease to be obligatory.

4. The next 'glaring error' of which your correspondent accuses me is the opinion that the Duke of Augustenburg, in renouncing his own rights, could bind those who claimed through him. I can only plead that I sinned in good company, for the same view was taken by the Powers who negotiated the arrangements of 1852, and especially by Prussia, who procured the renunciation from the Duke. Nay, I think I can appeal to a higher authority still. The same view must have been taken by the Duke himself when he wrote the words, 'We promise for us and our family not to counteract the resolutions which his Majesty may take in reference to the arrangement of the succession.' Your correspondent appears to me to have placed the Duke in a painful dilemma. Either the Duke did believe that he could bind his family when he wrote those words, in which case he was guilty of a 'glaring error,' or he did not believe it, in which case he was guilty of a gross fraud. But, at any rate, whether he could bind his son or not, he could certainly bind himself. He did bind himself not to aid any one in disturbing the succession. Had he adhered loyally to his promise he would have refused to make any renunciation in favour of his son, and then Prince Frederick would not have had a shadow of a claim during his father's lifetime. In reference to the legal argument of your correspondent, I need hardly observe that his appeal to the English law of entail is very wide of the question. The case must be argued upon European precedents, and not upon English statute law. I need not enter into a question which has been so abundantly discussed. The most important case bearing upon the question, whether a renouncing claimant can bar those who claim

through him, is the renunciation of Philip V. at the Peace of Utrecht, and the tendency of that case is directly adverse to the modern German view.

5. The next 'assertion utterly inconsistent with facts' of which I have been guilty is that the money paid to the Duke was paid in consideration of his renunciation. Your correspondent must have forgotten the terms of the instrument (December 30, 1852) in which the renunciation is contained. The first two sections refer mainly to the cession of landed property; the third section contains the promise not to counteract the new arrangements for the succession, which has been so often quoted. The fourth section then runs as follows:—

'The before-cited cession and transfer of our own rights to the before-cited ducal possessions, &c., as well as the obligations, promises, and assurances before mentioned, undertaken by us towards his Majesty, have been accepted by his Majesty the King for himself and his royal successors to the crown; and he has on his side promised to us, for himself and his royal successors to the crown, the following terms.'

Then follows a list of the money payments to be made to the Duke. It requires no argument to prove that not only the cessions of land, but also the promises and obligations mentioned in the first part of the section, together constitute the consideration for the money promised in the second.

I need not go further for the purpose of showing what grounds your correspondent has for charging me with 'glaring errors' and 'assertions utterly inconsistent with facts.' I should not have troubled you with an answer to him at this length, but that I am inclined to surmise from internal evidence that he is peculiarly entitled to take a zealous interest in the cause of the House of Augustenburg. I have only to apologise to you for the space I have unwillingly occupied in this reply, and am

Your obedient servant,

ROBERT G. CECIL.

January 23, 1864.

Count Vitzthum to the Editor of the Times.[1]

GERMANY AND DENMARK.

SIR,—In pointing out to you the other day some of the errors which every one who knows something about the question of the day will have detected in Lord R. Cecil's letter of the 21st inst., my object was certainly not to make any personal attack on his Lordship, or to wound his feelings in any way. My object was to serve, in my humble way, a good cause—the cause of peace, which the 'Times' defends so ably and so powerfully, let us still hope so successfully—in its columns.

With regard to the points at issue, a short commentary on Lord R. Cecil's reply will be sufficient to show that there is still something to say on the other side of the question.

1. The serious German complication which sprang out of the Danish dispute turns on the fact which I stated, that Austria and Prussia did not act as mandatories of the German Confederation when they signed the London Treaty. The consequence was that the new order of succession which that treaty endeavoured to create for the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg has until this day never been acknowledged, not even (until a few days ago, when Sir A. Malet forwarded a copy of the treaty by a Note to the Federal President) officially known by the German Diet. Whether Austria and Prussia had full powers from the Diet for other definite negotiations respecting Holstein; whether those full powers expired in July or in May, 1852; and whether other Powers fancied that Austria and Prussia acted as mandatories of the Confederation, all this is perfectly irrelevant, and has

[1] Published in the *Times* of January 29, 1864.

no bearing whatever on the important fact that those two German Powers signed with other Powers a treaty contemplating, for a certain contingeney of the future, a new order of succession to be established in a German country without the knowledge, without the authority, and without the full powers of the German Confederation.

2. It pleases Lord R. Cecil to sneer at the Diet, to pooh-pooh the notion that, where the vital interests of a German country are concerned, the central organ of a nation of 40,000,000 to 45,000,000 ought to have been consulted in order to make such an arrangement lawfully binding on Germany. I may tell the noble Lord that he will scarcely find any statesman in England, with some practical knowledge of what is going on just now in Europe, who does not deeply regret, if not deplore, that the German Diet has not been consulted; that, legally and technically, the Treaty of London does not exist for Germany; and that the Danish succession, so far as the Duchies are concerned, is still an open question, and cannot but be considered by every German statesman as an open question as long as the Diet has not assented. I may tell him, also, that there is in Germany, as far as I know, no statesman worthy of that name who does not deplore that the imbroglio brought about by this embryo of a treaty has not been avoided by the Danish Government, who by a wiser policy would have found means of conciliating in time the German subjects of the late King. The British Government—let me say this for the honour of a statesman who held the seals of the Foreign Office for a few days only—has not been blind to the danger, which Lord R. Cecil appears still unable to detect, of not consulting the German Diet, and of not binding Germany to that treaty. There will be found somewhere in the pigeon-holes of the Foreign Office

the draft of a despatch which was addressed simultaneously to Vienna and to Berlin, urging Austria and Prussia to lay the London Treaty before the German Diet. And why did Austria and Prussia not act upon that wise and friendly advice? Was it not their own interest to do so, in order to legalise the somewhat irregular course they had taken? Undoubtedly it was. But they could not do it, they could not even think of proposing the legal enactment of that arrangement, because they knew perfectly well that as long as all the Agnates and the Estates of Schleswig and Holstein had not given their assent it would have been out of the question to expect the assent of the German Diet.

3. With regard to the Russian claim, the future will show who is better informed, Lord R. Cecil or myself. All I can say is that newspaper telegrams are not evidence enough for those who happen to know something about the question to induce them to fear that Russia, in the face of certain documents discovered lately, at Kiel I think, and of certain others which are carefully preserved in the State archives of a Northern German State, will seriously bring forward claims which, if they were ever submitted to a British lawyer, would be dismissed as utterly worthless.

4. I have no pretension to judge the Duke of Augustenburg, and I trust the noble Lord will fairly admit that there may be still some family documents which might not have been communicated to Lord R. Cecil, and which, if known by him, might perhaps compel him to pass a milder judgment on a foreign prince, belonging to a house connected with almost all the reigning families of Europe. At all events, the Duke of Augustenburg is beside the question. His acts, intentions, motives have nothing whatever to do with the rights of his son. Prince Frederick was of age when his father signed his

declaration without his son's consent. Every German lawyer would have told the Danish Government that any declaration of the Duke could not be binding on the son, being of age. If they have neglected to demand his assent, as they have done, they have only to blame their own carelessness.

5. With regard to the last point, I accept Lord R. Cecil's admission of the 23rd that 'cessions of land' were, after all, made by the Duke of Augustenburg, as refuting the assertions of the letter of the 21st, which said that the Duke 'renounced his claim for a large sum of money,' and 'that he received full payment for a promise,' without mentioning the fact that, besides a 'claim' and a 'promise,' some estates were thrown into the bargain, estates which, if sold to-day, would fetch certainly more than the Duke received according to the arrangement of December 1852.

I may be allowed to add that the noble Lord is wrong in surmising 'that I am particularly entitled to take a zealous interest in the House of Augustenburg.' I have not the honour of knowing either the Duke or the Prince; I have nothing to lose by that cause, and it is to me personally a matter of perfect indifference whether the German Diet finally recognise Frederick VIII. or Christian IX. as Duke of Schleswig and Holstein, this being still, as far as I know, an open question.

I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

AUDIATUR ET ALTERA PARS.

January 27, 1864.

London: January 24, 1864.

Another Cabinet Council was held yesterday, after the return of Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell to town. The circular of inquiry to the co-signataries of the London Treaty,

which was agreed to at the last meeting but one, seems to have been framed in more peremptory terms than Count Bernstorff supposed.[1] Latour d'Auvergne states that the English Ministers had not forgotten to dot their i's, and had asked all the co-signataries whether they were prepared to uphold by force the integrity of Denmark as stipulated in the Treaty of 1852, in case the Diet should insist on the separation of the Duchies. The French Ambassador remarked: 'Inasmuch as Austria and Prussia are on the point of crossing the Eider, each of those two Powers will say No to that question. I need hardly assure you that we shall not say Yes. Baron Brunnow, the *chef-rédacteur* of the London Treaty, is doing his best to save the child of his bosom. But that the Emperor of Russia should feel inclined to defend by force of arms Brunnow's phrase of Danish integrity, I should think extremely improbable. There remains Sweden. But the enthusiasm of this northern neighbour of Denmark has sensibly cooled, and even she, after full consideration, would very likely say No. The British Ministers would then say to their Parliament: "We have knocked at every door, but not one of the co-signataries thinks the Treaty worth wasting powder and shot upon it. We can, therefore, do nothing but leave the Danes to their fate."'

This prognostic seems likely to be realised; at any rate, there is nothing in to-day's 'Times' or yesterday's 'Observer' to make one think the contrary.

Doubts are entertained at the Austrian Embassy as to any question of the kind I have mentioned having been addressed to Vienna. This, however, does not prevent the

[1] For this despatch of Earl Russell of January 18, inviting the 'concert and co-operation' of France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden in maintaining the engagements of the Treaty of 1852, see *Correspondence respecting Denmark and Germany*, 1864, part iv. p. 563.—Tr.

possibility of the French news being correct. No diplomatist here is better informed by his Court than Latour d'Auvergne. The British Circular will remain a *coup-d'épee dans l'eau*. The situation turns this evening on the question whether the Danes will resist the crossing of the Eider and offer generally any opposition to the German troops. Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell cannot since yesterday shut their eyes to the certainty that the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin will not wait for the meeting of the Rigsraad, but treat the promised repeal of the November Constitution as an empty feint.

In the Opposition head-quarters I have succeeded to-day in ascertaining that there is the most decided aversion to any interference on the part of England. Both Lady Derby and Mr. Disraeli have complimented me on my letter of the 13th to Lord Derby. Making all due allowance for the conventional phrases of politeness, I am honestly convinced that the views I set forth in that letter have produced a deep and permanent impression far beyond all my expectations. Truth is a power, and the courage to tell the truth never fails to have an influence on men of candour, who, like the Tory chief, are accustomed to take a high view of things.

The favourable tone displayed by the leading article in the 'John Bull'—the favourite paper of the High Tory aristocracy in the country and the clergy—gave me an opportunity of developing my views to Disraeli as follows:—

'The treatment of the Danish affair,' I remarked, 'has been impolitic from the first. Instead of obstinately insisting on the Treaty, your Ministers would have done better, if they wished to save it, to affect a greater indifference on the subject. Through their surpassing zeal on its behalf they have only played into the hands of the French Emperor and made him

wish and work for its repeal. "You yourselves have declared," he will say to them, "that to tear up the London Treaty would mean unsettling everything; the London Treaty is torn up, and accordingly I am not bound by any other." Had the Government, on the contrary, avoided putting any pressure on Vienna and Berlin, and abstained from all menace and interference, my prophecy of the 13th of this month would never have been realised, or at all events would not have been realised as quickly as it has been. As I then predicted, the German Great Powers are now in a fix. They have no choice but to tear up either the London Treaty or the far older treaty of the Bund. It was solely to avoid having a rupture with England and endangering the integrity of Denmark that Austria and Prussia, on the 7th of December last, rejected the otherwise unexceptionable proposal of Saxony. How different things would have been had that unfortunate difference of opinion been avoided. It paralysed the Federal Commissioners from the very beginning. And what have your Ministers gained by their attempt at intimidation? Nothing whatever, not even time. Had the schism been avoided, and a unanimous resolution been passed, the well-known slowness of the Diet would have been useful to the Schleswig-Holstein question. The arbitrary proceeding of Austria and Prussia, so extolled by your Ministers, has only increased the danger of war. Had the Prince of Augustenburg been recognised as Duke of Holstein, it would have remained to be seen in the first instance whether he would expect the Diet to protect him in his real or supposed claims on Schleswig. In the next place those claims would have had to be established, and, finally, the question decided whether the Diet was bound and entitled to assist the Duke of Holstein to his right in a non-German country. Weeks would have passed, and every day

was of importance for the preservation of peace. As matters now stand, war is unavoidable. Christian IX.'s only choice is between armed resistance and revolution. The overwhelming majority in the Austrian as well as in the Prussian Chamber is of our opinion. Rechberg and Bismarck would have been compelled to resign, if they had not resolved to abandon the integrity of Denmark and the London Treaty. The latter is ruined in any case—if there is war, *ipso facto*; and equally, of course, if a change of Ministry takes place at Vienna and Berlin, or if Christian IX. has to renounce his crown of thorns.'

'A strong argument,' replied Disraeli, after having listened to my remarks with eager interest.

London: January 25, 1864.

The 'Times' has been forestalled to-day by the 'Morning Post.' The latter already gives the news of the refusal of the six weeks' delay which had been proposed to Denmark, and throws out again some ominous threats of the employment of the British fleet. The responsibility, however, of this threat probably lies entirely with the chief editor, whose utterances the Government have often disavowed.

London: January 31, 1864.

Lord Derby has been summoned by the Queen, and is going to Osborne. He asked me to call on him before he went. Our interview in his study was strictly private, and lasted several hours.

After thanking me politely for my letters, he attacked Federal execution as illogical, and appeared somewhat surprised when I agreed with him.

'We protested,' I said, 'at the meeting of the Diet on December 7 against this illogical proceeding, and protocolled

a prophecy which has since been fulfilled. As matters now stand, war between Germany and Denmark is inevitable. It is in England's power and interest to localise the war. What the Government's plan is, I do not know; but if the Opposition intend to reproach them for an excessive love of peace, they are ill-informed. Unless you adopt some other point of attack, you will be supporting, without knowing it, Lord Palmerston's secret revolutionary designs. The Ministry is weak, and the Opposition strong. The latter will be held responsible by their own country and by history for the conflagration which Lord Palmerston's wounded vanity is seeking to kindle. And all that for a question which does not affect English interests, but at the most the personal whim of the Prime Minister. Just because he let himself be duped by Brunnow, he would like now to kindle a war, the end of which nobody can foresee. Whether the City constables are to be abolished and amalgamated with the Metropolitan police is a far more important question for England than whether the Elbe Duchies, which contain scarcely half as many inhabitants as London, are to remain united to Denmark or not. Speaking plainly, I do not think the British Government has ever been so misinformed as during the present crisis.'

In this remark Lord Derby thoroughly concurred. He is convinced that Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, by their unexampled zeal, have compromised the Treaty and peace, and played Napoleon's game. His own doubts arose from the fear that the Ministers might have pledged England's honour by some binding promise.

I endeavoured to dispel this feeling by reminding him that the London Treaty contained no guarantee, while the English Government had allowed the Greek throne of Otto I., which

they had expressly guaranteed, to be overturned, without making any wry faces about it.

A slight smile played on Lord Derby's eloquent lips as he nodded to me his assent. He added, however, in an earnest tone, like any one would do when making a solemn promise, and giving me his hand, 'We shall urge them to nothing, you may depend on it.'

CHAPTER XXX.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE—1864 (*continued*).

London, Feb. 7: Lord Derby's Peace Speech in the Debate on the Address—Impression made by his Speech on Lord Palmerston—German Successes in Denmark—Conversation with Mr. Charles Villiers—Satisfaction in the City at the Queen's peaceful Attitude.—London, Feb. 12: War News—Attitude of England and France in the Danish Question.—London, Feb. 21: Conversation with the French Ambassador on the Danish Question—A British Minister's Warning—War News—Brunnow on the Situation.—London, Feb. 22: Jutland—German Unity the *sine quâ non* of an agreement on the Danish Question.—London, Feb. 26: Invitations to the Conference.—London, Feb. 28: The Invitations of the Diet to the Conference officially confirmed—Lord Palmerston's impatience—Objections to the Conference being held in London.—London, March 8: Napoleon's Assurances of Friendship—Disposition of Earl Russell—The Northern Triple Alliance.—London, March 28: *Fata Morgana*—Oracular Statement of the Russian Ambassador—Conversation with Bernstorff.—London, April 2: Prospects of the Conference.—London, April 3: The latest Blue-book—Ministerial Changes.—London, April 10: Lord Clarendon, Second Plenipotentiary for the Conference—His Mission to Paris—Arrival of the Danish Plenipotentiaries.—London, April 15: Earl Russell declines to postpone the formal Opening of the Conference to the 25th inst.—London, April 20: Count Vitzthum to Earl Russell: Enquiry whether the Conference is to be opened notwithstanding the absence of the representatives of the German Diet, Austria, and Prussia.—London, April 20: Earl Russell to Count Vitzthum: Reasons against the desired Postponement of the Conference.—London, April 21: Count Vitzthum to Earl Russell: Intimation of Baron Beust's speedy Arrival.—London, April 22: Earl Russell to Count Vitzthum: Arrangements for Baron Beust's Arrival.—London, May 5: Unsuccessful Negotiations for an Armistice—Threatening Attitude of the English War Party, and the Russian Ambassador.—London, May 23: The British Plenipotentiaries accept the Principle of a Separation of the Duchies—Recommendations of the Neutral Powers.—London, June 20: Warlike Feeling—Earl Russell's Optimism—Russian Diplomacy.—London, June 23: Dissolution of the Conference—Communication of the Protocols to Parliament Glance at the Internal Condition and Future of England—The London Treaty cancelled—Baron Beust's Success.—London,

July 7: Debates in the House of Commons on the Policy of the Government in the Dano-German Question Disraeli's Attack Kinglake's Amendment Cobden. London, July 9: Verdicts of the two Houses—Victory of the Opposition in the House of Lords—The Ministry saved in the House of Commons by accepting Kinglake's Amendment.—London, July 11: Exultation in the Ministerial Camp Politics a Game of Chance—Earl Russell's Astonishment at the Reaction of Public Opinion—Peaceful Disposition of the Public.

London: February 7, 1864.

Lord Derby has kept his promise brilliantly. His masterly speech on behalf of peace in the debate on the Address is the proof. Lord Palmerston, who had been fetched from the Commons by the Duke of Argyll, happened to stand next to me in the House of Lords during this speech. I was thus able, without losing a word of the Tory chief's, to watch the impression made on the warlike Premier by Lord Derby's appeal on behalf of peace.

I reminded Lord Derby, after the sitting, that he had forgotten to mention the main reservation under which Saxony had agreed to the London Treaty in 1852. He admitted this, but observed with a smile that he had treated us better than Lord Russell. 'Certainly,' I replied. 'If ever I had wished to be a British peer, it would have been after Lord Russell's speech. I should not have let it remain unanswered.'

The news that arrived here yesterday from the scene of war has made a powerful impression. Nobody had expected that the Danes, threatened in the rear by the Prussian passage of the Schlei and in front by Gablenz, would abandon the Dannewerke so hastily, leaving their artillery behind them. In official circles this speedy solution of the military question is thought to assure the maintenance of general peace. The newspapers had predicted a stubborn defence of the Dannewerke, and even a defeat of the Austro-Prussian troops. All

the greater, therefore, was the astonishment of the London drawing-rooms, and the indignation against Germany has no bounds.

'It only shows that might is stronger than right,' was the angry comment of the peace-loving Lord Grey.

'Certainly,' I replied, 'for if might were not stronger than right, England would never have ventured to sign the London Treaty.'

'In future we shall speak not of Punic, but of German faith.'

'With just as much justice as the French speak of "perfidious Albion."'

Mr. Charles Villiers gave me a more willing ear. I told him the secret history of the London Treaty, and referred to the remarkable letter of Prince Frederick of Noër of March 24, 1853, which had been inspired by Prince Albert. I recommended to him at the same time the newly-published pamphlet 'Germany *versus* Denmark, by a Liverpool Merchant.' He would find weapons, I said, in that pamphlet, and in the explanations I had given him, for continuing the contest he had begun, as head of the so-called Court party in the Cabinet, against the warlike desires of Lord Palmerston. Lord Derby's great speech on behalf of peace has given this party great encouragement. The Premier's argument, 'If we do not go to war, the Tories will turn us out in order to go to war themselves,' deceives nobody any longer. Behind the majority of the Cabinet stands the Queen, who is against any interference on behalf of Denmark, and is making every effort to localise the war. In the loyal and peace-loving City it is said that her Majesty informed the Premier that she would not approve the proposed Speech from the Throne if it intimated the possibility of England's taking an active part in the Dano-German

quarrel. My informant added that this personal manifestation of the Royal will had been hailed with delight in commercial circles. Any interference by England was, therefore, out of the question, even if the Duchies should be completely severed from Denmark.

The conviction prevails among the Tories that Lord Derby's last speech in favour of peace was the result of a promise given by him to the Queen at Osborne.

London: February 12, 1864.

Field-Marshal Wrangel is not fond of newspaper correspondents; telegrams have been frequently interrupted, and in North Schleswig there are no wires. This explains the meagre and contradictory reports from the scene of war.

In Paris the English Ministers are doing their utmost to force the French Emperor out of his waiting attitude. The 'Times' correspondent already announces the forthcoming despatch of a French corps of observation of 50,000 men to the Rhine. If the news is true, this demonstration must have been arranged not only in understanding with, but at the wish of the British Government, and as a preliminary step to supporting the proposal of an armistice. Such a proposal, according to a *communiqué* in the 'Morning Post,' appears to have been agreed on by England, Russia, France, and Sweden, who are stated to have recommended as its basis the evacuation of Schleswig, with the exception of Alsen. The newspapers inspired by the Premier are indulging in more or less covert menaces of war.

The news telegraphed from Frankfort that the vote on the question of Succession is not to be taken for a fortnight, is most gratifying. To gain time is to gain everything.

In Vienna the distrust of Prussia and the fear 'de tra-

vailler pour le roi de Prusse' are becoming daily more pronounced. This explains even more than consideration for England the Austrian Government's adherence to the principle of the integrity of Denmark. In the event of the separation of the Duchies becoming inevitable, they would prefer the candidature of the Duke of Oldenburg to that of the Duke of Augustenburg, since the latter could only rule as a vassal of Prussia. Bernstorff's personal opinion is that even at Berlin the Oldenburg solution would have better chances of success than the instalment of Frederick VIII., who has forfeited the confidence of the Prussian Court by his coquetries with the democratic Committee of the Thirty-Six.

The danger of war from France is certainly not to be despised, but also not to be feared. An unprovoked attack by our Western neighbour would unite Germany at once. United, we are strong enough to protect ourselves against the foreign enemy and deliver Europe from the *incubus* of Bonapartism.

London: February 21, 1864.

Prince Latour d'Auvergne has just informed me that official news has been received in Paris of the sending of the Prussian *aide-de-camp* General Manteuffel to Dresden, but that nothing was known for certain as to the object of his mission. I was unable to enlighten him. The French Ambassador proceeded to express himself on the situation in general to the following effect:—

'The German Great Powers will soon find that it was easier to go to Schleswig than come back with honour. Here in England I am constantly being told that we ought to interfere. My answer is: "Messieurs les Anglais tirez les premiers," as our soldiers said before the battle of Fontenoy. I do not see at all why we should trouble ourselves about

things that interest us far less than England. The article in the "France," which has led in this country to wholly wrong conclusions, has no importance whatever; the paper is no longer inspired. Again, or rather still, a Conference is talked of. We hold firmly to the view that as long as hostilities are going on, discussions round a green-baize table can lead to nothing. We insist also on the Diet's being represented, and here such a proposal is scouted.'

The story of the Queen's having refused to approve the original draft of the Speech from the Throne I am able to confirm. In the Cabinet the draft was rejected by a majority of eight. I am assured that her Majesty actually returned a second draft, and finally only gave her assent at the eleventh hour, on the day before Parliament was opened, to the colourless Speech which was read by the Lord Chancellor on her behalf. One of the eight Cabinet Ministers, who had voted against the first draft, a man of peace, censured in plain terms the endeavours made by Palmerston and Russell to induce the French Emperor to interfere. When the present excitement is over, he said, the Government will bitterly rue this instigation to war. He added a well-meant warning, which deserves attention, coming, as it does, from a friend of Germany. 'Do all you can,' he said, 'in the interests of peace, to prevent Austria from showing her ships of war in the North Sea and Baltic. If the twelve vessels, whose departure is announced by telegraph, make their appearance in our waters, then the worst may be expected. We Englishmen are jealous, and would hardly stand a challenge on our own element. Apart from that altogether, it would be an inconceivable blunder to leave the coasts of the Adriatic unprotected. They must know very well in Vienna that Garibaldi is meditating the *quarta riscossa*. If his volunteers succeed in effect-

ing a landing anywhere and establishing a firm position, Italy will declare war; if the landing, on the contrary, is prevented, Garibaldi will be disavowed and peace maintained. The Austrian navy is, therefore, more necessary at this moment in the Adriatic than in the North Sea. A couple of ships are enough to protect Austrian trade; no fleet is wanted for that purpose. We have been comparing at to-day's Cabinet the effective naval forces of Austria and Denmark, and, as a consequence, have determined to summon our fleet home from Lisbon. Wind and weather permitting, our ships ought to reach Copenhagen in eight or ten days.'

The news of the Federal troops having crossed the frontier of Jutland is denied by telegraph. Herr von Moltke has explained at Berlin this movement by stating that the enemy, after having taken up a position with the object of reconquering Schleswig, had been driven back on Jutland territory, and that Kolding had been occupied. What excitement this false news has created here, and how excellently the warlike Premier has turned it to account, is shown by the article in the 'Observer.'

Brunnow is confident that peace will be maintained, although Prussia is striving to tempt Austria into extending the operation of the original military Convention to Jutland. 'When they see at Berlin,' he said, 'that the Government here are in earnest, they will tame down, and we may live to see the King suddenly dismissing Bismarck.'

London: February 22, 1864.

The excitement caused by the rumoured crossing of the frontier of Jutland has subsided, since it has been known that the German troops have evacuated Jutland.

If Germany is united, a revision of the London Treaty

may be effected without a European war, and there is a possibility even of the complete separation of Holstein and of Southern Schleswig. If the breach, however, between the German Great Powers and the minor States is widened, and if the possibility of an agreement disappears, there is reason to fear the recall of the Austrian and Prussian representatives from Frankfort and the dissolution of the Diet. Here such an event would be hailed with delight as a proof that Austria and Prussia have resolved in all earnest to maintain the integrity of Denmark. Great credit is given to Hanover for not having gone with the others to Würzburg.[1]

London: February 26, 1864.

The Government are still awaiting the Danish reply to the proposal of a Conference, and only in the event of its being in the affirmative will the formal invitations be issued to France, Russia, Sweden, and the German Diet. Baron Brunnow, to whom I am indebted for this piece of news, added that the invitation would be couched in such general terms as to enable the Bund to accept it, without abandoning its position in regard to the London Treaty. It was only to be hoped, he said, that the Diet would choose for their plenipotentiary a statesman and not a *doctrinaire*. No great result would come of the Conference, but it would quiet people's minds, strengthen the peace party in the English Cabinet, and lighten their not very enviable task. Every one might contribute his mite to the cause of peace. Only one Power, France, would gain by a general war, and that at the expense of Germany. The main thing was to avoid such a war; all else was compara-

[1] With regard to this Conference of minor German States at Würzburg, see the despatch of Lord A. Loftus to Earl Russell of Feb. 24.—*Correspondence respecting Denmark and Germany*, 1864, part v. p. 751.—Tr.

tively unimportant. Prussia was living on her capital; her bare existence depended on the sympathies of Russia and England. 'Ministers come and go, but interests remain,' was his concluding remark. 'For Austria and the minor States the war is a calamity; they can only lose by it, they cannot possibly gain anything. Events in Galicia warn urgently in favour of peace, and must make a promenade to Jutland seem a dangerous undertaking.'

I found Lord Russell to-day in high spirits. He gave me the latest information about the Conference, to which the Diet in any case would be invited. Whether they would agree as to the choice of a representative remained to be seen. I replied that much would depend on the terms of the invitation. Things seemed to have got into a smooth track, and one must get accustomed to reading Reuter's telegrams *cum grano salis*. 'Certainly,' said the Foreign Secretary, with a smile, 'one of Reuter's telegrams from Montenegro has lately given us a wholly unnecessary fright. I telegraphed an enquiry, and was informed that the news was mere fiction. Reuter's agent receives eighty francs for every piece of intelligence. If there is none, he invents some, to earn his living.'

London: February 28, 1864.

In the Notes, delivered by the English Ambassadors in Vienna and Berlin, inviting Austria and Prussia to the Conference, there is not a word of any basis, but simply an assurance that the German Diet would be asked to take part in the deliberations. Prussia's answer accepting the invitation has already arrived, and Bernstorff intends to deliver it as soon as his Austrian colleague in London shall have received the instructions, to the same effect, which are now on their way.

Without anticipating the decision of his Government, said the Prussian Ambassador to me, it would be downright absurd to make the Treaty of May 8, 1852, the basis of the negotiations. The only feasible and reasonable object of the Conference was to attempt to discover a solution which should establish the complete administrative separation of the Duchies from Denmark.

The Copenhagen Cabinet did not understand their own interests in requesting a fortnight's time for consideration before replying to the invitation to the Conference. A feeling of annoyance at this delay can be read plainly between the lines of the article in the 'Observer,' which seems to have been dictated by the Prime Minister himself. Old Palmerston is getting impatient. The Queen's opposition has made him nervous. He wants to get rid of the troublesome affair, one way or another. He feels that his days as a Minister are numbered, unless he soon discovers a means of shaking off the question in dispute, and avoiding a war which would suit the interests of the country quite as little as the temper of the House of Commons.

Things are so situated just at present that, with the display of any skill, something might be done for the real welfare of the Duchies, especially if the Conference could be transferred to another place but London. I asked the French Ambassador whether this was impossible. He shrugged his shoulders and replied, 'In the first place, I do not believe that the Conference will meet at all. The objections to its meeting in London are obvious, but we ourselves have already taken exception to Paris, and could not possibly retract our words. No doubt, since then the situation has improved. There is no more question of taking steps against Germany, and if Paris were proposed by another party, it is not unlikely that we should agree to it.'

Apponyi and Bernstorff have protested most strongly in their despatches against the choice of London, and have proposed Brussels. Perhaps it would be as well to hold the threat of Paris over the Government, in order to get them to agree to Brussels. To hold the Conference here would amount to making futile from the first any hopes of even a decent result. It would be better to remove it at once to Copenhagen.

London: March 8, 1864.

'Vous pouvez écrire à Lord Russell que j'ai cessé de bouder l'Angleterre,' such were recently Napoleon's parting words to the British Ambassador. Lord Cowley has hastened to discharge the welcome task. The announcement has been received with rapture. The Government, however, are still waiting for the realisation of this promise of the Emperor's. Lord Russell complains that no support is being given either at Paris or Copenhagen to his efforts on behalf of peace. At the Tuileries it is hoped apparently that the war will be continued. At Copenhagen the infatuation of the Ministers corresponds with the warlike temper of the people. 'If we fail to bring about the Conference,' is Lord Russell's lament, 'I really do not know what will happen, or what more we can do.'

The news of an extension of the military operations to Jutland has been received with tolerable composure by the Foreign Secretary, who has expressed to Count Bernstorff his hope that the Cabinet will accept it with like equanimity. After the sitting was concluded, he was able to inform Apponyi that such was the case. The latter did not fail to remark that the British Minister's apparent *insouciance* did not prevent him from espousing every day more warmly the cause of Denmark. This was not denied, but Lord Russell explained it

by the somewhat mysterious remark that if English sympathies were for Denmark, those of Russia were increasing for Germany. The surprise of the Ambassador, who was unable to reconcile Lord Russell's language with the attitude taken by Brunnow, increased when the Foreign Secretary gave him to understand that Brunnow was evidently not informed of the latest turn of affairs at St. Petersburg. It seems then that the rumour, industriously circulated by the Poles, of a revival of the Northern Triple Alliance, deserves more credit than would be supposed from the article in the 'Morning Post.'

London: March 28, 1864.

Peace-loving British politicians continue to see in the Conference, without armistice or basis, the oasis which is to preserve peace to Europe and save the Palmerston Ministry. An observant pilgrim in the steppes of modern diplomacy shakes his head gravely at this notion, and whispers in private: *Fata Morgana!* Baron Brunnow, after having done his utmost to bring about the Conference, now makes no secret of his scepticism: 'The Danes will not come; the French have never cared at all about the Conference.'

Bernstorff listened to this oracular statement of the Russian Ambassador not without pleasure. In his eyes Austria is to blame for everything, by still clinging to the absurd dogma of Danish integrity. The Danish communication of the 15th inst. has somewhat startled the Prussian Ambassador's nerves. He consoles himself, however, and hopes that the conquerors of Missunde would have time to take the bastions of Düppel, if the Conference were not held after all.

I did not conceal from Bernstorff that the Danish criticism could not create any surprise, inasmuch as Austria and Prussia still clung to the fiction that they were not at war with Chris-

tian IX. and were fighting for the integrity of Denmark. In the light of this fiction, many of the measures now taken in Schleswig and Jutland must appear arbitrary acts of power, however easily they could be explained by the actual circumstances of the war.

'We are regularly at war,' replied Bernstorff. 'Denmark's resistance releases us from all our obligations. Were I Minister, I would take my stand on the Declaration of January 31, and announce that the London Treaty, so far as Prussia was concerned, no longer existed.'

'Such an announcement would effect at once an understanding between all the German States. Why does not the Prussian Government make it?'

'Out of regard to Austria.'

'Austria,' I replied, 'cannot take the initiative in this question. For her it is a question of life and death to avoid even the appearance of a recognition of the principle of nationality. Metternich is quite right in scrupling to give his little finger to Napoleon in Schleswig, in order to avoid giving his whole hand to him in Italy, in the East, or on the Rhine. In comparison with this danger all the rest are nothing, even that of separation from Germany. This explains also the contradictions of English policy and the fact that the passage of the Eider has not destroyed the Anglo-Austrian alliance. Nobody knows the *arrière-pensées* of Napoleon. Nevertheless, it would appear from the oracular language of Drouyn de Lhuys that the Cabinet at Paris are anxious to avoid a rupture with England and a national war with Germany. Officially, they are for the Treaty and integrity, but in secret for the separation of the Duchies, hoping to find therein a pretext for compensation.'

'I quite agree,' remarked the Ambassador. 'If they are

afraid at Paris of a national war with Germany, we shall be able boldly to sever Lauenburg, Holstein, and the German part of Schleswig without provoking a general war. Perhaps a general war would not be for once a misfortune for Germany; she would find compensations for the Belgian transaction, as well as for Lombardy and Neuchatel. At any rate the Danes would be driven out of Germany altogether, and that is really the only solution.'

London: April 2, 1864.

Count Apponyi, Prince Latour d'Auvergne, and Baron Brunnow have already been instructed by their respective Governments that they will have to represent the latter at the Conference. Count Bernstorff is still without instructions, and has not concealed from me how gladly he would renounce the honour of figuring as Prussian plenipotentiary. He has firmly resolved to decline the post if his instructions should not agree with his personal views.

The Prussian despatch, demanding the participation of the Diet as a *sine quâ non*, has not yet been read by Bernstorff to Lord Russell. The former, however, has expressed himself very decidedly to this effect.

The more manifestly Austria, from fear of France, is pushing on the Conference, the more lukewarm they are becoming in Paris on the subject.

If the Conference takes place without a basis, it will suffer, when it meets, from a plethora of bases. Each of the eight Powers is bringing one of its own, and not one of them will agree with the other.

London: April 3, 1864.

Part V. of the Blue-book on the Dano-German quarrel adds to the already voluminous collection of about 369 despatches which have been exchanged during the last two

months. This publication will serve, it is to be hoped, to warn German Ministers to exercise greater caution in their communications with English diplomatists.

The semi-official 'Observer' has an article on the approaching changes in the Ministry, which contains an indirect avowal that public opinion in England is pronouncing daily more decidedly in favour of peace, in other words, against interference in the Dano-German quarrel. It imputes to the Tories the design of giving armed assistance to Denmark, and makes capital out of this discovery for Lord Palmerston.

The Duke of Newcastle, who has resigned the War Office solely on account of ill-health, will be succeeded by the Peelite Cardwell, while Lord Clarendon enters the Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Long inactivity has not softened the latter's views, and at times he gives passionate expression to his Dano-mania. Apponyi said to him lately, straight out: 'We think ourselves lucky that you are not at the Foreign Office just now.'

Garibaldi has landed at Southampton and been received with the usual enthusiasm.

London: April 10, 1864.

The conjecture that Lord Clarendon would act as second British plenipotentiary at the Conference is confirmed. He himself has made no secret of it since yesterday. The day after to-morrow he is to go to Paris, with the view of attempting once more to effect a direct understanding with the French Emperor.

'It is to be hoped, for all that, that Napoleon will stick to the last French despatch,' was Disraeli's remark on hearing of this mission.

The Danish plenipotentiaries have arrived. I met to-day, at Pembroke Lodge, M. de Quaade, M. Krieger, Councillor,

and M. Güldencron, Secretary of Legation. The former gave me the impression of being a man of the world, whereas M. Krieger seems to have moved more among officials than in drawing-rooms.

Lord Russell, who was highly pleased at the arrival of his Danish guests, expressed to me his satisfaction that the Committee at Frankfort had decided in favour of accepting the invitation and sending a German plenipotentiary.

London: April 15, 1864.

Lord Russell refuses to postpone the formal opening of the Conference till the 25th. This refusal is a sign of his weakness and a fresh proof how unsuitable is London, particularly while Parliament is sitting, as a place for the Conference to meet. Moreover, absolutely nothing has yet been prepared, and not a word has been said about the *modus procedendi*. The real centre of gravity lies in Paris. The English Ministers are hoping that Lord Clarendon will bring back with him the *mot d'ordre* from the Tuileries. He put off his departure not to miss the grand luncheon party which the Duchess of Sutherland is to give at Chiswick in honour of Garibaldi. This will not have spoiled his reception at the Tuileries, though it probably provoked a smile of sarcasm from the Emperor.

Count Vitzthum to Earl Russell.

(Private.) London: April 20, 1864.

DEAR LORD RUSSELL,—You would oblige me by letting me know whether the Conference will be opened to-day in the absence of the representatives of the German Confederation, of Austria and of Prussia, or whether I may telegraph to Baron Beust that the opening will take place on Monday, the 25th inst. Believe me, &c.

VITZTHUM.

Earl Russell to Count Vitzthum.

(Private.) April 20, 1864.

DEAR COUNT VITZTHUM,—I am sorry not to accede to the request of Baron Beust, but the Conference must meet to-day. I must remark that, until this morning, when I received an official note from Count Apponyi, I have had no official communication on the subject of a postponement. Even now I have had none of an official nature from Prussia.

This mode of proceeding was calculated to throw upon the English Government and upon me personally the odium of a voluntary indifference to the means of arresting the effusion of blood by means of a suspension of arms. Except a wish for such suspension nothing will be done to-day, and the business will be postponed to the 25th, when I trust Baron Beust will be present.

I remain, yours faithfully,

RUSSELL.

Count Vitzthum to Earl Russell.

(Private.) London: April 21, 1864.

DEAR LORD RUSSELL,—Baron Beust has left Frankfort, will sleep at Brussels, and will be here to-morrow night. I have lost no time in telegraphing the contents of your note of yesterday to Frankfort. I trust that your remark with reference to the want of official application on the subject of postponement does not apply to myself, as I had no right to make any official application on behalf of the Diet.

The day for the opening of the Conference having been fixed by the British Government without consulting the Diet and without knowing whether it would suit the Diet, I thought that there would be no objection whatever to a postponement, the more so as you perfectly admitted the reasons which prevented Baron Beust reaching London.

Believe me, &c.,

VITZTHUM.

Earl Russell to Count Vitzthum.

(Private.) Chesham Place: April 22, 1864.

DEAR COUNT VITZTHUM,—I will give orders to have Baron Beust's luggage allowed to pass by the Custom House.

I am glad to hear he is coming this evening, as he will have time to rest, and consult with his colleagues of Austria and Prussia before Monday.

In speaking of the absence of official representations, I did not at all allude to you, as I conceive it was not necessary for you to offer any official explanation.

Yours truly,

RUSSELL.

London: May 5, 1864.

The negative results of yesterday's Conference furnish another proof that the skilfulness and goodwill displayed by the English plenipotentiaries leave much to be desired.

Lord Russell and Lord Clarendon had originally supported the Austro-Prussian proposal of a *suspension d'armes* by land and sea. But on the Danes refusing to consent to the raising of the blockade, the British plenipotentiaries, under Brunnow's leadership, sought to substitute an armistice for a suspension of hostilities. Their proposal fell to the ground, neither the allies nor the Danes being sufficiently instructed. The English tactics are to shift the odium on the German Powers, while in reality it is the Danes who are hindering the arrangement of an armistice. The reason of this stiff-necked conduct of the Copenhagen Cabinet is obvious. They are afraid, above all things, of making themselves unpopular by raising the blockade, which in the sense intended by the Treaty of Paris has never been effective, and cherish secret hopes of a conflict which may lead England and Russia to

interfere. The 'Dagblad,' as well as the letter of the 1st of May from the Copenhagen correspondent of the 'Daily Telegraph,' put this fact beyond question. Unhappily, the Danish hopes of tempting England into making a naval demonstration are not unfounded. Hitherto, the British Government have been content with placing Copenhagen under their protection and taking note of the assurance given by the German Powers that they have no intention of bombarding the Danish capital. During the last few days the war party in this country have decidedly gained ground. A peer, who is very favourably disposed to Germany, said to me yesterday, 'Take care, for God's sake, to secure an armistice as soon as possible. If the question of war or peace were put to-day in the House of Commons to a vote, three-fourths of the members would vote for war.' Similar hints have been given to the Prussian Ambassador from a less unprejudiced quarter. We must not forget that England, by a blockade of the German and Austrian coasts at a comparatively small expense could exert a serious pressure on Vienna and Berlin, particularly if the revolution were let loose at the same time in Italy and Hungary.

The Russian plenipotentiary has stated outside the Conference that he will leave the council-chamber at once if the integrity of the Danish kingdom is called in question. I gave the French Ambassador, who reported to me this threat, the following answer: 'As long as England and France remain, the Conference is not broken up; moreover, the Protocol might be kept open for Russia to sign.'

Has Baron Brunnow been authorised to make such a statement? Will he carry out his threat, if the contingency occurs? I have strong doubts on both these points. As matters now stand, it is very likely that the main question at

the Conference will not come so soon under discussion, and that the meeting, which stands adjourned to next Monday, will again separate without the conclusion of an armistice.

London: May 23, 1864.

While Baron Beust is turning to account at Paris in the interests of Germany the interval between the sittings of the 17th and 28th inst., the good results of his activity here are becoming daily more conspicuous. The successful tactics of the Prussian plenipotentiaries are due to the inspiration of the representative of the Diet, whom alone also we have to thank for the change of disposition in our favour which has been evinced by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain. Nobody else had ventured to state openly that nothing but the complete separation of the Duchies would satisfy Germany. Baron Beust had the courage to do this, and thereby he has smoothed the way for the so-called radical solution of the question. Lord Clarendon was the first to declare his agreement to accept the complete separation of Holstein, Lauenburg, and South Schleswig as the basis of further discussion. Lord Russell concurred, and the two were empowered at the Cabinet held the day before yesterday to continue the negotiations on this basis. In consequence of this decision of the Government, Lord Russell invited the neutral Powers to meet to-day. The result of this consultation is to be communicated privately to-morrow to the Prussian Ambassador, and submitted to the Conference at their next sitting. The leading features of this compromise originate, I hear, with France. The Conference would have to draw the frontier line in Schleswig, subject to the future consent of the population. Even Russia accepts the principle of separation. As to the mode of consulting the inhabitants, no understanding appears to have been yet

arrived at. To judge from the disposition prevailing in Berlin and Vienna, it would seem, therefore, that a basis has been discovered. The neutral Powers, however, at the urgent instance of Russia and Sweden, are said to insist, as the *sine quâ non* of their consent to the principle of separation, on the neutralisation of the harbour of Kiel. Latour d'Auvergne pointed out that everything hitherto acquired would be placed in jeopardy if Germany were to convert Kiel into a naval stronghold; on that point, he said, it was idle to look to France for support. I doubted this, since Napoleon only two days ago stated voluntarily to Baron Beust that Germany required a proper harbour for her commercial navy. The French Ambassador replied, however, that the good wishes expressed by his Imperial master did not apply to this case. Bernstorff attaches no value to these considerations, and designates the condition as inacceptable. 'We shall simply refuse,' he said, 'to evacuate Schleswig and Jutland, until Holstein, Lauenburg, and South Schleswig are surrendered unconditionally to the German Bund.'

London: June 20, 1864.

At the sitting of the House of Lords the day before yesterday some significant side-lights were thrown on the real gravity of the situation. There is a panic on the Stock Exchange, and people in the City are afraid that England will throw her sword in the scale, if the negotiations collapse and the armistice cannot be prolonged beyond the 26th. The war party are making huge capital out of the negative result of the meeting of the Conference the day before yesterday. They are taking advantage in particular of Prussia's threat to issue letters of mark, to rouse the already excited feeling of the public to a pitch. Lord Russell, however, does not allow himself to be led astray by this talk, and clings, with his accustomed opti-

mism, to the hope that a peaceful solution will soon be found. I congratulated him yesterday on his statement in the House of Lords, which shows an entire accord with Baron Beust. The noble Earl repeated, nevertheless, his reservation, that if the fate of the Duchies could not be settled without consulting the inhabitants, there could be no question of consulting those districts of Schleswig which still remain to Denmark.

I did not think myself called on to combat uselessly this irrational reservation, but proposed that an international commission should be sent to Schleswig. This commission would be able to convoke the Estates or Assembly of Notables, with the view of submitting to the Conference, which would have to be adjourned for a few weeks, a full report as to the wishes of the inhabitants.

'I expected,' replied Lord Russell, 'a proposal of that kind at the meeting of the Conference two days ago, and was almost on the point of making it myself. Nobody, however, understood that it was for that very purpose that I drew attention to the want of any information as to the wishes and feeling of the inhabitants. Russia seemed to be dead against such a plan, and the fruitless discussion only served to bring out more sharply the hopeless antagonism between the opposite views expressed.'

A short conversation with Baron Brunnow confirms my fear that Russia is merely seeking to postpone a definite settlement. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg have not yet abandoned the hope of preserving the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. It is with this end in view that Russian diplomacy, while preaching peace officially, is secretly using every effort to prevent it. Nay, they are not ashamed of heaping fuel on the flames. They insinuate that the honour of England is in question, and that Lord Palmerston will

never allow himself to be made the laughing-stock of Europe. If the present Ministers showed themselves too old and too feeble to grasp the sword, a change of Government would soon bring the war party to the helm.

London: June 23, 1864.

England's last attempt to prevent the fresh outbreak of the war was shipwrecked at yesterday's Conference. The Danes firmly refused to submit the demarcation of the frontier in Schleswig to arbitration. The readiness expressed by Austria and Prussia to accept conditionally the mediation of the King of the Belgians ceased therefore to be of any avail. In view of the Danish refusal, the British plenipotentiaries did not think it necessary to put forward the proposals which they had formulated in Six Points. The suggestion made by France that a vote of the Schleswig communes should be taken was simply done *pro formâ*. The only business before the Conference, at their final sitting next Saturday, is to satisfy yesterday's Protocol. The Government seem anxious to discover a mode of adjournment which shall leave the door open for a reassembling of the Conference at some future time.

The funeral orations of the newspapers on the Conference are summed up in the line of Schiller's Fiesco: 'The Moor has done his work; the Moor can go.' Summoned to serve as a screen for the British Government, the Conference has fulfilled its object. Barren negotiations have brought us nearly to the close of the Parliamentary Session. After Ascot races, they say, a change of Ministry is out of the question. Will this saying be verified under circumstances so exceptional as the present?

Passions have been aroused, national feeling has been offended, the Opposition are impatient, and the Ministers dis-

united and exhausted. The Protocols are to be communicated on Monday to both Houses, and serious debates are to be looked for in the course of next week. If Parliament listens to the siren voice on the other side of the Channel and allows the bellicose Premier to seduce the country into taking part in the war, the outlook is one of the darkest. The Nemesis for the errors and shortcomings of the two-headed Ministry will surely come. The flood of Democracy, kept back by artificial dams, will burst the barriers set up by senile impotence and compel the introduction of a Reform Bill, the result of which—the levelling of social and political society—cannot fail to imperil the future of the British Empire. If the aristocratic war party turn a deaf ear to the warnings of the men of Manchester, and plunge the country, as they did in 1854, into an aimless and endless war with the natural allies of Old England, the future belongs to Cobden and Bright, who have found already a Parliamentary leader in Gladstone. But if old Palmerston is forced to abandon his carefully prepared display of pyrotechnics, the Radicals remain equally the masters of the situation. Now for the first time one can measure the full importance of Gladstone's speech in favour of an extension of the franchise, approximating nearly to universal suffrage. This *Mene Tekel* conveys a sinister warning to the English aristocracy.

Whether Parliament, to whom the Ministers are looking for inspiration, declares for war or for peace, in either case England is on the eve of a domestic crisis, the end of which no one can foresee. It would be sheer infatuation, nevertheless, to underrate the dangers which must result if the now mightiest Power in the world were to enter the fray. If Germany contents herself with defending what she has hitherto acquired, the peace party in this country will do their utmost

to prevent the despatch of the Channel fleet to the Baltic. A further extension of hostilities might lead to a general war and the letting loose of incalculable elements of combustion, which could not fail to find fuel in the revolutionary material now scattered about the world. If this evil be avoided, Germany may contemplate with satisfaction a diplomatic campaign concluding, as it commenced, with triumph. The internal dissensions, which threatened to make us the laughing-stock of the world, are healed. The London Treaty is cancelled; the Austrian and Prussian Ambassadors have followed almost unconsciously the lead of the Federal plenipotentiary, who had reason on his side. To the English statesmen, of course, the consistency with which the view of the Diet has been upheld, and the repeal of the London Treaty extorted from the Conference, have been extremely unpleasant. However, they fully acknowledge the *suaviter in modo* displayed by their German colleagues.

The main fact is that on the first occasion when the whole of Germany has been represented at a European Conference no detriment has been done to the honour of Germany.

London: July 7, 1864.

The debate on the Dano-German dispute began on Monday, the 4th, in the House of Commons. The resolution censuring the policy of the Government was moved by Disraeli.[1] To-morrow, the 8th, a similar resolution is to be introduced in the Lords.

Disraeli, in a speech of nearly three hours' duration, gave

[1] Its terms were as follows: 'To express to her Majesty our great regret that, while the course pursued by her Majesty's Government has failed to maintain their avowed policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark, it has lowered the just influence of this country in the counsels of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace.'

a masterly *résumé* of the negotiations and events which had taken place since the prorogation of Parliament last August up to the close of the Conference.

Under the Treaty of May 8, 1852, concluded without any guarantee, England, he said, incurred no legal responsibility which was not equally entered into by France, Russia, and Sweden. How was it, under those circumstances, that the position of France relative to Denmark was so dignified as to extort a tribute from her Majesty's Secretary of State, while that of England, under the same obligation, was one of infinite perplexity and terrible mortification? The answer was that this was due to the mismanagement and the 'intense incapacity' of the Government. Up to the end of last September, they could count, in their endeavours to uphold the integrity and independence of Denmark, on the co-operation of France and Russia. Had they maintained an understanding with those two Powers, the war would never have broken out. But after falling out with Russia on account of Poland, they carried on the negotiations so clumsily as to alienate France.

In proof of this assertion the leader of the Opposition referred to two events which occurred in the midst of the negotiations then pending with the Diet—namely, the French proposal of a Congress, and the death of Frederick VII. of Denmark (Nov. 16). He charged the Ministers, in the first place, with having couched their refusal to accede to the Congress in 'curt and offensive' terms. Not until last March had the Opposition learned from the Blue-books, then published, the real gravity of the situation. It was to revenge himself for England's passive attitude in the Polish question that the French Emperor proclaimed that neutrality in the Danish question which was so humiliating to the British Government.

Correct as this statement is, it would be difficult to prove it from the documents laid before Parliament.

In view of this neutral attitude taken up by Napoleon, the Government, continued Disraeli, had the choice between two courses—either to declare that they would defend, if necessary, by force the integrity of Denmark, or, like France, to abstain from any interference, any menaces, any promises, direct or indirect.

As for the reproach made against the Opposition, that they had no policy of their own, Disraeli repelled it emphatically by declaring, amidst the cheers of the House, that if he had been Minister he would have chosen the second alternative and adopted the same position as that of France. Instead of that, her Majesty's Government, wavering between peace and war, had invented a process of conduct best described as consisting of menaces unaccomplished and promises never fulfilled. To save themselves from their difficulties they supplicated, now France, now Russia, to assist them. They had lowered the just influence of England in the councils of Europe, and thereby diminished the security for peace. Finally, he came to the part played by the British plenipotentiaries at the Congress, which 'lasted about as long as a Carnival, and, like a Carnival, was an affair of masks and mystifications.'

'You yourselves,' he said, 'proposed, first, the dismemberment of Denmark. So much for its integrity! You proposed, in the second place, that the remainder of Denmark should be placed under the joint guarantee of the Great Powers. They would have created another Turkey in Europe, in the same geographical situation, the scene of the same rival intrigues, and the same fertile source of constant misconceptions and wars. So much for the independence of Denmark!' He concluded his speech in these words: 'It is not for us—it is not

for any man in this House—to indicate to Ministers what should be the foreign policy of the country. The most we can do is to tell the noble Lord what is not our policy. We will not threaten and then refuse to act. We will not lure on our allies with expectations we do not fulfil. And, Sir, if it ever be the lot of myself, and of those with whom I act, to carry on important negotiations on behalf of this country, as the noble lord and his colleagues have done, I trust we shall not, at least, carry them on in such a manner that it will be our duty to come to Parliament and announce to the country that we have no allies, and then declare that England can never act alone. Sir, those are words that ought never to have escaped the lips of a British Minister. They are sentiments which ought never to have occurred even to his heart. I repudiate—I reject them. I remember that there was a time when England, with not a tithe of her present resources, inspired by a patriotic cause, triumphantly encountered a world in arms. And, Sir, I believe, now, if the occasion were fitting, if her independence and her honour were assailed, or her Empire endangered, I believe that England would rise in the magnificence of her might, and struggle triumphantly for those objects for which men live and by which nations flourish. But, Sir, I for one will never consent to go to war to extricate Ministers from the consequences of their own mistakes. It is in this spirit that I have drawn up this Address to the Crown. I have drawn it up in the spirit in which the Royal Speech was delivered at the commencement of the Session. I am ready to vindicate the honour of the country whenever it is necessary, but I have drawn up this Address in the interest of peace.'

These words were received with a storm of applause which lasted several minutes. It was only after a pause that Gladstone succeeded in obtaining a hearing. The eloquence of the

Chancellor of the Exchequer is especially brilliant, as is well known, when he has to defend a bad cause. However crushing a refutation of Disraeli the Liberals may affect to see in his sonorous phrases, in reality they contain nothing but the confession of a diplomatic defeat. It is the old theme. We attempted to stir up our enemies in order to fight with their assistance our natural allies; having failed to carry France and Russia along with us, we discontinued our menaces, by which Germany would not allow herself to be intimidated. All this cannot be denied, but is it any excuse? Is it sufficient to justify Lord Palmerston in the future before the bar of history? Gladstone concluded with the charge so commonly employed on such occasions, that the leader of the Opposition had, in order to displace the Government, exaggerated his picture of England's pretended degradation.

The fight was then continued by the *Dii minorum gentium*. Mr. Newdegate moved an absurd amendment,[1] which, however, with difficulty found a seconder, and met with no support. This was the last attempt ventured by the war party.

Kinglake, a man of peace and a decided opponent of the London Treaty, moved an amendment drawn by Cobden, ironically expressing the satisfaction of the House that her Majesty had been advised to abstain from armed interference. This amendment opens a side-door to Lord Palmerston. It is stated that he will make use of it and accept Cobden's humiliating absolution, Kinglake having proved to him in black and white that a large majority of the Ministerial party would vote for Disraeli's Resolution unless the Prime Minister consented to pass under the Caudine Forks.

[1] Viz.: 'To submit to her Majesty the opinion of this House that the independence of Denmark and the possessions of that Kingdom, on the terms proposed by the representatives of the neutral Powers in the recent Conference, ought to be guaranteed.'

General Peel was the first to re-enliven the debate by a simple, outspoken speech, which perhaps will meet with more echo in the country than even Disraeli's masterly indictment of the Government.

Lord Stanley also laid his influence in the scale of peace. The censure that he passed upon the Ministers found approval even among the Ministerial party. He blamed them, not for the failure of their attempts to incite France against Germany, but for their having blundered from beginning to end, not for their policy, but for their want of policy. He blamed them for having attached a significance to the Treaty of 1852 which it did not possess, for having meddled in affairs which did not concern them, and for having taken up the cause of Denmark without sufficient ground, as no English interests were involved.

The debate was resumed on the 6th by Cobden. He pointed out with satisfaction, as the best guarantee for peace, the complete breakdown of secret diplomacy—the utter futility of the policy of the Government and the Foreign Office, which had exposed England to humiliations from all parts of the world. The country, however, he said, would not have to suffer for the sins of the Ministers, since the anachronism they had sought to perpetuate by the Treaty of 1852 would not be repeated. As for a mere change of Ministry, he ridiculed the notion; it was the system that was at fault. Turning to the Opposition, he said, 'I attach no importance to the question whether the noble Lord here is in office or Lord Derby. I think you are very wrong in trying to remove the noble Lord. He does your work better than Lord Derby would. He throws discredit on Reform, he derides the ballot, he spends more money, and is far more extravagant than we would allow you to be if you were in

office. If, instead of challenging him, you will give him time—if you allow him to die, officially speaking, a natural death—I have always been of the impression that after he has thoroughly demoralised his own party, he intends, when he makes his political will, to hand over office to you as his residuary legatees.'

This outburst against the Tories is characteristic of the situation. The Radicals regard themselves as the masters of the future. They do not care to share a precarious existence with the feeble old Premier. Still more significant of the reaction in public opinion in favour of peace was the biting irony heaped by Cobden on the friends of Denmark. 'I say deliberately,' he exclaimed, 'and I challenge any one to contradict me, that there are not fifty men in this house now who would vote for a war with Germany for Schleswig-Holstein on any issue that has been presented to us. I doubt if there are five members who would take such a course. I think the hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Newdegate) found some difficulty in finding a seconder for his amendment.'

The speech of Lord Robert Cecil opened up as few new points of view as did that of the Radical Mr. Forster. Lord Robert Montagu did not fail to give expression to his well-known criticism of the Treaty. Mr. Roebuck took the opportunity of exciting the laughter of the house. I should mention the brilliant, but really weak display of fireworks with which Mr. Horsman wound up the debate on the 5th. His speech was listened to with eager interest, it being said that the Government contemplated making him a peer. Horsman, in his usual fashion, found fault with all the world: Germany was mad, Austria and Prussia were robbers, the Ministers were imbecile, and the leaders of the Opposition the same; the Government and Parliament were equally in

the wrong. In short, England was dishonoured and humiliated, because Mr. Horsman had not been made Prime Minister.

On the whole, Germany has every reason to be satisfied with the debate. The Peace party have triumphed all along the line. Lord Stanley expressed the feeling prevalent both within and without the House, when he said, 'To engage in a European war for the sake of these Duchies would be an act, not of impolicy, but of insanity.'

The Ministry which had attempted to commit this act of insanity deserves to be overthrown. In any case, defeat would be more honourable for Lord Palmerston than to be obliged to continue in office under the gracious protection of Cobden. However the dice may fall, the Prime Minister is disarmed, and his secret schemes of anger and revenge are condemned. The victory of the Peace party is a victory of the Queen. Maligned, insulted, and reproached for German sympathies, her Majesty has checkmated the dictatorship of her Prime Minister, and beaten him three times in his own Cabinet on the question of war or peace. The Queen has recognised the true interests, the true wishes of her people, and not allowed herself to be misled by the gossip of the drawing-rooms or the declamations of the daily press.

London: July 9, 1864.

This morning, at a quarter past three, the two Houses pronounced almost simultaneously the verdict of Parliament on the conduct of the Government in the Dano-German question. The House of Lords condemned the Ministers, by agreeing to Lord Malmesbury's resolution, by a majority of 9. The House of Commons accepted Kinglake's amendment, and thus acquitted the Government, by a majority of 18. Lord Derby, chained to his bed by the gout, was obliged to hand

over the conduct of the debate to Lord Malmesbury. Lord Derby's eloquence, however, would hardly have gained another vote for his party, since the victory was won by the proxies.[1] Lord Grey parted company from his political friends and spoke and voted for the Tories. It cannot be said that the Lords had thrown any new light on the question, which is still so little understood in England. Lord Russell, urged by necessity, rendered full, though late, justice to the majority of the Diet. 'Austria and Prussia,' he said, 'would have done far better if they had taken the bold line which was taken by the German Confederation, and declared openly, if they consider Denmark to have been unfaithful with regard to the Treaty of 1852, that they were released from their engagements as co-signataries, instead of pretending to enter Holstein for the purpose of Federal Execution, and Schleswig for the purpose of occupation as a material guarantee.' At the same time, he withdrew in effect the charge of dishonourableness which he had formerly made against the German Great Powers, by admitting that both of them had originally desired to maintain the treaty, but had been compelled to yield to the unanimous wish of a nation of 44,000,000 Germans, 'all excited to the utmost pitch on the subject of establishing the separate nationality of their fellow-countrymen.' Had Lord Russell recognised this truth at the right time, and openly expressed his opinion to that effect, the blood which has flowed on the Eider would have been spared.

The debates also in the House of Commons yesterday and the day before furnished no new arguments on either side. Layard's lengthy and not altogether judicious special pleading on behalf of Lord Russell cleared up only one point of historical

[1] Without the proxies (45 to 48) the Government would have had a majority of 4 (123 to 119).

importance. The Foreign Under-Secretary proved that the so-called 'Gotha despatch' of September 24, 1862, containing a suggested mode of settlement, and which had been so severely censured, emanated in reality from London and not from Gotha, and therefore had not been subjected in any way to the influence of the Queen and the Duke of Coburg. 'The despatch had been determined upon in this country before Lord Russell went to Gotha. 'Lord Russell, when on his way to Germany in attendance on the Queen, sent for Mr. Paget to meet him at Brussels to communicate his views to him; but the despatch itself was signed when Lord Russell had returned to London, and was not even dated, as it was asserted, from Gotha.' After having thus refuted all malicious insinuations of undue pressure from the German Powers, Mr. Layard had no difficulty in showing how, if the Danish Cabinet had not rejected the proposal, all subsequent complications might have been avoided.

Bernal Osborne opened the debate yesterday by amusing the House at the expense of the Ministry, singling out, in particular, Lord Palmerston as the author of the Treaty of 1852, and Roebuck, Newdegate, and Lord Robert Cecil on account of their Dano-mania.

It was past midnight when Lord Palmerston rose. He had little to say in defence of the policy which had been arraigned on all sides, but he insisted, as decency required, on the joint responsibility of the Cabinet. His attempt to excuse the failures of the Government in the Danish question by expatiating on the prosperous state of the finances at home produced a scanty impression and was interrupted with cries of 'Question.'

Disraeli, as mover of the resolution, had the right of the concluding reply. He repelled without any bitterness the

charges made against the Opposition, and recapitulated the grounds for the statements, based on quotations from official documents, which he had made to the House in his opening speech.

After Newdegate, who insisted at first on a division, had ultimately withdrawn his amendment, in deference to the evident opinion of the House,[1] the other amendment, moved by Kinglake, but dictated by Cobden, was carried by a majority of 313 against 295. This vote practically concludes the present Session. The weak and thoroughly discredited Ministry remains in office, after obtaining a verdict from the House of Commons which is one rather of Guilty with extenuating circumstances than of acquittal. The influence of the present Ministers of Great Britain in the councils of Europe has been far from strengthened by the part they have played in this debate. Germany may be satisfied with the result. After the hard lesson he has learnt, and kept in check by a resolution which binds his hands, Lord Palmerston will be less dangerous on the Treasury bench than he would be on the front bench of the Opposition.

London: July 11, 1864.

Among the Ministerialists the victory won in the early dawn of the 9th is hailed with unprecedented joy. Palmerston had expected a majority of three or four at the outside. Several Conservatives voted with the majority, and no less than eleven abstained from voting. This is explained by the fear of a Roman Catholic intrigue. The Vatican had been anxious to make use of the opportunity for overthrowing

[1] The Speaker, after putting the question on this amendment the first time, when his decision was challenged by Mr. Newdegate, informed the House that special arrangements would be necessary, in the event of a division taking place, as the lobby would not contain all the 'Ayes,' whose votes would be registered against the amendm nt.

the hated Premier. Some *Monsignori*, especially sent from Rome, are said to have been busily engaged in the lobby in inducing the Irish members to vote with the Opposition. Be that as it may, a majority of eighteen votes was a godsend so unexpected, that the Premier begged some young ladies, who had no notion of what had happened, to congratulate him. Lady Palmerston was delighted at the hand-shakings lavished on the Prime Minister by the crowd that thronged the lobby.

Party politics in this country have become a game of chance. Lord Palmerston, fancying that the country wished for war, had been staking for a whole month on black, but at length, against his own conviction, had put his all on red, and red had won. Under the pretext that he alone could settle the question of Reform, and maintain the honour of England and peace, he remained for five years Prime Minister. The Reform question is still unsettled. Had Lord Palmerston had his way, England would now be plunged in a war that would shake the world. The last debates will hardly redound to the honour of the Government, but the Ministers still imagine seriously that they have saved the country. Lord Russell was utterly astonished at the reaction of public opinion in England, and frankly admitted that I had told him the truth from the first and represented things as they were.

The reaction is complete. The large majority of Englishmen see in the separation of the Duchies a second edition of the partition of Poland, an act of *force majeure*, which England unassisted is too weak to prevent. Denmark is beaten; consequently Denmark is in the wrong. Palmerston has discovered this too at the eleventh hour. 'Is it not simpler to leave the old toothless lion in office, than to risk a change, which might bring new men to the helm, and launch us into

a war with a united Germany?' Such is roughly the judgment of the public. To-day's 'Times' remarks on the truth of the maxim, which is as old as the time of Thucydides, that a Democracy is unable to govern other nations. The City paper adds the reflection that history has no instance of a nation that has sought its own ruin so directly and so resolutely as Denmark.

THE END.

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